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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What caused the Cold War to end? In the following I examine the puzzle of the 
fast and peaceful conclusion of the bipolar superpower standoff, and point out 
the problems this creates for the study of International Relations (IR). I discuss 
prevailing explanations and point out their gaps, and offer the framework of 
complexity theory as a suitable complement to overcome the blind spots in IR’s 
reductionist methodologies. I argue that uncertainty and unpredictability are 
rooted in an international system that is best viewed as non-linear. My analysis 
of the end of the Cold War proceeds with counterfactual investigations of 
leaders’ foreign policy choices. This helps produce a more fine-grained 
understanding of the manifold, dense interactive causal effects that abound in 
the international arena. I find that various choices made by four key 
international leaders in the 1980s – Ronald Reagan, George Shultz, Mikhail 
Gorbachev and George H. W. Bush – contributed to the rapid and unexpected 
end of the Cold War in various ways. While such leadership effects need to be 
offset against the wider structural context within which politicians operate, it is 
mistaken to exclude individual leaders and their key associates from the study 
of IR. I conclude that deterministic analyses fail to account for the independent 
causal wellspring provided by reflexive, conscious human agency. Complexity 
theory and counterfactuals can help identify the scope and limits of leaders’ 
influence on international affairs.  
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TIMELINE OF EVENTS 
 
1976 
11 March The Soviet Union begins deploying modern SS-20 Intermediate 
Range Ballistic Missiles capable of targeting the capitals of Western Europe, 
sparking a new round of the arms race. 
 
1977 
28 October In London, West Germany’s Social Democratic Chancellor 
Helmut Schmidt calls on NATO to undertake a massive programme of 
nuclear rearmament in response to the growing threat of the Soviet missile 
build-up. 
 
1979 
5 January The heads of state of the West’s ‘Big Four’ – Britain, France, 
Germany, and the United States – meet in Guadeloupe. Among other things, 
they decide that NATO should embark on theatre nuclear force 
modernisation to counter the SS-20 threat, whilst pursuing arms control 
negotiations with the Soviets in parallel. 
 
18 June US President Jimmy Carter and Soviet General Secretary Leonid 
Brezhnev sign the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II accords in Vienna. The 
SALT II accords are never ratified. 
 
12 December NATO takes its Double Track decision, offering the Warsaw 
Pact mutual limits on ballistic nuclear missile levels while simultaneously 
threatening to deploy new US Pershing-II warheads in Western Europe in the 
event no ceilings to missile levels are agreed. 
 
24 December The Soviet Union deploys its 40th Army to Kabul, marking the 
beginning of the Soviet-Afghan War. The USSR will eventually withdraw its 
forces nine years later. 
 
1980  
20 January Among other measures such as trade sanctions, President Carter 
threatens a boycott of the 1980 Summer Olympics due to be held in in 
Moscow unless Soviet troops are withdrawn from Afghanistan. The US and 
64 other countries eventually stay away from the Olympics. 
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4 November Ronald Reagan wins the US presidential election. Having 
accused Jimmy Carter of being “totally oblivious to the Soviet drive for world 
domination” during the campaign, Reagan begins to expand the US defence 
budget by 10%, year-on-year, until 1986.  
 
1981 
30 March 69 days into his Presidency, Reagan narrowly survives a deranged 
assassin’s gunfire outside the Washington Hilton. Reagan is hit in the torso; 
the bullet misses his heart by 25mm.  
 
18 November Reagan proposes the Zero Option as the basis for arms 
negotiations with the Soviet Union: the US will not station new Pershing-II 
missiles in Europe if the USSR removes all its deployed intermediate-range 
nuclear missiles, including the SS-20s. Initially met with derision as an 
unrealistic goal, the Zero Option will become the basis for the Intermediate 
Nuclear Force treaty signed six years later. 
 
13 December Poland’s leader General Jaruzelski announces a state of 
emergency and imposes martial law. Dozens of opposition activists are killed 
and thousands jailed. The crackdown permits the Warsaw Pact to call off 
plans to invade Poland to quell political unrest, an operation which had been 
in the offing since December 1980. 
 
1982 
9 May During a Commencement Address at Reagan’s alma mater, Eureka 
College, the US President announces his intention to kick-start nuclear arms 
reduction talks with the Soviet Union and expresses plans to meet with 
Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev at the United Nations. Reagan sets out a 
standard for engagement with the USSR: “A Soviet leadership devoted to 
improving its people’s lives, rather than expanding its armed conquests, will 
find a sympathetic partner in the West. The West will respond with expanded 
trade and other forms of cooperation.” Nothing becomes of any of these 
initiatives.  
 
5 July Alexander Haig, US Secretary of State, resigns after proving to be 
both an ineffective diplomat-in-chief and following repeated confrontations 
with other senior Administration members. Reagan chooses George Shultz, a 
business executive with a background in academia and government who 
advised Reagan on economic affairs during the presidential campaign, to 
replace Haig. 
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10 November Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of 
the USSR, passes away. The Politburo votes to elect Yuri Andropov, who had 
previously run the Soviet intelligence service KGB for 15 years, as its new 
leader. 
 
1983  
15 February Ronald Reagan meets Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin in 
the White House, a secret meeting arranged by George Shultz. It is Reagan’s 
first business session with a Soviet official. 
 
8 March In a widely covered speech to the National Association of 
Evangelicals, Reagan labels the Soviet Union an ‘evil empire’.  
 
23 March Ronald Reagan proposes the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), a 
colossal research programme aimed at constructing a space-based defense 
system against ballistic nuclear missile attack. It is nicknamed ‘Star Wars’ by 
the press (the third instalment of George Lucas’ franchise is due for release in 
May).  
 
1 September A Soviet fighter jet shoots down Korean Airliner Flight 007 
close to the island of Sakhalin after the civilian airliner strays into Soviet 
airspace due to a navigational error. All 269 passenger and crew on board 
are killed.  
 
2 November NATO begins Able Archer, a ten-day command post war game 
which includes simulated nuclear attacks. Some in the Soviet Politburo fear 
the exercise is a prelude to war; the USSR readies its nuclear forces and 
places air units in Poland and East Germany on alert. 
 
15 December In West Germany, NATO deploys the first of its 572 new 
Pershing-II missiles. Despite an enormous effort by the USSR to scupper it, 
the Dual Track strategy of 1979 is thus implemented. George Shultz later 
deems this the crucial turning point that marked the beginning of the Cold 
War, demonstrating to the USSR firm Allied cohesion behind its strategy of 
collective security.1 
 
 																																																								
1  Shultz (2007), xxiv 
 7 
1984 
16 January Ronald Reagan holds a nationally televised address during which 
he announces a strategy of engaging the USSR in a ‘serious’ dialogue 
seeking ‘areas of constructive cooperation.’ Reagan declares 1984 to be a 
‘year of opportunities for peace’; domestic commentators wryly observe that 
it is also a year of presidential elections. The speech receives little attention 
abroad. 
 
9 February Yuri Andropov passes away, and is replaced as General Secretary 
by Konstantin Chernenko, an ailing apparatchik.    
 
8 May The USSR and 14 other Eastern Bloc nations announce their boycott 
of the 1984 Summer Olympics due to be held in Los Angeles.  
 
24 September Ronald Reagan meets the USSR’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Andrei Gromyko, in New York, his first direct contact with a ranking Soviet 
statesman since he became President.   
 
16 December Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of the UK, meets Mikhail 
Gorbachev (at that point a senior Politburo member seen as a potential 
Chernenko successor) for lunch and discussions at Chequers, the PM’s 
country house retreat, as part of an effort to open up new lines of 
communication with senior Soviet leaders. The meeting is positive, 
prompting Thatcher to remark afterwards that she found herself liking 
Gorbachev and that ‘she can do business with this man.’ 
 
1985 
10 March Konstantin Chernenko is the third Soviet leader to die in office in 
as many years.  He is replaced by Mikhail Gorbachev, who has just turned 54, 
thus becoming the youngest Soviet leader since Joseph Stalin.  
 
19 November Reagan and Gorbachev meet in Geneva for the first US-Soviet 
head of state summit in six years. No concrete results are achieved beyond 
commitments to expand certain diplomatic, commercial and cultural links, 
and an agreement to hold a further two summits.  
 
1986 
26 April A Soviet nuclear power reactor explodes in Chernobyl, Ukraine. It is 
the worst nuclear power plant accident in history in terms of cost and 
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casualties.  Radiation fall-out contaminates the western USSR and Northern 
Europe.  
 
11 October Reagan and Gorbachev meet for a summit in Reykjavik, Iceland. 
After two days of marathon negotiations, the two leaders come close to but 
ultimately do not arrive at an agreement that would eliminate all their 
strategic nuclear weapons by the year 2000. They fail to reach a consensus 
over Reagan’s Star Wars initiative, which Gorbachev wants scuppered but 
Reagan refuses to give up. 
 
1987 
27 January At a Central Committee plenum, Gorbachev gains assent to 
several of his signature proposals for political and economic reform, and 
announces a ‘restructuring’ (‘perestroika’) of Soviet policy.  
 
28 May A West German teenager, Mathias Rust, lands his light aircraft on the 
Red Square after single-handedly flying through more than 750 km of heavily 
defended Soviet airspace in a self-declared ‘peace mission.’ He is promptly 
arrested. Mikhail Gorbachev uses the blunder as a pretext to start the largest 
purge of the Soviet military since Stalin’s time, forcing the Defence Minister, 
the air defence chief, and over 150 officers into retirement. A major obstacle 
to Gorbachev’s reform plans – the military – is thus weakened.  
 
11 November Gorbachev arranges for the dismissal of Boris Yeltsin as 
Moscow party leader, seeing him as a potential rival. Yeltsin had written to 
Gorbachev in autumn urging him to push for deeper reforms and to call out 
the conservative-minded opposition to perestroika and glasnost.  
 
8 December In Washington, DC, Reagan and Gorbachev sign the milestone 
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the Cold War’s first-ever arms 
reduction agreement. The two leaders agree on the complete elimination of 
all mid-range nuclear weapons in Europe, against opposition from 
conservatives at home and abroad.  
 
1988 
14 April The Soviet Union announces its intention to withdraw all its troops 
from Afghanistan by February of 1989. 
  
7 May The Soviet Union’s first anti-Communist party, the Democratic Union, 
is founded in Moscow. 
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29 May Ronald Reagan arrives in Moscow on his first-ever trip to the Soviet 
Union. On the Red Square, he tells interviewers that his description of the 
USSR as an ‘Evil Empire’ refers to ‘another time, another era.’ 
 
4 November George H. W. Bush, who served as Reagan’s Vice President 
since 1980, is elected President of the United States.  
 
7 December Gorbachev gives a speech at the UN General Assembly in New 
York, endorsing the ‘common interests of mankind’ as the basis for Soviet 
foreign policy (rather than the class struggle of yore). The Soviet leader 
surprises the West by announcing the withdrawal of tens of thousands of 
tanks and troops from Eastern Europe, as well as cuts to the Soviet army to 
the tune of 500,000 soldiers. 
 
1989 
4 June Poland’s legislative election is the first popular vote in the Soviet bloc 
and paves the way for the peaceful democratic transition first in that country, 
and soon after in other Warsaw Pact states. On the same day as the Polish 
elections, the Chinese government launches a violent military crackdown on 
democracy protestors on Tiananmen Square, leading to hundreds, if not 
thousands, of civilian deaths.  
 
8 November After a year of major political upheaval across Eastern Europe, 
with increasingly dramatic steps toward the liberalisation of political systems 
across the Warsaw Pact, the Berlin Wall falls unexpectedly. Following months 
of pressure from hundreds of thousands of demonstrators in major East 
German cities, Politburo functionary Günter Schabowski mistakenly 
announces the immediate lifting of all travel restrictions in the country, 
prompting an instant exodus of hundreds of thousands of East Germans. 
 
2 December Gorbachev and Bush hold their first summit meeting in Malta. 
Their personal chemistry leads to frank and wide-ranging talks, which 
reassure Gorbachev that Bush is not fomenting unrest in Eastern Europe, 
while Bush concludes that Gorbachev is genuinely committed to major 
reform. 
 
1990 
11 March Lithuania becomes the first Soviet Republic to declare 
independence, a move not recognised by the Kremlin.    
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29 May Against Gorbachev’s wishes, Boris Yeltsin is elected de facto 
President of the Russian constituent republic of the USSR. Two weeks later, 
Russia declares independence.  
 
30 May Under pressure at home from political developments and a 
deepening economic slump, Gorbachev arrives in Washington, DC for a 
summit meeting. Hoping for favourable terms in a potential US-Soviet trade 
deal, Gorbachev surprises all attendees when he signals his tacit consent for 
a reunified Germany to remain within NATO. 
 
3 October 45 years after the end of World War Two, East and West Germany 
are formally reunified. The most enduring symbol of Cold War division 
disappears on Western terms: reunified Germany remains in NATO. 
 
20 December Soviet Foreign Minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, Gorbachev’s 
closest political ally, stuns his boss by announcing his surprise resignation in 
Parliament. In a dramatic speech, Shevardnadze warns that reformists are 
losing ground and warns: ‘Dictatorship is coming.’ 
 
1991 
31 March The Warsaw Pact is dissolved. 
 
18 August KGB and military hardliners launch a coup against Gorbachev, 
isolating him in his Crimean holiday home and sending troops to secure 
government buildings in Moscow. Their chaotic effort fails within a few days, 
but Gorbachev’s authority is fundamentally weakened when it is Boris Yeltsin 
who takes the decisive stand against the plotters in Moscow.  
 
6 September The Soviet Union announces its recognition of the Baltic States’ 
independence. 
 
1 December In a referendum, more than 90% of Ukrainians vote to declare 
their independence from the Soviet Union.  
 
8 December Russia, Ukraine and Belarus establish the Commonwealth of 
Independent States. 
 
25 December Gorbachev resigns as President of the USSR. The Soviet flag is 
lowered for the last time from the Kremlin and replaced with the Russian 
tricolour. The UN recognises the USSR’s dissolution on 31 December. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
For it is owing to their wonder that men both now begin and at first began to 
philosophise; they wondered originally at the obvious difficulties, then 
advanced little by little and stated difficulties about the greater matters. 
Aristotle 
 
 
The ideal scientist thinks like a poet and only later works like a bookkeeper. 
Edward Osborne Wilson 
 
 
Nothing endures but change. 
Heraclitus 
 
 
 
 
 
26 years ago the Cold War entered its terminal phase. Peaceful 
democratic revolutions swept across Eastern Europe: the Iron Curtain that 
had kept the continent divided for almost half a century was lifted. The 
reunification of East and West Germany in 1990 was a powerful symbol of 
this. East Germany, the most technologically advanced of the Warsaw Pact 
states, had been the crown jewel of the Soviet empire.2 Territorially the 
farthest western outpost of the Soviet bloc, it was the Kremlin’s ‘grand prize’ 
of World War Two.3 Indeed, it was over Germany that Cold War tensions had 
first flared up in Europe in 1948, when Stalin ordered a blockade of all land 
routes to West Berlin, prompting the US, Britain and France to respond with 
the Berlin Airlift. As the US-Soviet relationship descended into antagonism, 
jointly occupied Germany was divided into two separate nations. The Berlin 																																																								
2  On the technological aspect, see Brooks (2005), 115 
3  Brent Scowcroft describes East Germany as the Soviet’s ‘grand prize’ in Maynard, 74 
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Wall, built in 1961, became an emblem of Cold War tensions and the 
enforced partition of Europe. Its fall in 1989 underlined the peaceful power 
shift that took place as Warsaw Pact states transitioned out of the Soviet 
Union’s orbit. Mikhail Gorbachev tolerated regime change in Eastern Europe, 
actively negotiating with Western powers over the reunification of Germany 
and mutual troop reductions across the continent. Meanwhile the constituent 
republics of the Soviet Union became restive as Moscow’s hold over Soviet 
territory weakened throughout 1990. The ideological core of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union was hollowed out by Gorbachev’s increasingly far-
reaching economic and political reforms. Long-repressed nationalist 
sentiments flared up in the USSR’s peripheries in the form of demands for 
autonomy or, in the Baltics, Ukraine, and Central Asia, for outright 
sovereignty. In December 1991, Gorbachev dissolved the terminally 
weakened Soviet Union after 69 years of existence, leaving behind 15 
separate, independent states.  
It was an astonishing conclusion to one of the defining chapters in 
modern history. Within a few decades of the Bolshevik assumption of power 
in 1917, Soviet Russia had transformed itself from an economically and 
socially backward monarchy into a military, industrial and ideological 
superpower that was the geopolitical counterpoint to the democratic-
capitalist Western world. Jack Matlock, US Ambassador to the USSR at the 
time of its collapse, describes his feelings in December 1991: 
 
“I could not explain with confidence just how it had happened. After 
all, the Soviet Union had possessed the largest military machine ever 
assembled on this planet by a single political authority. It had been 
governed by an apparently monolithic party with historically 
unparalleled instruments of compulsion. Tentacles of its elaborate 
bureaucracy had reached into every crevice of its subjects’ lives. How 
could such a state simply have destroyed itself?”4  
 
Anatoly Dobrynin, who served as the USSR’s Ambassador from Presidents 
Kennedy to Reagan, is equally perplexed:  
 
																																																								
4  Matlock (1995), 6 
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“The Soviet Union that Gorbachev inherited in 1985 was a global 
power, perhaps somewhat tarnished in that image, but still strong and 
united and one of the world’s two superpowers. But in just three years, 
from 1989 to 1991, the political frontiers of the European continent 
were effectively rolled eastward from the center of Europe to the 
Russian borders of 1653, those before Russia’s union with the Ukraine. 
How did all this happen?”5 
 
The discipline of International Relations (IR), established in order to 
analyse and understand the dynamics that govern relations between states, 
neither anticipated the end of the Cold War nor could account for its 
peaceful resolution. As Roberts observes, “few political scientists foresaw the 
end of the Cold War,” and “many International Relations specialists got it 
wrong.”6 Kenneth Waltz claimed as late as 1988 that “although its content 
and virulence vary as unit-level forces change and interact, the Cold War 
continues. It is firmly rooted in the structure of postwar international politics, 
and will last as long as that structure endures.”7 The fact that said structure 
disintegrated three years later remains an indictment of the predictive 
abilities of IR theories, particularly neorealism. John Gaddis notes that the 
end of the Cold War was “of such importance that no approach to the study 
of international relations claiming both foresight and competence should 
have failed to see it coming. None actually did so, though, and that fact 
ought to raise questions about the methods we have developed for trying to 
understand world politics.”8 The substance of what happened after 1989 – 
the resolution of the US-Soviet bipolar standoff without great power war – 
was as unpredictable as the sequence of events that ended the Cold War.  
The end of the Cold War was “dramatic, decisive and remarkably peaceful: a 
rapid succession of extraordinary events.”9 
That is not to say that no-one foresaw the possibility of a Soviet 
collapse. In 1946 George Kennan, a diplomat at the US embassy in Moscow, 
penned his famous ‘Long Telegram’ for Secretary of State James Byrnes, 
outlining a strategy of Western containment to address the threat of Soviet 																																																								
5  Dobrynin, 615 
6  Roberts, 518 
7  Waltz (1988), 628 
8  Gaddis (1992), 6 
9  Roberts, 513 
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expansionism. Kennan argued that if the Soviet Union could be prevented 
from expanding it would eventually collapse due to its inherent systemic 
flaws. According to Kennan, Soviet leaders would continue to enjoy 
unchallenged domestic political power for as long as they mastered “the arts 
of despotism.”10 But maintaining internal security, in addition to the stresses 
of a collectivised, top-down economic system, would end up testing the “the 
physical and nervous strength” of the Soviet people.11 Kennan qualified his 
projections by highlighting the unpredictability of the USSR’s political and 
social development. He focused on the constraints that the US could place 
on the Soviet Union in the hope of fostering change within the country, but 
pointed out that violent intervention would be counterproductive. The source 
of Soviet power should not be attacked outright, as it would likely exhaust 
itself internally with time.  
Kennan was enthusiastic about the Marshall Plan, agreeing that the 
large-scale provision of American aid would give Western European states 
less reason to turn to the Soviet Union.12 This reflected his belief that the 
external environment had to be made inhospitable to the spread of Soviet 
power. Kennan suggested a particular factor that could change the Soviet 
political system – its own leadership: “A great uncertainty hangs over the 
political life of the Soviet Union. That is the uncertainty involved in the 
transfer of power from one individual or group of individuals to others.”13 
Though any change to the Soviet system could only come from within, the 
transfer of power to a new generation of leaders would not itself necessarily 
bring the Soviet Union down. Kennan simply raised the possibility that, in 
light of the Soviet Union’s weaknesses, political change introduced by a new 
generation of leaders could one day “shake Soviet power to its 
foundations.”14 But this was not a given. All the West could do was contain 
the USSR and hope its future leaders would change their country once it 
became too weak to compete with the US.  
  This was an astute and nimble prognosis that enmeshed analysis with 
policy. An overly aggressive stance, Kennan reasoned, could strengthen 
Soviet power. Containment, by contrast, would gradually exacerbate Soviet 																																																								
10  Kennan, 576 
11  Ibid, 577 
12  Miscamble, 73 
13  Kennan, 578 
14  Ibid 
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weaknesses over time, until political change became possible. Kennan’s 
prognosis described the interdependence of US foreign policy and the future 
of international affairs: whichever strategy the US pursued would affect the 
trajectory of the Cold War. Hence Kennan suggested levers that would 
manage the conflict gently, not escalate it to military confrontation. Kennan 
lived to see his far-sighted vision become reality. The Cold War ended after 
Mikhail Gorbachev rose to power and became determined to reform a failing 
Soviet Union.15 How could Kennan anticipate this four decades in advance, 
when IR’s social scientists struggled to predict it even in 1988? 
Hugh Trevor-Roper asked a similar question: looking at the field of 
history, which thinkers have seen farthest into the future? His answer is 
intriguing: “Ironically, it is those who have made the least claim to rational 
prophecy: those who, in looking at past history, have admitted the limitations 
of human free-will but have been most careful to reserve its rights, and who, 
in order to leave some room for the operations of the imagination, have 
preferred to pose rather than to answer questions, to wonder rather than to 
explain why.”16  By contrast, predictive social science considers a causal 
explanation to be, in Dray’s words, “a statement of antecedent conditions 
together with certain laws or generalisations,” which permits the “logical 
deduction of the occurrence of what is to be explained.”17 Such analyses 
treat explanation as a matter of showing why things necessarily occurred – 
their arguments are by definition predictive. E. H. Carr embraced this 
philosophy in history, advising his colleagues: “write as if what happened 
was in fact bound to happen, and as if it was [your] business simply to explain 
what happened and why.”18 This ignores that which might have happened, 
but did not. Trevor-Roper explains why this is problematic: “In retrospect, we 
read the signs, select the evidence, and complacently predict what has 
already only too visibly happened. But at the time who foresaw such things, 
or would have believed them if foretold?”19  
																																																								
15  Though the Cold War ended as Kennan had predicted it would, “it was extremely 
difficult to get him to see this. When the Berlin wall finally came down and Germany 
finally reunified, he wrote in his diary that nothing good can come of this.” Gaddis, in 
Economist (2011) 
16  Trevor-Roper, 367 
17  Dray, 47 
18  Cited in Trevor-Roper, 363 
19  Trevor-Roper, 366 
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This thesis is premised on the conviction that the failure to anticipate 
the end of the Cold War throws doubt on the usefulness of prediction in IR. 
The Cold War ended in a mosaic of complexity that overly parsimonious 
forms of causal analysis necessarily obscure. Instead, this thesis advances an 
analysis rooted in the open-ended, non-linear nature of the social world, and 
uses tools drawn from complexity theory in order to analyse why some events 
happened – and others did not.  
  
 
Complexity theory, combined with historical imagination, can add to our 
understanding of the end of the Cold War 
It is well known that the study of IR is divided into various theoretical 
approaches. A 1997 article by Stephen Walt, titled ‘One World, Many 
Theories,’ sets out the case that no single approach can make sense of all the 
complexities that prevail in contemporary world politics. Walt argues that IR 
is better off with a diverse array of competing theoretical traditions instead of 
a single orthodoxy. He uses the then on-going debate about NATO’s 
proposed expansion into Eastern Europe to illustrate this point, presenting 
various theoretical interpretations at the time. 20  Realists viewed NATO 
expansion as a project to further US influence beyond its vital sphere of 
interests, making a harsh response from Moscow likely. Liberals saw it as an 
institutional means of reinforcing Eastern Europe’s burgeoning democratic 
rule and extending collective security to a potentially turbulent region. 
Constructivists stressed the social consequences of integrating countries like 
the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland into the Western security 
community, enlarging the common identity shared by NATO states that has 
made war among them virtually unthinkable. Walt’s point is that competition 
between IR’s paradigms reveals the strengths and weaknesses of various 
theories and spurs refinements in them, all the while revealing flaws in 
conventional wisdom.21 
The NATO example, however, suggests that much of the time these 
theories do not compete with each other. Instead, each presents only a 
narrow empirical canvass. The interpretations made by realists, liberals and 
constructivists all apply to some degree and in some combination: 
separately, however, they do not adequately capture the complexity of an 																																																								
20 Walt (1997), 30 
21  Ibid, 43 
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event like NATO expansion. After all, this simultaneously enlarged the 
European security community to the benefit of the continent (as per 
constructivist thinking), bolstered democratic rule in Eastern Europe and 
enabled the region to grow economically (liberal thinking), and provoked a 
backlash from Moscow that countries like Georgia and Ukraine are currently 
experiencing (realist thinking). The interconnections between the stories 
these different theories tell about world politics are worthy of study in and of 
themselves.  
Walt asks whether the end of the Cold War signalled a qualitative 
change in the nature of world politics – making new research methods 
necessary – or whether it was simply a far-reaching shift in the global balance 
of power.22 A number of points provide evidence for the former. New sources 
of change have gained relevance, including transnational networks of people 
and ideas, social movements, and the proliferation of new media both global 
and local in scope. Snyder makes the case that while the Cold War followed a 
comparatively predictable pattern of political action and reaction, its end was 
characterised by the emergence of more complex relationships in the 
international system.23 Witness only the multiple concurrent dimensions to 
the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989: economic trends, political developments, 
social pressures, and cultural movements all combined in a relatively short 
timeframe to bring about an unanticipated, yet major, shift in the European 
security structure.24  
Parsimonious explanations of such events that rest on too high a 
degree of abstraction do not capture the operation and impact of complex 
dynamics in the international system.25 Just how was the international system 
transformed in the 1980s? The fall of the Soviet Union was the first imperial 
collapse in history that was not accompanied by a great power war.26 The 
destructive potential of nuclear weapons has made such wars less likely; as a 
result, other factors drove international political change in that period. Verba 																																																								
22  For an analysis that does not see the end of the Cold War as a fundamental rupture in 
world order, see Lawson (2010). 
23  Snyder (1993), 4 
24  Garton Ash’s description (2009) is apt: “The essence of 1989 lies in the multiple 
interactions not merely of a single society and party-state, but of many societies and 
states, in a series of interconnected three-dimensional chess games.” See Sarotte (2014) 
for an account that combines all the developments above with historical contingency.  
25  Christensen (1993) 
26  Kissinger (1994), 763  
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lists the easing of great power tensions, the adoption of democratic rule in 
many states, the renegotiation of certain national boundaries, new claims of 
statehood, and demands for human rights.27 Does this suggest that the 
nature of international affairs is changing? 
The international system has evolved considerably since the 19th 
century. Continuous advances in transportation and communications 
technology in the wake of the industrial revolution have ‘shrunk’ the world, 
making the tapestry of international politics denser and the social world more 
tightly intertwined than before. 28 Hannah Arendt described this in the late 
1960s: “For the first time in history, all peoples on earth have a common 
present. […] Every country has become the almost immediate neighbour of 
every other country, and every man feels the shock of events which take 
place at the other end of the globe.”29 Buzan and Lawson argue that the 
industrial revolution massively increased the world’s interaction capacity, 
defined as “the ability to move people, goods, information, money and 
military power around the [international] system.”30 The interactive potential 
of people and networks of people has become thicker, across a wider range 
of more inter-connected societies. Most recently, the digital communications 
revolution created an entirely new domain in the international system – 
cyberspace, an arena with its own peculiar dynamics whose effects on global 
politics we are only beginning to understand.31  
The world’s growing interconnectivity has given rise to unpredictable 
sources of political turbulence that are hard to anticipate. The rise of the 
Islamic State from small terrorist group to transnational military network 
provides a potent example of this. Spawned as an unintended consequence 
of the US administration of post-invasion Iraq, ISIS grew in the wake of the 
anti-Assad uprising in Syria and the fragile state of governance in Iraq.32 The 
group deftly exploits the organisational resources available to social 
movements in the digital age. Its incubation was decentralised: lacking 
access to traditional mobilisation channels, ISIS instead projects a successful 																																																								
27  Cited in Snyder (1993), 3 
28  Buzan & Lawson (2015) 
29  Arendt, 83  
30  Buzan & Lawson (2014), 448 
31  See, for example, Reveron (2012) 
32   The US involuntarily gestated a new generation of hardened Islamist agitators, including 
the eventual founder and leader of ISIS, in the sprawling prison complex of Camp Bucca 
outside Baghdad. See, for instance, McCants (2015), or Chulov (2014). 
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propaganda narrative that directly targets and recruits disenchanted Muslims 
in both the Middle East and the West.33 Within a brief timespan this loose 
grouping of violent extremists mobilised itself into a formidable military actor 
in the Arab world, one that grew in the shadows and was registered only 
once it began to wield power. If rapidly emerging phenomena such as ISIS 
are a sign of a more unpredictable era of world politics to come, then IR 
needs to be primed for an age of turmoil. This requires the development of 
tools of analysis appropriate for a more complex world.  
Stephen Walt accepts that “realism and liberalism both failed to 
anticipate the end of the Cold War and had some trouble explaining it.” 
Moreover, he concurs that “we live in an era where old norms are being 
challenged, once clear boundaries are dissolving [and] issues of identity are 
becoming more salient.”34 In this thesis I make the case that we ought to 
break down the silos between IR’s theoretical stories and study how the 
causes and processes highlighted by each interact with one another. I 
subsume this approach to IR under the mantle of complexity theory, and use 
its principal analytical tools to study the end of the Cold War in the hope of 
making sense of the twilight of an old and the dawn of a new era. 
 
 
Complexity theory addresses the gaps in predictive social science 
Predictive social science is underpinned by a methodological axiom 
that sees its purpose as the discovery and explanation of regularities in the 
social world.35 In IR, such approaches seek to specify and isolate certain linear 
causal links in the international system, test the strength of these cause-effect 
connections repeatedly, and use the results to form generalised rules that 
apply across the system. 36 Such explanations require a strong degree of 
simplification. This comes at a cost. At worst, simplified causal connections 
are so general as to be insufficiently informative, or so conditional as to not 
																																																								
33  For an account of ISIS’ recruitment methods, see Erelle (2015) 
34 Walt (1997), 42 
35  “Prediction, which presumes the acceptance of regularity-deterministic assumptions, is 
widely accepted as a legitimate goal of social scientific inquiry.“ Kurki (2008), 68. 
Schweller, for instance, asserts: “The more predictions a theory generates, the more tests 
we can construct to evaluate it.” (1998), 11. On prediction in the social sciences, see 
Kincaid (1996); Rescher (1998). See also footnote 115 on p.  31 and fn 178 on p. 42.  
36  Walt (1999) 
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be general.37 Prediction, far from being the hallmark of social science, can act 
as a red herring. 38  
After the end of the Cold War many neorealists engaged in a game of 
retroactive prediction, crafting artful post-hoc accounts to demonstrate that 
peaceful Soviet retrenchment was the likeliest conclusion of the conflict: it 
could have been predicted had the necessary information (such as the scale 
of the USSR’s economic troubles in the 1980s) been available.39 By contrast, 
studying the trajectory of change in the 1980s through the lens of complexity 
theory suggests that how events play out in the international system is open-
ended, not pre-determined. The end of the Cold War was inherently 
unpredictable because it could have unfolded in many different ways.  
Kurzman, writing about the 1979 revolution in Iran, argues that social 
science ought to incorporate unpredictability into its explanations.40 He takes 
issue with Theda Skocpol’s influential theory on the causes of revolutions41 
and instead maintains that such uprisings are sudden, unpredictable 
breaches of routine social practices which shatter the ‘rules of the game’ that 
had hitherto been in place. Social preferences shift abruptly, and new options 
emerge. Skocpol’s argument – that state collapse opens the door to the 
expression of popular discontent and produces revolutions – begs the 
question of why this only occurs in some instances, not in all (such as the 
Iranian revolution, as Kurzman demonstrates). Ellman and Kontorovich make 
an analogous point regarding the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 
1918: to say, simply, that a multinational empire was not viable in a world of 
nationalism does little to explain Austria-Hungary’s collapse in 1918, since 
this was also true of Austria-Hungary in 1908.42 For a full account, further 
explanations are required that link such simplified (and not necessarily wrong) 
causal narratives with other processes (in the case of Austria-Hungary, its 
defeat in WW1, as Ellman and Kontorovich argue).  
																																																								
37  Hawthorn, 160 
38  Kurzman (2004) 
39  Brooks and Wohlforth, for example, assert: “Rather than being simply one of many 
equally probable responses to Soviet material decline, retrenchment was the most likely 
one.” (2002), 99 
40  Kurzman, 8 
41  Her point being, “an adequate understanding of social revolutions requires that the 
analyst takes a nonvoluntarist, structural perspective on their causes and processes.” 
Skocpol, 14 
42  Ellman and Kontorovich, 5  
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The main trouble with existing theoretical accounts of the end of the 
Cold War is not that they are false: they are incomplete. Realists are right that 
economic weakness gradually worsened the Soviet position; liberals are 
correct that the Soviet system struggled to keep up with its Western 
competitor on many social and political fronts; and it is true, as constructivists 
point out, that fundamental social and ideational developments were 
underway in the civil societies of both East and West which challenged 
established political, social and cultural practices. Arguing that one theory 
has greater explanatory purchase than another, therefore, is a quixotic 
enterprise: the various causal elements in the Cold War’s end are too 
intertwined for their different cause-effect sequences to be isolated and 
ranked. Instead, complexity theory can shed light on the links between 
concurrent causal dynamics in the international system. 
In 1982 eight scientists, most of them based at the Los Alamos 
national nuclear laboratory in New Mexico, founded the Santa Fe Institute, a 
research centre dedicated to the study of complexity. Andrei Kolmogorov, a 
Soviet mathematician, provides an understandable definition of ‘complexity’: 
the length of the shortest description of an object.43 For example, irrational 
numbers – those that cannot be written out as fractions – are complex 
because they are not reproducible through a reductive, simplifying formula. 
Similarly, a complex system is one with organisationally non-reducible 
properties.44 Such systems have three characteristics: they are non-linear (that 
is, such systems evolve in a convoluted manner), interaction effects abound 
(units in the system continuously affect each other’s behaviour), and 
‘emergence’ reigns. Emergent phenomena arise from within a system 
through the contingent combination of separate causal events, taking on a 
life of their own by interacting with the system as a whole and reverberating 
within it.45 Durkheim describes the phenomenon of emergence thus: “when 
certain elements combine and thereby produce, by the fact of their 
combination, new phenomena, these new phenomena reside not only on the 
																																																								
43  Gerovitch (2013) 
44  Stewart, 367. Herbert Simon defines a complex system as one in which, “given the 
properties of the parts and the laws of their interaction, it is not a trivial matter to infer 
the properties of the whole.” (1981 [1969]), 195 
45  For instance, traffic jams without a seeming cause (i.e., not due to roadworks or other 
obstructions) are emergent phenomena (Sugiyama et al), as are the movements of flocks 
of birds and school of fish (Cucker and Smale), or ant colonies (Gordon).  
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original elements but in the totality formed by their interaction.” 46 
Emergence is not the same as chaos, which entails root unpredictability.47 
Complex systems are situated on a spectrum that ranges between complete 
order and complete chaos: complexity theory tells us what types of systems 
tend to exhibit complicated, self-organising behaviour, and where on the 
spectrum of order and chaos such systems live.48  
Theories seek to identify and understand the crucial causes that shape 
outcomes.49 Complexity theory does this by teasing out how interactive 
causal effects combine to produce dynamics in systems and shape events.50 
Its tools of analysis can increase our understanding of how complexity 
operates in the social world. The concept of emergence is key: complex 
systems exhibit behaviours and tendencies that transcend its components.51 
This is what is meant by the expression ‘the whole is greater than the sum of 
its parts.’ Reducing a complex system to its various parts does not clarify how 
it works: the interactions between these parts create outcomes in the system. 
An emergent phenomenon is contingent across a range of events, it is not 
produced by single events, but by multiple events acting in conjunction. As a 
whole, complex systems move in a non-linear fashion, i.e. not through step-
by-step cause and effect chains.52 	
Applying this to political analysis yields interesting implications. A 
complex system is not fundamentally chaotic, so it is possible to make 
forecasts of it: by sketching out various dynamic causal scenarios, and 
highlighting the conditions under which such competing trajectories become 																																																								
46  Durkheim (1982 [1985]) 
47  Johnson, 39 
48  Stewart, 370 
49  “Theory is invaluable for many reasons. Because the world is infinitely complex, we need 
mental maps to identify what is important in different domains of human activity. In 
particular, we need theories to identify the causal mechanisms that explain recurring 
behavior and how they relate to each other.” Mearsheimer and Walt, 430 
50  In the social sciences, complexity theory is an approach rather than a theory that purports 
to explain everything. See Bunge, 265 
51  Stewart, 367. Weaver (1948) distinguishes between disorganised complexity – many 
variables, each with erratic behaviour, such as the behaviour of gas molecules in a 
container – and organised complexity – “a sizeable number of factors which are 
interrelated into an organic whole.” The ‘organisation’ of the latter is brought about by 
emergence. Whereas disorganised complexity is susceptible to statistical analysis, the 
interrelationships of variables in systems of organised complexity cannot be understood 
fully using statistics. Snyder (1993) and other authors in that volume argue that the 
interstate sphere is an organised complexity. 
52  See Simon, Chapter 7  
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reality.53 Such forecasts can be updated on the basis of actual events, as 
information and knowledge of a system accumulates.54 In a sense, Kennan 
practised a variant of this style of analysis in 1946.55 Forecasts integrate 
uncertainty (Kennan emphasised the unpredictability that characterised the 
Soviet Union’s future development) and conditionality (Kennan pointed to 
Soviet domestic political processes as a potential future source of change). 
Forecasts differ from predictions that construct calculated, stylised punts 
based on a theory’s underlying parsimonious base. 56  Precise, empirical 
predictions are not useful tools to analyse open-ended, non-linear complex 
systems like world politics.57 Numerous outcomes are possible in complex 
systems due to the dynamic interaction of multiple causes: the route charted 
by such systems is driven by the behaviour of the goal-oriented actors and 
units within it, who are moved by their own incentives and calculations.58 The 
interactions between actors in a system give rise to emergent structural 
effects, and these effects in turn shape the behaviour of actors. Patterns 
across a complex system, then, are formed interactively.  
The on-going interactions of units can be difficult to track, making 
system-wide predictions unsound (though certain types of local interaction 
are susceptible to forecasting).59 It is a challenge to link the intentions and 
behaviour of actors to results and outcomes in a complex system. These 
systems do not operate on the basis of repeated regularities and linear 
causal movements. Instead, they evolve in a non-linear manner, brought 
about not by the simple addition of various causal elements, but through 
their interaction. Stock markets, for example, are populated by individuals 
and institutions who pursue private incentives, accessing and interpreting 																																																								
53  For a description of such conditional forecasts, see Lebow (2000), 613 
54  Johnson, 91. This approach rests on the concept of Bayesian reasoning, see Silver (2012), 
pp. 240-250  
55  Gaddis disagrees; he finds Kennan’s observations ‘vague’ and ‘impressionistic’. (1992), 
57 
56  ”A forecast is a statement about unknown phenomena based upon known or accepted 
generalizations and uncertain conditions (‘partial unknowns’), whereas a prediction 
involves the linkage of known or accepted generalizations with certain conditions 
(knowns) to yield a statement about unknown phenomena.” Freeman and Job, 117. 
Forecasts are non-deterministic probabilistic statements: ”if A, then (probably) B.” See 
Gaddis (1992), 6 
57  Lebow (2011) 
58  This makes local prediction in complex systems possible, such as that a rise in the price 
of a good will most likely reduce its demand.  
59  See Jervis (1997), 12-17 
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information to guide their decision-making. They interact with each other in 
the process by purchasing and selling stocks. These actions affect stock 
prices, which prompts new behaviour by participants, leading to new 
interactions between them that in turn produce further changes in the 
market, and so forth. Certain local trends can at times be forecast, like the 
prospects of particular industries or companies. However, stock markets as a 
whole exhibit complex behaviour, making aggregate price movements 
unpredictable.60 Predictive parsimonious theories are limited in their ability to 
generate knowledge about outcomes in complex systems. 
 
 
Complexity theory allows for a novel take on the study of leadership in IR 
Leaders are critical nodes in international affairs because they are 
choice-producing units: when faced with the need for action they select 
certain policies over others. These policies interact with the international 
system, producing both intended and unintended effects that leaders 
respond to through further choices. This iterative process can end up 
changing the very fabric of international relations, as happened in the 1980s. 
Political leaders are one set of causal linchpins in the international system. 
When they make choices it provides us with counterfactuals in the form of 
alternative decisions that could have been taken. Such ‘What If’ questions 
allow us to explore causal interconnections in complex systems.  
A good example of this is the ‘Shultz-Clark’ showdown of March 1983, 
presented in detail in Chapter Four. When Reagan’s Secretary of State 
George Shultz began to press the President for deeper engagement with the 
Soviet Union, National Security Advisor William Clark and other hardliners 
pushed back and argued for a tougher line. The dispute culminated in an 
Oval Office meeting in March 1983 during which Reagan opted to side with 
Shultz. 61  Reagan authorised the preparation of a strategy of diplomatic 
engagement with a view to reducing Cold War tensions. His decision 
produced a series of ripple effects (e.g. the appointment of Jack Matlock on 
the NSC, a diplomat and Sovietologist whose thinking was closely aligned 
with Shultz’s). 62  Had Reagan sided with Clark, Shultz’s influence on the 
Administration’s Soviet strategy would have decreased relative to that of the 																																																								
60  Johnson, 113 
61  See Wilson, 73-74 
62  Matlock (2004), x 
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hardliners, making any eventual rapprochement with the Soviets that much 
harder to envisage. Gorbachev, upon coming to office in 1985, would not 
have found as willing and prepared a diplomatic partner in Reagan with 
backing from key aides. This would have made the dramatic moderation in 
Soviet foreign policy between 1985 and 1989 less likely: the budding trust 
that underpinned nuclear arms reduction and the concomitant reduction in 
US-Soviet tensions had its origins in the repeated high-level interactions 
between Reagan and Gorbachev.63 Gorbachev needed to point to progress 
in these talks to convince his own hardliners that the US was no longer an 
implacable foe.64 The analysis in Chapter Four suggests that Reagan’s March 
1983 decision to endorse Shultz’s strategy opened a causal channel of 
consequence in the complex maelstrom of US-Soviet relations in the 1980s. 
The chapter highlights the diffuse causal influence of leaders (i.e. the signals 
Reagan sent in 1983 to the USSR that he was ready to engage, signals that 
had no immediate impact, but without which relations would have struggled 
to improve rapidly from 1986 onwards)65  as they interact with systemic 
developments (Gorbachev’s desire to reduce tensions with the US was driven 
by the aim of reducing the pressures of the arms race on the Soviet Union)66 
and wider matters of timing (the fact that in Reagan and Gorbachev, two 
leaders came together who developed an effective personal chemistry that 
allowed them to pursue rapprochement against the advice of reactionary 
thinkers in their respective cabinets).67 Counterfactual analyses of decision-
making improve our understanding of complex interactive effects between 
leaders, policy choices, and outcomes; between leaders and their own staff; 
and between leaders and other leaders.68  
During an interview, Brent Scowcroft, who was National Security 
Advisor to George H. W. Bush, expressed unease over how poorly such 
interaction effects are understood, stressing this especially in regard to how 
leaders engage with their cabinet, and how cabinet members interact with 																																																								
63  See, for instance, Greenstein (1998) 
64  Larson, 190-234 
65  See Fischer (1997) 
66  Bessmertnykh comments: “Gorbachev wanted to go on with the reforms and the 
continued arms race, and especially the nuclear area, was a tremendous hindrance to the 
future of those reforms.” Cited in Kagan (2000), 21. Chernyaev also stresses this point 
repeatedly (2000 [1993]).  
67  See, for instance, Breslauer and Lebow (2004) 
68  Lebow (2010), 103-136 
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each other. 69  Many IR theorists are reluctant to integrate the study of 
decision-makers and their interactions into analyses of international affairs.70 
Remarks at a panel discussion during the 2015 annual convention of the 
International Studies Association help explain why: John Mearsheimer 
commented that an important tool open to leaders in the international arena 
– arms control agreements – are of little interest to IR.71 He argued that such 
agreements inevitably reflect the balance of power, only affect weapons that 
states do not care much about anyway, and are formed solely because they 
are in the interests of the states that sign them. This reflects the reductionism 
that prevails in Mearsheimer’s (influential) theoretical analyses of IR.72 In 
actual fact, such treaties are the product of intense diplomatic negotiations 
whose outcome is rarely foreordained. Leaders may lack the desire or 
political will to engage in such negotiations. Different leaders may diverge in 
their evaluation of what constitutes their own and their state’s best interests. 
Leaders must decide to open up negotiations, and must then oversee the 
process and bring it to a successful conclusion. None of these are 
straightforward, unitary decisions that all politicians would handle in the same 
manner. Such talks are complex affairs, and they divide political opinion, as 
demonstrated most recently by the Iranian nuclear talks that concluded in 
Vienna in 2015.73  
Different leaders and the various circumstances in which they find 
themselves can change the outcome of such negotiations – even whether or 
not they take place. This, then, is one straightforward effect of leadership on 
the evolution of the international system.74 Unless we take the intuitively 
unsatisfactory approach that any leader faced with a negotiation scenario 
would act in an identical manner, it seems clear that leaders have some 
causal influence on international affairs. While individual agency should not 
be prioritised over other important drivers of events – like the wider context 
in which decision-makers operate, the incentives they face, and the 
international position of the country they represent75 – bracketing leaders out 																																																								
69  Personal interview; 14 October 2014. 
70  For good reason: this is difficult to accomplish in a meaningful manner; see Jervis (2013) 
71  Mearsheimer (2015) 
72  See Snyder (2002) for a broad-ranging critique of Mearsheimer’s analyses of IR. 
73  Contrast the varying verdicts offered by Kissinger and Shultz (2015), Haass (2015), and 
Mogherini (2015). 
74  See Nye (2013), who also applies this argument to the domestic politics. 
75  Jervis (2013) 
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as mere pawns of bigger structural forces brings about a grainy 
understanding of international affairs. When are leaders beholden to wider 
dynamics, and when do they have leeway to shape those dynamics?76 This 
study aims to provide a firmer grasp on how leaders influence international 
affairs and the limits of their influence. That, in turn, contributes to a more a 
fine-grained, nuanced understanding of inter-related events and dynamics in 
the modern international system.  
 
 
We need to understand the ways in which leadership can introduce original 
impulses of change into the international system 
An additional reason why political decision-making should form an 
integral part of studying IR relates to the problem of determinism, specifically 
the social scientific approach it generated: this views its purpose as 
uncovering law-like generalisations in human relations. 77  The project of 
causally reductionist science was given a decisive boost by Isaac Newton’s 
feat of reducing all motion in the universe to three laws.78	On the basis of 
these laws astronomers have computed planetary movements in the solar 
system for 200 million years into the future.79 The success of this line of 
research, and the insights into the natural world it made possible in the 
centuries after Newton’s discoveries nailed a plank to the scientific method: 
the notion that the universe we inhabit, and thus our world, is fundamentally 
predictable, provided we can reduce phenomena to their correct causal 
basis. In the 20th century, disciplines like economics, political science and to 
some degree IR have attempted to extract the operational laws of the human 
world through similar reductive thinking. The basic appeal of that approach is 
clear. Abstraction and generality in science suggest a comforting sense of 
stability and continuity in a world that our sensory experiences suggest is 																																																								
76  Greenstein (1992) 
77  For an example of this methodology, see King, Keohane and Verba (1994); for a critical 
examination, see the symposium in the American Political Science Review 89:2 (June 
1995). 
78  Howard Brody, a physicist, has pointed out that these laws make for a good summary of 
the game of tennis: 1. An object in a state of uniform motion will remain in that motion 
unless it encounters an external force 2. Force equals mass times acceleration 3. For 
every action there is an equal and opposite reaction (unless the ball goes out). The 
Economist (2015) 
79  Stewart, 11. Lakatos (1973) calls Newton’s laws of planetary motion “the most powerful 
theory science has yet produced.”  
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disorderly and chaotic.80 Robert Shiller explains it thus: “Theorists like models 
with order, harmony and beauty […] People in ambiguous situations will 
focus on the person who has the most coherent model.” 81  Moreover, 
predictive methodologies have brought about tremendous successes in the 
natural sciences, through which humans have discovered truths in the 
physical world and harnessed them, making major advances in science and 
medicine possible. These methodologies assume that theories need to 
predict, and should be subject to testing and falsification.82		
Prediction implies determinism, as it presupposes causal links between 
present and future which are for us to uncover. To what extent, then, is the 
world predetermined by natural ordering principles? Pierre de Laplace, a 
French mathematician in the 19th century, took determinism to its logical 
conclusion:	
 
“An intellect which at any given moment knew all the forces that 
animate nature and the mutual positions of the beings that comprise 
it, if this intellect were vast enough to submit its data to analysis, could 
condense into a single formula the movement of the greatest bodies 
of the universe and that of the lightest atom: for such an intellect 
nothing could be uncertain, and the future just like the past would be 
present before his eyes.”83 
 
To the extent that humans are powered by natural forces, we too are subject 
to the laws of nature, and as such it should be possible, in theory, to uncover 
law-like regularities that govern human relations. But other than 
generalisations relating to material matters, such as ‘for any good, people 
tend to want more, not less’, we cannot project on all agents a deterministic 
psychology that captures all practical deliberation in a realistic manner.84 The 
human mind is too idiosyncratic. People are reflexive, thinking beings; 
molecules do not share this trait. As Stanley Hoffman points out, humans are 																																																								
80  Hawthorn, 181 
81  Cited in Coggan (2015)  
82  Consider Stephen Hawking’s description: “A theory is a good theory if it satisfies two 
requirements: It must accurately describe a large class of observations on the basis of a 
model that contains only a few arbitrary elements, and it must make definite predictions 
about the results of future observations.” (1998), 10 
83  Cited in Sarewitz et al (2000) 
84  Hawthorn, 185 
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not “gases or pistons:” our movement and behaviour is subject to internal 
sources of decision-making.85 Chemistry, too, would struggle to predict the 
motion and behaviour of molecules if they possessed minds of their own.86 
Reductionist social science attempts to deal with the problem of 
individuality by assigning generalised rules to human behaviour, such as 
utility maximisation, or rational agency. It is true that humans behave in 
consistent enough ways for us to make accurate generalisations such as, 
‘politicians are motivated by their desire to stay in office.’87 What’s more, 
human cognition does not escape the determinism of the natural world; our 
minds are shaped by all kinds of molecular phenomena, like basic biological 
drives, our brain chemistry, hormonal make-up, and so forth. But the notion 
that the mind is entirely reducible to predictable natural processes sits 
uneasily with our intuitive experience as free autonomous individuals. Natural 
laws may constrain us, but as Kant argued, humans can see themselves and 
others from outside as well as from inside, through the use of reason.88 
Hawthorn points out that we are distinct as creatures in our capacity to seek 
to know ourselves, to grasp universals, to sustain relations to the inexistent, 
to use language, to act freely, and to become part of social groups.89 
Humans can reflect on their self-conceptions and change them if they so 
choose. This should form part of our analyses of why people do what they 
do. It may well be possible that consciousness is ultimately reducible to 
natural, deterministic processes. But if it is not, as I argue, then consciousness 
can be a source of independent thought that gives relations between 
humans a self-defining, if not a self-creating quality.90  
I try to show in my thesis that individuals can act as unique causal 
influences in shaping the course of history. As Lebow puts it, “structural 
change may be the product, not the cause, of behaviour,” the opposite of 
																																																								
85  Hoffman (1959), 366 
86  Gaddis (1992), 51 
87  See de Mesquita (2011) 
88  For further elaboration on Kant’s stance regarding internal vs. external reasons for action 
and its connection to reason, see Wood (1999). 
89  Hawthorn, 176 
90  Take, for instance, Albert Hirschman’s analysis (1991) of the idea of ‘civil rights’ and its 
spread since being unleashed by the thinkers of the American and French Revolutions, 
producing waves of political action and reaction across the Western world throughout 
the next two centuries, though arching overall towards progressively more liberal social 
relations in the West.  
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what most structural theories of IR contend.91 People think and act differently 
depending on their dispositions, abilities and states of mind. Character 
matters: when a leader is confronted with alternative choices that cannot be 
ranked according to some kind of clearly definable payoff, the driving force 
behind whichever path is selected is what the individual tasked with the 
choice argues is the right path of action. Such choices are in no small part 
influenced by the interacting teams of advisors that leaders rely upon. Other 
leaders, reyling on other other advisors, may reach different decisions. For 
that reason, Watkins argues that ‘personalities’ have influence on history.92 
Collingwood believes that individuals can change their dispositions by an 
exercise of free will, arguing that what politicians are trying to accomplish 
forms an important part of the analysis of history.93 
In fact, this recognition is one of the defining operational pillars of 
democratic rule: it matters whom the citizenry elects to power, because the 
candidates will perform differently in office. Through their temperament and 
their choices relating to personnel and policy, political leaders can affect the 
course of history. They are subject to external, identifiable and reducible 
constraints, some of which are natural, others economic or social. I maintain 
that in addition to such structural drivers, free will also forms part of our 
being: consciousness and self-reflection are essential qualities of human 
decision-making, and this makes individuals unique. This thesis exhibits a 
strong interest in the causal force of the key actors involved in the end of the 
Cold War. Why did they select certain policies, how did they relate to other 
important decision-makers, how did they make sense of a changing 
international system, and what effect did all this have on the course of 
events?  
 
 
The analysis of causal complexity is aided by counterfactual thinking 
The ensuing study examines, in the context of the end of the Cold 
War, how leaders interact within a complex international political system 
filled with dense, multi-layered causal channels that connect structures (such 
as ideology, norms, economics), contingencies (events that occur because 
they fortuitously overlap with certain other events), and leaders’ choices. 																																																								
91  Lebow (2000), 616 
92  Dray (1980), 48 
93  Dray (1995) 
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Causal explanations describe relations between events and actuality. 94 
Humans, by virtue of their reflexivity, can influence and direct some events, 
thus giving them the power to create new situations. 95 As my research shows, 
leaders are far from omnipotent and subject to limitations – big, system-wide 
forces; their own cognition; the wider possibilities of nature. But it is a 
mistake to exclude political leaders from the study of international relations. 
Without Reagan, Bush and Gorbachev, the end of the Cold War would have 
unfolded differently. Ronald Reagan was the first President who outlined a 
vision for transcending US-Soviet hostilities and acted upon it. Mikhail 
Gorbachev stands as one of the only leaders of a major power to explicitly 
reject violence as means of preventing a precipitous loss in state power.96 
George Bush handled the liberation of Eastern Europe diligently, treading 
softly to encourage the reunification of Germany within NATO – something 
The Economist viewed, as late as November 1989, as a highly unlikely 
outcome – without antagonising the USSR in the process, convincing 
Gorbachev that the US was not exploiting its weakening position.97  
This thesis describes all of the above with the aid of counterfactual 
arguments: I explore how alternative decisions could have swayed events, 
using counterfactuals to highlight causal pathways for change. This yields a 
more fine-tuned understanding of how the international system was 
transformed in the 1980s. Counterfactuals – which involve speculating how 
world history would be different if some aspect of it is changed – inevitably 
provoke arguments about the permissibility of considering alternative 
histories as legitimate options, rather than as abstract ‘What Ifs’ that never 
took place and therefore have no bearing on empirical analysis. The aim is to 
convince the reader that particular ‘What Ifs’ contribute constructively to our 
understanding of international affairs. Understanding, qua Hawthorn, starts 
and ends with our experience of the actual. The actual, as this thesis tries to 
demonstrate, turns on what is causally and practically possible: what is actual 
																																																								
94  Hawthorn, 172 
95  See ibid, 172 (esp. fn 9) for an overview of the literature regarding links between causal 
relations (between events and realities) and interpretive explanations of self-defining 
relations in the realm of human thought. 
96  Lévesque (2004, 139) regards Gorbachev’s refusal to use force directly or indirectly to 
maintain the Soviet hold over Eastern Europe as “the most remarkable departure from 
Leninism in the Gorbachev years.”  
97  The Economist (1989) 
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depends on what else could have become actual.98 Laplace’s vision of a fully 
determinable world is not possible if the social world humans inhabit is at 
least partially malleable through our choices. Predictive theories stumble at 
the potential for humans to act independently of social laws, to innovate, 
dream, think, and decide. It is no surprise that creativity has been such a 
powerful force in shaping human history – and creativity is by definition 
unpredictable.  
 
 
The evolution of complex systems cannot be predicted 
Reductionist science has shed light on powerful causal dynamics in the 
social sphere: economics has advanced our understanding of production and 
consumption systems in a world of scarce resources; psychology has 
generated insights into how we think; political science has revealed 
knowledge concerning how politicians and parties seek and wield power, as 
well as how citizens form opinions and select their leaders.99 But as the failure 
to anticipate the end of the Cold War shows, social science struggles to 
come up with practically useful macro-predictions. There are limits to the 
usefulness of the reductionist model of knowledge generation. Hawthorn 
argues that “theory and method protect us from disorder and disarray, but 
what once gave consolation now confines.”100 Once we embrace complexity, 
the only generalisability left is unpredictability. History unfolds according to 
Runciman’s description, as a sequence that is, “no less than natural selection, 
both random in its origins and indeterminate in its outcome.”101 Successful 
institutions and ideologies will prove themselves adaptable (adaptation 
being one of the means through which units inside a complex system evolve). 
But we cannot know how or in what direction this evolution takes place, 
because multiple directions are open in the future, and humans can partially 
influence what direction to take. The best we can do is forecast what 
																																																								
98  Hawthorn, 164-166 
99  For examples of powerful insights from economics, psychology, and political science, 
respectively, see Levitt and Dubner (2005), Kahneman (2011) and de Mesquita and Smith 
(2011) 
100  Hawthorn, 181 
101  Runciman, 449. Interestingly, he refers to he end-product as “the most complex patterns 
of structure,” namely, “an intense, unremitting, and all too often violent competition for 
power between rival armies, classes and creeds.” 
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alternative paths are open in future, and how our choices can bring certain 
paths about vis-à-vis others, as Kennan did in 1946.  
The research undertaken here aims to be of practical as well as 
intellectual use. The gap between IR as a discipline and the policymaking 
world exists in part because IR’s abstract generalisations are of little 
relevance to those confronting everyday policy dilemmas.102 Bernard Williams 
argues that for a theory to be of practical use it has to give the agents for 
whom it is intended reasons that they recognise as reasons for themselves.103 
This does not mean disavowing theory, which is “the lodestone in the field of 
International Relations.”104 Theories try to explain the world, so a theory of IR 
that is practically relevant helps anyone with an interest in politics and 
society. ‘What If’ questions form an integral part of this project: when applied 
to the past they can suggest important causal mechanisms in a complex 
international system.  
Understanding causation empowers. Causes are the levers that 
change the world.105 Some causes we are beholden to, others we have 
influence over and can deliberately pursue or avoid. Studying the role of 
leaders in shaping history matters to all who wonder how they as individuals 
can act in a complex world to create change, what constraints they face, 
when to pursue a vision in the hope of making it a reality, and when to yield 
to bigger systemic forces, or better yet, how to harness those forces 
optimally and productively to bring about change for the better (something 
Gorbachev in the end failed to achieve).  
 
 
The structure of the study  
The thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter One discusses the theoretical 
debates behind causal analysis in IR, presents complexity theory in more 
detail, and describes the role of counterfactual thinking in the analysis. 																																																								
102  See Sagan (2014) 
103  Williams, 101-13 
104  Mearsheimer and Walt, 428 
105  All the more frustrating that harnessing them in the social sphere has proved an elusive 
endeavour; see Cartwright and Efstathiou (2011). Their conclusion states one of two 
scenarios: either a) “our elaborate methods for testing are neither necessary nor sufficient 
for claims that give true conclusions about [causal] policy manipulations,” or a more 
optimistic scenario b), “Conclusion 2: There is a lot of work left for philosophy to do: to 
find good, rich theories of causality that support method and use in one fell swoop.” This 
thesis aspires to achieve the latter.  
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Chapter Two offers an overview of the existing IR literature on the end of the 
Cold War. Chapter Three introduces three important concepts of complexity 
theory – nonlinearity, interaction, and emergence – in the context of the late 
1970s and early 1980s, the period just before the Cold War entered its 
endgame. Chapter Four is a counterfactual study of the impact of leadership, 
by contrasting the policies and characters of Reagan’s two Secretaries of 
State. Chapter Five is a study of the origins and consequences of Reagan’s 
decision to engage the Soviet Union before Gorbachev became leader, and 
examines how the Cold War entered a phase of emergent transformation, 
launched and guided by the interactions between Reagan and Gorbachev. 
Chapter Six uses nonlinearity, interaction effects and contingent emergence 
to trace causal links between the evolution of Gorbachev’s reforms, the 
events of 1989, and Bush’s diplomatic approach. 
The aim of the study is to describe more clearly some of the causal 
dynamics in international affairs that parsimonious approaches only cover 
nebulously. One issue with IR theory before the end of the Cold War was that 
it struggled to imagine the conditions in which systemic change would come 
about. But, as Einstein said, “We cannot solve our problems with the same 
thinking we used when we created them.” Complexity theory is attuned to 
the importance of original thinking in politics. The end of the Cold War 
demonstrates this point: Reagan and Gorbachev overcame the deep-seated 
enmity between their two nations only after bold, creative diplomatic 
manoeuvres. Among many other things, it took a concerted act of will – the 
emerging vision of a post-Cold War era – to make this reality happen. As our 
complex world evolves into the future, this thesis aims to contribute to the 
efforts of those who are thinking about how to bring about change in our 
age.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
  
ON CAUSAL ANALYSIS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, COMPLEXITY 
THEORY, AND COUNTERFACTUAL THINKING 
 
 
 
 
You see things; and you say, ‘Why?’ 
But I dream things that never were; 
And I say, ‘Why not?’ 
George Bernard Shaw 
 
 
When you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however 
improbable, must be the truth. 
Arthur Conan Doyle 
 
 
 
 
 
The explanatory powers of established methods for causal analysis in IR are 
limited in scope 
In their 1994 book ‘Designing Social Inquiry,’ Gary King, Robert 
Keohane and Sidney Verba present a unified logic of inference for social 
science. In an effort to save political science and IR from unsystematic 
inquiry, King, Keohane and Verba set out to design a scientific method that 
relies on the construction and testing of hypotheses in order to uncover 
regularities, potentially even laws, which govern the sphere of international 
affairs. Their research seeks to arrive at “valid inferences about social and 
political life.”106 In order for such an approach to make sense, hypotheses 
need to be tested in controlled, replicable experiments. This standard is 
uniquely difficult for IR to meet, since world politics is in effect one giant, on-																																																								
106  King, Keohane and Verba, 3 
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going natural experiment. King, Keohane and Verba’s ‘logic of inference’ 
permits the discovery of correlations, but not the establishment of causes. 
The authors know this: “uncertainty about causal inference will never be 
eliminated.” 107  Combining empirical patterns with a theory presents an 
observed relationship, but says little about the causal link between the data 
and the theory.  
The behaviour under investigation in IR – the subject matter that 
makes up international affairs: events, developments and decisions in the 
realm of foreign relations between states, all of which occur in a dense, 
strategically related web of war, diplomacy, treaties, trade, and social 
relations – exhibits a great degree of malleability. Such phenomena are less 
amenable to prediction on the basis of continually recurring patterns that can 
be deemed ‘law-like regularities.’108 It could be said that wars are to IR what 
recessions are to economics: both are forms of large-scale social upheaval 
that occur repeatedly and frequently, typically go unpredicted by their 
respective disciplines, but are susceptible to rigorous analysis and 
explanation once they occur. In IR, theoretical accounts of war ascribe 
general causes to broad categories like ‘the security dilemma’ or ‘power 
shifts’. 109  But wars originate as instantiations of specific circumstances, 
limiting the efficacy of attempts to find general causes that are common 
denominators to all wars. Nye, reviewing major theories on the origins and 
prevention of major wars, maintains that none of them are predictively 
powerful. That is not necessarily a problem: a good theory gives rise to 
clearly defined implications concerning, for instance, the role of rationality, 
perception and misperception, crises, and power transitions in prompting 
war.110 But Nye warns political scientists not to confuse reductionist theory 
with reality. Law-like generalisations about the causes of war that hold 
universally are hampered by the fact that each war comes about in a distinct 
historical context. General causes – for example, “shifts in the offense-
defense balance which make conquest easier cause war”111 – are hedged on 
so many assumptions as to end up becoming rather particular accounts 
																																																								
107  Ibid, 75 
108  Suganami, 635 
109  See, for instance, Gilpin (1988); Brown et al (2004) 
110  Nye (1988), 12 
111  See van Evera (1984; 1999) 
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themselves.112 It is important to study the origins of wars through a systematic 
search for general causes, but any causal connections found at a general 
level are necessarily stylised abstractions. 
When it comes to the end of the Cold War, the gap between IR's 
scientific ambitions and the empirical reality is particularly acute. Positivist 
science aims to develop theories and hypotheses that do not merely explain, 
but that yield valid and meaningful predictions about phenomena not yet 
observed.113 Such theories are vulnerable to blind spots. Structural realists, 
for instance, perceived the Cold War as a relatively static, rigid bipolar 
structure which could only change at the macro-level of the system, for 
instance through a Great Power war.114 Such theoretical models do not 
capture the possibility that new systemic realities can come about relatively 
rapidly through the practice of international politics. An empiricist theory’s 
worth is judged by its predictive power.115 In this respect, IR’s assessment of 
the end of the Cold War was poor: despite its predictive aspirations, the IR 
community failed to even so much as tentatively suggest an end to the 
conflict when it was already in the process of drawing to a close in the 
1980s.116 The end of the Cold War thus sparked explanatory efforts from 
across the paradigmatic spectrum, with theorists diving deep into the 
conceptual arsenal of their respective analytical approaches to account for 
what had happened, after it happened.117 A post-hoc deterministic account 
of an event – after failing to predict it in the first instance – casts doubt on the 
worth of a methodology that gives rise to such claims.  
																																																								
112  Hawthorn, 161 
113  See Hempel (1965)  
114  Waltz (1988) 
115  Friedman (1953) presents the classic formulation of the argument for instrumentalist 
causal analysis; see also Lakatos (1973) 
116 “Not only did almost nobody in politics or academia predict [the end of the Cold War], 
most forecasts pointed in the opposite direction of what actually happened. And most 
false predictions followed logically from core assumptions of major international relations 
theories.” Grunberg and Risse-Kappen, 105. The end of the Cold War thus constitutes “a 
formidable challenge to international relations theory. Neither realists, liberals, 
institutionalists nor peace researchers recognized beforehand the possibility of such 
momentous change, and they have all been struggling to find explanations consistent 
with their theories.” See Lebow and Risse-Kappen (1995) 
117  See, for example: Brooks and Wohlforth (2004), Waltz (1993) 
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The poor prognostic track record of IR theorists who rely on predictive 
methodologies provokes unease.118 Stephen Walt describes this approach as 
follows: a theoretical model is formulated, dependent and independent 
variables are specified, data pertaining to each variable is obtained, and the 
correlation examined.119 Such research aims to a) test the strength of the 
correlation between two variables and b) establish whether they co-vary in 
the manner predicted by the researcher. Empirical testing leaves the actual 
causal logic of the model untouched – it can only find evidence for or against 
it.120  
 
 
Integrating the causal role of leadership into IR lends itself to thinking in 
terms of complexity theory 
The method of inference described by King, Keohane and Verba rests 
on measuring the causal effect exerted by an explanatory variable on the 
dependent variable.121 This generates systematic, cross-case causal claims. 
Underpinning this methodology is the assumption “that the better the causal 
argument, the better the predictions” it generates.” 122  Kurki describes 
neopositivist causal analysis as the investigation of regularity relations in 
patterns of events. 123 Determinism is inherent in these models of causation, 
which make claims of the form, “given that regularities connect type A and 
type B events, we have the basis for assuming when A, then B.”124 The search 
for regularities across cases in IR requires simplifying assumptions, 
																																																								
118  For example, Mearsheimer (1990) argues that structural neorealism best explains the 
absence of a major power war during the Cold War through its modelling of a bipolar, 
stable world. Consequently, he predicted that following the breakdown of this structure 
and the emergence of a multipolar world, the prospects for inter-state wars would 
increase, particularly in Europe, where the power vacuum left behind by the implosion of 
the USSR would bring intra-European security concerns back to the fore and usher in a 
new period of instability. The perhaps most extraordinary outgrowth of this failed set of 
predictions was Mearsheimer’s advice that “the US should encourage the limited and 
carefully managed proliferation of nuclear weapons in Europe.” Other examples of 
predictive IR work in the aftermath of the Cold War are Snyder (1990), and van Evera 
(1990).  
119 Walt (1999) 
120  Kurki (2006), 96 
121  King, Keohane and Verba, 75 
122  Kurki, 104 
123  Ibid, 46 
124  Ibid, 38 
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particularly concerning the independent influence of human behaviour. 125 
This departure from reality is deliberate: generalisable causes need to strip 
away the particulars from each historical case that are unique to it. When 
different decision-makers are present in the cases under study, they must be 
reduced to a general ‘decision-maker’, for example by including a rational 
actor assumption.126 This generalisation clashes with the possibility that the 
decision-makers involved in each case contributed uniquely to the outcome 
being studied. For instance, neorealist work in IR studies the influence of 
anarchy – the lack of an overarching authority in the international system – on 
patterns of war and peace among states.127 With good reason, these theories 
assume that anarchy engenders fear in the international system: there is no 
world policeman, states are ultimately left to their own devices, and so they 
must protect themselves. Neorealists deliberately reduce the role of 
decision-makers as agents that seek to safeguard their states’ security in all 
cases. 128  Indeed, such assumptions are not limited to IR alone. 
Macroeconomists, like structural realists, have crafted careful models of the 
financial system that rely on the causal forces of structural economic realities, 
with agents in financial systems assumed to maximise their expected utility in 
all cases.129 Richard Thaler quips, “compared to this fictional world of [rational 
agents], humans do a lot of misbehaving, and that means that economic 
models make a lot of bad predictions.”130  
Relying on a general ‘decision-maker’ makes structural causal findings 
incomplete. Humans are not pure automatons. As Lebow argues, decision-
makers “change their goals and their modus operandi in the light of 
experience.”131 This makes humans an unpredictable causal force that cross-
																																																								
125  Lebow (2014), 4 
126  It is worth noting that not all parsimonious theories in IR rely on rationality. Waltz (1986, 
330) is clear that his “theory requires no assumptions of rationality.” Because foreign 
policy is a ‘complicated business,’ “one cannot expect of political leaders the nicely 
calculated decisions that the word ‘rationality’ suggests” Cited in Mearsheimer (2009), 
241. Other structural realists integrate rationality into their models, e.g. Wohlforth (1995), 
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127  See, for instance, Mearsheimer (2003)  
128   “Since neorealist theories focus on external constraints, there is nothing intrinsic to the 
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Elman (1996), 17 
129  Silver (2012), 19-46  
130  Thaler (2015) 
131  Lebow (2014), 5 
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case comparisons, with their reliance on deterministic causal explanation, 
struggle to register.132 Niebuhr explains why:  
 
“The realm of freedom which allows the individual to make his 
decisions within, above and beyond the pressure of causal sequences, 
is beyond the realm of scientific analysis. Furthermore, the 
acknowledgement of its reality introduces an unpredictable and 
incalculable element in the causal sequence. It is therefore 
embarrassing to any scientific scheme. Hence scientific cultures are 
bound to incline to determinism.”133  
 
Niebuhr echoes Collingwood’s point on the indeterminacy of history: “The 
plan which is revealed in history is a plan which does not pre-exist in its own 
revelation.”134 The past affects humans, who change their behaviour on the 
basis of supposed and actual lessons of history.135 People are not passive 
conveyor belts of external causal forces. Leaders come up with evolving 
internal reasons for action, through their individual interpretation of and 
response to external events, such as changes to the balance of power in the 
international system.136  
The search for fixed, law-like causal dynamics thus neglects an 
important, dynamic source of change in international relations: individuals, 
who are able to purposefully adjust their behaviour. “A simple search for 
regularities and lawful relationships among variables – a strategy that has led 
to tremendous successes in the physical sciences – will not explain social 
outcomes,” Almond and Genco argue. This is because “relationships among 
political events are not simply reactive, as are encounters of physical objects. 
They are not amenable to cause-and-effect like ‘clocklike’ models or 
metaphors. This is because the behavioural repertoires of elites and citizens 
are not fixed.”137 And that is why “the production of knowledge is itself also 																																																								
132  As Odom argues in his analysis of Soviet domestic reforms in the 1980s, the source of 
New Thinking was Gorbachev’s exercise of free will in policy-making, “in the context of 
decades of Soviet institutional decay and wretched economic performance.” (2004), 119. 
When reforms ran into difficulties, Gorbachev’s decision to continue could not be 
predicted.  
133  Niebuhr, 8 
134  Collingwood, 44  
135  On the prevalence of historical analogies in decision-making, see Khong (1992) 
136  On the distinction between internal and external reasons for action, see Williams (1981)  
137 Almond and Genco, 492 
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simultaneously productive of the world.” 138  Human ingenuity has causal 
effects on the world that can end up changing it.139  
As a result of our reflexive abilities humans can effect deliberate 
change in the social world. This means the social world is to a degree 
malleable.140 Reductionist theories struggle to incorporate this self-reflexive 
dynamic of change. This makes them of little use in providing guidance to 
policymakers who want to achieve certain goals. As Alexander George 
explains, “structural theory by itself does not give us much help in 
understanding how to promote peaceful change in international relations; 
how to achieve cooperation among states; how states define their interests 
and how their conception of interests changes.”141 Of course, Kenneth Waltz 
– who authored a famous structural theory of international politics – was 
deliberately parsimonious. His theory aims for what King, Keohane and Verba 
call ‘maximal leverage’: “we should attempt to formulate theories that 
explain as much as possible with as little as possible.”142 As such, Waltz 
points out that the omissions in his theory of international politics are a key 
feature of his theoretical enterprise.143  
Snyder explains why parsimonious theories are wary of integrating too 
much detail into an explanation: this can clutter an account and in the 
process mask underlying, recurring causal patterns. Walt agues that IR is 
more concerned with general theorising than with studying particular events 
because it attempts “to explain patterns of behaviour that persist across 
space and time, [using] relatively few explanatory variables (e.g. power, 
polarity, regime type) to account for recurring tendencies.”144 The benefit of 
parsimony is a focus on the bare, systemic effects of structure on the 
behaviour of a system’s units, such as how the distribution of power 
influences state behaviour. In this vein, Waltz’s theory seeks to “to find the 
central tendency among a confusion of tendencies, to single out the 
propelling principle even though other principles operate, to seek the 
																																																								
138 Jackson, 114 
139  Giddens makes this point when describing the ‘double hermeneutic’: the findings of 
social science can be taken up by those whose behaviour they refer to (1982, 14). 
140  See, for instance, Popper (1972) 206-255.  
141  George (1996), 244 
142  King, Keohane and Verba, 105 
143  Waltz (1990), 31 
144 Walt (2005), 33 
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essential factors where innumerable factors are present.”145 This position is 
sound in terms of the internal logic and consistency of his theory.  
While parsimonious systems theories in IR knowingly abstract from the 
messiness of historical reality, this approach has two important shortcomings: 
low levels of explanatory determinacy, and low levels of policy relevance. 146 
“International relations theory,” Stein notes, “deals with broad sweeping 
patterns; while such knowledge may be useful, it does not address the day-
to-day largely tactical needs of policymakers.”147 Take the three policy areas 
Alexander George sees as structural theory’s blind spots in IR: peaceful 
change, the promotion of cooperation, and the re-definition of state 
interests. These three phenomena, incidentally, describe the means through 
which Ronald Reagan, Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush, as leaders of the 
US and the USSR, influenced the end of the Cold War. None of the three 
processes George points out lends itself easily to generalisations. As such, 
abstract, simplified cross-case theories of world politics at the macroscopic 
level struggle to capture them. To be clear, structural theories are not 
necessarily refuted by the peaceful end of the Cold War, they simply “did 
little to illuminate the process.”148 
George suggests that if a theory does not account for the role that 
individuals played in the peaceful ending of the Cold War, its explanatory 
power is limited. The basic question concerning the causal influence of 
leaders on the international system is this: “Do the particular ideas and 
preferences of senior policymakers drive states, or is foreign policy largely 
determined by geopolitical, organisational, or economic factors over which 
individuals have limited control?”149 The analysis of decision-makers should 
not be all encompassing. Studying leaders and decision-making without due 
regard to the role played by the international system is just as self-limiting as 
pure macro-theorising. So-called ‘Bad King John/Good Queen Bess’ histories 
exaggerate the causal force of individuals, which is the inverse sin of the 
structural reductionism of macro-theories.150  It is difficult to balance the 
idiosyncratic predilections of individuals with the deterministic pressures of 
the structural variant. Lebow argues that a deeper understanding of political 																																																								
145  Waltz (1979), 10 
146  See Christensen (1993) 
147 Stein (2000), 56 
148  Snyder (1993), 8 
149  Shifrinson (2014), 2 
150  See Carr (1961), 53-56 
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outcomes requires us analyse two factors: the behaviour of the relevant 
actors – by reconstructing the world through their eyes, in an effort to 
understand their choices and behaviour – and the consequences of the 
actors’ behaviour.151 One way to do this is by studying the interaction of 
multiple policymakers, both with each other and with the international 
system. These findings are much harder to generalise than those of 
reductionist analysis. However, just as theory can be deliberately sparse, it 
can be purposefully rich. King, Keohane and Verba argue that parsimony is a 
judgment, namely, “the assumption that the world is simple.”152 Complexity 
theory, by contrast, assumes that complex systems are hard to understand: 
the behaviour of such systems is driven by tight, ambiguous causal 
interconnections.153 Complexity theory tries to shed light on these interactive 
effects in the hope of offering clues as to how outcomes are generated in 
complex systems.  
After more than a century of the formal study of IR, many events in 
international relations retain a mysterious quality. What does it tell us about 
IR and the nature of change in the international system when seemingly 
singular micro-events like the rise of Gorbachev can have momentous 
consequences?154 Why did the ‘domino theory’ fail to hold as originally 
feared after the fall of Saigon, but was at work in Eastern Europe in 1989? 
Why does hegemony sometimes lead to bandwagoning and at other times 
to balancing? 155  One answer is that the interactive dynamics of the 
international system permit multiple, contingent outcomes. If true, it 
suggests that complexity is a defining characteristic of the international 
system, and that a more open-ended means of causal analysis can provide 
deeper understanding of the complex processes within it.  
The first step towards such an analysis is recognising the limitations of 
linear analyses of IR. Andrew Abbott outlines the deep, parsimonious 
assumptions of the ‘general linear reality’ models that are pervasive in social 
science. These axioms are, in short order: the social world is made up of 
entities that are fixed, though their attributes can change; an entity’s given 
attribute has only one causal meaning; causality is monotonic and flows from 																																																								
151  Lebow (2014) 
152  King, Keohane and Verba, 20  
153  Snyder (1993), 5 
154  Grunberg & Risse-Kappen (1992) 
155  On a generalisable, structural realist (and thus reductionist) explanation of balancing vs. 
bandwagoning, see Walt (1987) 
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large to small (little things can’t cause big things, the arbitrary does not cause 
the general); sequencing effects do not matter (the order of things does not 
influence the way they turn out); independence of the dependent variable (an 
independent variable determines the dependent variable, up to an error 
term); and, lastly, the causal meaning of an attribute does not depend on its 
context in space or time (an attribute’s causal effect cannot be redefined by 
its own past).156 
 General linear reality models are powerful tools for empirical research, 
but it is a mistake to assume that social causality actually obeys the rules of 
linear transformations.157 Consider this description of linearity:  
 
“By linear systems, we mean the arrangement of nature to be one 
where outputs are proportional to inputs; where the whole is equal to 
the sum of its parts, and where cause and effect are observable. It is 
an environment where prediction is facilitated by careful planning; 
success is pursued by detailed monitoring and control; and a premium 
is placed upon reductionism. […] Reductionist analysis consists of 
taking large, complex problems and reducing them to manageable 
chunks.”158 
 
Does that sound like an accurate description of the workings of international 
politics? “Despite nearly a hundred years of theorizing” in IR, Harrison 
argues, “scholars and practitioners alike are constantly surprised by 
international and global political events.” As an example he cites the end of 
the ‘much-studied’ Cold War and the collapse of Communism in Europe, 
during which the “defining characteristics of four decades of international 
politics were erased in a few short years.”159 Methods that rely on linear 
causation, as Doran argues, cannot capture nonlinearity, defined as “a critical 
point at which expectations induced by a prior trend suddenly confront a 																																																								
156  Abbott (1988) 
157  Abbot writes, “They do this by assuming, in the theories that open their empirical 
articles, that the social world consists of fixed entities with variable attributes, that these 
attributes have only one causal meaning at a time, that this causal meaning does not 
depend on other attributes, on the past sequence of attributes, or on the context of 
other entities. So distinguished a writer as Blalock has written, ‘These regression 
equations are the ‘laws’ of science.’ To say this is to reify an entailed mathematics into a 
representation of reality.” (1988), 175 
158  Alberts and Czerwinski (1997), ii  
159  Harrison, 103 
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profound alteration in that trend, indeed, an abrupt inversion.”160 At the heart 
of thinking about complexity lies non-linearity161: as such, it is well-equipped 
to handle when systems experience what Duran describes as “a total break 
from the past, a discontinuity.” The evolution of a complex system proceeds 
not in simple, additive causal steps – one event follows another, one at a 
time – but in unpredictable bursts, influenced by contingent events that 
interact with each other across the system. These processes can generate 
critical mass in a particular area of the system with little forewarning and 
produce swift, unforeseeable changes.  
 
 
Three concepts of complexity  
Complexity theory studies “phenomena which emerge from a collection 
of interacting objects.”162 Three properties describe a complex system: 163  
 
1. Emergence: the system as a whole is more than the sum of its parts, 
and exhibits behaviours that arise from the interaction of its units. 164 
2. Interactive effects: changes in some parts in the system can produce 
expected or unexpected changes in other, distant parts of the system, 
and the system as a whole can change when its parts change. 
3. Non-linearity: multiple, dynamic causation means the effects of actions 
in the system are never isolated.  
 
Complexity theorists treat politics as “emerging from interactions among 
interdependent but individual agents within evolving institutional formations. 
So world politics is a more or less self-organizing complex system in which 
																																																								
160  Doran (2002) 
161  Not to be confused with multi-linearity, a mathematical term for a function of several 
variables such that when all variables but one are held fixed, the function is linear in the 
remaining variable. See, for instance, Tam (2011). 
162  Johnson, 51 
163  Based on Jervis (1997b) 
164  This idea is expressed in an intuitively understandable manner by Dray when he writes, 
“the characteristics of nations, classes and institutions need no more resemble those of 
their constituent individuals than need the characteristics of gases resemble those of 
their constituent molecules.” (1980), 42. In fact, James Madison made the point in 1788 
in The Federalist Papers (No. 55): “Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates, every 
Athenian assembly would have been a mob.” 
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macroproperties emerge from microinteractions.” 165  To understand the 
operation of the system, one needs to gain a sense of the nature of the 
interactions between the system’s parts, and how these interactions affect 
the properties of the system as a whole.  
Complex systems feature multiple, concurrent causal dynamics. The 
interconnected chains of causation that pervade world politics can produce 
contradictory ‘push vs pull’ effects: for example, the development of nuclear 
weapons by the US restrained Stalin as it increased his fear of military 
confrontation, yet at the same time also made him “less cooperative and less 
willing to compromise, for fear of seeming weak.”166 The diffuse, open-ended 
causal effects of an emergent property (US-Soviet rivalry, conditioned by the 
budding nuclear age) re-shaped the international system through multiple 
causal layers, with competing effects (restraining the Soviets vs. reducing 
their cooperation) that varied in strength over time. Similarly, consider the 
following (deliberately hyperbolic, but apposite) claim: ‘If Edward Snowden 
killed off the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership in June 2013, 
Vladimir Putin returned it to the agenda in April 2014.’167 The point is that 
small, unforeseeable events that snowball and take on a dynamic of their own 
(Snowden’s NSA revelations) can alter the perceptions and incentives of 
various agents in a system (creating suspicion of US intent among even close 
Allies). But at any time, other unanticipated shocks (Russia’s annexation of 
Crimea in 2014) can rapidly re-shuffle the priorities of agents in a system (as 
expressed by the degree of transatlantic cohesion in the economic sanctions 
applied to Russia).  
It should not surprise that complex systems can go through long, 
stable periods before suddenly being shaken by far-reaching waves of 
change. The constant combination and co-mingling of multiple chains of 
causation in an interactive manner can produce phases of severe turbulence. 
The Arab Spring is an example of a systemic conflagration that emerged 
when particular concurrent dynamics happened to overlap: economic 
hardship in the Arab world after the 2008 crisis heightened social tensions 																																																								
165  Harrison, 17 
166  See Jervis (1998). On Stalin and the bomb, see Holloway, 272 
167 An expert at the German Council on Foreign Relations commented at the time, “‘It’s an 
issue of trust. There is widespread anti-Americanism [in Germany], and the Snowden 
affair erased any trust people had. So when the US now says that we are going to have 
equal standards, everyone believes that these are bad standards.’” See Oliver and 
Vasagar (2015) 
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and weakened elite loyalty towards incumbents, new technological outlets 
for political communication made innovative forms of social organisation 
possible that were harder to repress, and popular resentment against 
seemingly impervious incumbents was widespread – all of these were potent 
causal developments in their own right.168 These causal currents merged after 
an unforeseeable micro-incident – the self-immolation of a young 
unemployed street vendor in Tunisia – which snowballed into a regional 
revolutionary conflagration that ended up toppling four dictators who had on 
average held power for the preceding 28 years. When particularly potent 
causes align and are triggered by a catalyst, complex systems can experience 
rapid cascades of events that produce far-reaching change. 169  Similar 
developments occurred in Eastern Europe in 1989, discussed in Chapter Six. 
The divergence between the post-revolutionary experience in Eastern 
Europe compared to the Arab Spring shows that further causal forces are at 
work still in determining outcomes. 
Causation is difficult to discern in a complex system, given that a 
cause may have different effects at different times. From the fact that nuclear 
weapons stabilised Soviet-American relations it cannot be inferred that they 
would have a similar impact on other rivalries: the interaction of nuclear 
weapons with the political context may differ among cases (contra much 
realist writing on the subject).170 Those who aspire to study global politics in a 
way that does its complex ontology justice are not surprised that no general 
laws of international relations have been found: events in a complex system 
are brought about by multiple interacting prior events. It is self-defeating to 
expect credible law-like generalisations to be made in open-ended systems. 
As Jon Elster points out, “One cannot have a law to the effect that ‘if p, then 
																																																								
168  See, for example, Dobson (2012). 
169  Lebow (2000) 
170  This point is made by Jervis (1997b). Realists have often opined that, since nuclear 
deterrence held between the US and the USSR, this is a model for conflict de-escalation 
in many other settings, for instance, Waltz (2012) argued as much in reference to Iran. 
John Mearsheimer (1993) once advised, seemingly prophetically in light of Russia’s 
recent annexation of Crimea, that Ukraine should retain its nuclear arsenal. Though it is 
worth pointing out the covert nature of Russia’s intervention in Ukraine, itself a reflection 
of how warfare in the age of complexity is morphing. Nuclear deterrence is of little use 
against an enemy who is not officially at war: hence the fears that Russia’s ‘hybrid war’ 
tactics could undermine NATO’s nuclear deterrent in a possible Baltic incursion. See 
Pfifer (2015).  
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sometimes q.’” 171  When studying complex systems, we seek instead to 
uncover causal channels, the mechanisms that show us how complex causal 
forces can operate172. Multiple actual and potential causal mechanisms co-
exist at any given time in complex system and generate contingent pathways 
for the system’s future.  
A complex system has interactive, emergent and non-linear 
properties. Its causal mechanisms interface with each other in contingent 
ways. Thus, by identifying such a mechanism, we ”make no claim to 
generality. When we have identified a mechanism whereby p leads to q, 
knowledge has progressed because we have added a new item to our 
repertoire of ways in which things happen.”173 If we can identify some of the 
causal mechanisms that operate in global politics, our understanding of the 
nature and implications of the interactions between the various parts of the 
system is enriched. In complex systems, unpredictability emerges from the 
interactively formed patterns of the varying actors involved, all of whom 
pursue their own goals.174 Shedding light on how complex social systems 
operate should thus also be of interest to policymakers, especially if these 
analyses help clarify the role that leaders can play in the complex systems.  
The study of causal mechanisms is forms part of what Jackson calls 
‘analyticism’.175 This organises scholarship around the causes of a particular 
sequence of events, so-called ‘singular causal analysis’. The aim is not 
generalisation: causal findings are not systematically extrapolated to other 
cases. 176  Lebow deems singular causal analysis “the most appropriate 
approach to understanding an open-ended, non-linear, and reflexive political 
world.”177 It consists of constructing causal narratives about outcomes or sets 
of outcomes.178 These narratives do not refer to prior generalisations, nor do 																																																								
171  Elster (1989), 10. That is why it is not particularly useful to speak of hegemony bringing 
about either bandwagoning or balancing. In a complex system, both outcomes are 
possible. This is not deny probabilistic causation, but a basic philosophical point: if a 
relationship is truly law-like, it should be possible to break down ‘if p, then sometimes q’ 
further, to show when p’  q and when p’’  r.  
172  On the ‘elucidation of mechanistic processes’, see Suganami, 367 
173  Ibid, 10 
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176  Jackson, 149 
177  Lebow (2014), 7 
178  Scientific realist theories are statements that accurately reflect how the world works. Its 
causal logic flows from a theory’s realistic microfoundations, involving entities and 
processes that exist in the real world. Instrumentalist theories, instead, focus on 
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they predict future events. Causes are understood “as the glue that holds a 
story together: it is something akin to a plot line in a novel.”179 History is the 
source of such narratives; as Dilthey writes, history provides “the totality of 
man’s nature.” 180 In this thesis I plot the complex historical processes that 
ended of the Cold War, with the hope of narrating the causal dynamics at 
play in that recent instance of system change in IR. 181  The analysis aims to 
connect the past to our present-day understanding by seeking out relevant 
cause-effect interactions and bringing them into sequence, instead of 
abstracting causes and breaking them up into law-like generalisations.182 As 
Jervis argues, a multi-causal, convoluted event like the end of the Cold War 
cannot be captured by the simple correlation of one-directional cause and 
effect sequences.183  
Complexity theory suggests that the international system is open-
ended, that causation flows in many directions, and that contingency and 
causal indeterminacy abound. Leaders play an important role in this 
conception of international relations: their choices and interactions with other 
agents can push outcomes in the international system in particular directions, 
opening up certain avenues and closing down others in the process. As 
described in Chapter Four, Ronald Reagan – helped by shifting patterns of 
interaction in his Administration following the appointment of George Shultz 
– embarked on a course of conciliation years before relations with the Soviet 
Union actually improved: had he opted for continued confrontation, the 
trajectory of East-West relations could have taken a different direction 
following the rise of Gorbachev. The iterated, positive interactions between 
Reagan and Gorbachev would not have taken place so quickly, giving 
Gorbachev less room to manoeuvre to reconfigure the USSR’s aggressive 
international posture. As a result, reconciliation and trust-building would have 
taken longer, and may well not have taken place at all. 
Scientific analysis is committed to exploring and attempting to 
understand a given segment of empirical reality. 184 Methodologically, I rely 																																																																																																																																																														
describing predictable causal processes from empirical observations. See Mearsheimer 
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on idiographic (i.e. historical) counterfactual reasoning. ‘What Ifs’ can be used 
to delineate actual from potential outcomes in particular episodes, in the 
process outlining the driving forces of events in these periods. Such 
counterfactuals imagine “alternative historical trajectories that might have led 
to different outcomes than that actually observed,” and are distinct from 
theory-based (i.e. nomothetic) counterfactuals that seek to clarify the 
implications of law-like generalizations.185 I subject evidence from history to 
counterfactual analyses in order to estimate how causally influential given 
developments were. This allows for the establishment of a non-linear causal 
trajectory of complex systemic change in IR. Causal-counterfactual narratives 
can make the nature of change in IR – in all its contingency, idiosyncrasy, and 
unpredictability – meaningful. The idea is to make sense of the vast petri dish 
of world politics by causally tying together the various events that in 
aggregation produce ‘history’.  
Causal narratives, assessed for their relevance using counterfactuals, 
can explain outcomes in IR and provide an awareness of the precariousness 
of history and the uncertainty of a complex world. This ties in to Hudson’s call 
for “nonarithmetic ways to relate variables.”186 The careful analysis of the past 
can also glean useful lessons for policymakers. Even without seeking law-like 
generalisations, we can still look for ”plausible, frequently observed ways in 
which things happen.”187 In particular, the thesis highlights three complex 
causal mechanisms – interactions among different leaders both at home and 
abroad, emergent systemic effects, and nonlinear developments – which 
influenced changes in pattern of events in the international system in the 
1980s.  
 
 
Complexity theory is sensitive to the open-endedness of history and the role 
of dynamic factors like time  
Timing is an important consideration in the study of complex 
causation: it affects the unfolding of non-linear, indeterminate chains of 
developments.188 By placing events into a logical temporal sequence we can 
look at the influence of timing as a cause. Reductionist models strip such 																																																								
185  Jackson, 115 
186  Hudson (2007), 32  
187  Elster (1989), viii 
188  See Pierson (2004) 
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factors out of their analysis for the sake of parsimony.189 But ‘timing’ – i.e. 
‘what happens when’ – has effects: causal sequences that overlap will 
produce different interaction effects at different times. For instance, the 
match-up of Reagan and Gorbachev as leaders of their respective countries 
in 1985 was an effect of timing. Chapter Five narrates the rapport built up 
between Reagan and Gorbachev, with the two men growing to like each 
other and defending policies they forged together against detractors at 
home. This raises the question of whether alternative timing and a different 
leadership pairing could have produced the same positive feedback 
processes in the mid-1980s that led to substantial arms reduction treaties.  
Timing predisposes particular developments over others.190 Trevor-
Roper expresses the point as follows: “The crisis does not always produce 
the man, moments of vital decisions quickly pass, in a period of confusion the 
power to act may be irrevocably lost.”191 None of this commits the analyst to 
an exaggerated emphasis on the contingency of history or the idea that “rich 
particularities of individual events and processes render them unique.”192 The 
main influence of timing on leadership is adding or removing options from 
the menu of political possibilities. Gorbachev’s words of prophetic advice to 
East Germany’s leader Erich Honecker, offered (in vain) in October 1989, 
express this concept: “he who comes too late is punished by life.”193 Critical 
junctures – moments of open-endedness in a complex system where events 
could unfold one of various ways – can be harnessed by agents, or subject 
them to political shocks.194 As discussed in Chapter 6, Gorbachev faced such 
a time-sensitive critical juncture in his dealings with Yeltsin: had he chosen to 
co-operate with his rival rather than seek to dominate him, different 
possibilities for rescuing the Soviet Union would have emerged.  
Causal turning points in the international system, which emerge in 
moments of contingency, are time-sensitive. At such moments of inflexion, 																																																								
189  Hom, 236 
190  The ‘Polya urn process’ gives a mathematical description of this phenomenon, describing 
how certain temporal junctures can bring about contingent but self-reinforcing dynamics, 
(colloquially referred to as ‘the rich get richer phenomenon’). See Pierson, 30 
191  Trevor-Roper, 360. He echoes Herodotus: “Very few things happen at the right time, and 
others do not happen at all,” epigraph in Lebow (2000)  
192 Pierson, 4 
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194  The political system can be more open or less open to challenge at different times. See 
e.g. McAdam, 41 
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multiple causal avenues open up, providing alternative pathways for the 
future.195 Historical methods – the chronicling of events and re-construction 
of how given moments in history presented themselves to the decision-
makers of the day – can be used to derive an account of how and why 
developments in international affairs unfolded in a particular manner. This 
indicates what it took for outcomes to move from the domain of the possible 
– along with all other possibilities at the time of a turning point in that 
domain – to the actual.  
Such analyses of IR are less concerned with abstract theoretical 
models and more with the interconnections between different causal factors 
and events. The method I espouse relies on empirical work, namely archival 
research, interviews and source analyses, all with a view to process tracing 
the end of the Cold War. The historical research pursued here is for its own 
sake, not for the sake of diving into history so as to obtain ‘raw materials’ that 
are ‘mined’ from history in order to fit a previously constructed theory.196 
Findings can be used to generate insights that apply more widely to policy 
analysis in other cases, but without treating these insights as having the 
status of a law. Theoretical insights are yielded through what Almond and 
Genco’s call ‘soft regularities’, those that embedded in the malleable, 
complex web of human social relations.197  
 
 
Counterfactual analysis can help clarify the role of leadership and decision-
making in complex systems  
Counterfactuals can be used to make arguments about how history 
might have unfolded in slightly different circumstances. The problem with 
counterfactuals, as described by Levy, is that they rest on non-existent events 
whose consequences cannot be known, and with an unknown and possibly 
infinite number of supplementary ‘ripple effects’. As a result	 analysts often 
construct ‘counterfactuals of convenience’ to bolster their theoretical 
prejudices and advance their political agenda.198 Still, counterfactual thinking 
has been part of our analytical toolkit for a long time. Herodotus argued that 																																																								
195  Turning points, qua Herrmann and Lebow, are changes of significant magnitude that are 
difficult to undo. (2004), 7-14 
196 See Lawson (2012) 
197  Almond and Genco (1977) 
198  Levy (2014) 
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if Athens had not sided with Sparta to resist Xerxes in 480 BC, the Persians 
would have subdued Greece. 199 Livy made the case that Alexander the Great 
would have failed if he had attempted to invade Rome.200 At the turn of the 
20th century, Max Weber examined the links between counterfactual analysis 
and causality. In Weber’s words, counterfactuals involve “the mental 
construction of a course of events which is altered through modification in 
one or more ‘conditions.’” 201  Counterfactuals can be used to estimate 
significance of a particular causal factor. Weber describes how: to “assess the 
degree to which a particular cause ‘favoured’ a given effect, we must 
hypothetically ‘compare’ the result that actually followed with alternate 
possibilities.”202 This is a powerful way of thinking about what constitutes a 
cause: some X, in absence of which some outcome Y would not have come 
about.203	
Counterfactuals, in Fearon’s words, are “propositions that take the 
generic form ‘If it had been the case that X (or not X), it would have been the 
case that Y (or not Y).’”204 In formal terms, counterfactual X □→ Y is the 
antithesis to a causal statement of the form X → Y (i.e., ¬X → Y, or X → ¬Y).205 
To construct a counterfactual, a conditional logical statement of the form ‘if X 
then Y’ is set up. Then, the antecedent or the consequent is negated. This is 
by definition a speculative move: a counterfactual supposes a change in a 
specified sequence of occurrences. This can test a factual statement.  
For example, let:  
X = Ronald Reagan was President of the US from 1980 to 1988  
Y = The Cold War ended peacefully 
 
The conditional is:  
 
X → Y  i.e., if Ronald Reagan is President, the Cold 
War ends peacefully 
 
The counterfactual is: 
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C = {¬X □→ Y}  i.e., even if Ronald Reagan had never 
become President, the Cold War would still 
have ended peacefully   
 
To evaluate C, we need to investigate two alternative scenarios: 
 
A = {¬X □→ ¬Y} i.e., if Ronald Reagan hadn’t been 
President, the Cold War would have ended 
violently 
 
B = {X □→ ¬Y} i.e., although Ronald Reagan was President, 
the Cold War ended violently 
 
Now let reality be  
Z = {X □→ Y} i.e., Ronald Reagan was President, and the 
Cold War ended peacefully 
If it can be demonstrated that counterfactual A is less of a departure from 
reality Z than counterfactual B – i.e. that a violent end to the Cold War absent 
Reagan is likelier than a violent end to the Cold War with Reagan in power – 
then we have found evidence that X (‘Ronald Reagan was President of the 
United States from 1980 to 1988’) was a cause of Y, the peaceful end of the 
Cold War. 
 As David Lewis shows, asking what caused something is in effect a 
request for the entire list of causal events that took place in the run-up to it, 
“the culmination of countless distinct, converging causal chains.”206 Causal 
questions can be narrowed down by making them binary: ‘Why x rather than 
y?’207 This question is structured counterfactually: implicit in its answer is a 
causal logic that underpins x vis-a-vis the causal process that would have 
brought about y. These kinds of ‘choice’ counterfactuals open up when 
policymakers are confronted with a sharply defined decision. Looking 
backwards at past decision-making dilemmas, and probing the consequences 
of a policy choice having gone another way, forms an important part of 
studying the interaction of leaders with each other and the international 
system. “Choices and decisions,” Almond and Genco assert, are “the heart 
of politics.”208 An individual’s decisions are made of ideas and goals in a 
process of constant interaction with other ideas, the behaviour of other 																																																								
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207 Grynaviski, 831 
208 (1977), 492 
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individuals, and the physical world. Hypothetical alternative decisions can be 
used to try and shed light on how political reality would have unfolded 
differently as a result, yielding what Ringer terms “a dynamic vision of 
alternate paths of historical change.”209  Counterfactuals can re-open the 
indeterminacy of the world as it presented itself to policy-makers at the time 
of a decision. By re-creating the uncertainty of political decision-making, this 
can offset the predestination of outcomes assumed by determinist theories.  
Decision-making counterfactuals are historical: 210  they involve re-
imagining historical alternatives – trajectories that didn’t actually unfold – in 
order to loosen the deterministic grip of post-hoc analysis and reconstruct 
the world as it was during the period under analysis. Political decision-making 
takes place under fluid circumstances. To understand the connection 
between the decisions taken and the outcomes produced under such 
uncertainty, we need to ask ourselves: why did key agents act the way they 
did? And why did events unfold the way they did? If events were 
foreordained, a counterfactual analysis should show that there was no real 
alternative to the actual outcome. If events were contingent, counterfactuals 
would illustrate where, within the realm of the possible, the trajectory of 
history could – or could not – have taken a different path. Historical 
counterfactuals highlight structural determination as much as contingency.211 
 The speculative foundation of counterfactuals – re-imagining history 
and speculating on that which never was – elicits scepticism among certain 
parts of the academic community. 212 We simply don’t know what would really 
have happened in alternative worlds. Carr is particularly dismissive: ”The 
trouble about contemporary history is that people remember the time when 
all the options were still open, and find it difficult to adopt the attitude of the 
historian for whom they have been closed by the fait accompli.”213 Carr has a 
teleological view of history, believing that coherent sequences of cause and 
effect expunge the role of chance and contingency. Believing in the pre-																																																								
209 (2002), 167 
210 Tetlock and Belkin (1996) conduct an exhaustive survey of the types of counterfactuals 
deployed in the social sciences and categorised their findings.  
211 Tetlock and Belkin, 37 
212 Ferguson (1997) categorises opponents to counterfactual theorising into two camps: 
materialists (who treat the study of history as analogous to the natural sciences) and 
idealists (for whom history is the transformation of past thought into an intelligible and 
often teleological structure by the imagination of the historian).  
213 Carr (1961), 98 
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eminence of the real and the irrelevance of the plausible, Carr defines 
progress through power. 214  Whoever is in power, the argument goes, 
controls history and thus the progress of history: there are no alternatives.  In 
his view, accident in history is devoid of meaning and hence cannot fit into a 
historian’s pattern of rational explanation and interpretation. Oakeshott 
argues that historians who consider what might have happened produce “not 
merely bad or doubtful history, but the complete rejection of history […] a 
monstrous incursion of science into the world of history.”215	 Sequences of 
cause and effect, that did not take place, are irrelevant because that which 
did not happen is not amenable to interpretation, making alternative worlds 
meaningless for both the past and present.  
But not all share this assessment. Contra Carr, Isaiah Berlin criticises 
the inability of determinists to make value judgements about the “character, 
purposes and motives of individuals.” 216  Berlin argues for the need to 
establish the possible courses of action open to human beings in the present 
and the past. He calls for “the placing of what occurred (or might occur) in 
the context of what could have happened (or could happen), and in the 
demarcation of this from what could not.” Delineating alternatives has as 
much to do with historical analysis as it concerns thinking about the present 
and the future. Hugh Trevor-Roper, Carr’s intellectual sparring partner, 
explains why: 
 
“At any given moment in history there are real alternatives […] How 
can we explain what happened and why if we only look at what 
happened and never consider alternatives […] It is only if we place 
ourselves before the alternatives of the past […] only if we live for a 
moment, as the men of the time lived, in its still fluid context and 
among its still unresolved problems, if we see those problems coming 
upon us [...] that we can draw useful lessons from history.”217 
 
Where Carr argues that history is the record of what people did, rather than 
what people might have done – “let us get rid of this red herring once and 																																																								
214  Wilson (2009) 
215		 Oakeshott (1966), 128-129 	
216 Berlin, 55. Jervis (2010) discusses the difficulties of assigning causal responsibility to 
individuals. 
217  Trevor-Roper, 367 
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for all” – Trevor-Roper counters: “History is not merely what happened: it is 
what happened in the context of what might have happened.”218 Weber 
makes a similar point: “In order to penetrate the real causal 
interrelationships, we construct unreal ones,” which is echoed in Bueno de 
Mesquita’s claim, “we cannot understand what happened in reality without 
understanding what did not happen but might have happened under other 
circumstances.”219  
But how to demarcate the actual from the possible, and the possible 
from the impossible? The distinction between what happened and what 
could plausibly have happened is crucial. Karl Popper believes that 
counterfactuals are necessary to understand history: “In order to be able to 
examine [counterfactual] possibilities in our search for the true conditions of a 
trend, we have all the time to try to imagine the conditions under which the 
trend in question would disappear.”220 Popper used counterfactuals in a 
Weberian sense, linking and de-linking actors with choices and outcomes and 
benchmarking counterfactual causal chains against what happened in reality 
in order to deepen understanding of how and why particular events 
occurred. Weber argues that historical counterfactual thinking proceeds by 
eliminating or changing certain facts or events, and using ‘general rules of 
experience’ to probe whether things would have happened differently if 
certain facts were changed: 
 
“The weighing of the causal significance of a historical fact begins with 
the question: whether with its elimination [...] or alteration, the course 
of events could, according to general rules of experience, have taken 
a [different] direction. We conceive of one or a few of the actual causal 
components as modified in a certain direction and then ask ourselves 
whether under the conditions which have been thus changed, the 
same effect [...] or some other effect ‘would be expected.’”221 
 
The ‘rules of experience’ (‘Erfahrungsregeln’) that Weber appeals to are, in a 
sense, imperfect empirical generalisations.222 Not laws proper, but causal 																																																								
218  Ibid, 363 
219		 Weber (1949), 185-86; Bueno de Mesquita (1996), 229.  
220 Popper (1957), 119  
221 Weber (1973)  
222 Ringer, 167 
 63 
associations which can be used to design conjectures about alternative 
pathways, i.e. developments that can be properly expected – and justified – 
as consequences of given antecedents.223 This allows certain historical facts 
to be changed without creating the intractable situation of having to decide 
which of an infinity of possible outcomes would have ensued. Weber’s ‘rules 
of experience’ thus offer a means of delineating consequences from 
counterfactual antecedents. The conceivability of the consequent depends 
on the reliability and comprehensiveness of the causal connections that the 
analyst draws upon – in the form of nomological knowledge, not rigorous 
laws – when imagining the consequences of a changed fact, so as “to sustain 
a projection about events that did not occur.”224 Thus, a counterfactual 
derives its strength from the argument it constructs about what would have 
happened. A good counterfactual argument is made credible by:  
 
1. Invoking general principles, theories, laws, or regularities 
2. Drawing on knowledge of historical facts relevant to a 
counterfactual scenario.225 
 
Recourse to laws is possible but not necessary, as a counterfactual “is 
invalidated not by lack of a law upholding it, but by conflict with a more 
strongly upheld conditional.”226 The credibility of a counterfactual must be 
judged not against any possible ‘laws’ it violates, but against the reality that it 
challenges. Counterfactuals underpin all explanatory thinking: as Hawthorn 
notes, “an explanation suggests alternatives. […] the force of an explanation 
turns on the counterfactual which it implies.” 227 A causal account convinces 
when we think its inverse is implausible: thus, any explanation builds on 
counterfactual reasoning, whether this is made explicit or not.228 																																																								
223  Kray et al (2010) argue that ideology infuses the causal linkage analysts construct 
between a counterfactual antecedent and its consequences: all can agree that Reagan 
was almost assassinated in 1981, but conservatives are more likely than liberals to argue 
that the Soviet Union would still exist if Reagan had died. 
224  Ringer, 168 
225 Fearon (1991), 176. A counterfactual's plausibility depends on the type of manipulations 
to obtain the antecedent, and the general conceivability of the consequent. See also 
Reiss (2009) 
226  Goodman (1983 [1954]), 122 
227  Hawthorn, 13-14 
228  Fearon (1991) demonstrates that analyses with few cases and many variables are 
compelled to use counterfactual argument by statistical principle. 
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Counterfactuals have numerous applications in causal analysis 
Historic counterfactuals of the kind discussed so far aim to explain or 
understand a particular historical episode or development. Another 
important type of ‘what if’ scenarios are covering law-based nomothetic 
counterfactuals. They explore more general theoretical arguments. 
Idiographic counterfactuals invoke plausible worlds, which nomothetic 
counterfactuals do not have to do: 229 they are formulated in terms of a 
general theoretical proposition, taking a clearly specified causal model, 
applying it to an actual empirical situation and manipulating the antecedents 
of this case to draw conclusions in the form of predictions that are grounded 
in the theoretical implications of the model.230 As explained by Tetlock and 
Belkin, the goal of nomothetic counterfactuals “is not historical 
understanding; rather, it is to pursue the logical implications of a theoretical 
framework.”231 For instance, John Mueller, using the rational actor model as a 
covering law to account for leaders’ decisions about going to or refraining 
from war, traces the development of post-WW2 history in the absence of 
nuclear weapons.232 He argues that the Cold War did not turn ‘hot’ because 
World Wars One and Two showed how costly great power war had become: 
in a counterfactual post-1945 world without nuclear weapons, the US and 
USSR would still not have gone to war with each other. Mueller does not 
dispute that the atomic bomb influenced international affairs. Nuclear 
weapons shaped diplomatic thinking during the Cold War and had a 
stabilising effect on superpower relations.233 But nuclear weapons, according 
to the counterfactual scenario, were coincidental to US-Soviet peace: with or 
without the existence of nuclear weapons, war had become so destructive 
that the USA and USSR would never have gone to war against each other. 
War-weariness was the real cause of great power peace since 1945.234  																																																								
229  Levy (2014) 
230  An innovative example is Fogel’s counterfactual analysis of the impact of railroads on US 
economic growth (1964). See also Bueno de Mesquita’s ‘prediction’ of the peaceful end 
of the Cold War (1998) 
231  Tetlock and Belkin, 11. See also Fogel (1970), 256-264 
232  Mueller (1998) 
233 Mueller (1999) 
234  In a similar counterfactual analysis, Mueller (1991) makes the argument that World War 
Two would not have occurred had Hitler not taken power, by looking at the identities 
and policy preferences of potential alternative chancellors to Hitler.  
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Of course, this analysis is not problem-free. As Tetlock and Belkin put 
it, “it is not at all clear that cotenability obtains between the counterfactual 
antecedent of a non-nuclear world and any connecting principle that posits 
the occurrence of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962.”235 In other words, one 
cannot simply counterfactually change one fundamental fact of world politics 
and then ignore the ripple effects of this change. Weber therefore 
recommends that for the purpose of causal analysis, counterfactuals should 
follow a minimal rewrite rule. Lebow follows this advice in his study of the 
causes of World War One.236 Counterfactuals, in order to convince, need to 
be deployed in a disciplined and transparent manner. The bigger a 
counterfactual rewrite and the longer the period of history it covers, the more 
difficult the process of spelling out an alternative world: in a system of 
interconnected behaviour, we can never do merely one thing.237  
Counterfactual arguments concerning the same outcome can reach 
fundamentally different conclusions. Lebow rewrites history by supposing 
that Archduke Ferdinand had survived the assassin’s bullet in 1914 on the 
eve of World War One, concluding that the conflict was highly contingent 
and could have been averted. 238 His counterfactual argues for the power of 
small events in producing large outcomes. Paul Shroeder’s counterfactual re-
examination of WW1 reaches the opposite conclusion, namely that WW1 was 
overdetermined and driven by structural and social forces, not by 
contingency and human agency.239	Counterfactuals can be used to argue for 
or against the contingency of an event: this hinges on whether changes in a 
key causal factor are deemed to have a large or small impact on the 
subsequent outcome 240 The key point to appreciate is that counterfactual 
conclusions do not constitute proof. Readers are the ultimate judges of a 
counterfactual’s utility, since they are free to either accept the counterfactual 
argument (which will always have to follow the basic logical structure outlined 
on page 58). A counterfactual succeeds when it presents a compelling chain 																																																								
235 Tetlock and Belkin, 23 
236  Lebow (2005)  
237  Taken from Garrett Hardin, cited in Jervis (1997), 10. Lebow (2000) questions the utility of 
surgical counterfactuals that change one fact only. Similarly, Jervis holds that 
counterfactuals “cannot be employed to help us imagine a world that is like our own in 
all ways except for one.” Instead, counterfactuals are helpful to think through complex 
connections in world politics. (1996), 316   
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of reasoning, giving the reader few reasons to reject the logic or the 
conclusion.  
 
 
Counterfactuals and complexity theory are means to a deeper understanding 
of the causal forces at work in the international system 
Linear models of world politics do a poor job of explaining periods of 
dynamic change such as the end of the Cold War, or the period of emergent 
instability we are arguably experiencing in the present. Reductionist 
approaches do not accurately capture the complexities that characterise 
change in international politics. If a system’s variables cannot be effectively 
isolated from each other or from their context, then “linearization is not 
possible, because dynamic interaction is one of the system’s defining 
characteristics.”241 The non-linear dynamic interaction of causal factors in 
complex systems makes it supremely difficult to predict large-scale 
outcomes. Research that aims to understand effects of contingent 
emergence, interaction, and non-linearity helps make sense of the open-
ended, contingent nature of change in such systems. An early advocate of 
this kind of causal complexity theory was Carl von Clausewitz, the 19th 
century Prussian military strategist. Clausewitz deems it imperative to face 
“up to the intrinsic presence of chance, complexity, and ambiguity in war.” 
For Clausewitz this is preferable “to the risk of being blind-sided by the 
strictures of a theory artificially imposed on the messiness of reality in the 
name of clarity.” These concerns mirror those of scientists studying nonlinear 
phenomena. Open systems, those “which cannot be isolated from their 
environments even in theory, which are characterized by numerous levels of 
feedback effects,” need to be described realistically as an interactive 
whole.242  
Clausewitz pioneered the concept of an enemy’s ‘centre of gravity’ in 
war, which he deems to be “the hub of all power and movement, on which 
everything depends.”243 This could be anything from a city, to an alliance of 
interests, public opinion, or particular leaders. Clausewitz’s point exemplifies 
his perception of war as a profoundly nonlinear phenomenon: certain aspects 
of war have an outsized impact on its conduct. Targeting an enemy’s centre 																																																								
241 Beyerchen (1992)  
242 Ibid, pp. 75, 82. See also Waldman, 175-184  
243  Clausewitz (1976), 596  
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of gravity is strategically advantageous, because concentrating fighting 
resources on the driving force that underpins the enemy’s power can bring 
victory even in the face of overwhelming military inferiority (a strategy that 
the Vietcong used to their advantage by sapping the US public’s will to fight 
in Vietnam, relying on the psychological impact of events like the Tet 
Offensive: though the attack was a military failure, it reinforced perceptions in 
the US that the Vietcong could not be beaten, and undermined public 
support for the war).244 
 
 
Toward a counterfactual analysis of complex change in the international 
system  
The end of the Cold War is a nonlinear phenomenon, an episode of 
international system change characterised by a multiplicity of interactive 
causal factors. This theoretical view, following Lebow and Stein, “suggests 
that system transformations – and many other kinds of international events – 
are unpredictable because their underlying causes do nothing more than to 
create the possibility of change.”245 Actual change comes about through the 
(sometimes fortuitous) meeting of causal chains, and the policies pursued key 
agents. The latter form the point of entry into my analysis.  
In Chapter Three I begin to connect these dots together by telling a 
causal story based on the evolutionary dynamic of the international system in 
the 1980s.246 The trajectory is traced through the eyes of high-level decision-
makers, whose causal role is not yet well understood, certainly not from the 
perspective of complexity theory.247 Leaders and the networks of associates 
they surround themselves with are a source of potential causal influence: the 																																																								
244  Nagl (2005). A compelling example of how warfare is infused with complexity is provided 
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interaction effects they generate are worth investigating. Critical junctures of 
decision-making form the most straightforward framework within which I 
construct my causal narrative. Causal dynamics are examined through 
counterfactuals, in an effort to estimate why given events took place over 
other alternatives. I investigate how and why leaders arrived at given 
decisions during that period, and look at the consequences of these 
decisions as they worked their way through the international system. The 
former requires examining policy or personnel alternatives at certain turning 
points – what other choices were available and why were they not pursued? I 
assess the consequences of decisions counterfactually, testing whether 
alternative choices would have materially affected the trajectory of the end of 
the Cold War.  
Individuals in positions of political power are constrained in their 
dealings by the wider context within which they operate. 248 This sets out a 
sometimes clear and sometimes less clear framework for action, which in turn 
informs the menu of choices individuals face. In 1985, for instance, the Soviet 
Union would have struggled to afford a new round of the arms race. This 
structural reality influenced Gorbachev’s search for arms control treaties that 
would alleviate the USSR's military burden.249 The crucial question, however, 
is precisely how and why Reagan and Gorbachev signed the treaties they 
did: what were the negotiation processes that finally produced success rather 
than degenerating into the mutual recriminations that had characterised arms 
control efforts prior to 1986? The details of the interactions that produced 
the known outcome allow for a counterfactual-causal exploration of what 
happened and why it happened. Gorbachev was under pressure to act and 
improve the USSR’s relative position. The policy paths he chose were not 
foreordained: Gorbachev faced real choices and real alternatives. Why did he 
not pursue perestroika without glasnost, for example? It is imperative to trace 
out how Gorbachev and Reagan arrived at their respective policy choices 
that brought the Cold War to a peaceful conclusion.  
 
 
How does complexity theory help us make sense of how individuals can 
influence international affairs? 
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A favoured realist argument concerning the peaceful end of the Cold 
War is that material factors left Gorbachev with little choice but to concede 
defeat.250 This assumes that Gorbachev’s choice was ‘made’ by the structural 
context in which he operated. Relaxing that assumption produces a more 
open-ended international system in which Gorbachev could also have opted 
to pursue strategies with precedence in the history of imperial decline, rather 
than the voluntary abnegation of authority through peaceful political reform. 
Even more indicative of the complexity of events was the fact that Gorbachev 
did not actually intend to bring about the outcome that eventually occurred – 
the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.251 The unintended consequences of 
what people did intentionally are part of history. 252 As such, we cannot 
understand historical events until we see why the individuals involved did 
what they did. Inadvertent, unplanned outcomes feature prominently in 
complexity theory. 253  They come about through the open-endedness of 
political developments, the interactions of leaders, and the dynamic 
processes of change this can produce in the international system.  
IR’s various theoretical interpretations of the end of the Cold War each 
fit a standard theory and static piece of the puzzle. Lining these up as a chain 
of discrete, linear causal steps, however, does not explain how and why 
events unfolded. 254  Economic weakness gradually worsened the Soviet 
position; fundamental social and ideational developments were underway in 
civil society in East and West that changed established political and cultural 
practices; and both Reagan and Gorbachev made remarkable choices in 
domestic and foreign policy that improved East-West relations. Each of these 
stories is described by different IR paradigms in isolation: my goal is to 
explain how these accounts are linked, in part by examining the positions 
leaders – as choice-producing units – occupied in the network of interrelated 
causes of the end of the Cold War. Complexity theory pushes beyond 
existing, compartmentalised accounts of the end of the Cold War and 
advances our understanding of how different causal effects interact.  
																																																								
250  See, for example, Brooks and Wohlforth (2000) 
251  See Pravda (2010). As Odom puts it, “It seems highly improbable that Gorbachev did 
understand the implications of his ‘New Thinking’ unless he was bent on the destruction 
of the Soviet state.” (2004), 146 
252  Dray (1980), 48 
253  Jervis (1997a) 
254  I am indebted to Robert Jervis for making this point in April 2015. 
 70 
Waltz argues that theories “are useful because they because they may 
help to understand, explain and sometimes predict the trend of events, and 
to help us understand how a system works.”255 I suggest that complexity itself 
can be the basis for a theory of IR that brings about greater understanding, 
clarification, and sensitivity to possible future trends. “International studies,” 
Lake maintains, “deals with the largest and most complicated social system 
possible.”256 Mearsheimer and Walt add, “the more complicated the realm, 
the more dependent we are on mental maps to help us navigate the 
terrain.”257 Non-linearity, interaction effects and contingent emergence guide 
us through the analysis of complex events. Counterfactuals can be used as 
methodological tools to estimate interactive causal effects in complex 
systems: they help explore the various trajectories events in a system could 
take.  
 ‘What if’ questions highlight points of open-endedness in history by 
re-opening events of the past and subjecting them to scenarios where things 
turned out differently.258 If done effectively, the contrastive appraisals of 
various scenarios indicate mechanisms of change in the international system. 
Robert Jervis explains this as follows: 
 
“Counterfactual thinking can be extremely useful for thought 
experiments that assist us in developing our ideas about how 
elements are connected and how results can arise. Counterfactuals 
can alert us to the possible operation of dynamics and pathways that 
we would otherwise be prone to ignore.” 259  
 
A ‘What If’ that credibly and convincingly highlights different possible 
outcomes in world history describes plausible causal mechanisms that 
operate in our complex social world. Counterfactuals oblige researchers to 
delineate why their chain of causation has a higher probability than 
alternative chains: they force transparency on the argumentative structure 
underpinning a causal account. This is why I use them as causation detection 
devices in my analysis of the Cold War’s complex ending.  																																																								
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CHAPTER TWO 
  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE END OF THE COLD WAR 
 
 
 
 
Reviewing the history of international affairs in the modern era, which might 
be considered to extend from the middle of the seventeenth century to the 
present, I find it hard to think of any event more strange and startling, and at 
first glance more inexplicable, than the sudden and total disintegration and 
disappearance from the international scene, primarily in the years 1987 
through 1991, of the great power known successively as the Russian Empire 
and then the Soviet Union. 
George F. Kennan 
 
 
 
 
 
110 years before the start of the Cold War, Alexis de Tocqueville 
predicted that the US and Russia would sooner or later have a rendezvous 
with history: “There are now two great nations in the world, which, starting 
from different points, seem to be advancing toward the same goal: the 
Russians and the Anglo-Americans […] Each seems called by some secret 
design of Providence one day to hold in its hands the destinies of half the 
world.”260 It was World War Two that paved the way for de Tocqueville’s 
scenario to become reality. After the US and the USSR jointly defeated the 
Axis powers in 1945, their wartime cooperation soon gave way to a scramble 
for influence, first in Europe and then around the world. The two wartime 
allies became combatants in a new kind of conflict. Neither of them dared to 
attack the other directly, yet both constantly tussled in the hope of gaining a 
geostrategic edge, soon supporting or launching proxy wars in nations as 
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distant as Greece, Iran, Indochina, Korea and Cuba.261 As Europe’s declining 
imperial powers retrenched and decolonialisation took hold in the 
developing world, the United States and the Soviet Union filled the emerging 
voids and engaged in a globe-spanning geopolitical confrontation. Facing 
each other at various strategic East-West faultlines across the world, the two 
combatants built vast military alliances and sought to sign up non-aligned 
states to their respective blocs. This struggle for influence took place under 
the spectre of a potentially apocalyptic atomic confrontation. Both countries 
pursued a relentless multi-decades arms race that produced enormous 
arsenals of nuclear weapons, ironically all in an effort to deter each other 
from using these weapons. Forty-five years of Cold War were punctuated by 
periods of tension and conflict, followed by efforts at arms control and 
reduced confrontation, a cycle that was repeated but not broken. The ebb 
and sway of superpower conflict was never tempered by a serious effort at 
de-escalation. Hostilities between the US and USSR became embedded in 
the fabric of world politics, and the Cold War was seen as an essentially 
permanent condition of international affairs.  
At the beginning of the final decade of the Cold War, the Soviet Union 
remained one of the world’s two superpowers. Zubok argues that Moscow’s 
relative material position vis-à-vis Washington was much stronger in 1980 
than at the beginning of the Cold War.262 Kissinger describes how perception 
soon diverged from reality:  
 
“At the beginning of the 1980s it was as if communist momentum 
might sweep all before it; at the next, as history measures time, 
communism was self-destructing. Within a decade the Eastern 
European satellite orbit dissolved and the Soviet empire fell apart, 
disgorging nearly all the Russian acquisitions since the time of Peter 
the Great. No world power had ever disintegrated so totally or rapidly 
without losing a war.”263 
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The disappearance of as powerful a state as the USSR was hard to 
fathom.264 As late as April 1991, when the Soviet Union was clearly in the 
midst of a severe crisis, Condoleezza Rice – who had just left her job as 
George H. W. Bush’s Soviet advisor – maintained that the country would not 
disintegrate: “The Soviet Union is going to be around for a long time to 
come.”265 Yet in December of that same year, the USSR’s flag was lowered 
over the Kremlin for the last time, bringing to a close the first voluntary, 
peaceful dissolution of an empire since the creation of the Westphalian order 
in 1648. The sudden end of the Cold War, Gaddis writes, “brought about 
nothing less than the collapse of an international system” through an abrupt 
shift in the balance of power, akin to the birth of bipolarity in 1945.266  
Academics have produced a plethora of articles and books in 
response; it takes a brave researcher indeed who ventures to read and 
synthesise all that IR has to say on the subject.267 The field’s penchant for 
macro-theorising268 has given rise to a debate in IR about how to treat the 
end of the Cold War: is this to be viewed as a tectonic shift in IR, brought 
about by the collapse of one of the two poles of power that dominated the 
international system since 1945? Or is the Cold War’s end a data point, 
conclusions drawn from which are inherently limited in scope since the event, 
despite its symbolic significance, was ultimately just another ‘happening’ in 
the chronology of world politics, one which is not significant enough to merit 
an evaluation of the major theoretical orientation?269 This question is further 
complicated by the fact that the Cold War was not a singular occurrence, but 
a cluster of events involving multiple temporalities and multiple spaces.270 
Brown remarks that the ‘Cold War’ was a mere metaphor, and as such 
disappeared rather than ended.271 
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The discipline of IR analyses the end of the Cold War along its 
paradigmatic fault-lines of realism, liberalism (and their respective ‘neo’-
variants), constructivism and critical approaches. All four explanations “offer 
distinctive accounts of the origins, nature and end of the Cold War,” but are 
nevertheless difficult to compartmentalise.272 Structural realists are right to 
point out that objective material pressures matter in determining a state’s 
power and position in the international system. But there is no singular causal 
direction from material structural developments to changes in policy, and 
rarely is a single policy path open to the decision-maker responding to 
material pressures. As many a leader will point out, easy policy choices are 
taken at the lower levels of an organisation’s bureaucracy. It is thus a triusm 
that hard choices, often equally (un)-appealing and with uncertain payoffs, 
are the ones that end up in the in-tray of high-level leaders; making a call in 
such scenarios is part of their job specification.273   
By failing to take into account the relevance of policy alternatives that 
open up divergent paths, structural realism is essentially an underspecified 
theory. Neoclassical realists try to rectify this by looking at the transmission of 
structural pressures to policy, integrating intervening variables such as 
domestic politics.274 But they too struggle to explain the central conundrum 
the end of the Cold War poses for realist theorising, namely, the evolution of 
the US-Soviet relationship from one of mutual animosity to one of co-
operation. As Jervis points out, “US perceptions of the Soviet threat changed 
despite the continued existence of large nuclear arsenals.”275 Constructivist 
theories highlight to good effect the interaction of agents and structures 
when identities are re-constituted, and shed light on the process by which 
norms evolve and permeate the policy-making establishment. Liberals offer a 
convincing perspective of how the ideological strength of Soviet communism 
was eroded by the comparative successes Western liberalism. But they do 
not explain why the Soviet desire for change took on a liberal mantle when 																																																								
272  Lebow (1999) 
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technocratic economic reform along Chinese lines could also have been 
attempted, along with the maintenance of a repressive state apparatus.  
 
 
The dominance of the material: Realism 
The core premise of realist thinking, Berenskoetter and Quinn assert, 
is that power is a central feature of international politics.276 There are many 
variants of realist theory in IR, all of which view the international system as an 
anarchic arena in which states need to ensure their survival. 277 Kenneth 
Waltz’s ‘Theory of International Politics’ represents a pure form of structural 
realism: the theory relies on one constant factor, the lack of a supranational 
authority in the international system, in combination with one variable, the 
number of great powers in a system. 278  Waltz relegates the remaining 
variables that influence international affairs to the unit level, and thus beyond 
the scope of his theory.279 In accounting for the end of the Cold War, 
structural realists see the changing distribution of material resources as the 
central driver explanatory driver.280 Brooks and Wohlforth, for instance, argue 
that changes in ideas and policies in the 1980s were prompted by “changing 
material incentives; that is, their effects are largely a reflection of a changing 
material environment.”281 The USSR lacked the power to maintain its control 
over allies such as East Germany: “in truth, there was little that the Soviets 
could have done to prevent the GDR’s demise.”282The structural realist 
argument is that the relative economic decline of the USSR and its Warsaw 
Pact allies was the basis for the end of the Cold War.283 
The USSR’s systemic problems began in the 1970s, and turned out to 
be the start of an economic descent from which the country never recovered. 
In the early 1980s, the Soviet economy was marred by crisis, experiencing a 
recession from 1980 to 1982, declining oil revenue as a result of a slump in 
world oil prices from 1985 onwards, growth rates that lagged behind their US 
counterparts by at least 1% per year and had done so since 1975, and a 																																																								
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defence budget that approached 20% of GDP by the time Gorbachev 
assumed office.284 Thus, structural realists argue, the Soviet leadership lacked 
the material means to maintain the Cold War status quo and faced economic 
collapse, unless it took steps to end its on-going confrontational relationship 
with the United States. After all, it was the country’s international position 
that caused its economic malaise: defence and military outlays consumed too 
much of GDP. Brooks and Wohlforth speak of a “punishingly high peacetime 
military burden,”285 given that “nearly a quarter of all economic activity, the 
best R&D resources, and the best technical and science expertise were being 
cannibalized by the massive defence sector.”286  
The claim that the USSR spent ‘too much’ on defence merits further 
examination. How much is too much? The average citizen suffers when 
national resources are devoted to the military rather than to consumption 
goods, but whether this inevitably translates into declining international 
power cannot just be assumed. The Soviet economic model was entirely 
different from the Western consumer-capitalist paradigm: its military-oriented 
economy may well have been the logical conclusion of Soviet-style 
communism, which spurned a market-based supply and demand society – 
treating this as the cause of class warfare and inequality – in favour of a 
massive state-led production system to support a garrison state.287 Kenneth 
Oye speaks of the potentially positive relationship between economic growth 
and military spending; it is not the case that military spending unavoidably 
leads to economic weakness. 288 Given that the Soviet behemoth justified its 
political monopoly by constant reference to the threat of counter-revolution 
from within and attack from abroad, it made sense to direct a large 
proportion of GDP to the armed forces: permanent militarization was a core 
feature of this model of governance. It is not clear that this necessarily had to 
lead to economic decline.  
The structural realist story about Soviet decline provided an expedient 
narrative after the state had imploded.289 At the time the USSR’s economic 
difficulties were first beginning to show they seemed much less determining 																																																								
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than appears with hindsight. Between 1950 and 1973, the annual Soviet real 
per capita growth rate exceeded that of the USA by 1%. During the same 
period, the USSR witnessed a 100% increase in real GDP per person 
employed, 25% more than in the US. 290 Clearly, the Soviet economy wasn’t a 
disaster from start to finish. It is unclear why structural realists deem the 
Soviet economic troubles of the 1980s to have been terminal, and why the 
economy’s former virility could not return. The USSR’s rise from an 
impoverished agrarian state into a superpower was stunning.291 Its collapse 
discredited command economics, but to conclude that the latter caused the 
former is spurious in the absence of evidence that the Soviet economy was 
beyond salvation and had to lead to the USSR’s ruin. Moreover, the statistical 
picture painted is not as clear-cut as it is sometimes made out to be. Brooks 
and Wohlforth’s assertion that the USSR experienced declining productivity 
relative to the US is based on the use of inaccurate statistics which were 
inflated by the inclusion of value added by offshore production of 
intermediate products to American plants, a mistake corrected by the US 
Department of Commerce in 1991.292 The revised figures show that Soviet 
productivity growth from 1972 onwards first exceeded that of the US, and 
only began to underperform marginally by 1984.293  
 Gorbachev’s reforms, the structural realist argument goes, were 
spurred by Soviet economic decline, but at the same time, “Gorbachev’s 
particular economic reforms clearly helped propel the Soviet economy into a 
severe tailspin by the late 1980s.”294 A conceptual contradiction is at work 
here: Gorbachev was at once a passive respondent to fundamental economic 
trends and responsible for their subsequent course. How could Gorbachev’s 
policies simultaneously have been the dependent and the independent 
variable with respect to the Soviet economy? That only makes sense when 
leaders and the economy interact through feedback loops. This, of course, 
suggests a causal role for agency and the potential for Gorbachev to embark 																																																								
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on reforms that could have improved economic outcomes. The question is 
how and when leaders can influence the performance of their state: which 
decisions affect the wellbeing of a state in the international system? It is true 
that the Soviet Union’s negative economic backdrop of the 1980s provided 
the context for Gorbachev’s decisions: but this left open what response 
would be taken. In fact, the verdict of US intelligence agencies from the end 
of the 1970s onwards was that the slowdown in Soviet growth would have 
profound political effects, but that it could not be predicted how the Soviets 
would deal with stagnation.295  
Structural realists maintain that Gorbachev’s policy decisions were not 
his own, but the product of the USSR’s calamitous circumstances by 1985: 
reform policies were epiphenomenal, that is, structural developments gave 
rise to them. 296  The point here is not to dispute that the USSR was 
experiencing severe economic turbulence by the start of the 1980s, but that 
the economic picture was fuzzier than it is retrospectively claimed. Consider 
the economic situation in the West at the time. While the USSR struggled 
economically in the 1980s, Western countries suffered from malaise in the 
1970s. In 1980, inflation in the United States reached 15% and in 1981 the 
unemployment rate topped 10%, the highest since the Great Depression.297 
For the first time since the Great Depression, the real value of stock holdings 
in the UK and the US was lower in 1980 than at the beginning of the 
decade.298 Economic difficulties were not limited to the Eastern bloc alone.  
In the absence of further causes, it appears that hindsight is the main 
basis for structural realist’s claim that the USSR’s economic position made the 
peaceful and rapid end of the Cold War all but inevitable. This is postdiction, 
not prediction, an avowed aim of structural realist theorising. 299  Such 
arguments res on post-hoc rationalisations, not logical necessity. The more 
statistics and facts are cited to support the argument that the Cold War’s 
peaceful end was brought about by incontestable material developments 
which left Gorbachev with no choice but to effectively wind down the bipolar 
stand-off, the more it begs the question: if this is so obvious now, why wasn’t 
it then? As Philip Everts maintains: “The manifest inability to assess correctly 																																																								
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the probability of certain developments in the East-West context since 1988 
does not seem to have contributed notably to the modesty of many 
observers and commentators of this conflict, and to reluctance on their part 
to make strong claims and predict what would happen next.”300 Quite simply, 
glasnost was unthinkable in the early 1980s, and to treat political reform of 
this kind as inevitable is a major fault with the realist position.  
Berkowitz categorises the broad alternatives open to the Soviet 
leadership from the mid-1970s onwards: “A more ruthless leader might have 
held the state together for another ten or fifteen years; witness Alexander 
Lukashenko in Belarus and Kim Jong-Il in North Korea. A more flexible leader 
might have managed a ‘soft landing’ for the Soviet Communist Party; witness 
the current situation in China. To provide a more definitive estimate fifteen 
years before the fact was impossible because the future was not yet certain. 
It never is.”301 Brooks and Wohlforth argue that the USSR, as the declining 
challenger in a bipolar system, was especially sensitive to any trends that had 
negative consequences for its ability to keep up with the leading power.302 
That leaves open why a strategy of retrenchment was pursued rather than 
attempt to maintain the status quo as long as possible.  
Brooks and Wohlforth cite another case of a relatively declining 
hegemon in support of their theory: between 1893 and 1913, Britain’s 
economy grew by 56%, compared to 90% in Germany.303 According to 
neorealist theory, this “produced a major reorientation in [British] grand 
strategy that combined retrenchment and engagement with growing rivals, 
notably Germany.” 304  Again, however, it seems that post-hoc over-
determination is at work. Where the case of declining Britain versus rising 
Germany culminated in the First World War, the case of a declining USSR 
versus the USA culminated in the former’s peaceful implosion. To attribute 
this difference entirely to the USSR’s position as a declining challenger (rather 
than that of a declining hegemon) misses out on the aspects of political 
leadership that influenced the trajectory of the US-Soviet (and UK-British) 
relationship. Brooks and Wohlforth argue that the rapidly escalating 
economic costs of maintaining the USSR’s international position made the 																																																								
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end of the Cold War on American terms the most likely outcome.305 An 
alternative explanation is that the interactions between the USSR and the 
USA were transformed at a crucial moment from confrontation to 
cooperation. Where leadership interactions made for a destructive trajectory 
of UK-German relations that ended in an arms race and eventually war, the 
leadership of the USA and USSR embarked on a constructive path in the 
1980s and emerged out of their arms race peacefully.  
Brooks and Wohlforth maintain that just because some variable 
(economic malaise in the USSR) does not wholly determine an outcome (the 
peaceful end of the Cold War), this neither invalidates their theory nor does it 
show that other causes matter. By misrepresenting their work as 
deterministic, they argue, critics construct a strawman to showcase the 
otherwise unremarkable finding that some other cause matters in explaining 
a complex outcome.306 But that misses the point: of course, no one demands 
that theories can predict single events such as the rise of Gorbachev or the 
design and implementation of perestroika. Instead, what I wish to contrast is 
the certitude with which Brooks and Wohlforth make statements such as this 
– “one of many equally probable responses to Soviet material decline, 
retrenchment was the most likely one”307 – with the reality of how this 
material decline was viewed by scholars of international affairs at the time, 
such as Paul Kennedy:  
 
“There is nothing in the character or tradition of the Russian state to 
suggest that it could ever accept imperial decline gracefully. Indeed, 
historically, none of the over-extended, multinational empires which 
have been dealt with in this survey – the Ottoman, the Spanish, the 
Napoleonic, the British – ever retreated to their own ethnic base until 
they had been defeated in a Great Power war, or (as with Britain after 
1945), were so weakened by war that an imperial withdrawal was 
politically unavoidable.”308  
 
Structural realists such as Kenneth Waltz have a response to the objection 
that their framework is underspecified as history unfolds, and overspecified 																																																								
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when explaining of historical change retroactively: “Theory explains 
regularities of behaviour and leads one to expect that the outcomes 
produced by interacting units will fall within specified ranges.”309 That is, 
structural realism is a theory about how the international system works, one 
that parsimoniously gets at the operational essentials in order to understand 
developments in international relations at a deeper level:  
 
“Of necessity, realist theory is better at saying what will happen than 
in saying when it will happen. Theory cannot say when ‘tomorrow’ will 
come because international political theory deals with the pressures of 
structure on states and not with how states will respond to the 
pressures. The latter is a task for theories about how national 
governments respond to pressures on them and take advantage of 
opportunities that may be present. One does, however, observe 
balancing tendencies already taking place [in the unipolar system that 
emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union].”310  
 
Again, the theory is underspecified in the present (is the current, turbulent 
epoch of world politics one of re-balancing? Or is the US maintaining its 
hegemonic position and preventing balancing? Either outcome seems 
possible), but allows for an explanation of systemic developments to be 
made after the fact (either outcome can be explained).  
The influence of structural pressures on the behaviour of states is real. 
But to focus only on those pressures without due regard for how national 
governments, or more precisely national leaders, choose to respond, and 
how their response ends up affecting the international system, leaves our 
understanding of outcomes in IR sorely incomplete. Structural realism is a 
mechanistic paradigm in which “essentially identical units – interests and 
identities are assumed to be exogenously formed – are driven by ‘natural 
laws’ to behave predictably in response to exogenously determined 
conditions […] This generates ahistorical, universal explanations of relations 
between states.”311 Such simplifications of reality do not always aid our 
understanding of international politics. For instance, concentrating on the 
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state as the unit of analysis creates an analytically convenient but arbitrary 
separation of international and domestic politics. 
The rapid and peaceful end of the Cold War upset a whole range of 
structural realism’s staple axioms, including the notion that when the cost of 
maintaining hegemony rises, states try to adjust without ever giving up their 
hegemony voluntarily: indeed, the latter was regarded as the reason why the 
international system is so war-prone.312 Says Everts, “we should recall that we 
are not talking here about trivial details, but about central elements and 
characteristics of the international system. The very incapacity to distinguish 
between ‘fundamental’ and ‘accidental’ forms of change of the system strikes 
me as a reason for serious concern.”313 Structural realists maintain that the 
relative decline in Soviet power caused the end of the Cold War. 314 The 
analytical focus on Soviet economic performance and its impact on the 
material balance of power ignores the fact that the USSR’s military 
capabilities continued to pose an enormous threat to the US at least until the 
Intermediate Nuclear Force and START treaties had been signed and ratified. 
In order to understand on a deeper level how and why the hostile 
relationship between the US and the USSR changed, it seems important to 
study what steps were taken by the relevant actors on both sides toward this 
end: agency is one of  (though not the sole) the missing links between what 
Everts calls ‘fundamental’ (i.e. structural) trends and ‘accidental’ (i.e. 
contingent) outcomes.  
 Schweller and Wohlforth assert, “The Soviet Union’s best response to 
relative decline within a US-dominated bipolar system was emulation and 
engagement. [Emphasis added]”315 This implies that the USSR could have 
responded differently to the deterioration in material conditions (and in 
doing so pursued a sub-optimal policy, compared to emulation and 
engagement). So while agency isn’t absent in this explanatory framework, 
material change “precedes and prompts change in [...] ideas.”316 What is left 
unclear is why Gorbachev chose the policies that defined his tenure. 
Structural realists answer this by arguing that their theory gives primacy to 
structures, not that material developments are wholly deterministic. Agency 																																																								
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is not denied outright; Davis and Wohlforth, for instance, recognise that 
ultimately, leaders choose strategies.317 Structural pressures are translated via 
governmental officials into actual policy; Wohlforth is clear that “decision-
makers’ assessments of power are what matters.”318 Individuals thus aren’t 
irrelevant to the realist explanatory framework, but insofar as they play a role, 
they are actors in a wider material play directed by the balance of power. 
Gorbachev was responsible for dramatic policy changes such as his surprise 
announcement of a unilateral Soviet troop withdrawal from Eastern Europe in 
December 1988, but the underlying reason for this change in foreign policy 
was the USSR’s precipitous economic decline, which made such military 
commitments unaffordable. Gorbachev “could not have been a reform 
leader [...] unless he could point to undeniable material trends” to explain his 
change in foreign policy.319 Brooks and Wohlforth approach Gorbachev’s 
choices from a structural angle: “We do not claim – no responsible analyst 
can – to account for each microanalytical decision or bargaining position 
adopted during the Cold War endgame.” 320  This leaves unclear the 
transmission belt from ‘material change’ to ‘policy change.’ 
A variant of realist theory – neoclassical realism – attempts to fill this 
gap by incorporating an intervening variable in the form of agents’ 
perceptions of power and their reaction to changes in the balance of power. 
Neoclassical realists maintain that while material conditions determine the 
behaviour of states, structural signals are channelled through the foreign 
policy-making process. 321 This allows them to introduce factors like domestic 
politics, ideas, belief systems, bureaucratic politics, and bargaining into the 
structural realist framework, in an effort to explain actual foreign policy 
decisions and outcomes.322 A country’s position in the anarchic international 
system and its relative power drive its behaviour, but the pressures of 
anarchy are ultimately expressed through policy.323 The mediation of systemic 
impulses through agents and bureaucracies introduces two intervening 																																																								
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variables: the mis/perceptions of the actors in charge, and the domestic 
politicising involved in determining and implementing foreign policies.324 This 
leaves open the possibility that a Soviet leader with views different from 
Gorbachev could have pursued alternative policy paths. Neoclassical realists, 
because they argue that the primary lines of causation in international politics 
flow from the structure of the state system, also end up with underspecified 
explanatory stories.  
Neither structural nor neoclassical realists can account for the 
consequences of Gorbachev’s policies – the largely peaceful disappearance 
of a hegemonic state. That outcome was not in the USSR’s national interest: 
realists assume that states, above all, seek to ensure their own survival.325 The 
destruction of their state could not have been the intention Soviet policy-
makers.326 So did Gorbachev simply choose the wrong policies? Or were his 
policy choices irrelevant, since the USSR’s fate was determined by other, 
non-agentic factors? The first response spells trouble for those who assume 
leaders select the optimal policy responses to changing international 
structural conditions. The second reduces the role of policymakers to that of 
walk-on extras, and leaves unclear what ideational factors caused dissolution 
of the USSR.327 Both narratives do not highlight what alternative policies the 
Soviet Union could have pursued in response to its materially-induced crisis, 
and how this could have changed outcomes. 
 By counterfactually scrutinising the potential consequences of 
alternative decisions, researchers can attempt to estimate the interaction 
effects between policy-making and its corollaries. The US intelligence 
community knew from the mid-1970s onwards that the Soviet economy had 
run into systemic headwinds, that “the Soviet Union as a whole was 
stagnating or declining economically.”328 Presumably, then, so did the Soviet 
leadership during that time. Yet a succession of leaders did not embark on 
reforms. Gorbachev either did so because of decisions specific to his 
thinking, as neoclassical realists can argue, or because he had no choice, as 																																																								
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structural realists maintain.  Ideas-based explanations provide some redress. 
Liberals, for instance, point to the pervasive disillusionment with the Leninist 
model of society as the foundation for Soviet reforms.329 Constructivists 
maintain that material forces produce indeterminate outcomes if they are 
considered in the absence of prevailing norms and ideas.330  
 
 
Institutions and ideas: Liberalism and Constructivism 
Liberal theories concur with realists that the economic decline of the 
USSR formed the underlying cause of the end of the Cold War, but include 
the prevailing international environment as a conditioning factor which 
accounts for the Soviet response. The principle of nuclear deterrence, for 
instance, allowed Gorbachev to implement policies that created short-term 
vulnerabilities, such as a more conciliatory foreign policy, in pursuit of better 
economic performance, without putting the USSR’s national security at risk.331 
This still leaves open the question of how it was that Gorbachev arrived at his 
policy choices – how did he formulate his policies, and what scope did he 
possess to go down other routes? Deudney and Ikenberry suggest that the 
international context was one in which liberalism ended up dominating 
competing ideologies: in terms of satisfying human wants, the free market 
proved superior to command economies; liberal democracies provided 
stable and agreeable political governance whilst respecting a broad array of 
citizens’ rights, in stark contrast to Soviet rule.332 
This explanatory perspective contends that long-term liberal trends 
punctuated the ideological membrane surrounding the Eastern bloc. People 
desire to live in freedom, and the USSR was not immune to this universal 
aspiration. The prospect of democratic liberalisation explains the opposition 
to Communism both in Eastern Europe and at home. East Germany in 1953, 
Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Poland in 1980: periods of 
popular dissent and unrest in the Soviet sphere remained a theme 
throughout the Cold War. And where liberal modernisation – capitalism’s 
dominance over collectivised economies in terms of enhancing human 
welfare – explains the failure of communism, liberal internationalism, in the 																																																								
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form of transnational commercial links and interactions of dissident 
movements in the East with human rights campaigners in the West, 
undermined the social and ideological stability of Communist rule. 333 
Ikenberry argues that after 1945, the United States spearheaded an 
international alliance of democracies that built a ‘Liberal International Order’. 
This American-led hegemonic order resided within the larger global bipolar 
system. The Cold War ended when the competing Soviet bloc succumbed to 
its internal weaknesses: the Liberal International Order took over the 
emerging vacuum and was extended to the larger global system. 334 
Ultimately, the outlook for the Soviet leadership of joining the prospering 
liberal sphere of peace offered the most appealing way out of the increasing 
and worsening strains and burdens of Cold War competition.335  
 This is an intuitively credible approach to explaining Communism’s 
failure. It has yielded some surprising philosophical implications. Fukuyama, 
for instance, ingeniously uses the liberal story to turn Marx’s Hegelian 
interpretation of history – as a series of class-conflict driven epochs that 
inevitably bear toward Communism – on its head, proclaiming the inverse to 
be true: in the evolution of political thought, the back and forth between the 
cosmopolitan liberal creed and its detractors, culminated with liberalism 
remaining as the only credible ideological system capable of enabling 
Hegelian self-actualisation on a macro-social scale.336 As Fukuyama argues, 
“What is important about China from the standpoint of world history is not 
the present state of the reform or even its future prospects. The central issue 
is the fact that the People's Republic of China can no longer act as a beacon 
for illiberal forces around the world, whether they be guerrillas in some Asian 
jungle or middle class students in Paris.”337 Liberalism, in other words, still 
lacks a credible ideological competitor.  
But the success of China’s economic reforms exposes the limits of the 
liberal account. After all, the Chinese leadership deliberately embarked on 
economic reform without political reform: it is no coincidence that the 
Tiananmen crackdown took place in 1989, the year that political revolutions 
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swept across Eastern Europe.338 This suggests that a wider array of possible 
courses of action presented themselves to the Soviets in the 1980s, not all of 
which entailed the end of one-party rule. The USSR was not obliged in any 
sense of the word to adopt the political system of its competitor. As a matter 
of fact, Russia – the rump of the Soviet Union – did not end up becoming a 
liberal polity, unlike its former client states. By examining the potential for 
economic rejuvenation in the absence of pluralist politics in the Soviet Union, 
the contingency of liberalism’s victory can be examined. Was it an 
unintended consequence of particular choices? A contingent coincidence? 
Or, after all, an inevitability?  
Liberals also have a hard time explaining the timing of the USSR’s 
reforms: why did Gorbachev acknowledge the Soviet system’s shortcomings 
in the late 1980s, when this was not a new revelation? As put by former 
Secretary of State George Shultz, the USSR’s failure as an economic and 
ideological model was fairly clear to most objective observers; it was in the 
military dimension “it had proved itself able to develop awesome power and 
use it ruthlessly and skilfully.”339 It may be that the timing of Soviet collapse 
was the result of the rapid deterioration of the USSR’s economic performance 
at the end of the 1980s. But was this collapse a consequence of Gorbachev’s 
decisions? Could the Soviet malaise have been handled differently? Was the 
USSR’s economic deterioration caused by Gorbachev’s idiosyncrasies or by 
powerful underlying economic forces? Counterfactually changing some of 
Gorbachev’s decisions and examining how this would have affected the 
performance of the Soviet economy can addresses these causal riddles that 
liberalism leaves unanswered.  
 Constructivist accounts of the end of the Cold War emerged as a 
challenge to established theoretical paradigms in IR.340 Where realists see 
states as being trapped in an anarchic system, constructivists emphasise the 
constitutive power of norms in the international system: anarchy is not some 
objective external feature, it is what ‘states make of it’.341 Constructivists 
discuss the sources and course of the Soviet ideological transformation. The 
re-making of Soviet security interests paved the way for changes in foreign 
policy: accepting a re-unified Germany within NATO could only come about 																																																								
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after a significant ideational transformation took place in the USSR. 342 
Koslowski and Kratochwil focus on the changing constitutive rules of 
international politics: the international system is an ensemble of institutions, 
these institutions are artificial, and fundamental change in the international 
system takes place when its constitutive norms are changed.343 Actors and 
structures mutually constitute one another, structures are not immutable 
because they depend on actors for their reproduction. These actions are in 
turn conditioned by the social systems that surround them.344 Material facts 
are meaningless in and of themselves. Instead, constitutive social norms 
govern how and why agents choose to deploy the material resources 
available to them. Changes that occur in the ‘rules’ governing superpower 
relations are vital to understanding the entire Cold War, rather than changes 
in material balances. In this vein, Stalin’s rejection of free elections in Eastern 
Europe started a process that created a Soviet empire, while Gorbachev’s 
revocation of the Brezhnev doctrine began the process whereby this empire 
was deconstructed. Koslowski and Kratochwil maintain that the bipolar 
international system that prevailed during the Cold War was the “outcome of 
a succession of choices” by key actors.345 These agents rely upon normative 
conceptualisations of the world, which constitute an ideational structural 
framework. When key actors re-interpret these normative positions, new 
policy choices can come about: Koslowski and Kratochwil argue that “by 
opting for a united Germany within Western European structures, the Soviet 
leadership decided that such a solution was likely to serve Soviet security 
interests better than a neutral Germany.”346 Constructivists thus emphasise 
the role of ideational change in shaping the international system.  
Constructivists see Gorbachev and the fellow ‘new thinkers’ he 
promoted in the Soviet government as norm entrepreneurs, whose ideational 
influence acted as the source of eventual US-Soviet accommodation. 
Evangelista highlights how Gorbachev persuaded authoritative figures who 
disagreed with him to accept his policy proposals, through heresthetics, the 
use of language to manipulate the political agenda. 347  The keys to 
Gorbachev’s success were “his skilful manipulation of the political agenda, 																																																								
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his appeal to broad norms […] and his mastery of the main features of the 
Soviet political system.” 348  Re-constituting norms such as the Brezhnev 
Doctrine was only possible after social-structural changes took place, 
prompted by civil society developments and changes in self-identification.349 
Evolving social practices – for example the rise of anti-totalitarian movements 
in Eastern Europe – undermined the legitimacy of the existing norm of Soviet 
suzerainty and brought about civil disobedience. This eventually destabilised 
the Soviet system, as the actors in charge decided to dismantle the social 
practices that upheld the informal Soviet empire (such as military intervention 
in client states that rejected Communist one-party rule).350	The structural-ideal 
features of the ‘normative identity’ concept are placed on a co-constitutive 
footing with the policy decisions of agents, meaning neither agency nor 
structure causally precedes each other.  
Co-constituting ideational structures and idiosyncratic agency makes 
for a thought-provoking explanation for how the Cold War ended. It also 
heightens researchers’ sensitivity to the role agents can play in influencing 
events. Evangelista, for instance, reaches a careful counterfactual conclusion 
of Gorbachev’s importance: “It is not too much of a leap to suggest that a 
politician less skilled in heresthetic techniques than Gorbachev would have 
failed to implement the foreign policy reforms that contributed to the end of 
the Cold War.”351 However, as Dessler notes, constructivist theories relying 
on co-constitution “have often been presented in terms too vague to be of 
practical use.” 352  Koslowski and Kratochwil maintain that Gorbachev’s 
toleration of Poland’s free elections in 1989 (in which the Communist party 
was roundly defeated) meant the beginning of the end of Soviet dominance 
of the Warsaw Pact. But just why Brezhnev sent troops into Czechoslovakia in 
1968 to uphold Communist governance, while Gorbachev refused to do so in 
1989, is not accounted for. And the norm-evolution posited as the 
explanation for Communism’s collapse is troubling in its certitude. Anti-
totalitarian sentiment in Eastern Europe was hardly a normative innovation of 
the 1980s. What prompted the grip of dictatorship to be lessened after 50 
years of domination? Evangelista asserts, “There is no doubt that the desire 																																																								
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to improve the Soviet economy in the long term lay behind many of 
Gorbachev's security policy initiatives, including the unilateral reduction in 
conventional forces.”353 Checkel identifies two causal mechanisms that can 
run concurrently when agents begin to observe new norms: an 
instrumentalist channel, wherein changing cost-benefit calculations and 
bargaining produces new behaviour, and persuasion at the level of groups or 
societies through learning and socialisation.354   
Risse-Kappen argues that ideas intervene between material factors 
and actors’ interests and preferences. In terms of where they originate, 
“ideas do not float freely”: agents are always exposed to a number of 
competing, sometimes contradictory policy ideas, which arise from 
“epistemic communities of knowledge-based transnational networks.” 355 
Domestic political structures are the key variables that determine which 
policies move up to high-level decision-making stratas. Risse-Kappen 
discusses Soviet political institutions, state-society relations and the values 
and norms embedded in Soviet political culture, all of which influenced the 
intellectual policy climate at the end of the 1980s. Policy networks in the 
West advocated common security and non-offensive defence, and promoted 
these ideas to Soviet institutchniks who participated in exchanges and 
meetings with Western security analysts and scholars. This emerging 
intellectual community changed the normative environment within which 
Gorbachev’s new thinking developed and took hold. When Gorbachev 
adopted the idea of a common security policy, he was met with the most 
immediate and positive response in Germany, where the idea of a common 
security policy had already established itself in the foreign policy consensus 
of society.356   
This raises questions about the role of leaders, specifically the scope 
agents possess to actively shape the ideational basis of policymaking: to 
what extent do idiosyncrasies matter? Is the agent in charge of or beholden 
to extraneous ideological forces? To what extent is the agent a recipient as 
opposed to a generator of ideas? There is a class of theorising in IR that 
borrows from psychology to open up the cognition of decision-making in an 
attempt to answer such questions. Such theories can “offer significant 																																																								
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insights into why particular ideas carry the day in specific policy choices.”357 
Lebow, for example, highlights the importance of agents’ motivation and the 
consequent distribution not of material capabilities but of interests.358 Stein 
argues that Gorbachev was an inductive learner who was open to radical 
ideas and policies and adjusted his policies in response to Western reactions 
and initiatives, rather than deductively thinking about how to best maximise 
his objectively given interests.359 Gorbachev was just one half of the equation: 
he had to interact with his counterpart in the US in order to defuse the Cold 
War. Breslauer and Lebow argue that Reagan entered office with simplistic 
but strong anti-Soviet views, illustrated by his ‘evil empire’ rhetoric, but 
“retired as the biggest dove in his administration.”360 Because his image of 
the Soviet Union, “while pronounced in its hostility, was relatively simple and 
undifferentiated,” it was susceptible to dramatic change. 361  Reagan’s 
tendency “to reduce issues to personality” meant that he came away from 
personal meetings with Gorbachev in Geneva in 1985 and Reykjavik in 1986 
impressed and convinced by his commitment to reduce the nuclear 
danger.362 Keith Shimko demonstrates that in the years before Gorbachev’s 
rise to power, Reagan’s belief system was much more open to the possibility 
of Soviet–American cooperation than were those of his advisors.363 
This cognitive assessment of agency stands in opposition to the utility 
maximising agent encountered in rational choice theories: idiosyncrasies 
matter, in that perception affects one’s choice of policy. Leaders work to 
build a balance of interest, interacting with other leaders, their domestic 
audience, international public opinion and the elite consensus among the 
policy-making class.364 The national interest is not a fixed, materially defined 
goal, but a flexible construct subject to re-definition via a complex process of 
ideological change. This means that policy-making behaviour can be non-
linear. 365  Elite learning at the unit level has systemic consequences – 
“reflective actors [...] can [...] transcend the consequences of anarchy.”366 																																																								
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Human beings are able “to alter their social environment in profound ways” 
by knowing and understanding the structures around them.367 The human 
intellect gives agents the “understanding and courage to escape from their 
security dilemma.”368  
The implication is that individual actors matter a great deal in world 
politics. IR traditionally locates variables that affect international politics on 
three levels of analysis: the international system, the domestic character of 
states, and the level of the individual.369 In Man, the State and War, Kenneth 
Waltz offers a compelling reason to leave the level of ‘man’ out of the study 
of war. Waltz argues that the search for causes attempts to explain 
differences in the world, which cannot be accomplished when the factor in 
question, human nature, is in fact not variable but constant.370 “Human nature 
may in some sense have been the cause of war in 1914, but by the same 
token it was the cause of peace in 1910,” writes Waltz.371 Since man’s nature 
is a given, it is futile to try and explain variance in international politics on this 
causal dimension: a constant cannot explain a variable, and so the level of 
the individual agent ought to be left aside as an explanan in IR. 
As a result, the concept of the ‘state’ – Waltz’s ‘second image’ – is a 
significant analytical building-block in IR. Singer, for example, who first 
formally introduced ‘levels of analysis’ to IR, was quite clear that the state is 
the “primary actor in international relations.”372 Hudson points out that “most 
contemporary theoretical work in IR gives the impression that its ground lies 
in states.”373 Wight has gone further, arguing that “any denial of the ‘state-as-
agent’ thesis might seem to presage the end of IR as an academic discipline 
[…] without the notion of the ‘state-as-agent’, IR appears to be little other 
than a macro-sociological exercise in political theory or history.”374 In other 
words, IR as an academic enterprise has to devote significant analytical focus 
to the state as an autonomous actor in international politics for it to provide a 
distinct set of contributions to social science. A commitment of some kind to 
the state is shared by most IR theorists, although the actual content of their 																																																								
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theories and the way they approach the state – critically, or axiomatically –
radically differs.375 Waltz’s theory of structural realism, for example, does not 
analytically probe the existence of states as such, states are simply assumed 
to be the principal actors in international politics. Wendt formulated his 
constructivist theory of IR as an explicit counterweight to what he felt was an 
ontologically reductionist approach by Waltz: but he, too, argues that the 
state is a ‘person’ possessing agency and deems IR theory to be a state-
centric project.376 Paradigms such as liberalism and constructivism, which 
probe the domestic arrangements of states, be they institutional or ideal, 
often do so with the aim of explaining the configuration of the international 
system populated by states, albeit from a state-level rather than a systems-
level perspective.377 To use Hudson’s terminology, the ‘ground’ of IR is the 
state, and insofar as human agents are included in IR theory, they are ‘black-
boxed’ as decision-makers, operating under the imperatives of the state as 
the key agent in international affairs.378  
By contrast, Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) concerns itself centrally with 
the decision-makers running the state, and thus focuses its inquiry on the 
state and individual levels of analysis. Foreign policy, defined by Hill as “the 
sum of official external relations conducted by [the] state in international 
relations,” is the manifestation of state behaviour in the international realm.379 
The aggregated outcomes and dynamics of such state behaviour are the 
focus of IR. But, as Welch points out, “all state behaviour is the product of 
human decisions. We talk about the [...] behaviour of states, but this is merely 
a convenient shorthand [...] for the goals and choices of individual human 
beings who make decisions that result in the behaviour we observe.”380 
Hudson disagrees with Wendt: “states are not agents because states are 
abstractions and thus have no agency. Only human beings can be true 
agents.”381 Snyder lays out the ground of FPA clearly: “We adhere to the 
nation-state as the fundamental level of analysis, yet we have discarded the 
state as a meta-physical abstraction. By emphasizing decision-making as a 
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central focus we have provided a way of organizing the determinants of 
action around those officials who act for the political society.”382  
Where IR struggles to theoretically integrate agency into its analyses, 
FPA deliberately opens up the black box of decision-making as the target of 
its scholarship. 383  A host of associated assumptions accompany this 
theoretical baseline. Governments are not mere passive absorbers of societal 
and international pressures, but actively shape the context they find 
themselves in. Leadership matters, and leaders differ both in their 
psychopathology and how they influence/are influenced by their milieu. It 
follows that, if we want to understand events in international politics, we 
need to study the decisions that preceded these events, who took them, how 
and why. As put by Walt: “Not all [of IR theory] falls neatly into the realist, 
liberal, or radical paradigms. In particular, a number of important works focus 
on the characteristics of states, governmental organizations, or individual 
leaders.”384  
What scholars of FPA do not do is “seek to provide a general theory 
of international behavior,” hence FPA is not to be seen as an “approach for 
the analysis of the international system as a whole.”385 Rather, FPA focuses on 
specific instances of actual state behaviour in the international realm – that is, 
foreign policy – peering past the state level of analysis into the individual 
level. This is what Hudson means when she states that FPA’s “ground of the 
human decision maker leads us toward an emphasis on agent-oriented 
theory.”386 Gerner observes, “the central focus on foreign policy analysis is 
on the intentions, statements, and actions of an actor – often, but not always, 
a state – directed toward the external world and the response of other actors 
to these intentions, statements, and actions.”387  FPA “privileges the human 
decision maker”.388 It seeks to unpack the ‘black box’ of decision-making.389 A 
basic distinction between IR and FPA, then, is that the former looks at 
outcomes in international affairs. Much of IR theory aims to understand how 																																																								
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these outcomes are brought about in relation to other outcomes and 
variables operating at Waltz’s third image: the international system of states. 
FPA, by way of contrast, studies the people and the decision-making 
processes that produce these outcomes. The interaction effects between 
decision-makers, policy and outcomes in the international system are the 
targets of this thesis’ investigation.390  
Agents are of particular interest in this mesh of causal influence. Due 
to the importance of idiosyncrasies, leaders cannot simply be exchanged 
counterfactually without affecting outcomes. By asking and trying to answer 
counterfactual questions – both about decisions taken and those considered 
but not taken (why not?), and about the presence of agents themselves – the 
extent to which leaders played a role in ending the end of the Cold War can 
be probed. This means looking at specific decisions, for instance on arms 
control negotiations, which involved the weighing up of options and 
adjudication between competing views. By examining why given options 
were selected and others discarded, the level of opposition that needed to 
be overcome, and suggesting alternative courses, the causal weight of actors 
can be studied. Was Reagan uniquely accommodating to Gorbachev’s 
overtures? Would different decisions have yielded different outcomes, or was 
the USSR headed inexorably toward collapse and capitulation? If the latter is 
true, was this due to Gorbachev? In a sense, such questions are applied 
forms of the agent-structure problem, which is one of the central ontological 
dilemmas of the discipline of International Relations.391  
 
 
Do Leaders Matter? Setting the analytical stage 
This thesis is an effort to examine the influence of leadership on 
international affairs. Jervis explains, “the question of the extent to which 
leaders matter in international politics is as familiar as it is impossible to fully 
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answer.” 392  One attempt is to ask whether leaders have individual 
preferences that have deep effects on their responses to particular events. 
Decision-making agents, in their interpretation of world events, differ in how 
they perceive “other leaders, the domestic sources of foreign policy, and the 
external environment.393 Counterfactuals that compare leaders can be used 
to examine whether alternative leadership leads to different policies in similar 
circumstances. Failure to find evidence of policy divergences suggests that 
leaders exhibit behaviour consistent across time and place. Such analyses are 
difficult to undertake, as it is unclear whether changing leaders in a 
counterfactual fundamentally changes the situation under investigation – just 
as it is unclear whether particular situations give rise to particular kinds of 
leaders. Leader substitutions that are random – such as deaths of leaders, or 
elections whose outcome are very close – put researchers on stronger 
ground in terms of attributing changing policies to factors we associate with 
the outgoing or incoming leader.394  
Ronald Reagan’s election victory in 1980 coincided with the beginning 
of a decade of geopolitical change that culminated in the peaceful collapse 
of the Soviet Union. Was Reagan incidental or coincidental to this outcome? 
There exists a so-called ‘Reagan victory school’395, interestingly its major 
proponents are non-academics including “former Pentagon officials like 
Caspar Weinberger and Richard Perle, columnist George Will [and] 
neoconservative thinker Irving Kristol.”396 In 1992, Deudney and Ikenberry 
described the Reagan victory school as an emerging orthodoxy, particularly 
in its praise of the Reagan Administration’s ‘peace through strength’ policies: 
“The view giving most of the credit [for ending the Cold War] to Reagan-era 
assertiveness and Western strength has become the new conventional 
wisdom.” They challenged such accounts: “contrary to the conventional 
wisdom, the defense buildup did not produce Soviet capitulation,” citing 
instead Soviet internal weaknesses and “an extraordinary convergence by 
Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev on a vision of mutual nuclear vulnerability 
and disarmament.” 397  Two years later, Lebow and Stein went further, 
asserting that the Reagan military build-up “did not defeat the Soviet Union. 																																																								
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On the contrary, it prolonged the Cold War.”398 Their reasoning is that 
Reagan’s hard-line stance on defence matters made it more difficult for 
Gorbachev to convince conservatives and his military leadership of America’s 
peaceful intentions. April Carter goes so far as to deny outright a link 
between Reagan’s policies and the end of the Cold War, arguing that this 
“vindicates the policies of seeking military superiority and ‘negotiations from 
strength,’ which could be disastrous as precedents,” and reject the idea that 
“Reagan’s arms build-up and his economic pressure on the USSR directly 
influenced the content of Gorbachev’s policies. [original italics]”399 Others, 
such as Beth Fischer, have tried to show that the Reagan victory school 
overplays the extent of Moscow’s apprehension about the US military build-
up, while Dobson questions whether the political goals of the Reagan 
Administration’s massive defence budget increases were anything other than 
domestic, with its foreign policy ambition limited to strengthening the US’ 
negotiation position rather than bringing about the USSR’s collapse.400  
A particularly controversial feature of Reagan’s military strategy was 
the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Launched in March 1983 this was soon 
nicknamed the ‘Star Wars’ project, with its ambitious vision of space-based 
defence against intercontinental ballistic missiles. Critics at home and abroad 
perceived SDI as a deliberate act of upping the ante on the USSR by opening 
a new phase in the arms race: targeting nuclear weapons mid-flight protects 
the US homeland but undercuts the basis for nuclear deterrence, because a 
defence against Soviet missiles would give the US a first-strike capability. 
Reagan faced serious domestic criticism for Star Wars. George Ball, 
Ambassador to the UN under Lyndon Johnson, penned a withering 10,000 
word critique of SDI, accusing the President directly: 
 
“The risks of this ill-conceived venture are enormous and they are 
increased by the possibility that the public will be so deceived by 
specious promises or confused by technological jargon that it will 
ignore the lessons of the past and acquiesce in a vision that seems to 
promise peace but will have the opposite result. Pursuing the 
President’s Star Wars program will turn outer space into a new 
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battlefield, increase the risks of catastrophic conflict, and enlarge 
man’s ability to destroy civilization.”401 
 
Evangelista believes that SDI was an obstacle to progress: reformers in the 
USSR pursued the goal of arms control despite, not because of ‘Star Wars’.402 
Zubok, by contrast, believes SDI signalled a new round of the arms race that 
Gorbachev was keen to prevent, contributing to the Soviet decision to 
pursue arms control instead. 403 Brown disagrees: “it was not so much the 
hard-line policies of Reagan’s first term [like SDI] that ended the Cold War, 
but his willingness to enter into serious negotiations and treat the Soviet 
leader more as a partner than an enemy.”404 The question is how sustained 
rapprochement between Reagan and Gorbachev came about. Did Star Wars 
create a climate in which any leader of the Soviet Union found it more 
advantageous to negotiate? A deeper question concerns whether Gorbachev 
or indeed any Soviet leader coming to power in 1985 was bound to pursue 
arms control, regardless of who was in office in the US. Relatedly, would 
someone other than Reagan have been able to strike the far-reaching deals 
with Gorbachev that were necessary to fundamentally defuse Cold War 
tensions? Lebow and Breslauer address this question by counterfactually 
examining how events might have unfolded in the absence of Ronald Reagan 
in the 1980s. They engage in a minimal-rewrite counterfactual study in which 
they have the President die at the hand of John Hinckley Jr., his failed 
assassin, a scenario which rests on but a few millimetres’ difference in 
Hinckley’s bullet’s trajectory.405  
This truly is a minimal rewrite counterfactual. It highlights the central 
role played by sheer chance in preventing Hinckley’s assassination attempt 
from succeeding. Had it not been for a few coincidences, Reagan’s 
presidency would have ended 69 days after it began. No model and no 
theory can integrate the underlying presence of such contingency in shaping 
social affairs. Randomness is by definition not amenable to analysis for 
patterns.406 Only theories of IR that abstract contingency entirely out of their 
analyses of world politics fail to view this fundamental presence of 																																																								
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unpredictability in daily human affairs as significant for causal analysis. Whilst 
no counterfactual can definitively demonstrate whether or not a particular 
agent was of causal importance in an event, they all raise profound questions 
concerning the relevance of individuals in influencing reality. 
 Breslauer and Lebow’s counterfactual involves reconstructing the 
entirety of the 1980s and scrutinising whether the same policy outcomes 
would have occurred under Reagan’s Vice-President, George H. W. Bush. 
This analysis sheds light on Reagan’s influence as an agent on the end of the 
Cold War. Breslauer and Lebow argue, on grounds of Bush’s “ambivalence, 
moderate Republicanism, and lesser popularity” that he would likely have 
embarked on a “less sweeping strategy of confrontation, less extreme 
rhetoric (‘evil empire’) and policies (Star Wars).” As such, Bush would have 
been less confrontational in his policy choices than President Reagan, 
particularly in the face of tacit Soviet conciliatory gestures by Andropov in 
1982 and the increasing intensity of the West European peace movement in 
response to the upcoming deployment of American Pershing II missiles.407 
Reagan’s choice of strategy was idiosyncratic, they maintain: “Reagan dug in 
his heels in the face of all these obstacles and held out for maximal Soviet 
concessions.” Moreover, “the temper of American politics, as well as Bush’s 
personality […] probably would have ruled out a substantially conciliatory US 
response to Soviet gestures [under Gorbachev].” Still, according to Breslauer 
and Lebow’s counterfactual, Bush’s marginally more mollifying course could 
have produced large-scale ramifications down the line: “The lesser resolve 
and greater insecurity of a George Bush or Walter Mondale might have made 
it less attractive tactically and more difficult politically for Gorbachev to justify 
far-reaching concessions.” 408  Breslauer and Lebow provide a cognitive 
schema of sorts on President Reagan, contending that his “ignorance of […] 
[and] much less complex cognitive schemas about the Soviet Union” enabled 
his “dramatic about-face” in going from regarding the USSR as an ‘evil 
empire’ to striking far-reaching security and arms agreements within the span 
of a few years.  
 Breslauer and Lebow’s counterfactual extrapolation of someone as 
deeply engrained in the fabric of history as President Reagan primarily serves 
to illustrate the underlying contingency of events in the 1980s (in that a minor 
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rewrite of historical events – Reagan’s death – would have fundamentally 
altered political outcomes). Their minimal rewrite of history offers one way to 
try and measure the role of leadership in world politics. Another is to look at 
the policy ruptures introduced when a leader selects a policy. Leaders’ 
choices provide a ‘natural’ counterfactual in the form of alternative decisions 
considered but not taken. Following from the theoretic baseline that 
causation operates on all three levels of analysis in a complex system, one 
way ‘into’ complexity is at the level of leadership. In the complex adaptive 
system that is the realm of international affairs, leaders are critical nodes, 
acting as choice-producing units. My argument is not that agents are the only 
critical nodes, but that they form a set of causal linchpins. 
 Counterfactuals, in the first instance, distinguish between incidental 
and coincidental events. For example, it is hard to conceive of Soviet 
retrenchment in the absence of economic weakness, so it can broadly be 
surmised that the decline in material power of the USSR contributed to the 
end of the Cold War, which is what realists argue. Similarly, in the absence of 
breakthroughs in expanding the liberal-institutional order, such as the 1987 
Intermediate Nuclear Force treaty, the normalisation of East-West relations is 
much harder to imagine – again, then, it can be surmised that liberal 
processes causally contributed to the end of the Cold War. Likewise, the 
peaceful revolutions of 1989 would not have occurred without the rise of a 
transnational epistemic community in Europe in the 1970s and the resulting 
normative-ideational evolution it brought about, as per constructivist 
accounts. Such broad counterfactuals establish expansive causal drivers, but 
on their own do not tell us how various incidental causal dynamics relate to 
each other. Similarly, different theories of IR make good sense of specific 
developments in the 80s in isolation. The economic picture favoured Soviet 
retrenchment (realists). Norm evolution occurred thanks to Gorbachev 
(constructivists). Leadership co-operation allowed for arms control 
agreements (liberals). It is when these developments are lined up 
concurrently that complexity arises. The causal interactions among IR theories 
can and should be made better sense of. Complexity theory is not a solution 
to all of IR’s epistemological problems: it is a supplementary means of 
investigating the more granular operational features of the international 
system. In combination with counterfactual analysis, complexity theory can 
help shed light on the meta-theoretical linkages between IR’s various 
approaches.  
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What follows is, to all intents and purposes, an attempt to ‘predict the 
past’: studying how events have unfolded versus how they could have 
unfolded, so as to better differentiate between essential and incidental 
causes. Counterfactuals suggest causal pathways. It is important to 
remember that counterfactuals do not imply inherent contingency: they can 
equally reveal an event to be overdetermined. By helping to distinguish 
between the contingent and the preordained, counterfactuals generate 
knowledge about causes. After all, the credibility of any postulated cause 
rests on how convincing its counterfactual inverse is.  
 
 
A note on methodology 
History is non-repeatable, so reverse-engineering it is enormously 
challenging. 409  Nonetheless, if a counterfactual analysis contributes to 
understanding of the general properties of the phenomenon under study (in 
this case, how structures, agents and chance interacted to bring about 
systemic change in the 1980s), and points out the limits of what can’t be 
known, the exercise is a knowledge-generating one. My theoretical 
contribution (I hope) is to go beyond existing approaches and advance our 
knowledge of how different causal effects interact. The study examines 
events in the 1980s as they were perceived and shaped by leaders. In an 
effort to reconstruct events as they were seen at the time I interviewed a 
number of policymakers from the Reagan and Bush Administrations who 
were involved in the end of the Cold War.410 This was also driven partly by a 
desire to safeguard the plausibility of the counterfactual scenarios I construct, 
by benchmarking them against what eyewitnesses deem to have been 
possible and realistic. I also consulted archival material, in order to back my 
accounts of the policies and strategies advocated by Reagan and Bush’s 
cabinets with primary source material. In addition, the analysis relies on 
secondary literature and autobiographical accounts from policymakers of the 
time. The 1980s are narrated sequentially, embellished by counterfactual 																																																								
409  Taleb likens the process to back-tracing a puddle left by a molten ice cube to its original 
form. When looking at an ice cube on a table, we can confidently predict that it will turn 
into a puddle of water, and precisely compute the process. When looking at a puddle of 
water, even with the knowledge that this used to be an ice cube, the process of 
reconstructing the shape of the ice cube and its disintegration is immensely complex, if 
not impossible. (2007), 195-198 
410  A list of interviewees is provided at the beginning of the bibliography.  
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analyses that tease out interactive causal links between the various driving 
factors of US-Soviet relations in the decade. Policy decisions, personnel 
appointments and bilateral negotiations are presented along with an analysis 
that attempts to weave together the complex and dense causal dynamics of 
the era. 
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CHAPTER THREE  
 
CARTER, REAGAN, AND THE BEGINNING OF THE END 
 
 
 
 
Reagan really wasn’t paying that much attention to Soviet affairs in the first 
two years. As a matter of fact, I think he didn’t fully grasp how his policies 
were coming across. He would tend to disengage if he felt nothing was 
going to happen. 
Jack F. Matlock 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter describes the features of complexity at the end of the 
1970s that established the context within which US and Soviet leaders acted 
in the 1980s.  
The deterioration in US-Soviet relations after 1979 was characterised 
by non-linearity: the Soviet decision to deploy a new class of intercontinental 
ballistic nuclear missile prompted renewed security fears in the West; 
concurrently, an avoidable domestic political manoeuvre – the Cuban 
Brigade crisis – in the US unintentionally convinced the Soviets that SALT II, 
the last remaining arms control pillar of détente, would not be ratified. This 
contributed to the Soviet decision to invade Afghanistan in 1979. Minor 
rewrites could have precluded this outcome.  
The interaction of US political leaders with the complex international 
context of 1980 is studied through the policy continuities and discontinuities 
between Presidents Carter and Reagan. Policy shifts from Carter to Reagan 
are examined counterfactually, providing evidence that Reagan introduced 
certain original, idiosyncratic foreign policy positions.  
The contingent non/emergence of events and the limits of leadership 
are discussed in terms of the Soviet non-invasion of Poland in 1980. Had the 
USSR not invaded Afghanistan, ample resources would have been available 
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to intervene in the Polish political crisis. This would have presented any 
incoming US President with an international crisis that would have 
significantly altered the policy context of the 1980s, with unforeseeable 
outcomes.  
 
 
Non-linearity: SALT II, Cuba, and Afghanistan  
Seemingly unrelated events in complex systems can have large-scale, 
unanticipated consequences. Rosenau calls this feature of complexity ‘the 
power of small events’.411 Decision-makers sometimes influence international 
affairs inadvertently through their contingent behaviour, bringing about 
outcomes through non-purposeful choices. A good example thereof is the 
curious tale of the Cuban Brigade Affair and the USSR’s invasion of 
Afghanistan in 1979. A few minor rewrites of entirely contingent choices 
could have substantially altered the Soviet strategic picture in the run up to 
the invasion of Afghanistan. This ties into the notion that in complex systems, 
decisions and conditions in one area of the system can causally influence 
future outcomes elsewhere in a system in a manner disproportionate to the 
seeming significance of events at the time. If an event is brought about by a 
confluence of many different causes, then the fewer such causes need to be 
removed to prevent the event, the more contingent it is.412 In the run-up to 
contingent events, a multiverse of pathways present themselves; history 
could unfold differently along each of these. Outcomes brought about by 
such non-linear confluences are not straightforward causal affairs. This poses 
a problem for theories that attempt to draw linear causal connections 
between events. The indirect and convoluted links between the Cuban 
Brigade Affair and the invasion of Afghanistan underline this point.  
At the end of the 1970s, the Soviet Politburo’s main benchmark to 
measure US engagement was the Carter Administration’s handling of the 
Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty 2 (SALT II) ratification process.413 SALT II 
was a US-Soviet arms control treaty signed by Carter and Brezhnev in the 
spring of 1979. Carter formally submitted it to the Senate for consideration in 																																																								
411  See Rosenau (1998) 
412  By extension, the more causes need to be removed to prevent said event, the more 
redundant it is. For a more elaborate discussion of this point see Lebow (2000) 
413  See Savranskaya and Welch (1994), especially comments by Dobrynin (95) and Gelb 
(148). Caldwell sums it up: “SALT, and the broader Soviet-American relationship, were 
intertwined like the strands of a rope.” (214)   
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June. During the summer months, a political storm in a teacup brewed in the 
US: the Cuban Brigade ‘crisis.’ Though on the face of it unrelated to SALT, a 
confluence of unfortunate timing, miscommunication, and misguided 
judgment meant that the issue eventually assumed an urgency wholly 
disproportionate to its actual relevance, and in the process helped derail the 
ratification of SALT II, which accidentally removed a key barrier to the Soviet 
decision to invade Afghanistan.  
Throughout 1979 Senator Richard Stone, a Florida Democrat 
threatened by a Republican bid for his seat, used his position on the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee to press for intelligence on Cuban military 
affairs. At a hearing of the committee in July, Stone asked Secretary of 
Defence Harold Brown and CIA Director Stansfield Turner to comment on 
reports that a Soviet brigade of combat troops had recently arrived in Cuba. 
Brown and Turner responded that there was no new information on Soviet 
activities in Cuba – a factually correct statement, as the brigade in question 
had been stationed there since 1962 to train and provide support to Cuban 
forces.414 Idaho Senator Frank Church, who chaired the hearing, made a 
public statement afterward confirming that the situation in Cuba remained 
unchanged. At the same time, news about an apparent Soviet military build-
up in Cuba was leaked to the press.415 By July 20, ABC news reported “a 
brigade of Soviet troops, possibly as many as six-thousand combat-ready 
men, has been moved to Cuba in recent weeks.”416 Senator Stone wrote a 
letter to President Carter four days later enquiring about the unit in Cuba and 
received a reply on from Cyrus Vance, the Secretary of State, again 
reiterating what Turner and Brown said to the Foreign Relations Committee. 
Vance cleared his letter with the White House, the Department of Defense, 
and CIA. But on August 22, the National Foreign Assessment centre issued a 
co-ordinated intelligence finding based on fresh satellite imagery that 
confirmed the presence of a Soviet combat brigade consisting of about 
2,600 men – a finding falsely presented as new. Senator Church’s statement 
of July now seemed to be contradicted. Church was under political pressure 
from a Republican Political Action Committee targeting his seat, which was 																																																								
414  See statements by Wayne Smith, Director of Cuban Affairs Bureau at the State 
Department in Savranskaya and Welch (1994), 157-160 
415  One such leaker was through John Carbaugh, an aide to hardline Senator Jesse Helms. 
See Savranskaya and Welch (1994), 166 
416  Ibid 
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airing a TV commercial that showed Church smoking a cigar with Fidel Castro 
on a recent trip to Havana.417 Church, advised that the ‘new’ intelligence 
‘finding’ was due to be published in the media imminently, decided to pre-
emptively leak the news and announced the presence of the brigade live on 
television, stating “there is no likelihood whatever that the Senate would 
ratify the SALT II Treaty as long as Russian combat troops remain stationed in 
Cuba.”418  This press conference took on Saturday, a day after a phone-call 
between Senator Church and Cyrus Vance, in which Church informed Vance 
of his intention to make a statement on the matter. Secretary Vance advised 
the Senator not to blow the affair out of proportion.419 Senator Church had 
also tried to reach President Carter by phone but was told by the White 
House operator that Carter was in Georgia and unavailable throughout the 
weekend.420  
The Soviets interpreted this turn of events as a deliberate effort by 
Carter to torpedo SALT II before the ratification process had even begun. It 
took a week for the US intelligence community to confirm that the Soviet 
brigade was not new but stationed there for almost 20 years. When Vance 
explained to Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet Ambassador, how the brigade 
affair came about, Dobrynin shook his head in disbelief and exclaimed, “How 
am I ever going to persuade the people back at home that this is what 
happened? They’ll never believe me.” 421  Alexander Bessmertnykh, 
Counsellor at the Soviet Embassy, described the affair as “so artificial it was 
almost like an attempt to sabotage the SALT treaty,” while Dobrynin later 
commented, “We simply could not believe the story. We could not believe it! 																																																								
417  Duffy (1983), 78 
418  Savranskaya and Welch (1992), 162. Reported on the front page of the Washington Post, 
6 September 1979; see Shoultz (2009), 669 
419  Vance responded to Church’s question (‘Would you mind if I made a statement on the 
brigade?’) with his trademark gentlemanly, but indirect form of communication: “Well, 
Senator, that would not be at all helpful, but of course the decision is up to you. I know 
you’ll use your best judgment in what you say.” Savranskaya and Welch, 157 
420  Les Denend, then a staff member on the NSC, has the following to say about this: “The 
Cuban Brigade was a summer event […] so nobody was there. Everybody takes vacation, 
and the first team is not there […] 1979 wasn’t like it is today. There was no e-mail, there 
were no cell phones, there was no messaging […] It was somebody in the White House 
Situation Room, who worked for me, who [was] going through the old material [and] 
found the press release from 1962 that said that a Brigade would remain. […] The 
damage was done. […] [The US Government] had agreed to the situation that Church 
was [now] outraged about.” Personal interview with Les Denend. 
421  Testimony by Marshall Shulman, Special Advisor to the Secretary of State for Soviet 
Affairs, in Savranskaya and Welch (1992), 154 
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It was ridiculous – all this talk about a brigade, quote unquote, that had just 
arrived in Cuba.”422 An editorial in Pravda, a propaganda organ of the Soviet 
Communist Party, entitled ‘Who needed this and why?’ asked how something 
that had been a non-issue for 17 years could all of a sudden threaten to 
derail SALT II, the crown jewel of the arms control process.423 Moscow 
refused to remove or modify their brigade in Cuba, treating the issue as a 
wilful and clumsy attempt by the Carter Administration to extract concessions 
from them after the treaty had already been signed. By mid-September, 
Vance admitted the U.S. had no right to demand that the troops be 
removed, under understandings signed in 1964 and 1970 with the Soviet 
government about the nature of relations between the USSR and Cuba.424 
The affair thus not only failed to elicit a change in Soviet behaviour, but also 
undermined the credibility of the Carter Administration. Carter used a 
televised address to the nation on October 1 1979 to announce that “the 
presence of Soviet combat troops in Cuba is of serious concern to us,” but 
seeing as the brigade would not be moved, could do no more than 
announce a few toothless unilateral steps to increase US monitoring of Soviet 
behaviour in the Caribbean region.425 
The timing of this unforeseeable turn of events was crucial to its 
subsequent impact. Until the brigade issue rose to the fore, the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee had undertaken a number of weeks’ worth of 
detailed hearings on SALT II, and “the prospects for its passage looked at 
least equitable.”426 However, in light of the ‘new’ intelligence about Soviet 
behaviour in Cuba, Frank Church – the committee chairman – decided to link 
further hearings to the outcome of the brigade affair. This meant that the 
Committee only ended up concluding its hearings by November. By the time 
it was finally tabled for debate in the Senate, the invasion of Afghanistan had 
already taken place, which effectively ‘killed’ SALT II.  
The various contingencies involved in the entire debacle must not be 
underestimated: when Senator Church received the supposedly novel but 
entirely misleading intelligence about the Soviet brigade late in August 1979, 
some of the key members of the Carter Administration were on holiday and 																																																								
422  See statements by Alexander Bessmertnykh and Anatoly Dobrynin, in Savranskaya and 
Welch (1992), 150-151  
423  Duffy, 80 
424  Ibid, 72 
425  Carter (1979)  
426  Duffy, 81 
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could not be reached in a timely fashion for non-emergency matters, 
including National Security Advisor Brzezinski and President Carter. 427 
Senator Church, by contrast, was campaigning in Idaho, feeling the heat 
regarding his ‘soft’ approach to foreign policy. When Church reached 
Secretary of State Vance before his ill-fated public announcement regarding 
the brigade, Vance failed to urge Church strongly enough not to go public. 
In the event, Church’s manoeuvring damaged SALT II’s prospects before it 
even made it to the Senate floor. For example, Senator Russell Long, a senior 
figure in the Senate, announced on September 12 that he was going to 
change his vote and reject SALT II, stating that ‘Soviet bad faith,’ as 
demonstrated by the brigade in Cuba, made this necessary.428 The fact that 
Church, during the August 27 press conference, linked the ratification of 
SALT to the departure of the brigade boxed in the Administration’s 
response, depriving it of an opportunity to craft a face-saving response. The 
leak-driven nature of the entire affair gave it a nefarious quality in the eyes of 
the Soviets.429 As Vance remarked subsequently, the brigade affair “was a 
real blow that set us back substantially.”430  
This seemingly minor episode brought about large-scale ramifications 
down the line. The Carter Administration presented itself in confusion over 
the brigade issue, handling it in a contradictory manner and reacting with 
bluster that later turned out to be hollow when it became clear that the 
brigade could not be removed. The impression this made on the Soviets was 
that Carter was an unreliable partner who was willing to risk SALT II 
ratification over an issue that had in effect been made up. Moreover, it 
signalled that Carter’s Administration was inconsistent and confused over its 
aims regarding the US-Soviet relationship, at a time when détente was 
already fraying. All this occurred before the invasion of Afghanistan. The 
brigade ‘crisis’ removed any remaining external reasons for the Soviets not to 
invade: SALT II was now dead-in-the-water in the eyes of the Soviets, even if 
it wasn’t to Carter. Viktor Komplektov, Head of the US Department at the 
Soviet Foreign Ministry at the time, later noted, “SALT was finished before 																																																								
427  Interview with Les Denend. Jimmy Carter was on the paddle wheeler Delta Queen on the 
Mississippi and Brzezinski holidaying in Vermont. See Savranskaya and Welch (1992), 168 
428  This again made front-page news on the Washington Post, September 13, 1979; see 
Shoultz, 670 
429  A point made by Robert Pastor, Director of Latin American Affairs on Carter’s National 
Security Council. See Savranskaya and Welch (1992), 145 
430  Cited in Scheer, 226  
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Afghanistan […] to us [ratification] was impossible, no matter what [Carter] 
did.” This despite the fact that Carter’s aim to ratify SALT II remained 
unchanged: “It is important to understand that Carter was determined to go 
ahead with SALT even as he was making is October 1 speech.”431 A more 
elegant resolution of the Cuban brigade issue would have left the prospects 
of SALT II intact as it began its passage through the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee. This could have altered the Soviet risk calculus in the run-up to 
the invasion of Afghanistan. Instead, after the public statements made by 
Senator Church and President Carter during the Brigade affair – statements 
that seemed bewildering in the eyes of the Soviets – the Politburo did not 
pay much attention to the Carter Administration’s potential response to a 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan: Bessmertnykh recalls, “Gromyko [the Soviet 
Foreign Minister] was an experienced man. He knew that the United States 
would react strongly, as Carter did. But all the same, I think they felt that they 
would survive it.”432  This was compounded by the fact that the Carter 
Administration failed to explicitly signal to the Soviets what repercussions 
awaited in the event of an invasion. The American reaction to any invasion 
could have been a more potent concern for the Politburo as it mulled 
whether to send troops into Afghanistan: 
 
“By not repeatedly warning against direct Soviet military intervention 
as the Soviet stake in Afghanistan grew, the Carter administration left 
the erroneous impression that what happened in Afghanistan was of 
no great importance to the United States.”433  
 
By August 1979, increasing Soviet involvement in the political affairs of 
Afghanistan had prompted speculation that a military engagement might be 
in the offing. This led National Security Advisor Brzezinski to give a speech in 
which he stated that after the US exhibited prudence with regard to Iran, 
others were expected to “abstain from intervention and from efforts to 
impose alien doctrines on a deeply religious and nationally conscious 
people.” 434  Brzezinski did not explicitly mention either the USSR or 
Afghanistan, but the New York Times titled its report of speech, “US 																																																								
431  Robert Pastor in Savranskaya and Welch (1992), 150 
432  Cited in n Wohlforth (1996), 128 
433  Matlock (2007), 32 
434  See MacEachin (2002) 
 110 
Indirectly Pressing Russians to Halt Afghanistan Intervention.” 435  By 
September 6, the New York Times, citing diplomatic sources, reported that 
the Soviets’ inability to resolve the political turmoil in Afghanistan was 
pushing them toward direct military intervention. Clearly, the possibility of a 
Soviet incursion was not considered a complete non sequitur. But a US Inter-
Intelligence Memorandum (IIM) on September 28, after taking a wide range 
of sources and analyses into consideration, concluded (with no dissenting 
opinion) that on balance, the cost of a Soviet invasion would outweigh its 
potential benefits.436 The IIM was right that such a decision could not be 
considered ‘rational’, but this didn’t prevent the Soviets from invading. 
Indeed the choice to invade Afghanistan illustrates how agency – in this case, 
poor Soviet decision-making – can upset apparently sound predictions such 
as the September 28 IIM. 
How did the US’ intelligence agencies arrive at their verdict that the 
Soviets would not invade? This is where the Cuban Brigade affair becomes 
important again. The uproar it left in its wake and the involvement of key 
Administration members convinced the Soviets that Carter was acting in bad 
faith over SALT II. The suspension of the treaty’s discussion in the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee either signalled that the Americans wanted to 
extract further concessions, or were not interested at all in ratification. Either 
way, to the Soviets the Cuban Brigade affair spelled the end of SALT II. And 
this was of great consequence, particularly regarding the September IIM. The 
Memorandum relied on “a senior Soviet political counselor in Kabul, Vasily 
Safronchuk, [informing] the US chargé [in Kabul] on 24 June that the USSR 
had no intention of sending combat troops to Afghanistan. He pointed to the 
harm such a move would do to the SALT II Treaty, and to the USSR's political 
position worldwide.”437 That is the reason why “intelligence assessments at 
the time continued to portray the insertion of Soviet combat forces as 
unlikely, although it was not ruled out.”438 Whereas to Carter and Vance, 
SALT II was still salvageable until the invasion of Afghanistan, in actual fact 
the Cuban Brigade Affair altered Soviet perceptions of the Carter 
																																																								
435  See Freedman, 98 
436  Ibid. See also Central Intelligence Agency. (1979)  
437  CIA (1979a), 9; and CIA (1980), 14-15. The latter cites a ‘pro and con’ invasion 
assessment disseminated in 16 June 1979. 
438  MacEachin (2002a) 
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Administration to the point that ratification was no longer seen as feasible. 439 
Valentin Varennikov, Deputy Minister of Defense and Chief of Ground Forces 
in the Soviet General Staff at the time of the invasion, recounts that the main 
motive for the invasion of Afghanistan were the security interests of the 
USSR, which shifted after Moscow perceived the US to have unilaterally 
frozen the process of ratifying SALT II.440 Anatoly Dobrynin is clear about this: 
“Brezhnev was very glad to have signed the [SALT II] treaty, but [events like] 
the Cuban brigade affair signalled major problems in our relations” and 
eventually, “it became very clear that there would be no SALT.”441 This might 
of course be a post-hoc rationalisation by Dobrynin. But the fact is that the 
decision to invade Afghanistan was made last minute in December of 
1979.442 The implication is that the successful ratification of SALT could have 
given the Soviets a reason not to jeopardise their relations with the US. 
Dobrynin phrased it starkly: “By the end of the Carter administration, there 
was very little left on our bilateral agenda. There was really only one small I 
link – the SALT talks – which we tried to maintain as a bridge between us. But 
when it failed, we had nothing left.”443  
Simply put, the artificial Cuban Brigade crisis removed the Politburo’s 
concerns over the effects the Soviet invasion would have on détente. The IIM 
of September 28 argued that the costs to the Soviets of invading Afghanistan 
were greater than the benefits – but “the Soviet leadership had long written 
off what the United States saw as the costs of Soviet intervention. Soviet 
leaders were pessimistic about the prospects of SALT II and improved trade 
before they decided to send troops to Afghanistan. They consequently did 
not consider these as costs.”444 It is worth bearing in mind that when Nur 
Mohammed Taraki, the Communist-leaning President of Afghanistan, 
requested Soviet troops to enter his country in March 1979 to help quell 
political unrest, the Politburo rejected this because it would wreck 
preparations for the Brezhnev-Carter summit and threaten SALT II.445 At a 																																																								
439  Savranskaya and Welch (1992), 162 
440  See Westad (1996), 75  
441  Ibid, 109 
442  Ibid, 153 
443  Ibid, 221 
444  Lebow and Stein (1993), 104. Lebow and Stein’s assessment of Soviet leaders’ 
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Caldwell (1991) 
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Politburo meeting on 19 March, Foreign Minister Gromyko warned of the 
ramifications of a Soviet intervention on the superpower relationship: “We 
would largely be throwing away everything we achieved with such difficulty, 
particularly détente; the SALT II negotiations would fly by the wayside.”446 
Nine months later, the Soviet calculus had shifted, as SALT II – so the Soviets 
believed – had been wrecked by the Carter Administration, though in truth it 
had been undermined by the Cuban Brigade affair.   
A combination of timing, contingencies and unintended consequences 
conspired to suffocate SALT II by the autumn of 1979, thereby strengthening 
Soviet incentives to intervene militarily in Afghanistan whilst simultaneously 
blinding the Carter Administration to this. The outcome was avoidable. And 
it was not one that was planned, or even favoured, by either the US or the 
Soviets. The implications of the combined micro-decisions in these small-
scale contexts – which are difficult to incorporate into a modelised or macro-
theoretical account of world politics – are profound. None of the agents 
involved at the time appreciated or could foresee the eventual consequences 
of the episode. As Robert Pastor, Director of Latin American Affairs on 
Carter’s NSC, explains, “Though the Carter Administration may have 
appeared to some to be coming apart at that moment, the main players were 
not consciously self-destructive.”447 Blight describes the Cuban Brigade affair 
as “intriguing, multidimensional, full of peculiar interactions between US 
domestic politics and the foreign policies of the US and Soviet Union toward 
one another.”448 The Soviet decision to send troops into Afghanistan was 
contingent, taken by a small group of Politburo bigwigs, essentially Ustinov, 
Gromyko and Andropov, in consultation with Brezhnev. Anatoly Chernyaev, 
then Deputy Head of the International Department of the Central 
Committee, reports he was informed by Kornienko, the First Deputy Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, “that the initiator of intervention was Gromyko who was 
enthusiastically supported by Ustinov.”449 They had rejected a request for 																																																								
446  Cited in Wilson, 45 
447  Pastor in Savranskaya and Welch (1992), 167 
448  Ibid, 168 
449  Brown (1996), 54. Alexander Bessmertnykh, who was to become Foreign Minister in 
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foreign policy, would support the introduction of troops into Afghanistan when […] it was 
a conventional wisdom [sic] that Afghanistan is an area which should not be invaded.” 
Bessmertnykh speculates that Gromyko was not the driving force behind the decision, 
but rather went along with Defense Minister Ustinov and KGB head Andropov, whose 
reasoning was ideological: they feared the loss of a socialist country at the Soviet Union’s 
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‘fraternal assistance’ from Kabul a mere eight months earlier. Relations with 
the US soured in the meantime, influenced by the Cuban Brigade crisis and 
its negative consequence for the passage of SALT II. By the end of 1979, the 
group of Soviet leaders around Brezhnev reversed their opinion and decided 
to launch the invasion of Afghanistan.  
The episode shows how convoluted and indirect micro-causal 
processes can escalate in a complex system and end up bringing about 
dramatic shifts. Causality can flow from small to large in international 
relations, an empirical finding that macro-theorists need to take into account. 
Had the Cuban Brigade story been nipped in the bud, and SALT II ratification 
proceeded as planned, the USSR would have been much less likely to invade 
Afghanistan – by all accounts a peculiar decision with a weak strategic 
rationale – and a significant source of trouble for the Soviets in the coming 
decade could have been avoided. Marshal Akhromeyev, who became Chief 
of the General Staff in 1984, has remarked on several occasions that the 
Soviet military was wary of going invading Afghanistan. 450 The invasion of 
Afghanistan was resource-intensive, making military intervention in Poland in 
1980/81 much costlier. Had the Afghan operation not taken place, the 
Politburo could have pursued a more aggressive line in dealing with political 
unrest in Eastern Europe, in keeping with the pre-Afghanistan Soviet policy of 
intervening only inside Warsaw Pact states. Any such third Warsaw Pact 
intervention, following Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, would 
have caused significant turbulence in Europe, producing an entirely different 
geopolitical context in the 1980s. It was thus a strange kind of luck that the 
USSR dealt itself a self-inflicted blow by invading Afghanistan in 1979, in that 
it was influenced unintentionally by foreign policy blundering in Washington. 
Such is the nature of non-linearity in international affairs. 
The invasion of Afghanistan rests at the capricious end of the order-
chaos spectrum. It was a foolish decision by Soviet leaders, unduly influenced 
by the Cuban Brigade Crisis. Had the invasion not gone ahead, a significant 
source of trouble for the Soviets in the coming decade could have been 
avoided. More resources would have been available to deal with the 
subsequent turmoil in Poland (discussed at the end of this chapter on page 																																																																																																																																																														
Southern border. Chernyaev, on the other hand, believes the ideological justification was 
a post-hoc effort to rationalise a fundamentally ‘absurd’ and ‘crazy’ decision. In Wohlforth 
(1996), 125; 128; 136 
450  Wohlforth (1996), 127  
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139): the Soviets sent more than 80,000 troops to Afghanistan within six 
months of the invasion and ended up committing hundreds of thousands of 
soldiers to the conflict. 451  In the 1980s the USSR confronted mounted 
economic and political problems in the Eastern bloc. These troubles meant 
that the Soviet hold over Eastern Europe could have faded regardless of 
whether the Afghan intervention had gone ahead or not: but invading 
Afghanistan certainly didn’t strengthen the Soviet hand when dealing with 
unrest in its own front yard. By 1981, “the Soviets could ill afford to take on 
the new costs that would come with a military occupation of Poland [and] the 
almost certain imposition of far more stringent Western penalties.”452 
 
 
Sketching out parameters of leadership interaction: Carter vs. Reagan 
Did Ronald Reagan pursue an original ‘Soviet strategy’, and if so, did 
this influence the end of the Cold War? Wilson cautions against the tempting 
assumption that outcomes favourable to US foreign policy goals are the 
direct product of presidential leadership. He sees such a stance as failing to 
do justice to the complexity of international politics: “Ascribing important 
events to wise decisions laid out in a clear set of directives might be more 
comforting to historians as they seek to find coherence amidst change, but 
such interpretations do not explain the swift and peaceful end of the Cold 
War.”453 Wilson locates the idea that grand strategy ended the Cold War in 
the camp of the ‘Reagan victory school’, a set of triumphalist accounts 
arguing (with varying emphases) that a combination of Reagan’s rhetorical 
offensive, rejection of détente, military build-up and uncompromising anti-
Communism pushed the Soviet Union to the brink of collapse.454 Wilson’s 
own explanation proceeds from a systemic base: the stage for a final 
showdown between East and West was set by the revitalisation of capitalism 
in the 1980s in the face of Communist stagnation. Paul Volcker raised interest 
rates to tackle stagflation, Reagan’s supply-side reforms stimulated the US 
economy, and the information technology revolution gave the Western world 
a productivity boost that the USSR could not keep up with. In this context 
Gorbachev emerged as the key agent of change, determined to reform the 																																																								
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struggling Communist system after defusing tensions in the international 
arena. What followed, in Wilson’s interpretation, was an improvised series of 
steps undertaken by four key actors – Ronald Reagan, his Secretary of State 
George Shultz, Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush – which shaped the 
outcome of the Cold War. Economics set the stage but did not write the 
script or act out the play: leaders determined the nature of the end of the 
Cold War.  
Wilson insists that US leaders did not rely on some kind of strategic 
blueprint that wound down the Cold War. Brands, in contrast, discerns a 
deliberate and innovative Soviet strategy on the part of the Reagan 
administration, summing it up as ‘coercive diplomacy’ (a term that echoes 
Reagan’s famous ‘peace through strength’ dictum).455 From the outset of his 
Presidency, Reagan undertook a deliberate, concerted arms build-up, 
accompanied by a more assertive military posture.456 This was an intended 
consequence of Reagan’s rejection of détente, the doctrine that governed 
America’s policy towards the Soviets since the Nixon Administration. The 
Office of the Historian of the US Department of State summarises the period 
of détente as follows:  
 
“Between the late 1960s and the late 1970s, there was a thawing of 
the ongoing Cold War between the United States and the Soviet 
Union. This détente took several forms, including increased discussion 
on arms control. Although the decade began with vast improvements 
in bilateral relations, by the end of the decade events had brought the 
two superpowers back to the brink of confrontation.”457 
 
Détente was born of the post-Vietnam age. In addition to the political 
backlash the war produced in the US, the country experienced economic 
difficulties in the 1970s. The OPEC oil embargo of 1973 led to the 
phenomenon of stagflation in Western economies: a hitherto unknown 
mixture of high inflation rates combined with a stagnant economy. In the US, 
the ‘misery index’, a measure combining unemployment and inflation 																																																								
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developed in the 1970s – this fact is itself a suggestive reflection of public 
concern over these metrics – averaged 14% between 1970 and 1980, double 
what it was in the decade prior.458 The US’ economic difficulties affected its 
capacity to confront the Soviets abroad. After the colossal price paid in 
American blood and treasure in Vietnam, anti-military sentiment was strong. 
Economic difficulties and the Vietnam drawdown led defence outlays to fall 
by one third between 1968 and 1976.459 Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger 
responded to the US’ weakened international position by embarking on a 
course of de-escalation with the USSR through arms settlements. This 
ushered in the era of détente, seen as a strategic solution to improve Cold 
War relations during a time when the US was less capable of pursuing direct 
military competition with the Soviets.  
Reagan made this a feature of the 1976 presidential campaign: his 
major foreign policy theme was that détente, far from creating a more stable 
superpower relationship, was instead a gateway to Soviet military 
superiority.460 Reagan’s proposed remedial strategy consisted of reasserting 
American power, which he believed to have declined. In Reagan’s view (and 
that of a vocal section of the American foreign policy establishment, 
embodied by organisations such as the Committee on the Present Danger), 
détente not only failed to bring about stability in East-West relations, it had 
in fact prompted a series of Soviet expansionist moves in the Third World.461 
Instead of a more accommodating foreign policy, what was required for the 
US to emerge from its post-Vietnam slump was a charismatic leader who 
could re-inspire the public’s confidence. Since the American system would in 
the long run outperform the Soviet model, Reagan’s case went, the country 
could afford to engage in a renewed bout of the arms race that aimed to 
outspend the USSR.462 Reagan argued in 1980 that the US negotiated the 
SALT II treaty from a position of weakness and announced, “we are going 
about the business of building up our defense capability pending an 
agreement by both sides to limit various kinds of weapons.”463 That said, 
already in 1980 Reagan made it clear that coercion was not an end in itself: “I 
have repeatedly stated that I would be willing to negotiate an honest, 																																																								
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verifiable reduction in nuclear weapons by both our countries to the point 
that neither of us represented a threat to each other.”464 A confrontational 
stance in order to up the ante on the Soviets, combined with arms control 
negotiations as a concurrent pathway toward defusing tensions in the long 
term: this sums up Brands’ analysis of Reagan’s ‘coercive diplomacy’ strategy.  
The evidence suggests that Brands accurately assesses the origins and 
overall thrust of US policy toward the Soviet Union in the 1980s. At the same 
time, he overstates the case that this was exclusively the product of the 
Reagan Administration. The political backlash against détente began after it 
became apparent that the Soviets did not intend to play by the same détente 
rulebook as the West.465 This changed the foreign policy context for all 
political actors in the US. Indeed, there is an argument to be made that, far 
from spearheading a turnaround in the American public mood away from 
liberalism toward conservatism, Ronald Reagan was the product of a gestalt 
switch that preceded him:  
 
“Reagan’s real achievement was to take advantage of a transformation 
that predated him. […] Conservative attitudes peaked, and liberal 
attitudes plateaued, in the late 1970s […] Reagan was the beneficiary 
of these trends, rather than their instigator.”466  
 
Martin Anderson, one of Reagan’s domestic policy advisers, writes: 
 
“What has been called the Reagan revolution is not completely, or 
even mostly, due to Ronald Reagan. He was an extremely important 
contributor to the intellectual and political movement that swept him 
to the presidency in 1980. He gave that movement focus and 
leadership. But Reagan did not give it life.”467 
 
Ronald Reagan took advantage of the fact that by the end of his first term, 
Carter was seen as a weak foreign policy President who lacked the toughness 
to deal with a threatening international environment exemplified by the 
Soviet move into Afghanistan. Carter was vocal in his outrage and quickly 																																																								
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imposed sanctions on the Soviet Union, but coming so shortly after the ‘loss’ 
of Iran, the invasion of Afghanistan cemented his image in the public eye as 
an impotent defender of America’s interests abroad.468 
On the issue of rearmament, too, Reagan picked up where the 
outgoing Carter Presidency left things off; it was Carter’s final budget that 
substantially increased US military outlays, beginning a process that either 
incoming Administration would likely have continued.469 Most importantly, a 
pronounced and probably terminal weakening of the forces that drove 
détente occurred at the end of the Carter presidency, not the start of the 
Reagan era. By 1980, Carter began to respond angrily to increased Soviet 
adventurism in the Third World, prompted by the invasion of Afghanistan, 
but also Moscow’s decision to deploy a new generation of intermediate 
ballistic missiles, the SS-20, which threatened Western Europe. Robert Gates, 
who served both Carter and Reagan, makes the point that such moves were 
going to elicit a US response regardless of who was in power: “Carter in the 
end had a very tough policy behind the scenes on the Soviets. I believe, to a 
degree that both the Republicans and Democrats would probably find 
objectionable, that there was in fact a good deal of continuity between 
Carter and Reagan.”470  
The connections and dissimilarities between Reagan and Carter that 
Gates alludes to are important: they illustrate how US strategy towards the 
Soviet Union was a function of both relatively permanent security interests on 
the one hand and an expression of the differing personal convictions of 
Presidents on the other. In fact, the pressures of the international system and 
the idiosyncrasies of Presidents are related: the latter can give rise to the 
former. Robert Gates cites the example of President Ford, who signed the 
1975 Helsinki Final Act “against the tremendous opposition of conservatives 
in this country who believed he was signing up to the Yalta Accords.”471 The 
Helsinki Declaration attempted to place relations between the Communist 
bloc and the West on a more stable footing. It recognised the inviolability of 
the borders of all the signatories (in a sense legitimating the Soviet 																																																								
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occupation of Eastern Europe), accepted their sovereign equality, and 
committed all parties to non-interference in each other’s domestic affairs. But 
another protocol of the Declaration pledged the signatories to respect their 
citizens’ human rights, fundamental freedoms, and the principle of sovereign 
self-determination. In signing Helsinki,  
 
“Ford created an opening that the peoples in the Soviet Union and in 
Eastern Europe were able to use, and everything from Helsinki Watch, 
the Orlov Group in Moscow to Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia, all of 
these things, were born out of that Helsinki Accord. So Jimmy Carter 
didn’t begin the human rights policy any more than Reagan began the 
attack on Soviet legitimacy. There is tremendous continuity here in 
many respects and one that for political reasons people have chosen 
to either ignore or pretend it didn’t exist.”472  
 
In an irony of history, it was the Helsinki principle of self-determination 
through which George Bush ultimately managed to convince Mikhail 
Gorbachev that a reunified Germany was entitled to join NATO if it so chose 
(see Chapter 6). More immediately, Ford’s decision to disregard conservative 
misgivings in the US and sign the Helsinki Accords ended up creating a new 
institutionalised security interest in the international system through which US 
human rights concerns could be expressed and, in an unintended 
consequence, helped mobilise civic activists on both sides of the Iron 
Curtain.  
The way that this interest played out was determined by various 
Presidents’ preferred approaches. Both Carter and Reagan publicly attacked 
the legitimacy of the USSR: “[Reagan’s] powerful rhetoric about the Evil 
Empire frankly played into Jimmy Carter’s denial of legitimacy to the Soviet 
leaders. That was the thing that made them hate Jimmy Carter so much: he 
was the first President who basically questioned their legitimacy as a 
government, since Harry Truman. And that’s what Reagan continued.”473 
Carter publicly raised awareness of the plight of particular dissidents, for 
instance by inviting exiled Soviet novelist Alexander Solzhenitsyn to the 
White House.474 Reagan, although similarly inclined to berate the Soviets on 																																																								
472  Ibid, 64   
473  Ibid, 62 
474  Savranskaya and Welch (1994), 144-155 
 120 
human rights in public, managed to actually solve one of these cases by 
trying a different approach. In 1978, a group of religiously persecuted 
Russians sought refuge in the US Embassy in Moscow. The issue remained 
unsettled for five years. Reagan brought it up during his first encounter with a 
top Soviet official – a confidential two-hour conversation with Soviet 
Ambassador Dobrynin in the winter of 1983 (described in more detail in 
Chapter Four). George Shultz remembers that the clandestine meeting 
produced “the first deal we made with the Soviet Union during the Reagan 
Administration. […] The deal was 'We let [the Pentecostalists] out if you don't 
crow.’”475 Reagan kept his word, believing, at least in this case, “front page 
stories that we are banging away at [the Soviets] on their human rights 
abuses will get us some cheers from the bleachers but it won’t help those 
who are being abused.”476 In a January 1984 exchange between Shultz and 
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, the Secretary of State expressed the 
President’s “admiration for the Soviet Union for taking a decision on the 
Pentecostal families. The decision had been up to the Soviet Union, and it 
had been made. It showed progress was possible. With reference to 
individual issues, President Reagan prefers a process of quiet diplomacy in 
this area [of human rights].” 477  Arguably, then, a different Presidential 
approach to the same issue (i.e., pressing for human rights improvements in 
private rather than in public) produced better results (in that Carter had tried 
but failed to secure the Pentecostals’ release).478  
Policy continuities between Carter and Reagan reveal pressures on 
policymaking that are independent of the two men’s personal differences, 
and policies on which they held the same views. We can look to policy 
continuities and discontinuities between US Presidents and try to link them to 
outcomes in the international system in an effort to increase our 
understanding of how leaders interact with other causal dimensions to 
produce outcomes in the international system. Such analyses must remain 
aware that the outcomes under scrutiny are ultimately produced through the 
complex interaction of leadership with other factors that influence for the 																																																								
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outcome under scrutiny. Leaders are part of a wider fabric of causal forces in 
the international system, so ‘ripping’ one out counterfactually also tears out 
additional surrounding texture: agents are not pieces of Lego that can be 
replaced in isolation. However, it is possible to tease out some of the means 
through which leaders can exert influence on international affairs. 
 
 
On interaction effects between leaders and complex systems 
 Chapter Five discusses at length the positive interactive effects 
between Reagan and Gorbachev, showing how personal relationships can 
contribute to the erosion of structural factors such as mistrust. Reagan 
abhorred nuclear weapons and wanted to transcend deterrence, either 
through a nuclear missile defence system, or denuclearisation. Gorbachev’s 
relationship with Reagan resulted in substantial arms reduction agreements 
that no other US-Soviet leadership pairing had managed to produce. Just as 
it is important to point out the limits of influence leaders have, the ability of 
leaders in a complex system to redefine certain relationships through specific 
choices is a valuable causal avenue available to leaders at given times. In the 
late 1970s, however, the Kremlin’s policy choices fed into the security 
dilemma and produced an anti-Soviet backlash in the United States, which 
preceded the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 and reduced the scope of 
US leaders to idiosyncratically improve relations.  
Take the US-Soviet arms race, a structural security phenomenon that 
accompanied the Cold War from 1945 until the 1980s, during which a 
multitude of leaders of various stripes and colours came and went. The logic 
of deterrence – nuclear weapons are such potent weapons that the only way 
to prevent their use is accumulating more than any potential adversary – held 
sway over a range of actors with different political preferences. Robert Gates, 
a Deputy CIA Director under Reagan and CIA Director under Bush, makes 
this point: “One of the areas where conventional wisdom is wrong is that it 
holds there were significant changes or differences in policy from one 
President to the other when it came to dealing with the Soviets.”479 This is 
not to say that there are no idiosyncratic elements influencing arms races: 
insofar as balance of power judgments are in the eye of the beholder, how 
agents perceive their counterparties matters greatly by way of influencing 																																																								
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policy recommendations.480 For instance, Gerald Ford’s Secretary of State 
Henry Kissinger and Secretary of Defence James Schlesinger had opposing 
views of the USA’s long-term potential vis-à-vis the USSR: Kissinger was a 
pessimist, Schlesinger an optimist.481 This led them to hold differing views on 
détente and the US negotiating strategy for the SALT accords: Schlesinger 
wanted “to make the terms for a SALT agreement tougher than would 
Kissinger.”482 It was ultimately up to President Ford to resolve the dispute, 
which he did in Kissinger’s favour. Thus individual analyses by decision-
makers could influence the direction of the Cold War’s arms race.  
The importance of these subjective and inter-subjective elements in 
policymaking must not be overstated. The security dilemma underpinning 
the arms race placed constraints on the idiosyncratic leeway policymakers 
possess. The adversarial relationship between the US and the USSR could not 
be just be ‘thought away’ by the agents in charge. In a democracy, the 
security dilemma affects policymaking through the feedback channel of 
domestic politics.483 Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State under Carter, describes 
how the “rising tide of conservatism” during Carter’s tenure limited the 
Administration’s room for manoeuvre in the SALT II negotiations.484 Vance’s 
Assistant Secretary of State, Leslie Gelb, speaks of ‘political tides’ and 
‘atmospherics’, which set limits to how far the President’s desire for 
accommodation through arms control could go.485 The security dilemma’s 
‘causal role’ was to act as the structural driver of the arms race. Carter’s goal 
of achieving bipolar stability by pursuing strategic equivalence with the 
Soviet Union did not solve the actual security dilemma, which resulted from 
each superpower’s differing interpretations of the other’s intentions. As 
Carter’s Secretary of Defence Harold Brown has explained, nuclear “parity is 
not a line, it’s a very broad band, […] The fact that’s it a broad band makes it 
subject to a great deal of interpretation […] Do we measure parity by 
numbers of warheads? Numbers of launchers? By throw weight?”486 Soviet 
successes in developing Multiple Independent Re-Entry Vehicle warheads, 
international turbulence relating to the two superpower’s global footprint, 																																																								
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and the importance of maintaining Allied cohesion invariably meant that the 
lowest common denominator through which to perceive the adversary was 
that of mistrust and fear.  
Moscow’s decision in 1977 to deploy SS-20 Intermediate-range 
ballistic missiles aimed at Western Europe, followed by the invasion of 
Afghanistan in 1979, brought an end to the period of relative stability in US-
Soviet relations that characterised the 1970s. Fears about an emerging 
‘window of vulnerability’ in the US vis-à-vis the Soviet’s nuclear capabilities 
put Carter under pressure to assert US interests more assertively amd 
constrained his ability to pursue arms control, thereby making it more difficult 
to move the US-USSR relationship to a more stable level. Already in 1976, 
before the deployment of the SS-20, Paul Nitze – a stalwart of Washington’s 
diplomatic establishment who had previously helped to negotiate both the 
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the interim strategic arms limitation 
agreement (SALT I) – warned that détente had upset the strategic balance in 
favour of the Soviet Union.487 A year later, a debate began in the US policy 
establishment “over the significance of growing Soviet nuclear capabilities 
that would culminate in the widespread conviction that a so-called window of 
strategic vulnerability existed.”488 Allied states began to call for a response to 
what was perceived to be a growing Soviet threat. In 1977, the Social 
Democratic Chancellor of the Federal German Republic Helmut Schmidt 
gave a speech at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London in 
which he highlighted the growing nuclear imbalance in Europe, declaring:  
 
“The Warsaw Pact has […] increased the disparities in both 
conventional and tactical nuclear forces. Up to now the Soviet Union 
has given no clear indication that she is willing to accept the principle 
of parity for Europe.”  
 
Schmidt called on “the Western Alliance to undertake a massive build-up of 
forces and weapons systems” in the absence of genuine prospects for arms 
reductions.489 This eventually culminated in NATO’s Dual Track decision of 
December 1979: to “meet the challenges to their security posed by the 
continuing momentum of the Warsaw Pact military build-up“ by “the 																																																								
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deployment in Europe of US ground-launched systems comprising 108 
Pershing II launchers […] and 464 Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM), 
all with single warheads”. NATO simultaneously authorised the US to pursue 
arms limitations negotiations, but explicitly stipulated that any future 
“limitations on [US and Soviet land-based long-range theatre nuclear missile 
systems] must be consistent with the principle of equality between the 
sides.”490 The planned Pershing deployment incensed the Soviet leadership, 
who viewed it as a first-strike decapitating nuclear missile.491 It thus seemed 
that a new round of the arms race was being ushered in, one that seemed 
unavoidable given the increasingly charged international climate. Soviet 
policy choices – to deploy the SS-20 and invade Afghanistan – made 
worsening relations with the West and a retaliatory deployment to counter 
the SS-20s likely. The Soviets evidently discounted such worries at the time, 
but this was a miscalculation. In 1986, Gromyko, who had been Soviet 
Foreign Minister from 1957 to 1985 – conceded at a Politburo meeting, “the 
deployment of the SS-20 was a major error in our European policy.”492 The 
West responded by threatening the deployment of its own intermediate 
ballistic missiles unless the Soviets would remove theirs.  
The classic arms race dynamic was at work: NATO leaders viewed their 
Dual Track strategy as an appropriate response to the strategic challenge 
posed by the SS-20 deployment, which were missiles targeting Western 
Europe. The Soviet leadership in turn regarded NATO’s response as an 
escalation of the nuclear arms race, with some in Moscow arguing the NATO 
decision was the final straw that made them feel as if they had nothing to 
lose by invading Afghanistan.493 The deterioration of East-West relations 
under the Carter Administration was driven by the international context: 
“Each side took steps to ensure its own security which the other in turn 
perceived as threatening its security.”494 Agency played a role through policy 
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miscalculations on the Soviet side, especially regarding the invasion of 
Afghanistan.  
 On 12 December 1979, the same day that NATO announced its Dual 
Track decision, the Politburo deployed Soviet forces to Kabul, where they 
stormed the Presidential Palace and executed the Afghan President, 
Hafizullah Amin.495 Soviet troop movements and the build-up to the invasion 
had begun in October, but the intervention nevertheless caught the Carter 
Administration by surprise. 496  Whilst the Soviets viewed the Afghanistan 
operation as a move to prevent an allied country from slipping from its reach, 
some in the US foreign policy establishment feared that the reasoning behind 
it was expansionary – an incipient Soviet push toward the Indian Ocean or 
even the Persian Gulf. 497 Carter himself did not necessarily view the Afghan 
invasion as a major strategic offensive, but after having lost a major ally in the 
region during the Iranian Revolution a few months earlier, US military 
authorities viewed the Persian Gulf area as highly sensitive to US security 
interests, particularly in light of the ongoing Iranian hostage crisis.498 This is 
why President Carter took a strong public stance against the USSR’s actions. 
Calling the invasion ‘a grave threat to peace’, Carter responded with a raft of 
anti-Soviet measures: he publicly demanded the immediate withdrawal of 
Soviet troops, announced on national television that “my opinion of the 
Russians has changed more drastically in the last week than even the 
previous two and a half years,” asked the US Senate to indefinitely postpone 
the ratification process for the SALT II Accords, imposed a US grain embargo 
on the Soviet Union, suspended the opening of US and Soviet consulates in 
Kiev and New York, nullified US-Soviet cultural and economic agreements, 
and, lastly, declared the US would boycott the 1980 Summer Olympics in 
Moscow. 499  It was Carter, prompted by his National Security Advisor 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, who initiated the clandestine CIA campaign to provide 
material support for Afghan mujahedeen to take up arms against the 
invading Soviet forces.500 An Executive policy towards Afghanistan was thus 
already in place when Reagan assumed office in 1981.  
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Policy discontinuities as natural leadership counterfactuals: Carter vs. Reagan  
 The claim that an individual leader’s characteristics matter implies that 
a state’s policy would have been significantly different had someone with 
other characteristics been in power. Counterfactuals seeking to assess the 
effects of leadership through individual policy beliefs need to show that 
these beliefs were: a) powerful – consistent with the policy eventually chosen 
and inconsistent with other policy paths; and b) autonomous – i.e. not 
produced by the immediate international or domestic situation. 501 Numerous 
of Ronald Reagan’s policy idiosyncrasies meet these criteria, and I argue that 
Reagan’s assumption of office generated a noticeable impact on East-West 
relations across a variety of issues.  
Evidence for the autonomy of Reagan’s policy beliefs is provided by 
the fierce anti-détente platform he campaigned on during the 1976 race for 
the Republican nomination – long before either the SS-20 deployment or the 
invasion of Afghanistan made this a particularly salient issue.502 Whereas 
Carter maintained that the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan came as the 
greatest surprise of his life, Reagan during his 1980 campaign emphasised, 
time and time again, how he had argued for years that the deterioration of 
American military and strategic strength under the Carter Administration 
would bring about a resurgence of Soviet aggression.503 During the 1980 
campaign, Reagan accused President Carter of being “totally oblivious to the 
Soviet drive for world domination.”504 Reagan could point to his own track 
record as a staunch anti-Communist who consistently warned of the Soviet 
threat.505 
After he assumed office, Reagan’s hardliner stance had immediate 
consequences for the US-Soviet relationship: “Since 1960, every incoming 
administration had made the US-Soviet relationship its first order of business 
and had set about putting its own stamp on the arms-control process. The 
Reagan administration was an exception. In its first two years it had virtually 
no dealings with the Soviet Union.”506  At President Reagan’s first press 
conference, he announced his uncompromising view of the Soviets: “They 																																																								
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reserve unto themselves the right to commit any crime, to lie, to cheat” in 
order to pursue their policy goals.507 Anatoly Dobrynin, Soviet ambassador to 
the US, informed Secretary of State Alexander Haig that he hoped such 
rhetoric would not continue, as it would cause concern in Moscow. 508 
Alexander Bessmertnykh, who later became Deputy Foreign Minister of the 
USSR, states that although the Soviets felt like they “had a pretty good 
picture of Reagan […] concern started to appear when Reagan started to 
make his positions clear on the Soviet-American relationship.”509 During the 
same press conference, Reagan announced his goal of achieving “an actual 
reduction in the numbers of nuclear weapons.”510 This seemingly innocuous 
statement in fact represented a radical break with US arms control policy 
since the inception of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks in 1969, which, as 
the moniker makes clear, were predicated on the notion of arms limitations 
rather than outright reductions.511  Reagan’s loud emphasis on the verifiability 
of any arms control agreements indicated that he planned on shifting gear 
when it came to authentication procedures to monitor Soviet compliance in 
any future agreements. 512  Reagan’s argument that SALT II was “fatally 
flawed” was based on his refusal to accept an agreement that “allowed the 
Soviet Union to just about double their present nuclear capacity.”513 
Njølstad argues that there was no “great political divide between the 
outgoing Carter and incoming Reagan administration as far as US policy 
towards the Soviet Union is concerned,” and maintains that there were more 
similarities than differences between their approach to strategic arms 
control.514 It is true that Carter’s SALT II accords represented the first arms-
reduction treaty between the two superpowers, albeit only in the narrowest 																																																								
507  Reagan (1981) 
508  Haig (1984), 103 
509  Wohlforth (1996), 106 
510  Reagan (1981)  
511  The logic was that nuclear deterrence was key to keeping the peace between the US and 
the USSR, and that deterrence was best achieved by ensuring both sides kept roughly 
equal numbers of weapons. Arms reductions would reveal imbalances in each side’s 
conventional military forces and thus introduce new sources of tension into the 
international system.  
512  As described by Matlock, Reagan was sharply critical of the SALT II accord’s verification 
mechanism during the campaign.  The treaty would have allowed encrypted of telemetry 
from Soviet weapon tests, making difficult, if not impossible, the accurate verification of 
some of the treaty commitments. See Matlock (2007), 17 
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sense of the word ‘reduce’ – in that the ceiling for nuclear delivery vehicles 
was to be lowered from 2,400 as stipulated by the Vladivostok Agreement of 
1974, to 2,250 in 1981.515 It seems that Carter viewed SALT II as a stepping 
stone towards a subsequent round of arms reduction talks, which weakens 
the argument that Reagan’s presidency made much of a difference in terms 
of US negotiation strategy. Njølstad argues that “it became a standing goal 
for all US presidents from Carter to Bush to seek substantial reductions in the 
first-strike capabilities of the Soviet Union.”516 THIs, however, is misleading. It 
is one thing to pay lip service to the aim of reducing the levels of nuclear 
arms; it is another to follow this through in policy terms. As Figure 1 
illustrates, Soviet nuclear weapons exhibited a manifest ‘stickiness,’ in that 
their number trended upward until 1986, with the pace of the USSR’s total 
atomic stockpile rising rapidly after 1977. That, incidentally, was the year 
when President Carter made a ‘deep cut’ proposal, which was rejected out of 
hand by the Soviets.517  Reducing nuclear arms levels was easier said than 
done, and this goal eluded Carter. 518  
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Fig. 1: Soviet Nuclear Stockpile519 
 
  
Reagan approached nuclear arms talks with the Soviets differently than 
Carter, because he disagreed with the premise that parity should be the 
basis of arms limitations agreements. 520  Reagan and most in his 
Administration felt the USSR was overtaking the US militarily, meaning that 
policy priority had to shift from arms control to re-armament. As put by 
Secretary of State Al Haig in the summer of 1981, “arms control is no longer 
the centrepiece of US-Soviet relations.”521 As a result of this stance, Reagan 
maintained an uncompromising attitude toward arms control, refusing to 
deal with the Soviets on anything other than an arms reduction basis.  
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger made clear in April of 1981 
that the Administration would not resume arms talks until the USSR began to 
change its behaviour on the international stage. Convinced that détente 
worked to the Soviets’ advantage, Reagan wanted to approach arms 																																																								
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negotiations with caution.522 Throughout 1981, however, the phenomenon of 
mass anti-nuclear demonstrations in Europe began to undermine this 
position. By October, a quarter-million people were demonstrating on the 
streets of Bonn against nuclear weapons, the largest public gathering in 
Germany since JFK’s Berlin rally in 1963.523 Stubbornly refusing to sit down 
with the Soviets seemed to begin to harm support for NATO in Europe. 
Reagan’s reluctance to engage in arms control talks was thus untenable in 
the long run, political reality dictated that he had to give way eventually and 
commence negotiations. Indeed, in November 1981, Reagan made his first 
formal arms control proposal – the zero option, which envisaged the US 
cancelling its Pershing deployment if the Soviet SS-20s were dismantled in 
their entirety. This proposal was born of the arms reductions philosophy 
Reagan outlined in his first press conference. It reflected his stubborn 
approach to the matter: the zero option seemed a wholly unrealistic ideal-
state which did not provide a reasonable basis for negotiation; “those who 
designed the zero/zero proposal knew very well that the Soviet leaders at 
that time were unlikely to accept it.”524 The decision to resume negotiations 
was in no small part designed to acquiesce the European arms control 
movement.525  
Nonetheless, the zero option reflected Reagan’s long-term aspiration 
of nuclear disarmament in Europe and came to embody some of the key 
strategic priorities of the Reagan Administration. The proposal resolved the 
US’ ‘decoupling’ dilemma: Soviet SS-20s aimed at Western Europe made 
necessary a corresponding US deployment of a ballistic missile in Europe to 
maintain the US’ nuclear umbrella. Otherwise, retaliation to a nuclear attack 
by Soviet forces against Europe would involve the US’ domestic nuclear 
arsenal, thus exposing American cities to counterattacks. If the SS-20s were 
removed, however, this quandary would disappear. For that reason, the 
Reagan Administration viewed the zero option as a legitimate basis for talks, 
not as an escape from negotiations. Secretary of State Haig told the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee after Reagan’s November 1981 announcement 
that the United States hoped for “a verifiable agreement that would achieve 
significant reductions on both sides, leading to equal ceilings at the lowest 																																																								
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possible levels – levels which ideally could be zero.”526 His statement also 
expressed another of Reagan’s strategic priorities: a cut in arms on both 
sides. This was a manifestation of Reagan’s deep-seated desire to overcome 
the entrenched nature of the nuclear standoff, the only escape from which 
had to involve radical reductions in arsenals on both sides. At the same time, 
the zero option revealed Reagan’s belief that the USSR could be ‘pushed’ 
towards the negotiating table, and ultimately towards accommodation with 
the US. It was this stance, paradoxical though it may sound, which contained 
within it the seeds for the resolution of the superpower impasse, because it 
was linked to another Reagan idiosyncrasy: his eagerness to establish contact 
with the Soviets in order to inject momentum into the US-USSR 
relationship.527 This is discussed in more detail in Chapter Four. 
Reagan had no qualms about rejecting arms control agreements which 
violated his conviction that the Soviet Union needed to make deeper cuts 
than the US. In 1982, after yet another fruitless US-Soviet meeting in Geneva 
to explore the reopening of talks on an Intermediate Nuclear Forces 
agreement, Paul Nitze, who headed the US negotiation team, went on an 
impromptu two-hour stroll with Yuli Kvitsinsky, his Soviet counterpart.528 Their 
ramble became known as the ‘Walk in the Woods’, during which Nitze and 
Kvitsinsky sketched a far-reaching proposal for mutual cuts to nuclear 
weapons in Europe. Their initiative initially generated hopes that stalled US-
Soviet relations could be re-energised. A key element of the package was a 
formula that foresaw a two-thirds reduction of Soviet SS-20 missiles in 
exchange for the US giving up its Pershing II deployment plans. When Nitze 
returned to Washington with his proposal, Reagan asked him to explain why 
the US was supposed to do without its medium-range missiles in Europe 
whilst the USSR would keep a portion of theirs. Nitze answered that there 
was a conceptual difference between the US giving up a weapon on paper – 
the Pershings were yet to be installed – and the USSR dismantling an already 
deployed force of its most modern missile class. Nonetheless, Reagan 
refused to accept the deal unless all the SS-20 missiles went. Nitze told the 
President he was asking and hoping for too much, to which Reagan replied, 
“Well, Paul, you just tell the Soviets that you’re working for one tough son-of-																																																								
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527  Oberdorfer (1998), 22 
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a-bitch.” 529  Nitze’s pragmatic argument embodied the cold calculus of 
nuclear arms negotiations, in which he was steeped during four decades of 
nuclear diplomacy with the Soviets.530 The point Nitze made to Reagan was 
sensible from a deal-making perspective. At the same time, Nitze’s proposal 
maintained the inherent instability of the nuclear arms race, as it effectively 
sanctioned a first-mover advantage to whichever party deployed new missiles 
before the other. Reagan was unique among US Presidents in refusing arms 
negotiations outright unless they involved nuclear cuts.  
An interesting degree of overlap between Presidents Carter and 
Reagan exists in the area of defence spending. Reagan’s arms build-up was 
preceded by a change of course that Carter initiated.531 In his final defence 
budget request, Carter asked Congress for a 14.2% nominal increase in 
military expenditure for fiscal year 1982 – a 4.4% increase in real terms – with 
5% year-on-year increases to follow afterward.532 In 1978 Carter had already 
secured an agreement among NATO members states which committed them 
to increase national defence budgets by a minimum of 3% per annum. 
Matlock agrees that the US arms build-up of the 1980s was not just a Reagan 
initiative: “Carter had also sought sharply increased defence funding at the 
close of his administration.” 533  Reagan restored some arms programs 
cancelled by Carter, such as the neutron bomb and the B-1 bomber.534 But 
the thrust of US weapons modernisation programmes in the Reagan 
Administration were initiated by Carter, including the Trident submarine, the 
air-launched cruise missile programme, the Pershing II and Trident II missiles, 
MX, and Mk-12A deep-penetration warhead programmes, and the B-2 
bomber programme. 535  It is also true that Reagan’s National Security 
Decision Directives 12 and 13 endorsed the doctrinal positions by Carter in 
his own Presidential Directives 53 and 59. These concerned US nuclear 
strategy such as selective strike options, escalation control or intra-war 
deterrence and were, in the words of Carter’s Secretary of Defense Harold 																																																								
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Brown, “not new strategic doctrines or a radical departure from US strategic 
policy over the past decade [but] a codification of previous statements.”536 
This represented a long-ranging element of continuity in American nuclear 
war-fighting doctrine, where little agentic leeway existed in the first place.  
That said, Reagan went further in his military build-up than Carter, 
putting forward a budget to Congress which foresaw a yearly nominal 
increase in defence spending of 10% between 1980 and 1986.537 In real 
terms, Reagan’s defence appropriations peaked at 7.3% in 1983 and levelled 
off at roughly 7% afterwards, compared to Carter’s 5%. 538  Reagan’s 
unprecedented peacetime build-up was not fully a product of forward-
thinking decision-making. Instead, it provides an interesting illustration of 
how such policy decisions can be influenced by contingency and bureaucratic 
inertia.539 President Reagan’s first director of the Office of Management and 
the Budget was David Stockman. He had his hands full within days after 
Reagan’s inauguration, being charged with finding cuts worth hundreds of 
billions of dollars in current and future budgets, as part of the 
Administration’s signature Economic Recovery Tax Act. This involved twelve-
to-sixteen hour workdays, and although defence was exempted from the 
cuts, Stockman needed to meet with Secretary of Defense Weinberger in 
order to outline the trajectory for future military spending. This meeting 
occurred at 7.30pm on 30 January 1981, on a day that had begun at 4.30am 
for Stockman. When Weinberger’s Deputy Defence Secretary, Frank Carlucci, 
suggested a real increase of 8% to 9%, Stockman responded with an offer of 
a 7% year-on-year increase, which Weinberger agreed to. Carlucci then 
suggested that 1982 was to be taken as the baseline year for the increases, 
to which Stockman concurred. Later, Stockman realised he had made a costly 
mistake: his calculations foresaw a 7% real annual defence budget increase 
using President Carter’s 1980 defence budget as a baseline. By instead using 
1982 as the baseline year, Congress’ 9% defence budget increase of 1981 
was incorporated into future defence spending increases: the baseline now 
started at $222bn instead of $142bn. The defence budget would grow 160%, 
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totalling the enormous sum of $1.46tn of military spending over a six-year 
period.540  
In repeated meetings in August with both Reagan and Weinberger, 
Stockman was unable to reverse his fateful error: “There must be no 
perception by anyone in the world that we’re backing down on the defence 
build-up […] when I was asked during the campaign about what I would do if 
it came to a choice between defence and deficits, I always said national 
security had to come first,” Reagan told Stockman.541  Weinberger, too, 
proved to be obstinate, refusing to accept any reductions to the rate of 
growth in the defence budget. During the third meeting on the issue, 
Weinberger provided Reagan with charts showing the scale of the Soviet 
military threat, and a cartoon which depicted a powerful American soldier 
shrunk to Woody Allen size by Stockman’s budget cuts. At the same time, it 
was becoming clear that the Economic Recovery Tax Act had relied on overly 
optimistic growth forecasts, and since the economy was heading into a 
recession, the cloud of large federal budget deficits was hanging over the 
Administration. Nonetheless, Reagan’s convictions in the area of defence 
were firm. He told Weinberger, “Defense is not a budget issue. You spend 
what you need.”542 In the event, after a series of fruitless meetings, Stockman 
managed to coax $13bn of defence spending ‘cuts’ over the 1982-85 period 
out of the two. This was eventually increased by a further $19bn for the fiscal 
year 1983 by Congress, but only after the sheer scale of the deficit crisis 
became apparent. In any case, the trajectory of the colossal Reagan arms 
build-up was steeper than initially anticipated: not out of design, but by 
accident. 
Reagan’s handling of the budget incident, with his emphasis on the 
signals that policy changes could send out and insistence on maintaining a 
defence policy consistent with his public rhetoric, is reflective of a broader 
communication strategy he pursued. To his domestic audience, Reagan 
conveyed a resolute determination to build up America’s defences. 
Convinced that the country’s military position relative to the USSR’s had 
deteriorated during the era of détente, Reagan loudly broadcast a new 
strategy of massive rearmament within weeks of assuming office, as he had 
repeatedly promised during the campaign. Reagan also changed tack in 																																																								
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terms of public communication with his adversaries in Moscow. His 
administration officials publicly discussed US nuclear-war fighting capabilities 
and limited war scenarios. Weinberger spoke of the need for parity “across 
the full range of plausible nuclear war-fighting scenarios with the Soviet 
Union,” and his Deputy Frank Carlucci stated at his confirmation hearing “I 
think the Soviets are developing a nuclear-war fighting capability, and we are 
going to have to do the same.”543 At a press conference, President Reagan 
proposed that a tactical exchange of nuclear weapons in Europe would not 
inevitably bring about a wider war.544 In a similar vein, FitzGerald writes: 
 
“During the campaign, both Reagan and Bush had made statements 
suggesting that they did not regard nuclear war as catastrophic. 
Reagan had charged that the Soviets believed nuclear war was 
winnable, and Bush had told a reporter that nuclear superiority did not 
matter ‘if you believe that there is no such thing as a winner in nuclear 
war […] And I don’t believe that.’”545 
 
Njølstad confirms that there was a difference between how the defence 
spokesmen of the Carter and Reagan administrations discussed the 
possibility of winning a nuclear war:  
 
“According to PD-59 [issued by President Carter] there was no way to 
ensure victory in an all-out nuclear war ‘on any plausible definition of 
victory’. The main task, therefore, really was to convince the Soviets 
that they, too, were deprived of that possibility. By contrast, the 
official position of the Reagan administration was that the United 
States must obtain the capability of prevailing in a nuclear war – that 
is, of winning.”546 
 
This was not just a PR strategy: it was spelled out in President Reagan’s 
NSDD-12 and NSDD-13. Both these directives reiterated the policy of 
deterrence, but also made clear that nuclear war is a contingency the US 
must be militarily prepared for: 																																																								
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“Strategic Communications […] is the highest priority element in [the 
Strategic Forces Modernization] program. It would develop command 
and communication systems for our strategic forces that can survive 
and endure before, during, and after a nuclear attack. We do not have 
such systems now.”547 
 
And: 
 
“If deterrence fails, the employment of nuclear forces must be 
effectively related to the operations of our general purpose forces. 
Our doctrine for the use of forces in nuclear conflict must ensure that 
we can pursue specific objectives selected by the National Command 
Authority (NCA) at any given time.”548 
 
Njølstad’s contention that “US quest for ‘first-strike’ stability would probably 
have been equally strong had Carter remained in the White House after 
January 1981” is questionable.549 He cites Carter’s PD-50, which directed 
“that any new US arms-control proposal should (1) contribute to US defence 
and force posture goals; (2) help in deterring and restraining the Soviet Union 
and its allies; and (3) promise to limit arms competition and reduce the 
likelihood of military conflict.”550 Njølstad argues this “was as close to a 
recipe for ‘first-strike’ stability as you could possibly ask for in the Cold War 
world.”551 As the wording of Reagan’s NSDD-12 and NSDD-13 make clear, 
this is not the case. The point is that Reagan was serious about strengthening 
the US’ defence posture, and communicated this vigorously. On the former, 
the difference between him and President Carter was one of degree, on the 
latter, one of kind. Njølstad concedes that one of the most significant 
differences between the defence policies of the Carter and Reagan 
administrations was “the latter’s far more explicit ambition of regaining some 
kind of superiority.”552  
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When Ronald Reagan entered office he was known for his vivid anti-
Communist rhetoric. He continued to make his belief know that he did not 
view the USSR as a permanent feature in the world’s political landscape. In a 
1980 campaign speech he declared, “The greatest fallacy of the Lenin-
Marxist philosophy is that it is the ‘wave of the future.’”553 In 1982 he 
remarked, “The Soviet Union runs against the tide of history by denying 
human freedom and human dignity to its citizens. It also is in deep economic 
difficulty. […] The constant shrinkage of economic growth combined with the 
growth of military production is putting a heavy strain on the Soviet 
people.’’ 554  The same year Reagan maintained, “The Soviet Empire is 
faltering because it is rigid […] In the end, this […] will undermine the 
foundations of the Soviet system.”555 Simultaneously, Reagan outlined a 
vision for transforming the East-West relationship if the Soviet Union changed 
its policies. In the same 1982 speech, Reagan specified what it would take for 
the US-Soviet relationship to improve: “I’m optimistic that we can build a 
more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union. […] [A] Soviet 
leadership devoted to improving its people’s lives, rather than expanding its 
armed conquests, will find a sympathetic partner in the West.”556 A 1980 
campaign speech included the line, “We would like nothing better than to 
see the Russian people living in freedom and dignity instead of being 
trapped in a backwash of history as they are.”557  
There were not many in the Reagan Administration who agreed with 
the President when he tacitly suggested post-Cold War vision, conditional on 
the Soviet Union being coaxed to change itself as a result of US policy. 
Robert Gates thinks Reagan was unique in believing “that a tottering regime 
could be pushed further off balance. […] President Reagan, nearly alone, 
truly believed in 1981 that the Soviet system was vulnerable, not in some 
vague, long-range historical sense, but right then.” 558  This is not just 
hindsight reasoning applied retrospectively. In October 1981, President 
Reagan privately expressed his belief that the Soviets could not “vastly 
increase their military productivity because they’ve already got their people 
on a starvation diet […] They’ve been building the greatest military machine 																																																								
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the world has ever seen. But now they’re going to be faced with […] an arms 
race and they can’t keep up.”559 In 1982, when Yuri Andropov became leader 
after Leonid Brezhnev’s passing, a State Department memorandum for 
National Security Advisor William ‘Judge’ Clark outlined how Reagan’s stance 
was perceived in Moscow. “The new leadership, like the old, sees in 
Washington an Administration that refuses to recognize Soviet status and 
prerogatives as an equal superpower. […] They see us as having raised the 
costs and risks of military and international competition.” The memorandum 
argued that the Reagan Administration was “more openly competitive and 
militarily threatening”, all of which was occurring at a time of “continuing 
discontent and potential instability in Eastern Europe.” The memorandum 
alluded to the fact that the USSR might one day “find it difficult to meet the 
growing economic burdens of empire.”560  
This memo reflects the early Reagan Administration’s strategy of 
upping the ante on the Soviets by doggedly pursuing re-armament in 
combination with increasingly antagonistic public rhetoric: “Détente with the 
United States – from which the USSR derived important benefits – has 
collapsed, and […] Moscow sees NATO as having embarked upon an effort 
to deprive the USSR of its longstanding advantage in medium-range 
missiles.” Would a Carter administration have pursued a similar approach? 
While détente was in the process of collapsing before Reagan became 
President, Carter dismissed Reagan’s overt hostility during the 1980 
presidential campaign. At the Democratic convention, he said the choice 
between him and Reagan was one of “security, justice and peace” versus 
“the risk of international confrontation; the risk of an uncontrollable, 
unaffordable and unwinnable nuclear arms race.”561  In September 1980, 
President Carter told Californians the election choice could be reduced to 
“whether we have peace or war.”562 During the sole presidential TV debate, 
Carter made clear that he endorsed the principles behind SALT II as the basis 
for arms control and would try to convince Congress to ratify it, correctly 
predicting that under a Reagan presidency, “the adversarial relationship 
between ourselves and the Soviet Union would undoubtedly deteriorate very 
rapidly,” and warned of Reagan’s “extremely dangerous and belligerent” 																																																								
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attitude.563 Whilst Carter’s assessments were hyperbolic in the context of a 
high-stakes debate, on the basis of his comments it seems unlikely that a re-
elected President Carter would have ended up pursuing Reagan’s policy of 
deliberately confronting the Soviets rhetorically and pushing for arms 
reduction instead of limitations.  
In sum, there is counterfactual evidence that the election of Reagan, in 
interaction with a variety of other factors, had altered the trajectory of US-
Soviet affairs. This provides evidence for the relevance of agency: through 
their chosen approach to foreign policy, Presidents causally interact with the 
international system. President Reagan oversaw a switch in US strategy of 
dealing with USSR: from managing to confronting the Soviets, with a view to 
the eventual abolition of East-West rivalry. We do not know how Carter, in a 
hypothetical second term, would have dealt with the increasingly charged 
international environment after 1979, and whether he would eventually have 
overseen a similarly assertive US foreign policy as Reagan.  
  
 
Contingent non/emergence – the crisis that never was 
A counterweight to leaders’ influence is their exposure to events 
beyond their control that can force their hand, or demonstrate their 
impotence. The Polish crisis, for instance, had the potential to push the 
trajectory of US-Soviet relations into dangerous territory in 1980, potentially 
weakening the Reagan presidency before it even began properly. As Reagan 
came to office, a budding political crisis in Poland unfolded which had the 
potential to spark a military intervention by the Soviet Union. This turbulence 
occurred independently of whoever took the White House in 1980, it would 
have presented any incoming President with serious geopolitical turmoil with 
unpredictable consequences. In the event, a number of complex and 
distantly related developments precluded the emergent crisis from tipping 
into an open-ended violent conflagration with serious repercussions for 
international politics. 
The Soviet response to turmoil in Poland was the intervention that 
never was. Brooks and Wohlforth, two structural realists, use the Polish non-
invasion as evidence that the end of the Cold War, far from being in large 
part the product of leadership, was primarily brought about by the economic 																																																								
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decline of the USSR. The fact that the Soviets decided against intervention in 
Poland is taken by them as evidence that the Brezhnev doctrine was not 
revoked by Gorbachev as is commonly assumed, but by the Old Guard 
themselves back in December 1980 – a doctrinal paradigm shift driven by 
material necessity.564 What Brooks and Wohlforth leave unanswered is why 
merely a year earlier, the material situation was such that the Politburo felt 
comfortable deploying 100,000 troops to Afghanistan, a country three times 
as distant from Moscow than Poland. One assumes that the USSR’s 
immediate strategic priorities would have rested in its own backyard rather 
than in a landlocked Central Asian backwater of limited geostrategic value. 
Brooks and Wohlforth’s reasoning, conditioned by hindsight, goes against 
the grain of realist thinking. If ever there was a situation in which a state could 
have legitimately felt the imperative to use force to defend its own national 
interest, then this was it: Poland was the entry point into the Soviet empire, 
the territory through which Russia was twice invaded in the 20th century. Its 
defection from the Warsaw Pact would have been a serious blow (as events in 
1989 showed) to the Soviet Union. 
Contrary to the claims made by Brooks and Wohlforth, the historical 
evidence indicates that the USSR strongly considered and came very close to 
executing military intervention in Poland. When Solidarity emerged as a 
serious protest movement in Poland in the summer of 1980, the Politburo 
responded by increasing the combat readiness of the Soviet Forces’ 
Northern Group. Led by Foreign Minister Gromyko, the Soviet government in 
its discussions concerning the Polish situation was unequivocal that “we 
cannot afford to lose Poland.”565 Brezhnev, though ailing, was: “still capable 
of articulate expression and decisive action […] [he] agreed with Honecker 
and Husák that the Czechoslovak and Polish situations were similar and the 
use of outside force was perhaps needed.”566 
Plans were drawn up for Warsaw Pact forces to invade Poland by the 
time of the Pact’s annual Soyuz manoeuvres, to be held on December 8, 
1980. In time-honoured fashion, Warsaw Pact troops from the USSR, 
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Bulgaria and Hungary were to enter Poland 
under the pretext of the manoeuvres, with a total of seventeen divisions  – 
i.e. just short of 200,000 soldiers – to be deployed around Poland’s largest 																																																								
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cities and industrial clusters.567 Movement of troops began on 1 December, a 
week before zero hour of the planned invasion. The wheels had been set in 
motion – but then the plan was paused at a contingent turning point. At the 
final pre-invasion Warsaw Pact leader summit on December 5, Stanislaw 
Kania, the First Secretary of the Polish Communist Party, made a compelling 
case that his government would resolve the crisis through political means. 
Whilst this did not impress other Communist leaders such as East Germany’s 
Honecker and Czechoslovakia’s Husak, Brezhnev subsequently took Kania 
aside for a one-on-one meeting. It was then that Kania convinced Brezhnev 
that “if there were an intervention there would be a national uprising. Even if 
angels entered Poland, they would be treated as bloodthirsty vampires and 
the socialist ideas would be swimming in blood.”568 To which Brezhnev 
replied, “OK, we will not go in, although if complications occur we would. 
But without you we won't go in.”569 Rather than non-invasion being a fait 
accompli pre-determined by the USSR’s material conditions, Mastny builds a 
compelling case that “given the advanced state of the [military] operation 
and its timetable, its subsequent halting was an extraordinary event.”570 
 Thanks to a high-ranking CIA source in the Polish military – Richard 
Kuklinski, a colonel who had been recruited in 1971 and ended up working in 
the group of the Polish army charged with drawing up martial law plans in 
1980 – the pertinent facts about the Warsaw Pact build-up and planned 
invasion were known in Washington.571 This time, National Security Advisor 
Brzezinski worked hard to dissuade the Soviets from invading, informing the 
public of the upsurge in Soviet forces around Poland on December 3 and 
privately warning Brezhnev of the adverse US response to any use of military 
force in Poland. 572  By that point, however, the lame duck Carter 
Administration was bereft of credibility in the eyes of the Soviets. As such, 
																																																								
567  Kramer (2009), 18  
568  Cited in Byrne, 158 
569  Cited in Mastny, 15 
570  Ibid, 13 
571  Robert Gates, a high-ranking CIA Soviet expert at the time of the Polish crisis, has 
described Kuklinski as ‘one of the most important CIA sources of information on the 
Soviet military of the Cold War period’ who provided the US with ‘more than thirty 
thousand Soviet documents over a ten-year period, including Warsaw Pact contingency 
plans for war in Europe, details on large numbers of Soviet weapons systems and 
planning for electronic warfare.” See Gates (2007 [1996]), 238. 
572  MacEachin (2002b), 50  
 142 
“the American warnings had no noticeable effect on the Kremlin leaders.”573 
It was Brezhnev’s decision to delay the intervention and give the Polish 
government more time to resolve the crisis that provided the crucial break for 
the Reagan Administration. Reagan’s hardline cabinet, too, proved largely 
ineffectual in exerting influence over events in Poland.  
The case of the Polish non-invasion illustrates how a dense thicket of 
interrelated contingent events interacts with systemic pressures and leaders. 
Contingent emergent pressures operate as bottom-up sources of causation 
in the international system.574 The impermeable causal texture of such events 
means that as they unfold, outcomes cannot be predicted. The later 
significance of events and non-events are also rarely predictable. The Reagan 
cabinet understood the significance of Poland, but neither comprehended 
what went on, nor exuded control over events on the ground. It went on to 
enjoy a considerable dose of old-fashioned luck. 
Reagan’s pick for Secretary of State in 1981, Alexander Haig, followed 
the Carter Administration’s policy of deterring a Soviet invasion. He 
responded to a congratulatory note on his appointment from Gromyko by 
warning him of “major consequences for East-West relations if the Soviets 
intervened militarily in Poland.”575 However, a number of comments by new 
Administration officials actually relieved the external pressure on Poland and 
the USSR somewhat. A State Department implied that were Polish forces to 
‘establish order’ domestically, the United States would treat this as a ‘Polish 
matter.’ It was subsequently ‘clarified’ that the US would still view a 
crackdown as a ‘matter of very great concern’.576 At the time the comments 
were made, General Jaruzelski – who had been appointed Polish Prime 
Minister in February – was already in the process of planning the subsequent 
imposition of martial law, as instructed by the Soviets. The US’ stance 
encouraged him to continue on this path.577 As for the Soviet leadership, it 
showed few signs of concern about the consequences of the Polish crisis on 
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its relations with the new Administration.578 Another invasion scare passed at 
the end of March, when further Warsaw Pact manoeuvres took place, after 
which the window for a military operation had passed. Brezhnev’s dithering in 
December gave the Polish government much-needed breathing space.  
Secretary Haig was under pressure from hardliners who viewed the 
Polish crisis as “an opportunity to inflict mortal political, economic and 
propaganda damage on the USSR.”579 However, US options were severely 
limited by the reality on the ground. Realising that the Soviets would treat a 
genuine anti-Communist uprising as casus belli, Secretary Haig pursued the 
idea that the situation in Poland ought to be deescalated. After all, the 
incoming Administration had made it clear its first priority was to focus 
American resources on rebuilding its armed forces. A military commitment 
against any Soviet aggression in Poland, therefore, was not even under 
discussion. 580  President Reagan was simply fortunate not to have been 
confronted, within a few weeks of entering office, with a crisis of the kind 
witnessed in Hungary in 1956 or Czechoslovakia in 1968 – a crisis which, 
whilst it would not have come as unexpectedly as the invasion of 
Afghanistan, would nonetheless have tarred him with the brush of Carter-
esque impotence in the face of the USSR’s seemingly unstoppable military 
might, undermining the Reagan’s Administration subsequent ‘loose talk’ 
strategy about war with the Soviets. 
In the event, Secretary Haig embarked on a twin strategy of alleviating 
economic pressure on Poland by re-scheduling its foreign debt obligations, 
whilst issuing ‘strong warnings’ to the Soviets to desist from intervening.581 
Such threats did not seem to influence Moscow’s decision-making. US 
leverage over the Soviets was limited beyond outright military action; total 
trade between the two states accounted for less than 1% of the USSR’s 
GDP.582 Moreover, in April 1981 Reagan decided to lift the embargo on US 
grain sales to the USSR that President Carter had imposed after the invasion 
of Afghanistan. Reagan thereby fulfilled a campaign promise directed at the 
rural vote in the Mid-West.583 Haig, a day after the announcement, told the 																																																								
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press that a Soviet invasion of Poland would lead to a complete halt of 
bilateral trade between the two countries, in an effort to maintain a modicum 
of pressure on the Soviets.  
Reagan’s attempt to alleviate the Polish crisis through debt relief was a 
continuation of Carter’s approach. Interestingly enough this came to 
unexpectedly help the Western position, since it was matched with an 
economic strategy in kind pursued by the USSR. As Mastny explains, the 
Soviets wanted to keep Poland afloat with substantial economic aid so that it 
could eventually resolve its internal crisis. 584  Weakened as its economic 
foundations were, the Soviet Union felt the burden of aid to Poland to a far 
greater extent than the US. General Jaruzelski used the severity of the 
problems that afflicted the Polish economy, compounded by the threat of 
social turmoil in case of a further deterioration to wring more material 
concessions out of Moscow – aid the USSR could ill-afford. At a Politburo 
session shortly before Jaruzelski introduced martial law, Andropov remarked, 
“Jaruzelski has been more than persistent in setting forth economic demands 
from us and has made the implementation of ‘Operation X’ [the codename of 
the martial law operation] contingent on our willingness to offer increased 
economic assistance.”585 Although other Politburo members commented on 
Jaruzelski’s ‘slyness’, they were in no position to turn down his request. Notes 
from the same meeting depict a consensus that the USSR should offer 
whatever economic aid was necessary to Poland in the aftermath of martial 
law, even if that meant “drawing down [Soviet] state reserves or sacrificing 
deliveries to the [USSR's] internal market.”586 This was a direct consequence 
of Soviet worries that if an appropriate amount of aid were not forthcoming, 
Poland would become increasingly reliant on Western aid. It was particularly 
the idea that Poland would pursue the restoration of its membership of the 
International Monetary Fund that was unpalatable to the Soviets. 587 
It is difficult to counterfactually speculate about the outcome of a 
Soviet invasion in 1980 or 1981. The key question is whether the invading 
Warsaw Pact forces would have encountered widespread resistance, which 
would have necessitated bloodshed. The CIA, in a classified 1981 study of 
the implications of a Soviet invasion of Poland, argued that “the Soviet 																																																								
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leadership would have to expect a degree of resistance to invasion far 
surpassing that encountered in Hungary in 1956 or Czechoslovakia in 
1968.” 588  MacEachin believes “the Soviets had the military might to 
overcome the Polish resistance” and concludes that “Moscow in the end 
could probably have won the war.”589 Kramer, in an exhaustive analysis of a 
recently released batch of CIA files on Kuklinski’s intelligence work, finds that 
his reports “implied that if the Polish army facilitated rather than opposed the 
entry of Soviet and Warsaw Pact troops for ‘exercises,’ the level of resistance 
from society would be negligible, particularly if the Polish security forces took 
preventive measures envisaged under the martial law plans.”590 It appears 
that the Polish army, by and large, remained loyal to the Warsaw Pact. In 
March, teams of Soviet officers travelled through Poland in order to assess 
the allegiance of the Polish forces. Their findings were so confident that the 
Commander-in-Chief of Warsaw Pact forces, Marshal Kulikov, concluded “the 
Polish Army and the security organs were prepared to fulfil any assignment 
given to them by the party and state leadership.” 591  Indeed, Kuklinski 
reported in December 1980 that “everyone [in the highest levels of the Polish 
Defense Ministry] is very depressed and crestfallen, no one is even 
contemplating putting up active resistance against the Warsaw Pact 
action.”592 In April, he wrote that at most, uncoordinated and localised 
resistance by individual units seemed feasible, but that staunchly pro-Soviet 
figures, such as the Polish Deputy Defence Minister and Warsaw Pact 
Commander General Eugeniusz Molczyk would ensure that resistance would 
be stamped out at the first sign.593  
The CIA’s scenario envisaged fiercer Polish resistance because it 
assumed (despite Kuklinski’s reports) a much larger invading force of 30 to 45 
divisions.594 This would have constituted a far more aggressive incursion, and 
could concomitantly have provoked a fiercer response from within Poland. 
The actual invasion plans considered in December 1980 and spring 1981 
would have involved the imposition of martial law by Polish authorities, with 
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external military backing.595 It is difficult to speculate on whether a Warsaw 
Pact invasion of Poland would have led to widespread bloodshed or a quick, 
effective and brutal crackdown like in 1956 (Hungary) and 1968 
(Czechoslovakia). In any case, the Soviet strategy was to gradually push the 
Polish authorities toward the imposition of martial law. As time went on, the 
plan no longer foresaw Warsaw Pact involvement, save for a catastrophic 
breakdown of law and order in Poland. This was for no other reason than the 
fact that as time passed after the initial aborted invasion, the initiative 
gradually slipped from Moscow. It is a good example of how temporal 
sequencing can open up or, in this case, close down particular policy 
avenues.  
Kuklinski informed the CIA that “the martial law planning still held out 
the possibility of early Soviet and Warsaw Pact military intervention in Poland 
if the clampdown led to serious incidents of bloodshed” and the Polish army 
began to disintegrate.596 In the event, the martial law crackdown was swift 
and severe. In less than ten hours, the Polish army arrested 6,000 opposition 
activists and General Jaruzelski transitioned from civilian to military rule: 
“With brutal efficiency and minimal bloodshed, the Polish authorities 
managed to crush Solidarity, a broad-based social movement that had 
seemed invincible.”597 This was thanks to the detailed plans that had been 
drawn up by the Polish General Staff, aided by Warsaw Pact commanders 
and the Soviet KGB. 
Nevertheless it is plain that the Soviets were reluctant to invade 
Poland. This is why some realists cite evidence to the effect that the Brezhnev 
Doctrine was ‘dead’ by 1981. Indeed, such quotations can be gleaned from 
Politburo discussion documents. Andropov, for instance, was adamant that 
Warsaw Pact forces should not move in: “We cannot risk it. […] Even if 
Poland were to be ruled by Solidarity, so be it.”598 The context in which these 
arguments were made, however, was that of General Jaruzelski requesting a 
guarantee days before imposing martial law that “if the Polish forces do not 
manage to break the resistance by Solidarity [they could] expect assistance 
from other countries, up to the introduction of armed forces into the territory 
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of Poland.” 599  The Politburo rejected this request and was apparently 
prepared to live with Poland’s Communist rule being swept away with a 
Solidarity-led government being installed in its place.  
However, this scenario was only tolerable if it led to Poland’s 
Finlandization – not an unlikely prospect. Why would Solidarity not have 
wanted to maintain a working relationship with the USSR at a time when it 
was the only restive Warsaw Pact state, to reassure Moscow of its underlying 
peaceful intent and guarantee the Warsaw Pact’s vital lines of communication 
in the country? Under such conditions, the USSR was prepared to live with 
Poland outside of the Warsaw Pact, provided it offered safeguards not to 
become a NATO outpost.600 An overtly hostile anti-Soviet Poland would have 
risked being nipped in the bud by a Warsaw Pact invasion, so 
accommodation would have been a perfectly rational path for Solidarity to 
pursue. Crucially, in 1981, Moscow had means to prevent Poland’s defection 
from producing a domino effect across Eastern Europe: Solidarity’s appeal at 
the time was narrow, and in neighbouring East Germany and Czechoslovakia, 
the Communist “regimes were safely entrenched and [their] relatively affluent 
populations viewed the unruly Poles with indifference if not hostility because 
of the economic chaos they engendered.” 601  It is thus short-sighted to 
assume that a Solidarity-governed Poland in 1981 would have acted as a 
catalyst for the rapid end of the Cold War. By that point, the Soviet 
leadership was not ready to wind down the Cold War. Timing mattered. As 
put by Kramer, “The inability of the hard-liners to produce better results 
(from 1981 to 1985) undoubtedly gave the new Soviet leader greater leeway 
to consider ‘new thinking’ in foreign policy.”602 Just as the Polish invasion 
became unrealistic as time went on, so the perception of the deteriorating 
Soviet position needed to grow over time for new policy avenues such as 
serious disarmament to open up.  
A ‘Finlandized’ Poland could have prolonged the Cold War in that it 
would have removed a significant source of economic pain for the USSR. In 
1980 alone, total hard currency transfers to Poland amounted to $3bn.603 As 																																																								
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put by Mastny, “by prompting Moscow to consolidate the rest of its empire, 
Poland’s escape from Moscow’s fold would have made its final break-up 
more difficult.”604 A non-Communist Poland would have been unpleasant for 
Moscow, but would not have necessitated the premature break-up of the 
Soviet Union. The statements cited by Brooks and Wohlforth that supposedly 
exemplify the death of the Brezhnev Doctrine were made in response to 
Jaruzelski asking for outside military support to back up his impending 
martial law crackdown. It is likely that in the event martial law were to fail –
with Poland collapsing into a state of quasi-civil war rather than a swift 
transition to Solidarity rule – the Warsaw Pact was ready to intervene. 605 The 
night before the proclamation of martial law, army units in East Germany and 
Belarus were put on alert.606 Kramer concurs: “the evidence suggests that 
Soviet leaders had not ruled out a large-scale invasion of Poland if the martial 
law operation had gone disastrously awry and civil war had erupted.”607 The 
Kremlin decided to reject a military option only when asked by General 
Jaruzelski to provide a military assurance that could back up martial law.  
 The above begs the question why the Soviets were seemingly coming 
to terms with the limits of military force to achieve their foreign policy 
objectives. Only a year earlier an invasion was a near certainty. And two years 
earlier the same leadership – with Andropov as the driving force – launched 
the invasion of Afghanistan. What changed in the meantime? The underlying 
approach to the Polish question taken by the Carter and Reagan 
Administrations was broadly identical, and is best summed up by the record 
of a meeting between President Carter and his national security advisors on 
December 7, 1980: “We do not know whether the Soviets will go in. Our first 
goal is to keep them out.”608 The Reagan Administration maintained a high 
level of apprehension until springtime, and was kept up-to-date on Soviet 
plans by Colonel Kuklinski’s detailed and accurate intelligence. The President 
had no appetite for a military confrontation, preferring to focus on restoring 																																																								
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American strength. In addition, Soviet decision-makers at the time were 
largely impervious to American attempts at influencing their policies:  
 
“In December 1980 and the spring of 1981, when Kuklinski’s reports 
and other evidence were pointing to the threat of Soviet/Warsaw Pact 
military intervention in Poland, high-level U.S. officials warned the 
Soviet Union both privately and publicly that an invasion of Poland 
would lead to major political and economic consequences for the 
USSR. These warnings probably had only a minuscule impact at most 
on Soviet calculations.”609 
 
This was first and foremost an internal matter for the Warsaw Pact, something 
that Robert Gates corroborates: “The United States had limited power to 
affect the course of events in Poland.”610 Still, as Kramer points out, it is 
important to appreciate that under such highly delicate and fragile 
circumstances, “even a tiny difference can be important.”611 As it happened, 
the Soviet leadership’s choice to invade Afghanistan a year earlier now took 
military intervention in Poland off the table. At a Politburo meeting in 
December 1981, shortly before the Polish crackdown, Andropov explained 
why the Soviets could not commit to military intervention: “A variety of 
economic and political sanctions” prepared by the West “would make things 
very difficult for us.” His colleague Mikhail Suslov added, “world public 
opinion will not allow us to [invade].”612 This is rich in historical ironies: 
Afghanistan was an ill-conceived campaign in a country of little relevance to 
the Soviet Union, but ended up becoming a serious strain on the USSR as a 
result of the invasion. Poland, in the meantime, not only had the potential to 
become an actual threat to Soviet hegemony, but nine years later became 
the first Warsaw Pact country in which the Communist party was peacefully 
deposed from power. 
By the fall of 1981, the US intelligence community had come to attach 
too great a probability to the possibility of a Soviet invasion, and the CIA 
ended up discounting Kuklinski’s warnings of the rapid approach of martial 
																																																								
609  Kramer (1999), 168 
610  Gates (2007 [1996]), 239 
611  Ibid, 240 
612  Cited in Mastny, 30 
 150 
law. 613  As a result, the Reagan Administration was not informed of its 
imminent imposition – and failed to even warn the Polish authorities of the 
damage martial law would cause to its relations with the West.614 This was 
clearly contrary to the Administrations’ goals: “If senior U.S. officials had 
been clearly warned by the CIA that Jaruzelski was intent on imposing martial 
law, they undoubtedly would have tried to undercut his plans, not least 
because they feared that a crackdown would ultimately bring in the Soviet 
Union.”615 If the CIA had listened to Kuklinski, the Administration could have 
distributed copies of the plans it possessed that detailed the imposition of 
martial law, thereby depriving the authorities of the key element of surprise in 
their overnight crackdown, either leading to its failure or postponement, and 
in any case robbing Jaruzelski of the element of surprise. As discussed 
above, this could have either brought about a large-scale invasion of Poland, 
or the Kremlin could have stuck to its previously agreed line and waited for 
an internal resolution of Poland’s troubles.616  
The actual US policy on the eve of martial law – doing nothing – was 
brought about by flawed intelligence analysis and would not actively have 
been chosen by any Administration. 617  Had the Reagan Administration 
warned Solidarity either privately or publicly of the coming crackdown, 
martial law would have been much more difficult to impose successfully.618 In 
the event that this would have led to a ‘clean’ collapse of the Polish 
government, it seems that the USSR could have lived with a Finlandized 
Poland, which had been restive for some time (as opposed to other Warsaw 
Pact states).619 By removing a costly source of trouble from the Eastern bloc, 
this could have alleviated pressure on the Soviet empire at an opportune 
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time and created economic and political breathing space for Moscow. 620 A 
‘messy’ collapse threatening to spill over into neighbouring countries, by 
contrast, would likely have entailed a Soviet invasion.621 Had this succeeded 
in restoring order, it would in all likelihood have deterred further uprisings in 
Eastern Europe for quite some time. Either of the above scenarios, then, 
could well have strengthened the Soviet position: either by removing a 
continuous source of turmoil from its imperial sphere, or demonstrating the 
USSR’s ability to crack down hard on dissenting imperial minions, in the 
process exposing the Reagan Administration as powerless to deter Soviet 
aggression.  
That either of those scenarios didn’t come to be – they remained non-
emergent – was, in the final analysis, due to highly contingent, interrelated, 
fissures in the texture of events at the time: Brezhnev’s last-minute dithering 
in December 1980; the CIA misjudging Kuklinski’s warnings about martial 
law; and Jaruzelski’s ‘backbone’ in going through with the crackdown despite 
the absence of Warsaw Pact reassurances. Absent any of the above, the 
picture would have changed dramatically. Such contingencies spell trouble 
for any attempt at macro-theorising system change: at crucial turning points, 
small happenings and the consequences they have – in either bringing about 
particular events or preventing them from coming about – can have large-
scale consequences.  
  In complex systems, the interplay between idiosyncratic actors and 
systemically induced pressures can produce junctures with multiple potential 
trajectories, the selection of which is a function of timing and unintended 
consequences (as with SALT II, the Cuban Brigade, and the invasion of 
Afghanistan), agency (as with the agent switch from Carter to Reagan), or 
emergent effects (as with the ‘smothered’ non-crisis in Poland, the lack of 
intervention being partially the unintended result of the military and political 
cost of the invasion of Afghanistan). If Afghanistan had not been invaded, 
there is ample evidence the Soviet Union would have intervened in Poland a 
year later. This is a good illustration of how small, concurrent, contingent and 
seemingly unrelated events interact in the international system in a complex 
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manner. The ‘whole’ of emergent non/occurrences in IR is bigger than the 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
GEORGE SHULTZ vs. ALEXANDER HAIG 
 
 
 
 
If only the Soviet leadership could come and see our homes and our stores, 
and see how we live in this country, they’d have a good view of us. 
Ronald Reagan 
 
 
I knew where he was: he wanted to have a constructive dialogue. And he was 
confident in himself. 
George P. Shultz 
 
 
 
 
 
Political behaviour is based on two conditions: an operational 
opportunity to act, and leaders’ willingness to act.622 The modality of these 
two factors is multiple: opportunities to act vary, as does politicians’ desire 
for action. Complexity theory provides an analytical framework for 
investigating the influence of idiosyncratic decision-making under 
uncertainty. In addition, counterfactuals are a means of estimating the effects 
of different leaders on political outcomes. Leaders make staffing and policy 
choices. They select from among the available personnel and strategic policy 
alternatives, pick particular options over others, and thereby exert a degree 
of influence over the international system. In this chapter I investigate how 
Reagan’s staffing choices interacted with his foreign policy choices. I proceed 
through two comparative counterfactual investigations: The first examines 
the similarities and differences between Secretaries of State Al Haig and 
George Shultz, the latter having replaced the former in 1982. I examine their 																																																								
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policy and personality differences. This gives rise to a secondary 
counterfactual, namely, how the appointment of George Shultz shifted 
patterns of policy influence in the Reagan Administration. Reagan, by 
selecting Shultz, put in place an operative who would come to enable 
Reagan’s radical peace-making strategy. Links between personnel choices 
and policy outcomes are complex, but can be traced. It is difficult to 
disentangle whether Reagan’s personnel choice of Shultz in 1982 was 
contingent, but it can be shown to have been of causal consequence for the 
rest of the decade. 
One way to explore how agency influences outcomes in the 
international system is by juxtaposing two leaders in the same role, 
comparing their leadership styles, the content of their policies and 
contrasting the foreign policy outcomes that occurred during their respective 
tenures. Substituting one agent with another and investigating the possible 
consequences of such a change tests the strength of links between certain 
leaders, their policy choices, and international outcomes. Re-imagining 
events by delinking agents and outcomes requires the formulation of causal 
pathways and an explanation of how policy can and cannot affect 
international relations. If it is convincingly shown that the replacement of a 
particular agent had direct influence on international affairs, this implies that 
leaders constitute an important causal dimension which the discipline of 
International Relations should pay more attention to. 
 
 
Counterfactual leadership comparisons are not without their pitfalls 
The search for causes, as Waltz points out, amounts to the explanation 
of variance in the world. This deceptively simple statement hides a deep and 
complicated debate concerning the meaning of causality in social sciences.623 
Broadly speaking, causality can be derived through a Humean-inductive 
mould, by seeking to uncover regular relations among patterns of events  
(the so-called ‘positivist’ approach), or, following Kurki, by investigating the 
“real causal powers of ontological entities.”624 Either way, a factor can be said 
to have ‘caused’ an event when its presence made a direct difference to 
subsequent happenings. Turning this concept on its head, a factor is a cause 																																																								
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if its removal from a given situation alters later outcomes.625 I work on the 
assumption that leaders can be studied as ‘causal difference-makers’.626 That 
assumption alone is hardly enough; indeed, it begs the question of just how 
much causal latitude agents can possess in the domain of foreign policy. It is 
uncontroversial to maintain that people ‘matter’, but it is much more difficult 
to show how they matter.627 My approach is to remove a leader from a given 
context, and study how this could have changed subsequent events. Such a 
‘counterfactual contrast’ exercise can pinpoint specific acts of agency that 
made a difference in terms of outcomes: if it can be shown that a particular 
foreign policy development would have been different because of the 
presence/absence of a leader, said development will by extension have been 
shown to be a causal consequence of leadership. This is but one of many 
types of counterfactual analysis. Since it aims to generate causal insights 
pertaining to particular developments in the international system, care needs 
to be taken to make the ‘what if’ scenarios a) realistic (rather than a so-called 
‘miracle counterfactual’, such as replacing Al Haig with Kermit the Frog rather 
than with George Shultz); b) plausible (i.e. speculating on outcomes in a 
manner driven by and consistent with the historical evidence available from 
the period in question); and c) focused (i.e. seeking to alter specified causal 
factors in a transparent manner).628 
When a new agent comes to power and changes the previous policy, 
this may reflect a modified external environment, shifting domestic interests, 
or the new agent’s distinct preferences. What weakens the conclusions 
derived by substituting one leader for another is that the ceteris paribus 																																																								
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condition doesn’t hold: we cannot rip out one leader from the fabric of 
decision-making without introducing wider changes in the political and 
economic structures of the time. 629 But the rule of ‘We can never merely do 
one thing in a system’ does not mean we need to look at the world as a 
seamless web where one change effects everything else elsewhere.630		
A counterfactual analysis needs to be careful to accurately identify 
deliberate policy changes introduced by a new leader, and scrupulously link 
these changes as directly as possible to subsequent events. Otherwise there 
is a danger of mistaking coincidence for incidence. Substituting one leader 
for another entails a range of changes that go beyond agency alone. World 
events will occur subsequent to a leadership switch that are causally 
unrelated to it and would still have occurred absent a leadership change. 
Counterfactual analyses of events should not mistakenly end up attributing 
an outcome to agency when leaders were in fact coincidental.  
These are the obstacles to a meaningful counterfactual analysis of the 
causal force of leaders. Thankfully they are not insurmountable. Ideally, a 
counterfactual experiment holds constant all factors other than the one 
whose causal influence is being investigated. In the case of the replacement 
of Alexander Haig by George Shultz in 1982 a number of circumstances 
combine to make this a promising counterfactual scenario. On many of the 
policy issues of the day, Secretaries Haig and Shultz held similar positions. 
On the issue of linkage, however, they disagreed. In addition, there are well-
documented character differences between the two. If it is possible to trace 
events in US-Soviet affairs to the changes brought about by the appointment 
of George Shultz, and furthermore demonstrate that Alexander Haig would 
have been unlikely to bring about similar changes himself, a case can be built 
to show how a Secretary of State’s leadership can make a real difference.  
 
 
Alexander Haig vs. George Shultz 
After Reagan’s election in 1980, there was speculation that George 
Shultz, who had advised Reagan on economic issues during the campaign, 
would be appointed Secretary of State. 631 Reagan previously made use of 
Shultz’s services, having known him since 1974, when Reagan was Governor 																																																								
629		 Levy (2014)  
630  Elster calls this the ‘counterfactualisation of the whole universe.’ Elster (1978), 177 
631  Brinkley, 75 
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of California and established regular contact with Shultz. 632 Two weeks after 
the 1980 election, Richard Nixon sent Reagan a detailed memo outlining his 
recommendations for various cabinet posts, arguing strongly against Shultz 
and in favour of Haig as Secretary of State.633 Reagan followed this advice. 
Alexander Haig took office, along with the rest of the Reagan Administration, 
on 22 January 1981, holding his post until July 1982. Haig was a military 
man-cum-politician, with a highly distinguished record of bravery in 
Vietnam.634 Haig’s first employ in the White House came in 1969 when Henry 
Kissinger made him his Military Assistant. Less than a year later Richard Nixon 
promoted Haig to Deputy National Security Advisor, before appointing him 
his Chief of Staff amidst the Watergate endgame, with Haig serving Nixon 
until the bitter end. Gerald Ford later made him Supreme Allied Commander 
Europe, a position Haig kept until 1979.  
When Haig resigned as Reagan’s Secretary of State in 1982, President 
Reagan immediately offered Shultz the post.635 Shultz was, at the time, 
President of the global construction firm Bechtel Corporation, having 
previously served the Nixon Administration for five years as Secretary of 
Labor, Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and Secretary of 
the Treasury, gaining a reputation for integrity, competence and a reticent 
doggedness in pursuit of his tasks. Prior to his career in government Shultz 
was a professor of economics at MIT and Dean of the Chicago Graduate 
School of Business, and at one time worked for President Dwight 
Eisenhower’s Council of Economic Advisors. During the Second World War 
Shultz enlisted and served with the Marines in the Pacific theatre, attaining 
the rank of Captain.636  
Both Secretaries Haig and Shultz viewed negotiations with the Soviet 
Union as an essential aspect of their job. Anatoly Dobrynin, Soviet 
Ambassador to the United States from 1962 to 1986, remarks that Haig’s 
views on reaching out to the Soviets “did not differ much from those of the 
President himself.”637 Shultz’s first experience of negotiations with Soviet 
officials came in the early 1970s over talks about a US-Soviet trade 
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agreement.638 Haig and Shultz were the only high-level officials in the Reagan 
Administration who had practical experience of dealing with the USSR prior 
to assuming their positions.639  
 
 
While Al Haig advocated a policy of linkage, Shultz rejected it 
For the first year of his Presidency, Reagan did not make a 
comprehensive statement on his policy towards the Soviet Union.640 It was 
thus largely up to Secretary Haig to craft a working set of policies on the 
basis of both his views and those of Reagan. In September 1981 Haig sent 
Reagan a memo concerning his (Haig’s) upcoming meetings with Soviet 
Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. Haig stated his aim was for the talks to 
contribute “to your [i.e. Reagan’s] objective of putting the US-Soviet 
relationship on a sounder footing,” and expressed the importance of 
negotiations – “getting TNF [Theatre Nuclear Forces] negotiations started is 
vital to us” – as well as his intention to raise human rights issues and the 
possibility of opening US and Soviet consulates in Kiev and New York, 
respectively. 641  Haig also began talks with Gromyko on limiting nuclear 
weapons in Europe, a decision approved by Reagan and Brezhnev.642 These 
positions were similar to the foreign policy talking points later taken by 
Secretary Shultz. In addition, both Secretaries Haig and Shultz viewed the 
aim of strengthening alliances abroad as fundamental to US strength.643 In his 
‘Strategic Plan for Presidential Diplomacy and Summitry’ of April 1981, 
Secretary Haig’s first objective was for Reagan to act and be recognised as “a 
leader of the industrial democracies and as a willing partner in the 
community of all nations.”644 This policy continuity between Secretaries Haig 
and Shultz reflects the functional priorities that come with being a Secretary 
of State: the government’s chief diplomat is tasked with executing a 
President’s efforts to deal productively with other states.  
However a Secretary of State does possess a degree of autonomy in 
crafting the strategy and policy principles that underwrite his or her 																																																								
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diplomatic tasks. The main policy distinction between Secretaries Haig and 
Shultz concerned ‘linkage’. This was the idea that relations with the Soviets 
across all policy areas are intrinsically inter-related. The deterioration of 
relations in one sphere – say, the invasion of Afghanistan – demanded the 
cessation of diplomatic efforts in another – in the case of Afghanistan, arms 
control.645 Kissinger and Nixon deployed linkage as a strategic complement 
to détente, to rein in Soviet behaviour during complex, multi-pronged arms 
control negotiations.646 Haig explicitly embraced linkage, having formed this 
view during the Nixon era, specifically the idea of linking arms control to 
Soviet concessions in ‘regional affairs’ (i.e. Soviet military adventures in the 
Third World).647 During Haig’s tenure Reagan pursued linkage. Reagan stated 
at his first press conference, “I happen to believe, also, that you can’t sit 
down at a table and just negotiate unless you take into account, in 
consideration at that table all the other things that are going on. In other 
words, I believe in linkage.”648 Haig explicitly told Reagan that the aim of a 
sounder US-Soviet relationship is achieved by “linking improved bilateral 
relations with increased Soviet restraint.”649 
 A 1981 speech by Haig on relations between the US and the Soviet 
Union developed this theme further: “We have learned that Soviet-American 
agreements, even in strategic arms control, will not survive Soviet threats to 
the overall military balance or Soviet encroachment upon our strategic 
interest in critical regions of the world. Linkage is not a theory; it is a fact of 
life.” 650 Haig’s endorsement of linkage suggests that the eventual 
improvement of US-Soviet relations under his leadership would have had to 
be preceded by significant changes in Soviet conduct. This had the effect of 
lodging a ‘chicken-egg’ paradox in the fabric of East-West relations, 
precluding better relations: the Soviet Union would have to change its 
foreign policy and exercise strategic restraint across the board for the US to 
contemplate serious bilateral initiatives. As the rest of the decade 
demonstrated, Soviet concessions in foreign policy only occurred after the 
leaders of the US and USSR had struck up a constructive relationship based 
on summit meetings and a genuine, mutual commitment to arms control. 																																																								
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 Reagan pursued both of these trust-buildings elements after Haig had 
departed, but before Soviet behaviour in the international system became 
noticeably more benign. This went against Haig’s logic of linkage. At a 
private dinner early in 1981 Anatoly Dobrynin asked Haig whether the 
Reagan Administration was interested in any constructive dialogue with the 
Soviets at all, to which Haig linked the possibility of agreements to “the 
Soviet Union’s general conduct” as judged by the Administration. Dobrynin’s 
straightforward rejection of this approach – “a history of our relations showed 
it could not produce anything but permanent confrontation” – left Haig 
untouched. He seemed unfazed by the fact that linkage contradicted the 
goal of improving relations with the USSR. 651 
Linkage offered no basis on which to expect constructive changes in 
Soviet behaviour. Haig was aware that his diplomatic strategy – assigning all 
the blame of Cold War tensions to the Soviets in the expectation that this 
would prompt a change in their policies – was confrontational. As Haig wrote 
in his September 1981 memo to Reagan, he firmly expected his upcoming 
meeting with the Soviet foreign minister to be quarrelsome:  
 
“Gromyko will of course resist, and any results will be neither large nor 
immediate, but we may be able to start a process headed in the right 
direction. My main purpose will be to drive home to him that our 
whole approach to East-West policy has fundamentally and durably 
changed. […] But I also want to convey to Gromyko that there is 
something for the Soviets in a more moderate course. […] There are 
positive benefits if they adjust to [our new course] responsibly.”652 
 
Haig expected firm resistance “rather than explicit concessions.” This was 
part of a wider campaign to “keep the onus for delay and lack of good will 
on the Soviets, where it belongs.”653 A September 1981 NSC document that 
outlined White House media talking points on a letter from Reagan to 
Brezhnev repeated this strategy of putting “the onus for present world 
tensions and dangers on the Soviets” and holding  
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“the Soviets responsible for the deterioration of our relationship. If the 
Soviet Union does not exercise the necessary restraint, the response of 
the United States to protect its interests will be predictable and firm. 
[…] The cause for present world tensions and danger is the Soviet 
Union.”654  
 
This was hardly a basis on which to expect an improvement in relations with 
the USSR, since it put the responsibility of change squarely on the Soviet 
Union. That strategy did not generate actionable diplomatic impulses to 
defuse Cold War tensions. 
The problem with linkage was recognised as early as February 1981, 
when Lord Carnes, a hardline staffer on the National Security Council – i.e. 
hardly a typical advocate for going ‘soft’ on the Soviets – sent Richard Allen, 
Reagan’s then National Security Advisor, a memorandum titled ‘Thoughts on 
Linkage’:  
 
“The Secretary’s [i.e. Haig’s] position seems to be to hold the Soviets 
to a strict interpretation of the Basic Principles of Relations statement 
of 1972 and the Agreement on Prevention of Nuclear War of 1973, 
and make any kind of agreement in arms control or trade contingent 
on compliance with them. Apparently, he would consider Soviet 
activities in Africa as well as Afghanistan in violation of these 
agreements. [...] A blanket rejection of negotiation with the Soviets 
unless they renounce all activity in the Third World will cause 
considerable turmoil among the West Europeans, and could 
accelerate the split between the US and its allies on defence, arms 
control and other East-West issues.”655  
 
In other words, Haig’s diplomatic strategy was an unworkable path towards 
reduced East-West tensions, and this risked America’s credibility with its own 
Allies.  
Linkage, much like Haig, was a relic of the Nixon era. Unless Haig was 
to change his mind about the policy’s efficacy, for which there is no evidence, 
his continued tenure as Secretary of State would have meant the continued 
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pursuit of linkage. In an autumn 1981 memo analysing a letter from Brezhnev 
to Reagan, Haig was clear that he expected the Soviet Union to take the 
necessary steps for its relationship with the US to improve:  
 
“The Soviet Union wants better relations, accepts the fact that the US 
wants them as well, but will not agree to the terms that require 
Moscow to change its foreign policy. This line was, of course, to be 
expected. The real test of Soviet readiness to work for improved 
relations will be in Soviet actions, not words, over the coming 
months.”656 
 
Haig was firm in his conviction that it was the Soviet Union alone that had to 
take the necessary steps to improve its relationship with the US. Subsequent 
events showed that this improvement only came about once Reagan 
committed to a strategy of diplomatic engagement, after both the USSR and 
the US undertook trust-building steps and were prepared to see past each 
other’s immediate transgressions in the pursuit of accommodation. To be 
sure, linkage remained a definitive aspect of the US-Soviet relationship; it 
encapsulated the interrelated tensions that drove the Cold War along. But 
Shultz made it possible to move to what Abraham Sofaer, a State 
Department official, calls ‘limited linkage’, which was “the most controversial 
of the changes in diplomatic policy adopted by President Reagan to enable 
his administration to engage the Soviets effectively.”657 It was a subtle, but 
significant shift that enabled Reagan to begin his move from confrontation to 
co-operation, summed up by remarks Shultz made to Reagan when 
summarising a meeting with Dobrynin in June 1983: “my main point was that 
you continue to be willing to engage the Soviets in serious dialogue aimed at 
solving problems, and that the individual items we wished to discuss should 
be seen in that context.”658 
 
 
Shultz decided that US-Soviet relations needed a new approach 
George Shultz maintains that his belief on the need for a new course 
in US-Soviet relations was cemented in the summer of 1982 after German 																																																								
656  Haig (1981), Brezhnev’s October 15 Letter, RRPL 
657  Sofaer, 130 
658  Shultz (1983), My Meeting With Dobrynin, RRPL 
 163 
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, a close friend of Shultz’s, told the freshly 
appointed Secretary of State at a private, non-official weekend retreat that 
the lack of contact between the US and USSR was exceedingly dangerous. 659 
Shultz dismissed linkage early on, viewing it as a concept which may have 
made moral sense but was in reality an obstacle to diplomacy:  
 
“we needed to get away from the old concept of ‘linkage’ […] It was 
unrealistic to expect that the Soviets would back off, simply for the 
sake of their relationship with us, from a position on some part of the 
world from which they were gaining an advantage. Linkage, I felt, was 
inhibiting our disposition to move forcefully and, ironically, often 
seemed to be turned on its head by the Soviets, as they tried to use 
linkage to their advantage – to threaten that the relationship would 
suffer if we undertook some action that they opposed.”660  
 
Shultz’s break with linkage created a new dynamic in the US-Soviet 
relationship, one that foresaw a more equitable distribution of responsibility 
between East and West for the state of Cold War tensions. The policy shift 
away from linkage was formalised with National Security Decision Directive 
75, signed in January 1983, which rejected linkage and instead called for 
simultaneous bilateral negotiations on arms control, human rights, regional 
issues and bilateral exchanges. It formed the basis of the Reagan 
Administration’s ensuing Soviet policy.661 This approach stood in contrast to 
Reagan’s earlier attitude toward linkage, as expressed in his letter to 
Brezhnev (drafted by Haig) of November 1981, in which Reagan wrote of the 
difficulties he had accepting “your declaration that Soviet actions in other 
parts of the world must have no bearing on our US-Soviet relations. We both 
have worldwide interests, making it hard to see how our bilateral relations 
can be isolated from global happenings.”662 The passage exposes the logical 
flaw at the heart of linkage: how could common diplomatic ground be found 
if the US viewed every Soviet misdeed as warranting further pressure?663 It is 
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hard to envisage that the shift to a pragmatic bilateral approach takes place 
in a counterfactual where Haig stays on as Secretary of State. 
Shultz forcefully imprinted his views on the need to phase out linkage. 
When the Soviet Union shot down a Korean Airlines plane in September 
1983, killing 269 civilians after the airplane accidentally strayed into Soviet 
airspace, Shultz fought his corner in subsequent Administration debates on 
how to react. He pressed for a strong rhetorical response whilst insisting that 
the recently resumed East-West arms control talks had to continue. 
Hardliners saw it as self-evident that any incipient engagement with the 
Soviets had to be shut down. In a counterfactual where the martial Haig 
remained Secretary of State, KAL 007 would likely have placed US-Soviet 
relations into a semi-permanent deep freeze. Shultz saw it as an opportunity 
to maintain the dialogue he was in the process of setting up.664 Shultz argued 
vehemently that he should stick to his previously arranged meeting with 
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Madrid. By contrast, “Weinberger 
objected violently: ‘George should not go.’”665 Shultz won the argument: 
“The President did not agree [with Weinberger]. […] Weinberger advocated 
[saying] to Gromyko that there would be no more arms control negotiations 
until we had a satisfactory explanation of the downing of the KAL.” 666 Shultz 
then met with Gromyko in what he describes as one of the angriest 
diplomatic encounters in his career – nonetheless, a complete breakdown in 
relations had been averted. Shultz’s advocacy of strong rhetorical response 
while simultaneously continuing dialogue with the Soviets was contrary to the 
policy of linkage. As Shultz later remarked, after the downing of KAL 007 “we 
broke dramatically with linkage, and it was good that we did.”667  
By 1984, the strategic shift away from linkage was complete. Jack 
Matlock, then Reagan’s Special Assistant for European and Soviet Affairs, 
wrote a document for the National Security Council entitled ‘Dealing with the 
Soviets’ that contained the following passage which negates linkage entirely: 
  
“Our strategy presupposes that our adversaries are nasty and will do 
outrageous things. It cannot and should not change every time they 
do something outrageous: Jimmy Carter was shocked by Afghanistan; 																																																								
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he withdrew SALT II. Ronald Reagan was not surprised by KAL; he 
kept Geneva talks going. We can always use our adversaries’ 
outrageous conduct to build support behind our firm negotiating 
positions. But to have relations so vulnerable to shocks means further 
loss of control over events.”668 
 
This is a powerful depiction of the consequences brought about by the end 
of linkage. Linkage, regardless of its utility, was an expression of the 
fundamentally adversarial East-West relationship, a prism – or a prison – 
through which each side was prone to viewing the other with suspicion. 
Linkage of some sorts would always be part of the dynamic behind US-Soviet 
relations: what Shultz managed to achieve, as in the aftermath of the KAL 
007 disaster, was to channel this competitive energy in a way that 
contributed to continued dialogue with the Soviets. 
 
 
Haig and Shultz had markedly different leadership styles 
 In addition to the actual content of policy, a Secretary of State imprints 
the office with his or her personality. A counterfactual contrast exercise 
between Haig and Shultz can provide clues as to whether the transition from 
one to the other was of consequence to policy outcomes. Did noticeable 
differences exist between Haig and Shultz’s composure, and if so, what 
impact did this have on their respective tenures?  
  In the early days of the Reagan presidency, fierce debates erupted in 
his Cabinet regarding which Soviet strategy the Administration should 
pursue. This was because Reagan, on entering office, was “not paying that 
much attention to Soviet affairs in the first two years”. His advisors, all of 
whom “sought to prove that they truly represented what Ronald Reagan 
wanted”, filled the resulting policy vacuum. 669  Two competing policy 
positions in the Administration vied for the President’s endorsement. Haig 
sought negotiations with the Soviets on the basis of linkage. He pitted 
himself against a set of anti-Soviet hardliners who opposed dialogue out of 
principle and instead advocated relentless pressure on the USSR in the hope 
of undermining the regime.670 The two camps openly competed for Reagan’s 																																																								
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support. In a memo written in June 1982, shortly before Haig’s resignation, 
Richard Pipes of the National Security Council sparred with Haig:  
 
“The basic difference between State [i.e. Haig] and myself is 
philosophical. State believes that we should be content with an 
attempt to influence Soviet behavior by offering rewards to the USSR 
when it is peaceful and punishments when it is not. Following what I 
sense to be the President’s belief, I, by contrast, argue [...] that Soviet 
international behavior is a response not only to external threats and 
opportunities but also the internal imperatives of the Soviet political, 
economic, social and ideological system. State may be expected to 
fight this proposition tooth and nail, although it seems to express the 
quintessence of the President’s approach. [Emphasis added]”671  
 
This struggle for the President’s ‘true’ foreign policy position – was he a 
hardliner or a pragmatist at heart? – was a function of Reagan’s seeming 
ambivalence on many important foreign policy issues, and unwillingness to 
adjudicate between rifts in his Cabinet.  
Reagan campaigned for the Presidency on a fierce anti-Soviet 
platform, in part out of conviction, but also to carve out his position as an 
anti-establishment candidate seeking to distance himself from the policy of 
détente. At the same time, Reagan made it clear on numerous occasions that 
his quarrel was with Communism rather than with the Russian people, and 
that he deemed nuclear war and indeed the entire concept of nuclear 
deterrence to be morally abhorrent – embodied by this famous phrase 
during hais 1983 speech in which Reagan announced plans for a nuclear 
missile defence system: “Wouldn’t it be better to protect the American 
people rather than avenge them?” Such statements belie the war-mongering 
reputation that was sometimes attached to Reagan’s name.672 His viewpoints 																																																								
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on foreign policy were not easy to discern, and he was susceptible to 
contradictory policy positions in an effort to reach a middle ground between 
opposing camps inside his Administration. Hal Brands describes the 
procedural aspect of Reagan’s foreign policy-making as ‘bureaucratic 
warfare’.673 Brands argues that the intensity of the policy struggles in the 
cabinet was not so much a sign of dysfunction as a deliberate attempt by 
Reagan to stay above the fray, preventing him from becoming captive to a 
particular faction, and retaining his ability to work constructively with the 
diverse cast of characters he intentionally assembled in his Administration.674 
Reagan entered office with a clear enough view of the nature of the Soviet 
threat, but he did not have a pre-prepared strategy for how to deal with the 
Soviets. One consequence of this was that foreign policy principals had to 
engage in sustained, determined campaigns to advocate their points of view 
to the President and at the same time discredit alternative proposals from 
other cabinet members.  
The style with which such policy advocacy is conducted matters in a 
Presidential Administration. Alexander Haig carried himself with the 
obstreperous air of a general. The American public got a taste of his 
personality after Reagan was gunned down in March 1981. Haig gained 
infamy after storming out of the White House Situation Room and into the 
Briefing Room a few hours after the assassination attempt, dislodging press 
secretary Larry Speakes who was in the middle of running a press conference. 
Watching Speakes from the Situation Room, Haig lost his temper when the 
press secratry struggled to clearly answer the question of who was running 
the government. Haig barged in and proceeded to declare, “As of now, I am 
in control here, in the White House, pending the return of the Vice President, 
and I am in close touch with him.”675 Haig’s authoritarian tone ruffled feathers 
among the public and in the Administration. Principals such as Secretary 
Weinberger were irritated when Haig single-handedly announced that he was 
taking charge.676 
Haig’s combustive personality interfered with the resolution of the 
inter-personal tensions that were a byproduct of the combative policy-
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formulation process in the Reagan Administration. 677  Anatoly Dobrynin 
described Haig as a “military man by formation and demeanor. [...] He was a 
typical bully, his manner of speaking was confrontational. [...] He was more 
used to an atmosphere of confrontation rather than uncertainty which he 
connected with the relaxation of tension and vague prospects for protracted 
negotiation.” 678  This had consequences for the direction of US-Soviet 
negotiations under Haig: if a Secretary of State views his adversary as 
incapable of change, he wont pursue a strategy that aims for long-term 
reconciliations. Haig’s own writings corroborate this. In his 1981 memo to the 
President on the upcoming Gromyko talks, Haig bluntly asserted his failure to 
anticipate any progress, instead expecting ‘stiff rebuttals from Gromyko’. This 
cantankerous attitude extended to Haig’s relations with his own colleagues. 
Jack Matlock describes Haig as “offending members of the 
Administration.” 679  Another account based on eyewitness interviews 
describes Haig’s demeanour at NSC meetings, where “he would lecture, 
hector, pound his fist on the table. [...] To Reagan, who liked others to be as 
easygoing, unassuming and sanguine as he was, this behaviour was like 
fingernails on a blackboard.”680 Further evidence for the problematic nature 
of Haig’s temperament comes from a surprisingly hostile memo for Reagan 
written by National Security Advisor Richard Allen, in which he commented 
on Secretary Haig’s draft response to the first letter sent by Brezhnev to 
Reagan:  
 
“The draft response submitted by Secretary Haig [...] is fundamentally 
negative in content and in places undiplomatic in language. Given the 
importance of this document – the first formal exchange of 
correspondence between the heads of state of the United States and 
the USSR – it deserves more careful thought. The whole tone of the 
response is petulant and suggests a ‘brush off.’ [...] It behooves us to 
[maintain a statesman-like air]. I fear that this draft would produce a 
most unfavorable impression among our Allies. […] The draft response 
contains passages that violate accepted diplomatic usage. For 																																																								
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example, on page 3, Brezhnev’s arms control limitation proposals are 
characterized as ‘designed for propaganda purposes.’ In another place 
(page 4), Brezhnev’s accusation that the West interferes in Poland is 
labelled ‘simply not true.’ We have behind us five centuries of 
diplomatic experience, during which forms have been evolved to 
convey such messages more politely. If this draft were adopted, it 
would be perceived by Moscow as deliberately insulting, and by our 
Allies as indicative of a lack of constructive ideas.”681  
 
Haig’s attitude to diplomacy – both external and internal – was too abrasive 
to resolve the fierce policy confrontations in the White House. In frustration, 
Haig referred to fighting a guerrilla war in the White House and called his 
detractors as “a bunch of second-rate hambones” and “ignoramuses and 
saboteurs [and] political pygmies”.682  
Comparing Secretary Shultz’s personal style to Haig is a study in 
contrasts. Ambassador Dobrynin describes Shultz as “guarded and taciturn 
[...] he did not use the sharp expressions characteristic of Haig,” furthermore, 
as “a conservative man not excessively burdened with bellicose ideology [...] 
he proceeded from the possibility of coming to terms with the Soviet 
Union.” 683  This relates to the point that a diplomatic decision-makers 
fundamental view of his adversary – is reconciliation theoretically even 
possible? – infuses his approach to negotiations and impacts the scope of 
the various directions that bilateral relations can take. 
A newspaper article from December 1982 describes the switch from 
the volatile Haig to Shultz and quotes a State Department official:  
 
“‘The level of tension is down. […] People spend a lot less time 
worrying about the psyche of the boss. With Haig, there was a lot of 
concern about what sort of a mood he was in that day, about how you 
were going to reach him. I never do that with Shultz. You just draw up 
your best argument.”684 
 
																																																								
681  Richard Allen (1981), Memorandum for the President, RRPL 
682  Cannon, 195; Dobrynin, 506 
683  Dobrynin, 508 
684  Bumiller (1982)  
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Matlock’s depiction of Shultz is similar, as a good manager, listener and 
negotiator.685 Shultz defended the State Department’s position in Cabinet 
arguments over Soviet strategy more successfully, without needlessly 
antagonising his detractors. Shultz, like Haig, battled with Weinberger, who 
remained unwilling to consider any conciliatory moves toward the USSR.686 
Inter-bureaucratic sniping continued as Shultz dismantled linkage and 
pressed for talks. But instead of letting himself get derailed, Shultz stood his 
ground without hysteria, gradually cementing his position by carefully and 
assiduously courting the President to ensure he the foreign policy positions 
he put forward had Reagan’s endorsement.  
 
 
How personality impacts policy: the pipeline dispute 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the imposition of martial law in 
Poland in December 1981 caught the Reagan Administration by surprise.687 
Haig came under pressure from hardliners who viewed the Polish crisis as “an 
opportunity to inflict mortal political, economic and propaganda damage on 
the USSR.”688 The governments of France and Germany, however, did not go 
beyond expressing their concerns verbally.689  Haig realised that the Soviets 
would treat a fully flung anti-Communist uprising in Poland as grounds to 
intervene and argued that the situation ought to be decompressed rather 
than fanning the flames further. In the event, the Administration chose the 
middle ground of imposing sanctions on the USSR. Secretary of Defense 
Weinberger and Director of Central Intelligence William Casey pushed the 
President to up the ante further on the Soviet Union by issuing an embargo 
on US involvement in a planned East-West gas pipeline, Urengoi 6, an 
enormous infrastructure construction project that foresaw the eventual 
delivery of 1.37tn cubic feet of Soviet gas to a West European consortium 
every year.690 The US’ unilateral embargo on the pipeline’s construction 
placed undue stress on Allied relations. European governments were firmly 
committed to the project. Britain, Germany, France and Italy were eager to 
diversify their energy supplies after the oil crisis in the 1970s. All were in the 																																																								
685  Matlock (2004), 24 
686  Oberdorfer (1998), 35-37 
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midst of an economic downturn and viewed the Urengoi project as an 
important source of jobs and investment. When Reagan realised that the 
Allies were unwilling to join the US’ pipeline embargo, he petulantly 
concluded a meeting of the National Security Council with the words, “They 
[the Europeans and the Soviets] can have their first pipeline. But not with our 
equipment and our technology.”691 Egged on by Weinberger and Casey, the 
President went further than the original embargo on US companies and 
sanctioned European firms that exported American technology for use in the 
pipeline project. The fissures in the transatlantic relationship widened, with 
the French, Italian, German and even British governments openly defying 
Reagan’s attempt to extend American jurisdiction extraterritorially.692  
Compounding the situation was the ‘nuclear freeze’ movement in 
Europe, which threatened to subvert NATO’s plan to station Pershing II 
medium-range ballistic missiles in key European countries. Allied relations 
suffered from this combination of the pipeline dispute and the public’s 
unexpectedly vocal opposition to a new round of US nuclear missiles being 
stationed in Western Europe.693 Haig’s aggressive style was not conducive to 
a lessening of tensions regarding the pipeline dispute, notwithstanding the 
fact that Haig was fully aware how critical it was to maintain Allied 
cohesion. 694  Haig had failed to resolve the pipeline dispute, and since 
weakening NATO support for the Pershing deployment was intimately linked 
to this quarrel, the counterfactual assumption that mending Allied relations 
would have taken longer under him is not far-fetched.  
Secretary Shultz pursued a less confrontational stance with Europe 
than Haig.695 When he realised that the pipeline sanctions weren’t yielding 
results, Shultz pressed the President to shelve them, which he did by 
November 1982. 696 Through persistent shuttle diplomacy, Shultz ensured 
that the Pershing missiles were deployed across Europe as planned, 																																																								
691  Cited in Thornton (2004), 208 
692  See, for instance: Rattner (1982); Flora (1982) 
693 The Christian Science Monitor reported in 1981: “There is at this time no certainty that 
the Western allies in Europe are going to allow the new American types of short- and 
medium-range nuclear weapons to be deployed on their territory. That is what the recent 
marching, shouting, and demonstrating in Western Europe is all about. Many Europeans, 
and not all of them on the political left, are vociferously opposed to having the new 
American weapons on their soil.” Harsch (1981)  
694  Garthoff (1994), 548-50; Haig (1984), 246-56; Shultz (1993), 135-45 
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beginning in November 1983.697 This was an achievement, given that as late 
as July 1983 a scholar maintained, “it is far too early to tell whether the 
NATO deployment decision will succeed. It has already lost the wide 
consensus of support it enjoyed in 1979.”698 Shultz also set about repairing 
some of the damage done to US-Soviet relations between 1981 and 1982. 
For instance, Haig had purposefully downgraded the treatment of 
Ambassador Dobrynin, ending the policy whereby Dobrynin, a Washington 
DC stalwart who had served as Ambassador since JFK, enjoyed a direct line 
to the Secretary of State and was allowed to enter the State Department 
unseen through a private entrance.699 Shultz reinstated the old policy.700 
 There is evidence that Shultz’s approach produced results where Haig 
failed: both attempted, through Dobrynin, to engage the Soviets in trust-
building measures that signalled good faith; specifically by asking for exit 
visas for dissidents. Haig told Dobrynin in November 1981 that Reagan was 
personally interested in the fates of Nathan Sharansky and Andrei Sakharov, 
whose release would have a constructive effect on relations.701 In a summary 
of a meeting between himself and Gromyko, Haig reported to Reagan, “I 
made a pitch on humanitarian issues with special reference to Jewish 
emigration, citing your interest and pointing out that small gestures in this 
field can have a disproportionately large payoff in overall relations.”702 The 
Soviets disregarded all such requests by Haig.  
The difference to Shultz’s approach requires a secondary 
counterfactual analysis, the upshot being that Shultz realised such a request 
was best made by Reagan himself, with the more fundamental point that 
Shultz chose to formulate foreign policy strategy only after first discerning 
Reagan’s actual views. Shultz formulated his policy advice on the basis of 
what he deemed to be Reagan’s own policy vision:  
 
“I knew where he was: he wanted to have a constructive dialogue. 
And he was confident in himself. There was a kind of mood around 
that we couldn’t sit down with the Soviets because they would get the 
better of us somehow or other. Reagan was very confident in himself. 																																																								
697  Shultz (1993), 373 
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He was more confident than I was confident in him! So basically it was 
Reagan and me against these other people, but ultimately I knew 
where he was so I knew what he wanted.”703 
 
Compare that approach to what Reagan noted in his diary after Haig 
resigned. Responding to Haig’s stated reasons for stepping down – “there 
was a disagreement on foreign policy” – Reagan commented, “actually the 
only disagreement was over whether I made policy or the Sec. of State 
did.”704 As Matlock recollects, “Haig really didn’t get along very well with 
anybody on the White House staff. […] He was a military commander, 
although highly political – he was very important of course in the Nixon 
White House. But he was not so much a team leader. Whereas Shultz 
brought statesmanship and a quality of leadership that created a team in the 
State Department.”705 Reagan was more supportive of Shultz than Haig. 
When Secretary of Defense Weinberger told Reagan in 1986 to fire Shultz, 
Reagan would hear none of it: “Cap had allies among some of my more 
conservative political supporters, who let me know they thought Shultz had 
gone soft on the Russians and they wanted me to fire him – an idea, I told 
them, that was utter nonsense.”706 By that point, the web of interaction 
among White House decision-makers had shifted decisively in the direction 
of Shultz, influencing the policy process. Replacing Haig with Shultz thus 
introduced an important shift in personality, paving the way for Reagan to 
develop a burgeoning dynamic of trust with his Secretary of State. It was this 
that moved Reagan to a position where he could begin to pursue his goal of 
improving the US’ relationship with the USSR. This move in turn laid the 
foundation for the eventual strategy of engaging the Soviets, which ended 
up yielding historical results.  
 
 
Secondary counterfactual: how the Haig-Shultz transition paved the way for 
Reagan’s Soviet outreach 
 Presidents influence events beyond their cognitive style and decisions: 
leaders generate additional effects through the teams they surround 																																																								
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705  Matlock interview 
706  Reagan (1990), 605 
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themselves with and through the decision-making context they create for 
themselves, and further effects still through the counter-reactions they 
produce from adversaries and partners at home and abroad. I now trace the 
secondary impact of the Haig-Shultz transition – namely, the consequences 
this had for the Reagan presidency and the Cold War.  
A secondary counterfactual is one where the initial change forms a 
baseline of sorts, from which the researcher branches into additional 
counterfactuals that specify various alternative changes entailed by the initial 
change.707 The aim is to attribute Reagan’s changing Soviet policies to factors 
that can be associated with Shultz’s appointment. Shultz identified Reagan’s 
policy preference of dealing with the Soviets and presented the President 
with a strategy of engagement. This produced a backlash from 
Administration hardliners. Reagan ended up having to choose from one of 
two clearly defined, competing options.  Situations in which a policy choice is 
particularly narrow – i.e. between clearly specified alternatives, the actual 
choice vs. the one considered but not taken – generate a natural 
counterfactual of sorts.708 What would have happened if the alternative policy 
had been selected? Showing, through documentary evidence, how events 
could have turned out differently requires describing the causal channel 
through which the policy under examination unfolded. If the evidence 
suggests an alternative policy would not have changed subsequent events 
dramatically, said policy channel is shown not to have causal force, implying 
either directly or indirectly that other causal drivers – possibly systemic – 
were more salient. Either way, knowledge about the influence (or lack 
thereof) of particular policies in complex systems is generated. By 
counterfactually contrasting the impact of policy alternatives, we can study 
how given decisions taken by leaders filter through the international system, 
or if they do so at all. 																																																								
707  This requires auxiliary assumptions – ‘connecting principles’ (Goodman, 1983 [1954]), 17) 
or ‘enabling counterfactuals’ (Lebow, 2010, 17) – necessary to sustain the primary 
counterfactual. These connecting principles should be explicit and consistent with the 
hypothesised linkages from the real world to the antecedent, with linkages from the 
antecedent to the hypothesised consequent, and with each other. Goodman refers to 
this requirement of logical consistency as ‘cotenability.’  
708  Qua Ferguson, “We should consider as plausible or probable only those alternatives 
which we can show on the basis of contemporary evidence that contemporaries actually 
considered.” (1997), 86. Levy argues that this rules out too many plausible 
counterfactuals. (2008, 636-37). See also Lebow (2010, 48): some things are not 
committed to paper, and some records are lost. 
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  As Jervis points out, “many observers were puzzled when President 
Reagan was quicker than his advisors to reach out to Mikhail Gorbachev and 
seriously explore far-reaching arms agreements because he seemed at least 
as hard-line as they were.”709 This puzzle is less acute when understood in 
light of the Haig-Shultz transition. Haig saw his role as Secretary of State as 
chief author and manager of the Administration’s diplomacy. Pursuing his 
visions as the Administration’s self-declared foreign policy ‘vicar,’ Haig 
believed after his first discussion with Reagan that “he had been given 
exclusive responsibility for foreign policy and, given Reagan’s lack of 
experience or familiarity with the field, he planned to exercise that 
responsibility vigorously.”710 In the process, Haig failed to realise that Reagan 
was ready from early on to commence dialogue with the Soviets, once going 
so far as to object to Reagan sending a hand-written letter to Brezhnev, 
arguing that this came across as too benign.711 Haig, like many others, fell 
prey to the simplistic image of Reagan as a one-dimensional aggressive anti-
Communist – an image that belied the fact that Reagan was actually eager 
for contacts with Moscow and hoped for better relations with the Soviet 
Union.712 In 1982 Reagan told officials from the Federal Republic of Germany, 
“The West has a historic opportunity, using a carrot and stick approach, to 
create a more stable relationship with the USSR.”713 In a diary entry of April 
1983, Reagan took issue with those who “don’t think any approach should be 
made to the Soviets. I think I’m hardline & will never appease but I do want 
to try & let them see there is a better world if they’ll show by deed they want 
to get along with the free world.”714 When Reagan had his first ever White 
House visit from Foreign Minister Gromyko in 1984 – it took all of Reagan’s 
first term for this to happen – the President began the meeting by stating, 
“Mr Minister I’ve looked forward to this meeting and wish it could have taken 
place 3 or 4 years ago.”715 This, the evidence suggests, was a sincere 
comment on Reagan’s part: he included them in his handwritten preparatory 
notes, which were not meant for public consumption. 
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 In contrast to Haig, Shultz did not set out to imprint his own opinions 
on the President’s foreign policy. Instead, Shultz decided he first needed to 
get to the bottom of what Reagan’s actual views were. His private talks with 
Reagan convinced Shultz of the former’s readiness to move to more serious 
engagement with the Soviets.716 One formative occasion to do this took 
place by chance in February 1983, after a blizzard meant the President 
abruptly had to cancel his plans for a weekend at Camp David, and 
spontaneously invited Shultz over to the White House for dinner. Shultz 
describes the meeting:  
 
“He asked me about my recent trip to China, and about the Soviets I 
had known from my Treasury days. And it dawned on me, that this 
man has never had a real meeting with a senior Communist figure. 
And he was dying to have one. [...] So I said, ‘Ambassador Dobrynin is 
coming over next Tuesday, how about I bring him over here and you 
can talk to him?’ So he did, and he started a dialogue. They talked for 
an hour-and-a-half. They talked about everything. [...] Reagan wanted 
to have a constructive dialogue.”717  
 
Hardliners like William Clark, hearing of Reagan’s proposed meeting with 
Dobrynin, personally intervened with the President in order to stop it from 
going ahead.718 Their efforts failed: Shultz’s suggestion struck a chord with 
Reagan, giving rise to the first of many instances in which the President 
imprinted his personal preferences on US-Soviet relations while remaining 
impervious to severe intra-Administration pressures. The clandestine Reagan-
Dobrynin meeting provided initial evidence that Reagan’s anti-Communism 
did not preclude a pragmatic working relationship with the Soviets. During 
what was his first ever meeting with a Soviet official – in 1983, no less – the 
President also cut his first deal with the USSR, concerning the seven 
Pentecostal Christians who lived at the US embassy in Moscow in 1978. They 
were allowed to emigrate provided Reagan didn’t publicly announce the 
deal. This was a mutual trust-building measure at a time when the Cold War 
seemed to be in deep freeze.719  																																																								
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  The policy interplay between Reagan and Shultz explains the latter’s 
comment that the break with linkage came about through conjoined thinking 
between him and the President.720 This budding relationship between a 
President willing to engage his adversaries and a Secretary of State who saw 
his primary role as fleshing out and working to implement his boss’ foreign 
policy vision generated a powerful interpersonal dynamic between Reagan 
and Shultz. It was through their common approach to Soviet relations that 
the two eventually pushed relations with Gorbachev toward a path of 
negotiation, one that was inconceivable under Haig. This was not because 
Shultz won over cabinet colleagues: infighting in the Administration did not 
die down as “hardliners like Weinberger feuded with Shultz and his allies, 
and made plain their displeasure with the idea of meaningful 
negotiations.”721 Unlike Haig, Shultz made himself indispensable to Reagan, 
who realised the Secretary of State was carrying out his (Reagan’s) own 
policies. After another vicious Cabinet debate between Weinberger, Shultz 
and Casey in November 1984, Reagan noted in his diary, “We have trouble. 
Cap & Bill Casey have views contrary to George’s on S. Am., the Middle East 
& our arms negotiations. It’s so out of hand George sounds like he wants out. 
I can’t let that happen. Actually George is carrying out my policy.”722 Shultz 
formulated a policy of engagement, best captured by his testimony to the 
Senate Foreign Affairs Committee: “Strength and realism can deter war, but 
only direct dialogue and negotiation can open the path toward lasting 
peace,” backing this with the necessary bureaucratic and personal skills to 
push it through a largely hostile Administration.723  
It is doubtful Haig could have been directed and overseen the 
normalisation of US-Soviet relations. While he was not a hardliner in the vein 
of Weinberger and Casey, who felt that the Cold War could only end if the 
US pursued a policy of unrelenting pressure towards the Soviet Union, Haig 
was nonetheless doubtful of the USSR’s ability to transform its international 
position. Haig was politically close to Nixon and Kissinger, and would have 
been as skeptical as his two mentors were of the wide-ranging disarmament 
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strategy eventually pursued by Reagan after Reykjavik.724 Matlock explores 
the counterfactual prospect of the Cold War endgame led by Haig:  
 
“[Haig] was less sanguine than Reagan and Shultz that the Soviet 
Union could change, and therefore posed more limited goals for US 
policy than they eventually did. Haig would very likely have settled for 
something resembling a cease-fire in place. This would have reduced 
pressure for internal reform […] The world would have seemed safer to 
Western publics, but the East-West divide would have remained.”725 
 
Richard Haass describes Haig as “very much the foreign policy traditionalist 
in the year-and-a-half in the Reagan administration,” contrasting him to 
Shultz, who “was different because he did not come in with great experience 
in foreign policy. For example, Shultz was much more willing to go along with 
some radical ideas, say, with nuclear disarmament, than I think Haig ever 
would have done. Shultz didn’t buy into what we might call traditional, 
strategic thinking. Whether it was positive or negative, he was much more 
the outsider, if you will, in the whole strategic debate.”726 A relative open-
mindedness about the possibility for change in international affairs – 
unburdened or unrestrained by the strictures of paradigmatic thinking about 
strategy – was a prerequisite for a policy that could transform East-West 
relations. The Reagan-Shultz duo fit the bill, a Reagan-Haig pairing did not.   
   
 
Shultz’s role in Reagan’s choice 
 The progression from policy decisions to outcomes is not 
straightforward in a complex system like the international sphere. By linking 
an alternate decision to possible ways in which this could have changed 
outcomes, connections between decisions and effects are explored. The 
theoretical contribution made by this thesis is to advance knowledge of how 
different causal effects interact. This is not to definitively demonstrate the 
explanatory victory of one class of causes over another. Instead, the purpose 
of complexity counterfactuals is to study the interrelationship between 
different causal trajectories. In her 1997 book on Reagan, Beth Fischer made 																																																								
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the novel argument that changes in Reagan’s Soviet policy dated back to late 
1983, after tensions had peaked over the downing of Korean Airlines Flight 
007 and the Able Archer exercises.727 I argue here that the crucial strategic 
switch from confrontation to dialogue occurred during the first half of 1983, 
owing in particular to the influence of George Shultz.  
In the early 1980s, the Reagan Administration was quite aware of the 
deteriorating economic situation in the Soviet Union. A Special National 
Intelligence Estimate of November 1981 stressed the mounting economic 
problems the Kremlin faced, and how burdensome military expenditures 
increasingly made it difficult for the USSR to raise its citizens’ standard of 
living.728 Reagan raised the prospect of the Soviet Union’s collapse as early as 
May 1981, announcing at a commencement speech in Notre Dame, “The 
West won't contain communism. It will transcend communism. It will dismiss 
it as some bizarre chapter in human history whose last pages are even now 
being written.” 729  But, contrary to realist theorising, Soviet economic 
weakness was not seen by Administration officials as a sure-fire sign of the 
country’s coming ruin. Granted, structural realist theory makes claims about 
the operation of the international system on a macro-level, so from this 
perspective the statements of agents are irrelevant – structural realists argue 
that economic weakness translates into dwindling international power. But 
politics is not just the manifestation of abstract developments; it is also a 
human enterprise. Abstract material developments precipitate responses by 
policymakers. To look only at material developments is to tell only part of the 
story.  
The Soviet Union’s economic problems produced two competing 
strategic approaches advocated by key members of the Reagan 
Administration. They are well summed-up in an August 1983 NSC briefing for 
the President on the Soviet Union, which presents a ‘state of play’ analysis of 
US-Soviet relations and concludes with a brief section titled ‘Implications for 
US Policy,’ which is worth repeating in full: 
 
“The struggle is long-term. There are no quick fixes. This means that 
we must devise a strategy which can be sustained for a decade or, 
probably, more. Two broad options in theory:  																																																								
727  Fischer (1997) 
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1. Unrelenting pressure on the Soviets; and 
2. Negotiation of specific differences on basis of strength, with 
follow-up to keep gains permanent rather than 
temporary.”730 
 
In the early months of 1983, a behind-the-scene struggle broke out in the 
Administration concerning which of these roads to take. By August, Shultz’s 
preferred approach had received Reagan’s endorsement, which is why the 
NSC briefing cited above presented the two strategies in loaded terms. A 
look at the run-up to the two policy options confronting Reagan sheds light 
on how a top cabinet member like the Secretary of State exudes patterns of 
influence in a Presidential Administration that affect the direction of policy.  
On 3 March 1983, George Shultz presented Reagan with take on how 
US-Soviet relations should develop.731 He called for an agenda of sustained 
dialogue with the USSR on arms control, regional issues, human rights and 
bilateral issues (such as economic and cultural links), outlining specific 
proposals the US should offer to advance and improve relations. This 
prompted William ‘Judge’ Clark, the National Security Advisor, to write his 
own memorandum for the President, in which he berated Shultz for failing 
“to reflect a full understanding of the nature of the Soviet threat and the way 
the Soviets operate.” Clark went on the offensive, stating that Shultz’s memo 
was  
 
“another attempt to explain how increased dialogue can pressure the 
Soviets into more acceptable behaviour. The many reasons given as to 
how dialogue can pressure the Soviets to do anything are weak and 
unconvincing, as they reflect a wishful-thinking perception about the 
nature of the Soviet system and its willingness to compromise.”  
 
If Shultz’s recommendations were followed, Clark warned,  
 
“we will be sending all the wrong signals to the Soviets. We will be 
‘improving’ US-Soviet relations on Soviet terms, and not on our terms 
and thus portraying an image of political weakness that is the exact 																																																								
730  Matlock (1983) Briefing for President Reagan: US-Soviet Relations – State of Play, RRPL 
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RRPL 
 181 
opposite of the image of revived spiritual strength that your election 
symbolised.”732 
 
Clark’s attempted subversion of the Shultz strategy of a somewhat 
moderated negotiating position and constructive engagement with the 
Soviet Union was not a one-off. Already in January 1983, after Shultz sent 
Reagan a memo arguing for “an intensified dialogue with Moscow to test 
whether an improvement in the US-Soviet relationship is possible” and 
calling for a “process of dialogue”, Clark followed up with his own memo. He 
informed Reagan he had “serious reservations about the proposed timing 
and method of implementation of [Shultz’s] memo,” arguing that his strategy 
would “arouse even more public expectations and would make it difficult for 
us to maintain a firm policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.” Clark was blunt, 
stating his “grave reservations” about “the overall thrust of the proposed 
strategy for ‘improving US-Soviet relations.’” He felt that “beginning a 
‘process of dialogue’ at all levels (Departments/Desks, Ambassadors, 
Ministries, Summit) would not be fruitful but counterproductive, as it would 
serve primarily Soviet interests.” Clark, speaking for hardliners in the Reagan 
Administration, saw “little point in summitry until the Soviets have made a 
major move which clearly demonstrates a willingness to reduce threats to us 
and the rest of the free world.”733 
On 10 March a meeting took place in the Oval Office concerning 
Soviet strategy. Richard Pipes was invited to the meeting by Clark, and 
“proceeded to eviscerate Shultz’s efforts to set up a meeting between 
Reagan and [Soviet Foreign Minister] Gromyko in New York that October.” 
Hardliners argued that the Kremlin had to modify its behaviour before serious 
negotiations could get under way; “Weinberger and [CIA Director] Casey 
seconded the notion that Shultz was too soft.”734 After the battle-lines were 
clearly drawn, Reagan made his choice: he concluded the meeting by 
announcing that he wanted Shultz to be his public spokesman on arms 
control.735 
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A memo from Shultz to Reagan in May describes the newly chosen 
course of bilateral discussions:   
 
“At your direction, I have embarked on a process of intensive dialogue 
with Dobrynin on the full range of US-Soviet issues. […] Our 
exchanges with the Soviets are a constant testing process, in which we 
probe for possible new Soviet flexibility on the issues, while insisting 
that real progress must involve concrete Soviet actions to address our 
concerns. These exchanges put us in control of that process – in a 
position to bring it to a halt at every step if the Soviets are unwilling to 
proceed with a real give-and-take. [Emphasis added]”736  
 
Shultz’s plan for dialogue with the Soviets was centred on the four 
issue areas he highlighted on 3 March – arms control, regional issues, human 
rights and bilateral issues – along with concrete, detailed suggestions for 
what to discuss in each area.737 Around this time, a permanent replacement 
for Richard Pipes on the NSC was hired: Jack Matlock, the US Ambassador to 
Czechoslovakia, and a career diplomat fluent in Russian.738  Matlock was 
initially reluctant to return to Washington, fearing he would be marginalised 
in a NSC staffed primarily by former CIA and military types who advocated 
uncompromising anti-Soviet policies. However, Matlock changed his mind 
when he was told, “we want you back because the President’s decided it’s 
time to negotiate with the Soviets and he doesn’t have anybody on the staff 
here with any experience doing it.”739 Thus Reagan’s policy decision in March 
1983 led to personnel changes in the Administration. Matlock proceeded to 
craft a negotiating strategy on the basis of Shultz’s proposals, which 
eventually became known as the ‘Four-Part Agenda’. Shultz formally 
announced the agenda, in Reagan’s name, at a White House meeting with 
Reagan, Vice President Bush, and Weinberger.740  Realising that his own 																																																								
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strategy was being jettisoned, Clark wrote a memo to Reagan early in July 
arguing that he and his deputy Bud MacFarlane should take over the 
Administration’s Soviet policy, while Shultz, “a solid economist, should take 
charge of the Pacific Basin initiative.”741 When Shultz found out about this 
effort to undermine him, he tendered his resignation to Reagan – who 
declined to accept, instead offering Shultz more authority to conduct foreign 
policy, as well as regular one-on-one meetings.742  
 The relevant counterfactual to consider is the alternative strategy 
advocated by the likes of Clark and Weinberger. Clark wrote to Reagan in 
1982 that he should only participate in a summit meeting with the Soviets 
after “Moscow demonstrates by deeds rather than words that it is prepared 
to negotiate seriously.”743 This strategy – waiting for a ‘major move’ by the 
Soviets that demonstrated their good faith – was in effect a recipe for 
continued East-West antagonism, since it set an unattainable benchmark 
before any actual conversation between the leaders of the US and the USSR, 
let alone rapprochement, could begin. In the event, the first Reagan-
Gorbachev summit (in Geneva in 1985) took place without any such prior 
‘good faith’ demonstration on the part of the Soviets. Bud MacFarlane 
himself admitted that the NSC’s strategy toward the USSR consisted solely of 
“stressing their system as best as we can.”744 Clark, who had been both 
Shultz’s and Haig’s principal adversary, resigned as National Security Advisor 
in autumn 1983. Haig, confiding in Ambassador Dobrynin the reasons for his 
resignation, cited points of disagreement with hardliners like Clark on East-
West relations and strategic arms limitation talks: yet only a few months later, 
the same disagreements ended not with the Secretary of State’s resignation, 
but with his the National Security Advisor’s. Shultz demonstrated that a 
Secretary of State with the right bureaucratic mettle could fight and win such 
policy confrontations. 
																																																								
741  I.e. relegating Shultz to diplomacy in non-Soviet affairs only. Cited in Wilson, 75. On April 
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Halfway through 1983, Shultz’s strategy of engagement was in place: 
now it took a shift in the Politburo’s position to generate momentum in US-
Soviet relations. The Soviets had been aware of the new strategy from the 
summer of 1983. During meeting between Shultz and Dobrynin in July 1983, 
the Ambassador presented a statement from the Politburo that read, “It has 
been noted in Moscow that the Secretary of State […] spoke of the wish of 
the US leadership to see Soviet-American relations somewhat more 
improved,” before listing a well-trodden litany of complaints about Soviet 
grievances and calling for a return to détente. 745 This reflects a hardline 
negotiation stance on the part of the Politburo, the product of three years of 
tense US-Soviet relations. Reagan’s new approach did not yield immediate 
results. But, as complex systems are prone to do, it produced delayed, 
contingent effects: the US policy shift made engagement feasible –  once a 
leader emerged on the Soviet side who reciprocated the desire for better 
relations.  
A year later, the Reagan-Shultz agenda had taken on real shape. After 
Andropov’s death in February 1984 Reagan began pushing for a summit with 
Chernenko. On March 2 1984, the President opened a high-level 
Administration meeting on US-Soviet relations “by observing that he felt the 
time had come to think of something between a get-acquainted meeting and 
a full summit with the Soviet leader. Such a meeting would allow them to talk 
about the situation and to lay plans for the future.”746 In a further indication of 
what the hardliners’ alternative Soviet strategy envisioned, Weinberger 
warned in a meeting three weeks later, “If we become too eager the Soviet 
Union will sense weakness” and argued that the US should not pursue 
progress on strategic arms reduction talks in 1984. 747  Reagan was 
undeterred, addressing Weinberger’s point directly: “We want an agreement 
[on arms reduction], but we want a good agreement. I do not intend to make 
unilateral concessions to get them back to the table, but I believe we must 
have a credible agenda on arms control.”748  
That same month, Reagan sent a letter to Chernenko and informed 
him, “Our dialogue has reached a point where […] we should look for 
specific areas in which we can move our relationship in a more positive 																																																								
745  Dobrynin, 506 
746  Memorandum of Conversation (1984), Meeting Concerning US-Soviet Relations, RRPL  
747  Cited in Wilson, 85 
748  Minutes of NSC Planning Group (1984), RRPL  
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direction.”749 He proposed steps such as trade-offs in arms reduction talks 
and a chemical weapons ban.750  In a memo to Reagan that describes a draft 
response to one of Chernenko’s letters, Shultz informed the President that 
the proposed response “reaffirms the US commitment to arms control and 
our readiness to be flexible in the search for agreements [and] attempts to 
reassure the Soviets that we are not a threat.” Shultz sought to get 
Chernenko’s attention by expressing Reagan’s “readiness to consider in the 
CDE [Conference on Disarmament in Europe] a non-use of force undertaking 
if the Soviets agree to some of the specific confidence-building measures we 
have proposed.”751 These were concrete, pragmatic signals to the Soviets 
that the US was interested in an improved relationship – signals from the US 
side which at that stage went unreciprocated, and moreover were contrary to 
what linkage would have dictated. 
Little came of this initiative: now it was the Soviets’ turn to be 
intransigent. Chernenko replied by stating that a summit was out of the 
question. In an interview with Pravda, the Communist Party mouthpiece, 
Gromyko explained that the “US Administration continues to place its bet on 
military force, on securing military superiority, and on forcing its concepts on 
other peoples”, adding that arms reduction negotiations could not begin 
until Pershing missiles – deployed in November 1983 in response to the 
Soviets’ SS-20 deployment of 1979 – were removed again. This stance was as 
uncompromising and unrealistic as Clark’s insistence that the Soviets make a 
‘major move’ before any meeting could take place. In June, Chernenko wrote 
a letter that once again focused on familiar but worn-out Soviet complaints 
about NATO encirclement. By this point, Reagan’s thinking about the Soviet 
Union had shifted considerably. His private thoughts about Chernenko’s 
letter are illustrative: it strengthened his conviction to push for a summit. 
 
“I have a gut feeling we should pursue [a summit]. [Chernenko’s] reply 
to my letter is in hand & it lends support to my idea that while we go 
on believing, & with some good reason, that the Soviets are plotting 
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against us & mean us harm, maybe they are scared of us & think we 
are a threat. I’d like to go face to face & explore this with them.”752 
 
Reagan continued to prepare the ground for a summit and intensified his 
correspondence with the Soviet leadership in 1984. Chernenko reiterated 
that the US had to remove its intermediate nuclear force missiles from 
Europe before any meeting could take place.753 Matlock suggests that this 
antagonistic stance had to do with the fact that “the Soviet leadership did 
not want to deal seriously with Reagan in 1984 lest they aid his re-
election.”754 Still, as a result of Reagan’s new engagement strategy, all the 
pieces were in place for major moves in US-Soviet relations once a suitable 
partner emerged on the Soviet side, which happened in 1985 after 
Gorbachev assumed power.  
Reagan and Gorbachev met within less than a year. There was little 
concrete progress at their Geneva Summit other than a commitment to more 
talks, and minor symbolic steps such as the re-opening of consulates in Kiev 
and New York which had been shut after the invasion of Afghanistan. But 
upfront results from such meetings are rarely the key drivers in complex 
systems: the dynamics that enabled this meeting to come about in the first 
place are more interesting. The fact that the US side was ready to enter 
serious negotiations without first having to go through intra-Administration 
debates (Shultz had won the argument a year earlier) and designing a 
strategy (Shultz and Matlock’s four-part agenda was in place since the 
summer of 1983) made it possible to rapidly improve relations if a Soviet 
leader so inclined came to power. A few months after his first meeting with 
Reagan in Geneva, Gorbachev launched the process of perestroika with a 
speech to his Foreign Ministry and a personal memorandum to the Politburo 
in May and July 1986, respectively.755 As Greenstein notes, the bulk of 
change in superpower relations – the transformation of Reagan’s and 
Gorbachev’s mindset, perceptions and expectations – took place during 
Reagan’s second term.756 The seeds for this transformation were laid through 
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the interactions between Shultz and Reagan that paved the way for 
constructive engagement with a Soviet leader willing to negotiate.  
When a renewed snag arose in US-Soviet relations in the form of the 
Daniloff affair in 1986 (the arrest of a US journalist, wrongly presumed to be a 
spy), the NSC once again recommended taking a tough stand against the 
Soviets. Reagan resisted and stuck to the Shultz strategy, supporting quiet 
negotiations which led to Daniloff being freed, enabling the Reykjavik summit 
to go ahead as planned.757 At long last, an approach crafted three years 
earlier began to pay dividends: “After Geneva and Reykjavik, the Soviet new 
thinkers did not believe that the West would attack them, or ever seriously 
intended to.”758  Such positive feedback loops, generated by interaction 
patterns between leaders, can effect dramatic change in a complex system 
and overturn even entrenched structures of hostility. Specific policy choices 
by Reagan, put on the menu by Shultz, made this interactive process of 
engagement possible. Reagan disavowed the advice of his hardline 
colleagues and followed Shultz’s prescription from 1983 onwards, preparing 
for a meaningful dialogue even in the absence of concrete Soviet signals, 
and eventually recognising Gorbachev not as an extension of previous Soviet 
leaders, but as a significant break from the past and, concomitantly, an 
opportunity for the President to help foster change in the Soviet Union.759 
The Reagan-Gorbachev interactions that Shultz made possible were central 
to this: they encouraged the formulation and solidification of trust, which had 
been sorely missing from the US-Soviet relationship at least since the fraying 
of détente under Carter. Reagan’s subsequent dealings with Gorbachev 
persuaded him that the new Soviet leader was not simply out to rebuild the 
USSR so as to challenge the USA anew. Gorbachev in turn began to pursue 
deep domestic reforms convinced that the US would not exploit Soviet 
weaknesses for its own gains. Not everyone shared Reagan’s trust in 
Gorbachev. The principal anti-Soviet hardliner, Secretary of Defence Caspar 
Weinberger “was utterly convinced that there was no potential benefit in 
negotiating anything with the Soviet leaders and that most negotiations were 
																																																								
757  See Mann (2009), Chapter 6 
758  Sarotte (2011), 30 
759  The argument that Gorbachev was a Communist in sheep’s clothing was one that Nixon 
and Kissinger never tired of making, as Mann amply documents (2009). 
 188 
dangerous traps.” 760  Indeed, as late as 1988, Weinberger wrote the 
following: 
 
“A recent, rather startling poll indicated that 71% of Republicans and 
74% of Democrats believe that the United States can trust the General 
Secretary of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev. Trust in what sense? 
Trust that Mr Gorbachev will turn his back on the goals of the Soviet 
state? Trust that he is becoming more like us in economic values? 
Trust that the Soviet Union will never violate an agreement with the 
United States (the historical record notwithstanding)? Trust that Mr 
Gorbachev is diametrically opposed to the precepts of the Communist 
Party that he heads (precepts that are, of course, diametrically 
opposed to Western values and principles)? All of this is highly 
unlikely.”761 
 
  The Reagan-Shultz constellation was a complementary interactive 
relationship that paved the way for US-Soviet rapprochement: while Reagan, 
qua Shimko, knew he wanted a less dangerous relationship with the USSR, he 
could not achieve this without the skills of Shultz, who ”provided two 
ingredients that were otherwise lacking: a persistent and practical drive 
toward improved relations through the accomplishment of tangible 
objectives […] and organisational skills to mobilize at least parts of the 
fractious US government to interact on a systematic basis with the Soviet 
government.” 762  Reagan wanted rapprochement to happen, Shultz 
recogonised this, and together with Gorbachev the two US statesmen made 
it happen.  
 
 
The role of policy choices in producing complex outcomes 
It is a mistake to trace a linear causal flow from Soviet weakness to 
retrenchment: this would have been the least likely outcome in a climate of 
animosity.763 The fact that the USSR faced severe economic hardship in the 																																																								
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1980s was in and of itself indeterminate of the future course of Soviet foreign 
policy: it was no more than one aspect of the decision-making context that 
leaders confronted, and one with unclear implications. As Matlock has 
argued, Reagan and Shultz “recognised that the Soviet leaders faced 
mounting problems, but understood that US attempts to exploit them would 
strengthen Soviet resistance to change rather than diminish it.”764 The US was 
reluctant to make concessions, but did not actively seek to weaken its 
adversary. Instead US policy makers used the opportunity to begin dealing 
with a Soviet leader who seemed more interested in dialogue than his 
predecessors. As discussed in the next Chapter, this set off interactions that 
culminated in the 1987 INF Treaty, which eliminated an entire class of nuclear 
weapons in Europe and technically handed the Soviet Union (with its bigger 
armed forces) conventional superiority. Reagan pushed the INF Treaty 
through against the recommendations of large parts of the Republican 
establishment. A more moderate leader than Reagan with less strongly held 
convictions concerning the trustworthiness of the Soviet Union under 
Gorbachev would have struggled to justify such a treaty.  
Systemic trends present policymakers with an operating environment, 
but not with faits accomplis. Structural realism helps us understand the 
international situation faced by Gorbachev and Reagan in the 1980s, but it 
does not account for how the two leaders acted against the open-ended 
backdrop of this situation. Brooks and Wohlforth note their analytical focus is 
“on the overall shift of retrenchment – that is, the sum total of dozens upon 
dozens of critical decisions over a series of years which collectively added 
up” to the end of the US-Soviet confrontation.765 Researchers attuned to 
complex causation understand the limits of such a linear causal analysis: 
decisions are not additive, they are interactive. Had critical decisions gone 
differently, it would have affected further decisions down the line, and 
possibly acted against the emergence of better relations. In spring of 1983, 
an alternative course of action regarding the Soviet Union – increasing the 
burden of superpower confrontation – was open to Reagan, which he 
rejected in favour of outreach. Had he not done so, the subsequent benign 
development of relations between the US and USSR becomes harder to 
envisage. For his part, Gorbachev’s accession to power and willingness to 
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deal seriously with Reagan sparked vigorous debates among the US foreign 
policy establishment about whether the new Soviet leader could be trusted, 
or was primarily interested in revitalising a declining Soviet Union. A hardline 
US foreign policy which allowed for serious East-West negotiations only after 
significant Soviet concessions would have made it exceedingly difficult for 
Reagan to reach out to Gorbachev in 1985.  
The impact that the appointment of George Shultz had on the 
effectiveness of Reagan’s foreign policy implementation provides an example 
of the effects of interactive agency on international affairs. An effective 
negotiator, tasked by his or her principal with a strategic vision that both 
support, can generate substantial momentum behind a policy goal. Shultz 
helped Reagan to pivot his Administration’s Soviet strategy away from 
seeking confrontation and towards a more cooperative approach. Hardliners 
pushed back, advising Reagan not to follow Shultz’s course. Reagan was 
aware of the sharp policy difference, remarking in his autobiography: “Cap 
[Weinberger] was not as interested as George [Shultz] in opening 
negotiations with the Russians, and some of his advisors at the Pentagon 
strongly opposed some of my ideas on arms control that George 
supported.”766  In the absence of Reagan’s choice to engage, rapprochement 
with Gorbachev a few years later would have been much more difficult. Thus, 
Reagan’s March 1983 decision to endorse Shultz’s strategy opened up a 
causal channel of consequence in the complex fabric of US-Soviet relations in 
the 1980s.  
Leadership calibrations, as this chapter shows, can have important 
consequences in the domain of foreign policy. But puzzles remain. It is quite 
possible that the ‘agency shift’ that George Shultz brought about was the 
product of his determination to learn from Haig’s mistakes rather than repeat 
them. As Shultz wrote, Reagan “liked his staff around him as he made 
decisions, and he liked general agreement. That was what had gotten Al 
Haig in trouble. Haig tried to get the President to make decisions on his own 
or let Haig make them. Ronald Reagan wanted to talk things through with 
others.”767 This subtle point merits highlighting: the question is whether 
Shultz only acted the way he did because he learned from Haig’s mistakes. It 
is furthermore possible that Haig could have gradually changed his manners 
																																																								
766  Reagan (1990), 605 
767  Shultz (1993), 166 
 191 
and ended up understanding Reagan’s true intentions regarding the Soviets 
over time. The possibility cannot be dismissed out of hand.768 
Nonetheless, Shultz’s impact appears to have been significant in terms 
of East-West as well as Allied relations.769 It was his addition to the cabinet 
that allowed Reagan’s peace-making instincts to reveal themselves for the 
first time. This generated decisive leeway and momentum in the entrenched 
Cold War dynamic, paving the way for substantial progress to be made once 
Gorbachev assumed the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee 
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March 1985. In this way, 
interactive agency – combined with other, subsequent developments – 
turned out to be of great importance in paving the way for superpower 
reconciliation to take place. When the Cold War seemed at its most heated, 
the appointment of a canny diplomat who recognised Reagan’s ultimate 
peace-building desires introduced the initial conditions that later enabled the 
relationship between the US and the USSR to undergo revolutionary 
changes. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
CHOICES, PERSONALITIES, AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE REAGAN-
GORBACHEV RELATIONSHIP 
 
 
 
 
A rock pile ceases to be a rock pile the moment a single man contemplates 
it, bearing within him the image of a cathedral.  
Antoine de Saint-Exupery 
 
 
You know, Ron, I wish you would stop this anti-nuclear stuff. What am I going 
to say to the ladies at Greenham Common? 
Margaret Thatcher 
 
 
 
 
 
I now turn to the interactive effects among decision-makers that 
created the context in which a sustained Cold War thaw could be pursued. A 
fierce, sharply defined policy debate in the Reagan Administration concerned 
how to respond to a weakening Soviet Union: whereas George Shultz and 
Jack Matlock advocated negotiations, Caspar Weinberger and other 
hardliners wanted to hold off on serious negotiations and let the Soviet 
strategic position deteriorate further. Existing IR theory gives little insight into 
how such debates transition into policy decisions. Complexity theory, on the 
other hand, can account for the emergence of a co-operative course. The 
substance of the competing Soviet strategies is examined and it is shown 
how each would have created a different context for negotiations with the 
Soviet leadership. Because the policies advocated by Shultz and Matlock 
resonated with Reagan more than thhose of the hardliners, patterns of 
influence in the Reagan Administration shifted decisively toward a strategy 
that made improvements possible. President Reagan was ready to engage 
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the Soviet leadership from 1984 onwards – a full year before Gorbachev rose 
to power. Once Reagan found a willing partner in Gorbachev, their incipient 
relationship ballooned into the most ambitious round of arms reduction talks 
of the Cold War. Despite missteps, the relationship continued to evolve in a 
positive feedback effect, buffeted by the idiosyncrasies of both agents, 
especially towards Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative. In the end, personal 
negotiations, for which both Reagan and Gorbachev overcame significant 
domestic opposition, produced the Intermediate Nuclear Force Treaty of 
1987. This was a milestone: the first nuclear arms reduction treaty of the Cold 
War, eliminating an entire class of missiles. It remains in force to this day.   
 
 
An emerging critical juncture and a gap in IR theory 
By the mid-1980s, the evolving structural context presented the 
leaders of both the US and the Soviet Union with a critical juncture. The USSR 
was burdened with costly obligations abroad and a stagnating economy at 
home. The US, by contrast, was going through an economic boom. The 
balance of power was shifting, in other words. Brooks and Wohlforth argue 
that any Soviet leader’s response was heavily stacked in favour of conciliatory 
options.770 But the perceptions of policymakers at the time did not reflect 
that view. Anti-Soviet hardliners in Reagan’s defence establishment such as 
Secretary of Defence Caspar Weinberger and his assistant Richard Perle 
never argued that a change of Soviet goals or strategy was imminent 
because of the country’s economic problems.771 This despite the fact that 
“throughout the 1980s the intelligence community warned of the weakening 
Soviet economy.”772 
The problems that the Soviet Union faced were not hidden from the 
view of US policymakers. Robert Gates, Deputy CIA Director under Reagan, 
reports: “November of 1985 [was] the first time I ever heard CIA briefers tell 
Reagan the Soviet regime cannot last. It cannot survive, it’s doomed, and the 
degree of alienation, of social alienation and economic decline, says it’s 
going to fall apart, and sooner rather than later. Still no dates.”773 The USSR’s 
troubles required a policy response by the US: should the Administration 																																																								
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exert more pressure on the Soviet Union, as NSDD-75 suggested, until the 
regime imploded? Or had the time come to reach out to the Soviets, despite 
the fact that they were adversaries? IR theory offers no policy advice in such 
micro-situations, which is one of the reasons for the wide gap between 
policymaking and academia in IR.774 The deteriorating position of the Soviet 
Union produced different policy prescriptions in Reagan’s cabinet: it follows 
that the makeup of the Administration and the relationships between the 
President and his key advisors played a substantial role in determining how 
US-Soviet relations developed. Reagan entered office without any blueprint 
for arms control other than vague calls for real reductions, negotiations from 
strength, closing the window of vulnerability and establishing ‘equality.’775  
Structural IR theories describe the causal dominance of systemic 
variables in influencing outcomes in international relations. But at the macro-
level of analysis all that is observable is the direction into which structural 
developments seemingly ‘push’ units. Complexity theory offers deeper 
insights into how policymakers interact with the structural forces that abound 
in social systems. Findings about complex causal interactions and emergent 
effects are more contingent and causally open-ended than the findings 
derived from a reductionist macro-structural base. Complexity features in 
explanations of how political outcomes are brought about by way of leaders’ 
interactions with structures.  
But how can we link theories about the behaviour of leaders with 
theories about macro-developments? Herrmann describes this challenge:  
 
“How does one create an interactive theory that takes the perspective 
of an actor in the system, rather than that of the system itself, while at 
the same time taking into account that the actor is constantly 
responding to perceived external feedback to its prior actions, new 
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initiatives of others, differing situations, and shifts in the international 
structure?”776  
 
Mahoney and Snyder offer an analytical approach that integrates structure 
and agency (in the context of democratising states): they look at critical 
junctures, when “political action created structures that had persistent causal 
effects which shaped the subsequent trajectories of political change.”777 
Crucially, this “does not assume that structural factors predetermine critical 
junctures; instead, these junctures are based on contingency.”778 Theirs is a 
model of ‘punctuated agency’: political choices, fashioned by leaders at 
crucial turning points, set the course towards new structural realities, or 
alternatively creates further turning points. This micro-analytical approach 
undertaken here sheds light on the occlusions of structural IR theory. 
Structural realism explains the dynamics that ratcheted up tensions in the 
early 1980s. Being systemic in origin, these developments would have 
occurred with or without Reagan in power. To better understand what 
happened next, and why confrontation was followed by reconciliation, 
agency – specifically, the interactive formulation and implementation of 
policy, and the contingent emergent effects of policy decisions – enter the 
analytical picture.  
 
 
The strategy advocated by Shultz and Matlock harnessed the concept of 
emergence and paved the way for improved US-Soviet relations before 
Gorbachev assumed power 
The make-up of an Administration’s key staff and the President’s 
interaction with his team give the policy-making process its core character. 
The web of relations and patterns of influence in an Administration are 
important inputs to its eventual policy output. The case of Shultz, described 
in the preceding chapter, is a prime example thereof. The causal role of intra-
Administration interactions applies to all Presidencies, something that is 
illustrated again in the following chapter when it comes to the George H. W. 
Bush Administration. The nature of a President’s relations with his or her 
advisors, and of the advisors with each other, determines the content and 																																																								
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texture of foreign policy and diplomacy. Policy channels unfold and 
trajectories develop in meandering and diffuse ways in complex systems. 
Leaders provide an analytical opening for theorists as they infuse foreign 
policy with their own flavour by setting the policy agenda internally via their 
key political lieutenants, which ends up affecting policy outcomes.  
Until Reagan endorsed Shultz’s strategy in spring of 1983, 
Administration officials jostled to define the Administration’s policy 
preferences toward the Soviet Union.779 William Clark, NSC Advisor from 
1982 to 1983, stated that Reagan’s goal was “to stress out the Soviet 
economy, particularly its hard currency cash flow, and fully exploit its 
rigidities, to engage Moscow on every front – through our military build-up, 
the war of ideas, and the battleground of the Third World.”780 Richard Pipes 
declared with not inconsiderable boldness, “because Reagan knew what he 
wanted but could not articulate his feelings in terms that made sense to 
foreign policy professionals at home and abroad, I took it upon myself to do 
so on his behalf.”781  Shimko has shown Pipes’ claims to be false: years before 
Gorbachev came to power, Reagan was much more open to the possibility of 
Soviet–American cooperation than were his advisors.782 Serious outreach only 
began after Reagan’s belief pattern, aided by his interactions with Shultz, 
drifted away from stressing the Soviet Union as an enemy – grounded in a 
Manichean world-view that prioritised the challenge Communism posed to 
democracy – toward a more open-ended stance reflecting faith in reason, 
communication and negotiation as means to overcome conflict.  
Reagan’s move toward a ‘softer’ view of Soviet intentions was required 
to overcome the mutual suspicion between East and West that drove the 
arms race. Reagan was the first US President to shift his belief pattern in the 
direction of a more optimistic, upbeat approach to arms control. Shultz had a 
more moderate image of the Soviet Union relative to Weinberger, as well as 
a more nuanced cognitive style, and thus a looser ‘image-policy’ preference 
relationship.783 As Shultz put it in testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee in June 1983, “we are not so deterministic as to believe that 
geopolitics and ideological competition must ineluctably lead to permanent 																																																								
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and dangerous confrontation.”784 This reduced sense of determinism in the 
Administration’s relations with the Soviet Union had important 
consequences. Shultz recalls, “Coming into office as Secretary of State at a 
time when we were confronted with tremendous problems, the economist in 
me asked: ‘Where are we trying to go, and what kind of strategy should we 
employ to get there?’ recognising that results would often be a long time in 
coming.” 785  Shultz combined a diplomatic disposition that favoured 
negotiations with a dynamic view of the US-Soviet relationship: his strategic 
approach was open-ended in scope, but directional in its assumption that the 
very process of engagement would affect the trajectory of US-Soviet 
relations. By contrast, hardliners had a rigid view of the Cold War. In 1984, 
NSC staffer John Lenczowski warned National Security Advisor Bud 
MacFarlane, “an atmospheric ‘improvement of relations’ would be a 
deception” which “would send a great signal of weakness to the Soviets.”786 
This advice was static in its assumption that Reagan’s approach relations with 
the Soviet Union could not influence the course that the relationship would 
take. 
Jack Matlock, by contrast, impressed on Reagan the notion that the 
point of negotiating was not a way for the US to topple a faltering Soviet 
regime: it was to engage for the sake of engagement. “We must reject the 
idea that reaching agreements with the Soviets is an end in itself,” Matlock 
argued, “and also the idea that the Soviet system is on the verge of 
collapse.” 787 This does justice to the operating principle in complex systems 
that the direction of events is difficult to target directly. Matlock, echoing 
George Kennan’s Long Telegram, advised that the best Reagan could hope 
for was that more benign US-Soviet atmospherics could provide a context in 
which a more moderate Soviet leadership could emerge: “The forthcoming 
generational change of Soviet leaders provides some basis for hope that the 
system will change. Future leaders will face a choice between a course of 
further centralization, militarization and oppression and one of moving 
toward a more open system. [Emphasis added]” 788 The most realistic aim of 
Reagan’s new Soviet strategy was to influence the direction of Moscow’s 																																																								
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choice. The key to making the engagement strategy succeed was for the US 
to “put forward negotiable proposals and be prepared to make reasonable 
compromises and trade-offs.” The diplomatic advice Matlock offered was 
permeated with principles of complexity theory, particularly the concept of 
emergence. 
Emergence is the process of creating new properties in a complex 
system “due to the pattern of interactions between the elements of the 
system over time.” 789 This is what George Kennan recognised in 1946: while 
he could not predict the future of US-Soviet relations, containment provided 
the most likely context within which new Soviet leaders could arise who 
wished to change their relationship with the US. Similarly, what Matlock 
suggested was laying the seeds for eventual US-Soviet rapprochement 
through persistent diplomacy. In due course, this brought about a fast-
moving series of interactions between Reagan and Gorbachev that produced 
the INF treaty. This outcome, again, reflects emergence: “Emergent 
phenomena are observable at the macro-level, even though they are 
generated by micro-level elements.”790 At a time when the Soviet Union was 
confronting grave challenges, Matlock and Shultz recognised that the future 
of the Soviet Union was not a linear function of US policy. A ‘linear’ policy of 
doubling down on Soviet troubles through a more confrontational approach 
could easily have brought about the opposite consequence. The USSR’s 
relationship with the US was one of many dynamic elements that affected the 
trajectory of its development, and while the US could not directly shape 
Soviet domestic affairs, it could try to provide the conditions by which to aid 
a positive evolution.  
Shultz was made aware of this from the outset of his role in the 
Reagan Administration. In a 1982 State Department overview of US-Soviet 
relations, written in the aftermath of Andropov’s appointment as General 
Secretary, the department’s Soviet experts described the ‘View from 
Moscow’, including the problems the regime faced: “instability in Eastern 
Europe, declining growth, productivity and morale, and Western – especially 
American – rearmament.” The paper outlined the choices the regime faced: 
“At one extreme, economic reform, reduced military spending, and 
international retreat; at the other extreme, accelerated military growth and 
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broad expansionism whatever the cost,” and pointed out that “it would take 
zero growth and serious hunger to force military and international 
contraction, given that this would mean abandonment of Brezhnev’s main 
achievement: status, might and reach comparable to ours.” But “because 
they doubt our willingness to respond positively to anything less than a 
broad Soviet retreat, which they will not contemplate,” the state of relations 
in 1982 made it likely that Moscow would “wait for a new American 
administration before attempting to improve US-Soviet relations. [Emphasis 
added]”791 As the previous chapter showed, Shultz succeeded in shifting 
Reagan’s negotiation stance toward one where the Administration did 
respond positively to developments less then a broad Soviet retreat. In 
effect, Reagan reached out to the Soviets before he had a real case to do so.  
After Reagan pivoted to Shultz’s strategy of engagement in March 
1983, his perceptions of the Soviets began to evolve. A NSC memorandum 
on US-Soviet relations from that same month features handwritten comments 
by Reagan, who underlined this sentence in the paper: “the Soviets view the 
very fact that we are sitting at the table with them as something they forced 
us to do.” Reagan’s hand-written comments in the margins dispute the point, 
noting, “I don’t agree with that. History shows they have always resisted 
coming to the table.”792 The paper foresaw bleak prospects regarding the 
zero-zero proposal on Intermediate Nuclear Forces – i.e. Reagan’s opening 
offer for INF negotiations in 1981, widely perceived as disingenuous in 
calling for the Soviets to dismantle their already deployed SS-20s in 
exchange for the US not going ahead with its own deployment. Again, 
Reagan commented by hand, “I don’t believe this is accurate. We knew from 
the 1st we might have to settle for less but whatever gains we made might 
make it easier to ultimately get zero-zero.”793 [Italics added] This represented 
a shift in Reagan’s thinking: recall his response to Nitze after the Walk in the 
Woods that the Soviets had to cut all their SS-20s, not gradually ‘to make it 
easier to get zero-zero’, but immediately.  																																																								
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Reagan’s views on negotiations continued to shift throughout 1983. In 
November, NATO’s Able Archer exercises took the alliance through a full-
scale simulated release of nuclear weapons. This appeared to produce fears 
in Moscow of an impending first-strike. After reading a CIA report on Soviet 
anxieties of a nuclear attack, Reagan asked his then-National Security Advisor 
Bud McFarlane “Do you suppose they really believe that? I don’t see how 
they could believe that – but it’s something to think about.” 794  When 
McFarlane sent Reagan an article titled ‘Does the Soviet Union Fear the 
United States?’ Reagan responded the following: “Bud, this is very revealing 
and confirms much of what I’ve been trying to say but didn’t have the 
knowledge or the words.”795  Matlock confirms, “once Reagan began to 
realise that [the Soviets] might really be [afraid of the US], this was something 
that, when he met with Mitterrand, when he met with Thatcher, he would ask 
them directly “‘Can they really worry about us?’ And the answer was – 
‘Maybe they do. We have to take that into account.’”796 Reagan, aided by 
Shultz and Matlock, was increasingly attuned to the effects of the bilateral 
context on US-Soviet relations, and that his own behaviour contributed to the 
nature of this context. If the Soviet Union feared the US, it was less likely to 
change its foreign policy. 
  Reagan eventually absorbed the point that Moscow’s foreign policy 
choices depended in no small part on how the US approached its 
relationship with the Soviet Union.  This softening in Reagan’s perception of 
the Soviets was important. Improving relations between the two superpowers 
is much harder to envisage had Gorbachev continued to perceive Reagan as 
belligerently anti-Soviet. Gorbachev could only embark on his fundamental 
domestic reforms by convincing the Soviet leadership that the greatest threat 
the country faced was not an attack by its Western rivals, but instead the 
failure of Communism at home.797  
 
 
Nothing would have come of Reagan’s agenda for negotiations without 
Gorbachev 
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The origin and development of Reagan’s policy towards the Soviets 
tells only half the story of how a better relationship could take hold. It took 
the rise of Gorbachev to bring about improved dynamics of interacting 
agency in the bilateral relationship. Shifting patterns of influence in the 
Reagan Administration paved the way for negotiations: the subsequent 
dynamic unfolded primarily between Reagan and Gorbachev.  
Both Andropov and Chernenko spurned Reagan’s advances. In 
December 1983, Reagan, by then more aware of the seriousness with which 
the Soviets viewed his efforts to strengthen American power, wrote to 
Andropov stressing the “opportunities – indeed the necessity – for us to work 
together to prevent conflicts, expand our dialogue, and place our 
relationship on a more stable and constructive footing. Though we will be 
vigorous in protecting our interests and those of our friends and allies, we do 
not seek to challenge the security of the Soviet Union and its people.”798 But 
a positive interactive dynamic did not take hold. Andropov interpreted the 
political context to warrant a hardening of Soviet resistance to America, 
rather than retrenchment, remarking to an aide, “If we begin to make 
concessions, defeat would be inevitable.”799 In January 1984, Soviet Foreign 
Minister Gromyko maintained, “Reagan and his team are trying to destroy us, 
and we really have to do something against it.”800 In an April 1984 letter from 
Reagan to Chernenko (who replaced Andropov after his death two months 
before), the President added a hand-written postscript, ruminating on “the 
tragedy and scale of Soviet losses in warfare throughout the ages,” 
emphasising “neither I nor the American people hold any offensive intentions 
toward you or the Soviet people,” and calling for a “common and urgent 
purpose” of achieving “a lasting reduction of tensions between us.” 
Chernenko met this with a dismissive response: “Try to look at the realities of 
the international situation from our end, and at once one will see distinctly 
that the Soviet Union is encircled by a chain of American military bases.”801 
With Reagan reaching out in earnest from 1984 onwards, the ball 
moved to the Kremlin’s court at a time it felt acutely vulnerable. In terms of 
the balance of power at the time, the coercive aspect of Reagan’s strategy 
had reached a high watermark. The successful Pershing II missile deployment 																																																								
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in Western Europe by the end of 1983 represented a major defeat for the 
Soviet Union, which had pulled out all the stops (literally – Andropov had 
instructed the Politburo to pull ‘all levers’ to halt the deployment) to try and 
prevent this from happening.802 The Pershing II missiles had been a political 
hot potato in Western Europe, where the anti-nuclear movement mobilised 
enormous protests, particularly in the UK and Germany, in an effort to 
prevent these weapons from being stationed. Shultz was “very conscious that 
everything we did in Washington was important because it would influence 
public opinion in European countries, which in turn would create a context 
that was more or less supportive of deployments.”803  Shultz knew that 
Reagan’s outreach to the Soviets – whether effective or not – would reassure 
NATO Allies that the Administration was, in fact, committed to defusing East-
West tensions rather than just creating a more hostile Cold War climate. 
Shultz later commented, “I think the turning point was when we deployed 
Pershing missiles in Germany and [the Soviets] had to face up to the fact that 
the alliance had cohesion and strength.”804 Separately, he wrote that the INF 
deployments demonstrated “allied unity and resolve […] and that strength 
was recognized as crucial to diplomacy.” 805  The Pershing deployment 
mattered to Shultz’s strategy because “if the West did not deploy Pershing II 
and cruise missiles, there would be no incentive for the Soviets to negotiate 
seriously for nuclear weapons reductions.”806 With the Pershings in place, a 
crucial plank in NATO’s bargaining position had been nailed down.  
As Shultz wrote to Reagan in March 1983, “the Soviets must recognize 
that, while we are serious in our arms control proposals, we also have the will 
and capacity to correct the imbalances which their military buildup has 
created.” This could produce the chance “to make some progress toward a 
more stable and constructive US-Soviet relationship over the next two years 
or so,” which could only occur “if the Soviet leadership concludes that it has 
no choice but to deal with this Administration on the basis of the 
comprehensive [four-part] agenda we have established.”807 The four-part 
agenda for dialogue with the Soviet Union (first outlined by Shultz in advance 
of the key months of the intra-Administration debate on whether to engage 																																																								
802  See, for instance, Volkogonov (1983), Meeting of the Politburo 
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the Soviets) covered the broad areas of arms control, regional conflicts, 
bilateral relations and human rights.808 The Shultz strategy insisted on this 
agenda as the basis for all US-Soviet talks, in an effort to bring the Soviets to 
deal with the US on their terms, but also to undercut his domestic foes: when 
in October 1984 “Bud McFarlane said the Soviets wanted to deal with us on 
arms control issues only,” Shultz countered, “That is why we have to insist on 
our four-part agenda, to force them to deal with human rights and the 
explosive regional issues, as well as bilateral issues.”809 As Matlock wrote in 
‘Dealing with the Soviets,’ “we must not permit the prospect of reaching 
agreement in some areas to inhibit our reaction to Soviet encroachments on 
our interests in other areas. We must compete while negotiating.” This 
implicitly criticised linkage: coercive diplomacy provided a diverse enough 
array of tools to handle disputes in one area without the entire US-Soviet 
relationship having to suffer.810  
 
 
After Gorbachev assumed power, his interactions with Reagan allowed a new 
superpower dynamic to take hold  
Shultz’s four-part agenda set up a framework within which relations 
could improve once the Soviets reached a point where they were ready to 
negotiate. This missing piece of the puzzle was filled with the appointment of 
Mikhail Gorbachev as General Secretary in March 1985. On the day of his 
election, Shultz visited the Soviet Embassy to sign the condolence book for 
Chernenko. During his visit he informed the Soviet Ambassador Anatoly 
Dobrynin that Reagan realised new opportunities were emerging in US-
Soviet relations, and that it would be unforgivable if they weren’t taken 
advantage of – even if the outcome would be, as complexity theory suggests 
– unpredictable. 811 Relations with Moscow would be high on the President’s 
list of priorities, and Dobrynin later reflected, “Reagan wanted to establish a 
dialogue at the highest level from the very beginning.”812 Shultz handed 
Dobrynin a letter from Reagan to Gorbachev reiterating the President’s 
desire to start a conversation. The following day, National Security Advisor 																																																								
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Bud McFarlane visited the Soviet Ambassador to sign the condolence book 
and repeat Reagan’s message. 
Reagan was aware that Gorbachev was a new kind of Soviet leader. 
Margaret Thatcher, during a Camp David visit in December 1984, reported 
her impressions of Gorbachev, whom she met during his visit to the UK a few 
days prior, then still only as a Politburo member. Thatcher described 
Gorbachev as “an unusual Russian in that he was much less constrained, 
more charming, open to discussion and debate, and did not stick to 
prepared notes.”813 Matlock believes that “Thatcher’s famous certification 
counted for a lot, a great deal.”814 Shultz had the chance to form his own 
impressions of Gorbachev when he attended Chernenko’s funeral: 
 
“He was in complete intellectual control of a wide range of issues. He 
enjoyed the give-and-take. You could feel his energy and intensity 
even at the end of what must have been an exhausting period for him. 
Having observed other Soviet leaders, I could say with confidence that 
this new leader would be a formidable adversary, but he clearly liked 
ideas and was ready for vigorous conversation.”815 
 
Matlock had begun to work on papers outlining the pros and cons of a 
summit with Andropov during the summer of 1983, since Reagan was keen to 
move ahead and create a US-Soviet agenda – the contents of which had to 
be defined – for a summit meeting.816 After the progress made in setting 
such an agenda in 1984, and given that the main obstacle was the Soviet 
refusal to engage, Reagan would have reached out to Chernenko’s successor 
regardless of whom he turned out to be. The fact that it was Gorbachev – a 
man similarly inclined to communicative diplomacy as Reagan, and 
increasingly convinced that the Soviet Union faced a turning point in its 
history that required fundamental domestic reforms – was a stroke of luck 
that set in place an interactive process of high-level East-West negotiations. 
This reactive, evolutionary negotiation path between the two leaders 
ultimately brought about a substantial lessening in tensions, paving the way 
for the eventual end of the Cold War.  																																																								
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 As early as April 23 1985, Gorbachev signalled privately that a change 
in Soviet foreign policy was warranted. At the Politburo plenum that day he 
launched a relatively routine attack on Reagan’s foreign policy. After the 
plenum, however, Gorbachev met with Ambassador Dobrynin privately and 
made clear two key views of his: victory over Western imperialism was not 
achievable by arms, and he wanted the maximum number of US troops to be 
removed from Europe. “No effort should be spared to reduce hostility in 
relations,” Gorbachev concluded.817 He began to shuffle his team of ministers 
and advisors, most notably replacing Andrei Gromyko, who had been Soviet 
Foreign Minister for almost three decades, with Eduard Shevardnadze as 
Foreign Minister. Shevardnadze and Gorbachev knew each other for a long 
time. As a political outsider, Shevardnadze would bring both a breath of fresh 
air into the USSR’s foreign policy and be personally loyal to Gorbachev: he 
became a firm supporter of Gorbachev’s domestic reforms. 818  The 
Gorbachev-Shevardnadze duo shared a pragmatic approach, in that they 
were both “interested in problems as well as how they can be solved through 
mutual compromise.”819 Gorbachev and Shevardnadze now took control of 
foreign policy. Dobrynin, who had observed US-Soviet relations as 
Ambassador for over 20 years, remarked that as a result, Soviet policy 
towards the US “became increasingly dynamic, playing a significant role in 
paving the way for the turn that took place at the Geneva summit.” He 
stresses the interaction pattern that took hold from the beginning of 
Gorbachev’s tenure, an “intensive exchange with the administration at all 
levels. This included personal letters between Gorbachev and Reagan; 
meetings and correspondence between Gorbachev’s new and pragmatic 
Soviet foreign minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, and both the Secretary of 
State and the President, and active working contacts through diplomatic 
channels that had previously been almost completely blocked.”820 This was a 
Soviet pivot of sorts, in that some Politburo members thought it was a 
mistake to try to deal with Reagan: “Just as their American counterparts 
demanded changes in Soviet policy before they would support realistic 
negotiations, Soviet hardliners wanted an American commitment to an arms 
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control agreement before the leaders met.”821 Reagan’s official outreach had 
begun in January 1984 with a TV address that was supposed to start the 
public mark of the new outreach era.822 Soviet officials paid little or no 
attention. Anatoly Chernyaev, who later became one of Gorbachev’s key 
foreign policy advisors, was Deputy Director of the Central Committee’s 
International Department in 1984 – but despite this foreign policy role he was 
largely ignorant of Reagan’s speeches. Chernyaev later realised that Reagan’s 
outreach – his desire for contacts and to move the arms race to the back 
burner – began in late 1983, but at the time, ‘We didn’t know about this.’823 
Reagan’s strategy would come to naught until a receptive partner for a 
conversation was found in Gorbachev. This then set in motion a diplomatic 
initiative with increasingly profound consequences for the Cold War. 
A summit meeting was arranged for November 1985: the Geneva 
summit. This was the first encounter between Reagan and Gorbachev and 
the first US-Soviet summit in more than six years. Prior to Geneva, Reagan 
met Shevardnadze in September 1985, preparing for the meeting “with an 
intensity usually reserved for the head of a major allied government.”824 
Reagan used the occasion to outline the four-part agenda as the basis for his 
upcoming meeting with Gorbachev, and while his discussion with 
Shevardnadze was frank and at times combative, producing no real results, 
Reagan was – for the first time – interacting with Soviet counterparts who 
were not obstructionist to the core. Shultz met separately with Shevardnadze 
in New York in October and in Moscow a month later, each time structuring 
his talks in accordance with the four-part agenda. In Moscow, Shultz also met 
with Gorbachev to discuss the upcoming summit. Though their conversation 
was confrontational, Shultz reported back to Reagan afterward: speech 
 
“Gorbachev is quite prepared for a more wide-ranging discussion with 
you; indeed he concluded our sessions with an expression of interest 
in all of the items on our agenda, including arms reductions, regional 
and bilateral issues, and human rights.” 825  																																																								
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Shultz gave priority to the fact that a process of communication had 
been launched: “While there was no particular substantive progress, we did 
reach agreement, subject to your concurrence, on a sequence or flow of 
subjects to be covered in Geneva.” He saw the overarching value in these 
talks not in the results they produced but in the interactions themselves: “In 
the end what really matters, of course, is that you and Gorbachev establish a 
relationship with each other and the opening tête-à-tête on Nov 19th will be 
important in that regard.”826 In preparation for Reagan’s first encounter with 
Gorbachev at Geneva, Shultz sent him a detailed memorandum titled ‘What 
to Expect from Gorbachev in Geneva.’ On linkage, he advised Reagan to tell 
Gorbachev that his “Administration has never dwelled on linkages, and you 
[Gorbachev] know what. […] The important thing is to get to work to start 
narrowing the differences between us. If we succeed, the linkage question 
will   itself.”827 This relationship was to be based on personalities as well as 
policy. One policy in particular would fundamentally shape the trajectory of 
the Reagan-Gorbachev interactions: the Strategic Defense Initiative. 
 
 
The direction of US-Soviet relations emerged from the constructive 
interactive effects of the Reagan-Gorbachev relationship 
Shortly before the Geneva summit, after Reagan had completed 
thorough briefings on Gorbachev and the Soviet Union, he dictated a free-
flowing series of thoughts about his planned approach to what would be his 
first ever encounter with a Soviet leader. Regan expressed awareness that 
Gorbachev had to “show his strength to the Soviet gang back in the 
Kremlin,” and noted that he ought not make his counterpart look weak or 
incompetent. Reagan demonstrated an intricate understanding of how 
linkage, in modified form, could be used to drive the US-Soviet relationship 
forward – i.e. how linkage could ‘take care of itself’: on trade, which mattered 
more to the Soviets than the US, Reagan would “hang back until we get 
some of the things we want” in the areas outlined by the four-part agenda. 
Deepening contacts between the US and the Soviet Union mattered, for 
instance through consular exchanges and cultural agreements, but Reagan 
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realised that this ultimately amounted to “window dressing for PR.”828 The 
overriding goal going forward, Reagan noted, was a solid, verifiable arms 
control agreement, without which a new phase of the arms race was likely to 
begin. He concluded his dictation by observing that Geneva was the first 
step in a process that should produce further meetings at the highest level, 
with a view to eventually settling the differences between East and West.829  
This document is reflective of Reagan’s temperament as leader, which 
conditioned his approach to the upcoming dialogue with Gorbachev. Reagan 
didn’t think in neat, analytical categories, but “in a general, almost 
impressionistic way.”830 He grasped the various dimensions of the US-Soviet 
relationship: Reagan was image-conscious, focused on how the ‘big issues’ 
defined his foreign policy goals, and thought about negotiations in terms of 
the personality and political needs of his interlocutor, as well as taking public 
opinion into account. Shortly before the Geneva Summit, Reagan was 
“briefed by CIA that the Soviet economy was undergoing severe turmoil.”831 
Reagan didn’t view this as some kind of vindication of his earlier strategy of 
turning up the heat on the USSR in an effort to achieve regime change 
through pressure alone. Instead he stuck to the new plan of engaging 
Gorbachev, seeing Geneva as the first in a series of dialogue to pursue arms 
control.  
For Gorbachev, a key aim in his negotiation strategy was resolute 
opposition to the Strategic Defense Initiative that Reagan had pursued since 
1983, which threatened to unleash a new, costly round of the arms race. In a 
letter to Reagan in June 1985, Gorbachev wrote that he viewed SDI as an 
insurmountable obstacle to the goal of limiting and eventually reducing the 
level of nuclear weapons:   
 
“The attempts to develop a large-scale ABM [anti-ballistic missile] 
system […] will not only prevent any limitation of nuclear weapons, but 
will, instead, lead to their build-up and improvement. Therefore, when 																																																								
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we resolutely raise the question and state that the militarization of 
space is impermissible, it is not propaganda and not a consequence of 
some misunderstanding or fear of ‘falling behind technologically’. It is 
a result of a thorough analysis, of our deep concern about the future 
of relations between our countries, the future of peace.” 832 
 
Gorbachev saw SDI not “as a large-scale ABM system” but as a “strategic 
offensive weapon […] to be deployed in space [through which] it will be 
possible to carry out the first strike by the new systems practically 
instantly.”833 In November, Gorbachev told Shultz in Moscow, “We know 
what’s going on […] if you want superiority through your SDI, we will not help 
you. We will let you bankrupt yourselves. But also we will not reduce our 
offensive missiles.”834  
In terms of the evolving Reagan-Gorbachev dynamic, SDI proved to 
be a crucial benchmark that fundamentally affected the trajectory of the 
relationship. Reagan was clear in his mind that “I won’t trade our SDI off for 
some Soviet offer of weapons reductions.”835 Reagan viewed SDI as an 
essential step towards a nuclear-free world, telling the National Security 
Council: “Integrating missile defense in our respective arsenals would put 
international relations on a more stable footing. In fact, this could even lead 
to a complete elimination of nuclear weapons.” He made it clear that he was 
“ready to internationalise these systems,” seeing the defence against nuclear 
weapons as a service to all of humankind.836 Frank Carlucci, who succeeded 
Caspar Weinberger as Secretary of Defence, is adamant that this “was not a 
bargaining chip. He was quite clear on that: Reagan wanted to implement 
SDI.”837 And so the two leaders ended up clashing fundamentally over the 
perception of SDI. Reagan saw it as a means to overcome the threat of 
nuclear aggression through a defensive umbrella; Gorbachev regarded it as a 
shield that would permit the US to undertake a first strike against the Soviet. 
Reagan viewed ‘Mutually Assured Destruction’ (MAD) as an immoral doctrine 
that wagered the safety of all of mankind against the assumption that the 
threat of a nuclear holocaust would be enough to deter the use of atomic 																																																								
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weapons,838 and wanted to replace MAD with ‘mutually assured survival’,839 
Gorbachev, though inclined to agree with Reagan’s anti-nuclear stance, saw 
SDI as a destabilising initiative that threatened the security of the USSR. In a 
sense, this dispute encapsulated the core issue of mistrust that drove the 
East-West adversarial relationship: “Reagan never thought that SDI should be 
considered a threat, and he was trying to find ways to reassure 
Gorbachev.”840 An inability to trust each other’s intentions meant that, no 
matter how insistent Reagan was in his attempts to assuage this concern, 
Gorbachev refused to accept the security risk that came with permitting 
Reagan to develop a system which, in theory, could provide the US with a 
protection from nuclear attack and thus the means to launch a debilitating 
first-strike against the Soviet Union.  
 In Geneva, Reagan and Gorbachev affirmed the importance of ending 
the arms race, and the need for a new stage in US-Soviet relations to begin. 
Reagan expressed his concern at Soviet activities in the Third World, while 
Gorbachev explained his view that the US military-industrial complex stood 
to benefit from continuing the arms race. On SDI, Reagan promised it “will 
never be used by the U.S. to improve its offensive capability or to launch a 
first strike,” while Gorbachev repeated what he told Shultz in Moscow: 
reductions in strategic weapons would not be achieved if SDI went ahead.841 
The idea of a 50% reduction in strategic nuclear weapons was tabled, as 
were plans for an interim INF agreement, but Gorbachev tied all this to a 
reconfirmation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (which, under a strict 
reading, banned the development of SDI). Both leaders committed 
themselves to significant steps towards improving bilateral relations “with 
mutual understanding and a sense of responsibility.”842 Gorbachev made a 
surprise move by agreeing to include a phrase in the final summit 
communiqué committing the Soviet Union to “resolving humanitarian cases 
in the spirit of cooperation,” the first time a reference to human rights was 
included in a joint document.843 They communiqué also affirmed the two 
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leaders’ belief “that nuclear war cannot be won and must not be fought.” 844 
This was an early sign of the direction the Reagan-Gorbachev relationship 
would take toward steep nuclear arms reductions.  
Gorbachev, equally as confident in his abilities to negotiate and 
debate as Reagan, concluded after Geneva that his best strategy to deflate 
Cold War tensions was to sign major arms control agreements with the 
United States, to reduce and eventually end the nuclear arms race. This could 
be achieved by adopting a course of cooperation with Reagan.845 No such 
commitment to this process existed on Gorbachev’s part before Geneva, 
contrary to realist claims that Gorbachev had no choice but to engage the 
US. Another Soviet leader – and indeed Gorbachev himself – could have 
pursued a more confrontational approach, had he been so inclined. Reagan, 
attending a NATO head of state summit immediately after the summit, 
informed his Western counterparts, “our first meeting was not a watershed 
event in and of itself, but rather an important part of a long-term process. As 
a demonstration of that fact I am pleased to confirm further meetings with 
Gorbachev in 1986 and 1987,” adding, “I believe that Mr Gorbachev knows 
as I do that progress in US-Soviet relations would be a benefit to all the 
world.”846 In January 1986 instructions went out to the US diplomatic team 
negotiating the interim INF agreement framework. The document called on 
negotiators to “broaden and deepen the apparent areas of convergence that 
emerged at the Geneva Summit,” including the “reduction and limitation of 
US and Soviet LRINF [long-range intermediate nuclear forces] missile systems 
to agreed levels for both parties” and agreements on “effective measures for 
verification of compliance with obligations.”847 Gorbachev, too, started to 
develop a nuclear disarmament programme with Shevardnadze and Marshal 
Akhromeyev, Chief of the Soviet General Staff, premised on the idea that the 
US and USSR would be just as secure and indeed safer with much smaller 
stockpiles of nuclear weapons. After the Politburo endorsed their plan, 
Ambassador Dobrynin presented it to George Shultz in January 1986: “a 
stage by stage programme leading to a comprehensive and universal nuclear 
disarmament by the beginning of the next century,” predicated on a ban of 
offensive weapons on space. While the latter was unacceptable to Reagan, 																																																								
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Shultz appreciated this was the first concrete Soviet proposal for across the 
board arms cuts, with balanced reductions for both sides.848 
  
 
The interactions between Reagan and Gorbachev took on emergent 
properties in the domain of nuclear arms control 
The nuclear weapons reductions that Reagan and Gorbachev pursued 
henceforth – which became the dominant engine that hauled along the 
process of improving East-West relations – were contingent as well as 
emergent in nature. Driven firstly by each side’s decision-making processes 
regarding what to propose during negotiations, and secondly by the 
negotiation process itself, the evolution of arms control talks took on a life of 
its own. In a complex adaptive system, “‘emergent properties’ are the result 
of contingency, not determinism: you cannot predict when, or if, they will 
emerge, how long they will endure.”849 The Reagan-Gorbachev dynamic was 
contingent and emergent: the structural conditions of 1985 did not dictate 
the direction in which US-Soviet relations would head. Each side’s choices 
were based on the evolving preferences of the decision-makers. This 
negotiation path was self-sustaining: as Reagan and Gorbachev invested 
more time and capital into diplomacy, the trust that was necessary for arms 
reductions took hold. Both Reagan and Gorbachev pursued negotiations out 
of conviction, though for Gorbachev the process took on an increasing level 
of urgency, as his domestic political choice of engaging in a sequence of 
intensifying political and economic reforms could only proceed amidst a 
marked reduction of international tensions. This will be demonstrated in the 
next chapter. 
 The Reagan Administration’s reaction to Gorbachev’s surprising initial 
offer of January 1986 illustrates how the outcomes of the ensuing arms 
control negotiations were in large part generated by the iterated, multi-sided 
negotiation process itself, not by objective security benchmarks alone. The 
Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Kenneth Adelman, 
wrote to Reagan, “Gorbachev’s plan is largely propaganda, using your vision 
of a nuclear-free world as bait to stop SDI,” and advised that Reagan’s 																																																								
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response should “seek to pocket those parts of Gorbachev’s statement that 
move (at least in word) toward the goals you have espoused.”850 Reagan, 
however, endorsed Shultz’s alternative counsel. Shultz’s letter made clear 
how significant he viewed Gorbachev’s opening gambit:  
 
“Gorbachev’s proposal goes directly to the fundamental issue you 
raised with him in Geneva – whether our two nations can agree on a 
plan that will let us break the 40-year cycle of steadily growing nuclear 
arsenals. […] Some will argue that Gorbachev’s initiative is cynical 
propaganda and that any substantive response on your part would 
somehow be ‘rewarding his intransigence.’ Who knows. While 
Gorbachev is, of course, out to protect his own interests, he has at the 
same time made concrete proposals to advance the personal dialogue 
the two of you began in Geneva.”  
 
Shultz concluded his letter in stark terms, calling on Reagan to “build upon 
that dialogue, take the initiative in setting the agenda for Gorbachev’s next 
meeting with you and challenge him to seize this potentially historic 
opportunity.”851 After yet more intra-Administration debate, Reagan ended 
up sending Gorbachev a reply in which he formally endorsed the goal of 
nuclear abolition, and suggesting specific steps beginning with the 50% 
reduction in nuclear warheads that the two had discussed in Geneva, 
followed by the elimination of INF missiles, all while concurrently reducing 
conventional military power in Europe. Reagan referred to Gorbachev’s 
proposal as “a significant and positive step forward.” 852  Fundamental 
disagreements between the two sides remained, most significantly regarding 
SDI and Gorbachev’s insistence on a nuclear test ban, but the fact remains 
that here was a meeting of minds regarding the goal of nuclear abolition, 
which paved the way for the Reykjavik summit later that year.  
Shultz captured the evolving perception on the US side in a 
memorandum for Reagan in February 1986: “Although much of Gorbachev’s 
proposal is clearly designed for propaganda effect, we cannot dismiss out of 
hand the possibility that Gorbachev is making an effort to sustain the 
dynamic of improving US-Soviet relations that you and he began at the 																																																								
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[Geneva] summit.”853 In general, Shultz’s counsel to Reagan concerning his 
dealings with Gorbachev, though hard-headed, pointed to the opportunities 
for improved relations if dialogue was maintained and leadership interactions 
continued. A January 1986 memorandum from Shultz to Reagan is illustrative 
in this regard. It concerned Gorbachev’s response to a letter on human rights 
he received from the President. Shultz begins with his verdict: in terms of 
tone and content, the letter “holds out little hope of broad-based progress 
on human rights issues.” Shultz’s tone is matter-of-fact: “It is not surprising 
that Gorbachev has formally stayed the party line on an issue as touchy as 
this one is for the Soviets.” The key, Shultz feels, “is not what they say, but 
what they do,” and in the week prior to receiving Gorbachev’s letter, one 
human rights case raised by the President was resolved: this “is a sign that 
the positive steps which began at the Geneva meeting are continuing for the 
moment.” Shultz stressed the importance of the fact “that Gorbachev is 
prepared to continue the dialogue.” Interaction between Reagan and 
Gorbachev was key, Shultz insisted: “Disappointing as the substance of 
Gorbachev’s response is, it only underscores the need to consider how we 
can best encourage and broaden” the ‘fragile’ process of improving 
relations.854  The path of the Reagan-Gorbachev liaison, and by extension the 
US-Soviet relationship, was not predetermined, and Shultz tried hard to steer 
Reagan toward cooperation through his own counsel to the President. 
According to Ambassador Dobrynin, Reagan informed his closest 
advisors after Geneva that his impression of Gorbachev was that he was a 
committed communist, but one with whom business can be done.855 Reagan 
drove the negotiation process forward on the basis of this conviction. It 
entailed an increasing awareness on the President’s part of Gorbachev’s 
thinking. At a National Security meeting in June 1986, Reagan remarked:  
 
“Gorbachev has an internal dilemma, heightened by Chernobyl – we 
need to reach an [arms control] agreement which does not make him 
look like he gave up everything. We cannot give away SDI, but we can 
make clear we do not seek a first-strike capability.” 
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Reagan was thinking of something like an agreement that if SDI research 
progresses until “we get to the point of needing to test, we would invite the 
Soviets to observe our tests.” Actual deployment by either side would 
depend on progress on the road toward the total elimination of strategic 
nuclear missiles. If SDI was deployed as part of a global move toward a 
nuclear weapon-free world, Reagan believed that “both sides would see SDI 
not as a threat, but as a defense against a madman” with an atomic 
missile.856 He hoped to use the SDI argument to drive movement forward on 
nuclear arms reductions.  
At the same NSC meeting, Shultz described the “overall state of the 
relationship” and noted that “the Soviets are at a fork in the road where they 
can either choose to wait out the President […] or go for an agreement that 
will allow them to reduce their military spending on the premise that Ronald 
Reagan is their best hope for selling an agreement to the American 
public.”857 Barely a week later, at another National Security meeting, Reagan 
stressed that he would not bargain away SDI. He added, “We do not want a 
first-strike capability, but the Soviets probably will not believe us.” The 
evolution of Ronald Reagan from hawk to peace-making diplomat entailed an 
effort to understand what Gorbachev thought of the issues at stake:  
 
“The Soviets have economic problems, and Gorbachev has his own 
internal problems with the hardliners. Further, Chernobyl has altered 
Gorbachev’s outlook on the dangers of nuclear war. The time is right 
for something dramatic. We should go for zero ballistic missiles, agree 
to go forward with research permitted by the ABM treaty, and invite 
the other side to witness testing when we come to that. There will be 
no deployment of SDI until we eliminate ballistic missiles, and SDI 
technology will be shared with the world.”858 
 
Reagan exhibited a growing awareness of how to narrow differences 
between the two parties by thinking the issues through from both sides of 
the negotiation equation. 
 Gorbachev arrived at Reykjavik with a clear aim in mind. As he told 
aides preparing for the summit, 																																																								
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“[O]ur goal is to prevent the next round of [the] arms race. […]  And if 
we do not compromise on some questions, even very important ones, 
we will lose the main point: we will be pulled into an arms race beyond 
our power, and we will lose this race, for we are presently at the limit 
of our capabilities […] I repeat, the leitmotif here is the liquidation of 
nuclear weapons, and the political approach prevails here, not the 
arithmetical one.”859  
 
In pursuit of this goal, Gorbachev offered a range of major concessions: 50% 
cuts in all nuclear arms (including intermediate ballistic missiles, where the 
USSR had a major advantage over the US), excluding British and French 
nuclear weapons from the reductions required by the INF treaty, and halving 
the time-period for non-withdrawal from the ABM treaty from his original 
offer of 15 to 7.5 years. He also gave up his demand to ban research on SDI, 
provided that testing was limited to laboratories.860  
Gorbachev’s moves were motivated by his desire to free up precious 
resources that the Soviet Union diverted to the arms race, in order to create 
breathing space for his domestic reforms. Since there had been no advance 
official exchanges regarding the agenda in Reykjavik, the presentation of 
Gorbachev’s blitz of offers sparked a high-stakes round of negotiations which 
ultimately collapsed over Reagan’s refusal to limit SDI research to the 
laboratory. Reagan tried hard to convince Gorbachev that SDI was not a ploy 
to hand the US a first-strike ability. In a July 1986 letter to Gorbachev, 
Reagan offered to “sign a treaty now which would require the party that 
decides to proceed to deploy an advanced strategic defense system to share 
the benefits of such a system.” But the Soviet leader’s red line remained: SDI 
testing had to remain in the laboratory. Gorbachev scoffed at the suggestion 
that the US would share its strategic defence technology, telling Reagan, “If 
you will not share oil-drilling or even milk-processing equipment, I do not 
believe that you will share SDI.” 861  There is some debate on whether 
Gorbachev could have relented on his red line: Garthoff writes that the 
Politburo’s instructions ruled such a move out, whereas Blanton and 
Savranskaya suggest that the final Politburo meeting before Reykjavik 																																																								
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indicated Gorbachev did have some leeway.862 Ambassador Dobrynin reports 
that he “came away from Geneva with the uncomfortable impression that 
Gorbachev had gotten himself unreasonably fixed on American military 
research on space weapons and converted it into a precondition for summit 
success.”863 Soviet arms control expert Georgi Arbatov told veteran American 
negotiator Paul Nitze before the Reykjavik summit’s collapse, “Accepting 
your offer would require an exceptional level of trust. We cannot accept your 
proposals.”864 It was Marshal Akhromeyev, representing the Soviet military 
establishment at Reykjavik, who could have permitted Gorbachev to 
compromise. Soviet diplomat Sergei Tarasenko recounts that Shevardnadze 
subsequently accused Akhromeyev of ruining the summit by failing to do just 
that.865 
 For his part, Reagan was equally uncompromising in his refusal to 
contemplate agreeing to Gorbachev’s offer. SDI was not something to be 
bargained away. On this point, Paul Nitze asserts that National Security 
Advisor Bud McFarlane, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and himself felt that a deal 
could be worked out under which SDI was curtailed in exchange for Soviet 
concessions: “We thought that if we could, it would be perfectly worthwhile 
to delay any deployment of SDI for ten years provided we got what we 
wanted in the reduction of, particularly, the land based big offensive 
missiles.” But it was “Reagan against most of the rest of the administration 
on this.”866 
On SDI, Reagan’s personal beliefs majorly influenced negotiations with 
Gorbachev. Shultz explains Reagan’s position thus: “Reagan was very serious 
about the importance of defending the American population against ballistic 
missiles […] He was convinced of the importance of learning how to defend 
yourself against ballistic missiles. And he wouldn’t compromise on that.”867 
Reagan’s aversion to the idea of nuclear warfare is well documented.868 He 
expressed this particularly viscerally in a press conference in March 1983: “To 																																																								
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look down an endless future with both of us sitting here with these horrible 
missiles aimed at each other, and the only thing preventing a holocaust is just 
so long as no one pulls this trigger – this is unthinkable.” There were two 
solutions, in Reagan’s mind:  
 
“There is one way, and the way we’re pursuing, which is to see if we 
can get mutual agreement to reduce these weapons and, hopefully, 
eliminate them, as we’re trying in INF. There is another way, and that 
is if we could, the same scientists who gave us this kind of destructive 
power, if they could turn their talent to the job of, perhaps, coming up 
with something that would render these weapons obsolete. And I 
don’t know how long it’s going to take, but we’re going to start.”869  
 
This was a policy that had not been proposed by any other US politician. 
Reagan’s idiosyncratic convictions had significant effects on negotiations with 
the Soviets, a source of influence on international affairs that macro-theories 
struggle to capture. 
What of the offer of sharing SDI technology with the Soviets? Reagan 
was fully committed to the idea of shifting the nuclear balance from offence 
to defence. As a a result, Matlock suggests the technology-sharing proposal 
was serious, and Gorbachev could have adapted his negotiation strategy 
around it by seeking guarantees, a co-operative ‘open labs’ research 
initiative, or possibly even some kind of joint SDI effort. “Reagan could have 
made far reaching commitments to gain Gorbachev’s acquiescence on SDI, 
and would have been as stubborn about defending those at home as he was 
about defending SDI to Gorbachev.” 870  The direction that the Reagan-
Gorbachev negotiation took was not premeditated by structural security 
variables alone, but contingent on Reagan’s deep, strongly felt desire to rid 
the world of the threat of nuclear attack.871 As Gates commented, “at that 
time there were probably only two people in the world who thought SDI 
could work: Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev.”872 This is deliberate 
hyperbole, but Gates’ point is that while Reagan believed in his vision of 
strategic defence, others in his administration were aware that considerable 																																																								
869 Cited in FitzGerald, 208 
870 Matlock (2004), 168 
871 See Cannon, 247-251 
872 Gates interview  
 219 
technical hurdles, not to mention the prohibitive cost, made SDI as Reagan 
envisioned it an unlikely proposition to begin with. But because SDI had 
become a Soviet fixation it came to be seen by many in the Administration as 
a bargaining chip. Rozanne Ridgway, who attended all five Reagan-
Gorbachev summits as a negotiator, elaborates: 
 
“I have always been convinced that President Reagan himself was a 
true believer in the importance of defense. There is a consistent 
straight line in the arms control field from SDI through Reykjavik. [...] 
But if you understand that the man really believed this, then you can 
understand what was happening there.” 
 
At the same time, SDI took on a life of its own inside the 
Administration. As Ridgway recounts, SDI “was used in a different way by 
different factions [in the Administration] to achieve different things,” and it 
became a tool in the battles on the US side between people who wanted […] 
to talk about a new era in which offense come down and defense went up, 
and those people who wanted to use SDI to stop all arms control talks with 
Moscow.”873 Indeed, in the National Security Council discussions leading up 
to Reykjavik, hardliners like Weinberger pushed hard to keep SDI untouched, 
as a means to block agreement.874 In the June 12 meeting, Weinberger 
insisted, “There should be no restraints on SDI research.”875 Reagan in all 
likelihood understood that some in his Administration viewed SDI as a tool to 
‘beat’ the Soviets. By contrast to the hardliners, Reagan was willing to 
compromise on SDI insofar as its operational future wasn’t affected – he 
agreed to delay deployment for seven years after Shultz told him, “As far as I 
can see we don’t have anything to deploy, so you’re giving them the sleeves 
from your vest” – but his underlying goal of building a defensive umbrella 
against nuclear weapons, be it for the US alone or the entire world if need 
be, was unshakeable.876  
And so there was no meeting of minds in Reykjavik on the matter of 
SDI. Matlock, an eyewitness to the proceedings, believes “Reagan was really 
trying to find a way to satisfy [Gorbachev.” The President was ready to 																																																								
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eliminate all nuclear ballistic missiles before SDI was deployable, which was 
meant as a major concession: “But it wasn’t viewed that way.” Gorbachev 
insisted on SDI research remaining in laboratories. This was a bottom line 
Reagan refused to accept, but “it was Gorbachev that kept threatening to 
end the meeting – it was not Reagan.”877 The great ‘What if’ of the Reagan-
Gorbachev negotiations is the scenario in which Gorbachev decided to take 
Reagan up on his offer to pursue SDI as a joint project, and in the process the 
two had arrived at an agreement to get rid of nuclear weapons by the year 
2000. In the US military and foreign policy establishment, many were aghast 
at the security implications of giving up on nuclear deterrence, and Reagan 
would have faced formidable opposition at home as well as from close allies 
like Margaret Thatcher. The original proposal going into Reykjavik was to 
eliminate ballistic missiles, something that the Joint Chiefs of Staff only 
approved because they viewed it as a wholly unrealistic negotiation 
outcome.878 Larsen writes, “the proposal to eliminate all nuclear or even 
ballistic missiles would never have survived military scrutiny, allied protests, 
or congressional concerns.”879 After the Reykjavik Summit, Admiral Bill Crowe 
told Reagan the military chiefs were alarmed at the idea of giving up ballistic 
missiles; Henry Kissinger prophesied that in a nuclear-free world, Western 
Europe would move into the Soviet orbit, National Security Advisor John 
Poindexter warned that it “would be a catastrophe to eliminate nuclear 
weapons”, and Weinberger regarded “Reykjavik as a blunder of the highest 
magnitude.”880 At the same time, Reagan and Gorbachev would likely have 
ridden a groundswell of public enthusiasm, particularly among the anti-
nuclear populations of Europe. Given the two leaders’ formidable charisma 
and powers of persuasion, it is not at all unfeasible to think that a new anti-
nuclear movement could have ended up transforming international politics 
with the support of the two most powerful leaders in the world, who would 
likely have mobilised enormous domestic support by showcasing their 
agreement on this critical issue of reducing risks associated with Cold War 
animosity, by ridding themselves of nuclear weapons. Shultz, for one, 
remembered the fear and tensions surrounding the INF deployment in 1983, 
and was not averse to the idea of a nuclear weapon-free world. Moreover, as 																																																								
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he told Pointdexter, “I have watched Ronald Reagan for two decades. When 
he gets an idea in his head, it stays there. Cuts in marginal rates of taxation. 
SDI. Elimination of all nuclear weapons. He won’t go away from those ideas. 
Don’t write him off.”881  
The inverse counterfactual, that of Reagan acquiescing to Gorbachev’s 
laboratory demand, would have committed Gorbachev to the far-reaching 
START proposals he made at Reykjavik, jump-starting arms reduction talks on 
the basis of what Nitze – an old Cold Warrior, one of the authors of NSC-68 
and a leading member of the anti-Soviet Committee on the Present Danger – 
called “the best Soviet proposal we have received in twenty-five years.”882 
The Reykjavik Summit demonstrates how interactions at the level of 
leadership can have far-reaching consequences for the nature of international 
affairs and outcomes in the international system. Even though it ended up 
yielding no immediate results, the experience was momentous. As 
Greenstein summarises, “where suspicion and animosity had been, goodwill 
and guarded trust came to be.”883  
A year after Reykjavik, at a Moscow meeting between Shultz and 
Gorbachev, the Secretary of State elucidated his views on how leadership 
interactions drove the improvement in US-Soviet relations: “more and more 
active contacts at the upper levels help move the work on the substance of 
important issues further,” speaking of “a certain interconnectedness” 
between “the process of our interaction and progress on the concrete 
issues.” Gorbachev responded,  
 
“I agree with you. I would say that an intellectual breakthrough took 
place in Reykjavik, and that it was very powerful, that it had a shocking 
effect, resembling a reaction at a stock exchange. […] Reykjavik 
opened a new, very important stage in the political dialogue between 
our countries, especially on the most important issues of security.”884 
 
Shultz regarded the summit’s spectacular turn of events as a 
vindication of the strategy of engagement he had set up. The long hoped-for 																																																								
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major Soviet concessions, concessions that Shultz predicted in 1983 would 
come about if Reagan embarked on serious negotiations, finally crystallised 
in Reykjavik: “I knew that the genie was out of the bottle: the concessions 
Gorbachev made at Reykjavik could never, in reality, be taken back. We had 
seen the Soviets’ bottom line. The concessions could, I felt confident, be 
brought back to the negotiating table.” Indeed, the concessions reached 
further than anything a US negotiation team had seen before:  
 
“At Reykjavik, we had reached virtual agreement on INF and had set 
out the parameters of START. […] Reagan and Gorbachev agreed that 
human rights would become a regular and recognized part of our 
agenda. They reached the basis for a first step of 50 percent 
reductions in Soviet and American strategic nuclear forces over a five-
year period – something others considered impossibly ambitious. They 
reached agreement on even more drastic reductions in intermediate-
range nuclear weapons, down from a Soviet total of more than 1,400 
warheads to only 100 Soviet INF missiles worldwide. That reduction 
would cut by more than 90 percent the Soviet SS-20 warheads then 
targeted on our allies and friends in Europe and Asia. This 
breakthrough would eventually lead to a zero-zero outcome: the total 
elimination of an entire category of nuclear weapons for the first time 
in history.”885  
 
While levels of trust were not yet sufficient in 1986 to permit game-changing 
arms reductions, Reykjavik paved the way for the pivotal INF Treaty. The 
relationship between Reagan and Gorbachev was profoundly affected by 
Reykjavik, in that the two leaders, despite the discordant ending to the 
summit, began to view each other with more diplomatic empathy, through a 
more human lens.  
Chernyaev reports that after Reykjavik, Gorbachev “never again spoke 
about Reagan in his inner circle as before […] that Reagan was a fool and a 
clown [and that] it was too bad such a person was at the head of a 
superpower. Never again did I hear statements such as ‘The US 
administration is political scum that is liable to do anything.’”886 Gorbachev 
																																																								
885  Shultz (1993), 776 
886  Chernyaev, 85 
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proclaimed he was “even more of an optimist after Reykjavik,” and that he 
understood how Reagan’s domestic situation meant he was not completely 
free in making his decisions. Gorbachev saw Reykjavik as signifying a new 
stage in the process of disarmament – from limitations to total abolition.887 In 
the first Politburo meeting after Reykjavik, Gorbachev announced, “We now 
understand the President’s problems, he is not free in his decisions. And we 
did not dramatize the fact that the SDI and ABM problems stood in the way 
of Reykjavik being a complete success. We thought: let the president 
consider what happened, let him consult with the Congress. Maybe another 
attempt will be necessary to breach the distance that separates us.”888 Prior 
to Reykjavik, when Gorbachev met with French President Mitterand in 
Moscow in July 1986, he tore into Reagan, who was “satisfying the demands 
of the military-industrial complex and the efforts to pull the Soviet Union into 
a new round of the arms race. [This policy] rests on the known forces that 
propelled Reagan to power, and which the American President serves so 
diligently.”889 Chernyaev recounts Mitterand’s response:  
 
“It would be a mistake to equate the goals of the US military-industrial 
complex with the policies of the administration and the intentions of 
Reagan. It seems to me, notwithstanding his political past, Reagan is 
one of those statesmen who is intuitively trying striving to find a way 
out of this dilemma […] Unlike many other American politicians, 
Reagan is not an automaton. He is a human being. [Emphasis 
added]”890 
 
The experience at Reykjavik brought Gorbachev round to this point of view. 
He told Ambassador Dobrynin that he now saw Reagan “as a person capable 
of taking great decisions.” Gorbachev described Reagan as  
 
“ essentially pragmatic and more flexible than his rhetoric would lead 
anyone to believe. That explains the turn in his policy to Soviet Union 
– because his general ideological outlook hasn’t changed. He realised 
a confrontational approach would stand in way of his plans which, in 																																																								
887  Blanton and Savranskaya (2006), NSA Electronic Briefing Book 203, Doc. 17  
888  Ibid, Doc. 25 
889  Blanton and Savranskaya (2015), NSA Electronic Briefing Book 504, Doc. 11 
890  Chernyaev, 76 
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the final analysis, were aimed at finding a proper place in American 
history by creating a safer world.”891 
 
After an interpersonal dynamic between the two had been established, 
Gorbachev and Reagan began to view negotiations through each other’s 
eyes.  
Years later, Shultz asked Gorbachev privately, “‘When you and I 
entered office, the Cold War was about as cold as it could get, and when we 
left, it was basically over. What do you think was the turning point?’” 
Gorbachev “did not hesitate” and replied: “‘Reykjavik, because the leaders 
talked about all the important issues over an extended period.’ The results 
could not have been achieved in any other way, and in the end they led to a 
deepening of the personal relationship.”892 
 
 
The new phase of arms control that began at Reykjavik led to the signing of 
the INF Treaty a year later 
After Reykjavik, the remaining two years of the Reagan-Gorbachev 
relationship were dominated by INF negotiations. Gorbachev managed to 
persuade the Politburo in February 1987 to ‘untie’ the INF package from the 
ABM treaty, ending the link that had previously formed the basis of the 
USSR’s anti-SDI stance.893 Progress on INF negotiations was slow as Shultz 
battled Weinberger and increasingly the Republican establishment over the 
idea of eliminating an entire class of nuclear weapons.894 Sensing the sluggish 
pace of negotiations, Shevardnadze and Gorbachev were frustrated at the 
seeming abandonment of the Reykjavik position, commenting during a 
Politburo session in April 1987, “the general tendency is hardening on all 
directions after Reykjavik – they want to keep 100 [missiles] and are against 
the global zero.”895 Shultz was indeed struggling to bring about consensus on 
the negotiation position of ‘zero INF missiles’. Both right-wingers at home 
and NATO allies abroad wanted a residual force of 100 missiles to maintain a 																																																								
891  Dobrynin, 609 
892  Shultz (2007), xxiv. Shultz, by contrast, believes the turning point came in 1983 after the 
Pershing II deployment demonstrated NATO’s resolve even in the face of severe 
pressure from the Soviets and domestic peace movements. 
893  Blanton and Savranskaya (2007), NSA Electronic Briefing Book 238 
894  See, in particular, Wilson 132-135 
895  Blanton and Savranskaya (2007), NSA Electronic Briefing Book 238, Doc. 7 
 225 
minimum amount of deterrence. But Reagan and his Secretary of State were 
of one mind: “Reagan was firm. I was firm as well. People were obstructing. 
But it was his strategy, and they were blaming me. When it wasn't actually 
me – it was him!”896 Reagan met with Kissinger in March 1987, writing in his 
diary afterward, “I’m afraid I can’t agree with one of his views. He doesn’t 
think we should go for the zero option we’re negotiating with Soviets on 
INF.”897 When Weinberger told the President he opposed a zero-zero deal 
on short-range missiles, Reagan wrote: “He and I disagree on this one.”898 
Margaret Thatcher was also unable to dissuade Reagan: “She says no & I had 
to differ with her.”899  
Thus, by June 1987, the ‘double zero’ goal became US policy, and in 
December 1987, Reagan and Gorbachev signed the INF Treaty amidst vocal 
opposition from Republican luminaries like Nixon and Kissinger, who 
criticised Reagan for removing nuclear missiles from Europe while the Soviet 
advantage in conventional military forces remained.900 Reagan understood 
the criticism, but disagreed with it. In a meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
a day before Gorbachev arrived in Washington to sign the INF Treaty, he 
insisted that the global scope of the treat would “make Asia as well as 
Europe more secure”, without “weakening the other elements of our 
defensive posture in Europe.” The key, to Reagan, was that “we will have the 
toughest verifications provisions of any treaty on the books.” As a result, he 
confidently proclaimed, “the INF Treaty adds to our security and that of our 
Allies. For the first time ever we will reduce nuclear weapons rather than just 
limit their buildup.”901 All long-range and short-range intermediate nuclear 
force missiles – a total of 2,692 nuclear weapons – were to be eliminated by 
1991.  
It was a watershed moment: the first time during the Cold War that a 
US-Soviet treaty had been signed which did not just limit, but actually 																																																								
896  Shultz interview 
897  Brinkley, 482-483 
898  Ibid, 492 
899  Ibid, 505. The disagreements surrounding the INF treaty illustrate Reagan’s true 
radicalism: for adherents of the doctrine of nuclear escalation dominance (the fabled 
‘escalation ladder’), scrapping all the Pershing II and Glickhams missiles left the USSR 
with conventional superiority. Hence doctrinaire nuclear strategists viewed the ‘double 
zero’ outcome as undesirable: Reagan explicitly sought and achieved it, defending this 
goal against all domestic opposition.  
900  See Mann (2009), Chapter 6 
901  Talking Points for the President (1987), RRPL 
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reduced the amount of nuclear weapons in the world. As Reagan told the 
Joint Chiefs, the schedule of verification inspections that had been agreed 
was intrusive and represented the breakthrough in trust-building that he and 
Gorbachev had achieved. American and Soviet inspectors were to be 
permanently based outside missile manufacturing sites in each other’s 
countries, with full inspection rights. By this point, Reagan’s primary point of 
reference for negotiations ceased to be his domestic audience. As Larson 
notes, “Reagan told the press that Gorbachev was a new kind of Soviet 
leader, the first who did not talk about world domination […] The President 
observed that he and Gorbachev had established ‘an entirely different 
relationship from what existed previously.’”902  
After Reykjavik, the trajectory of US-Soviet relations was conditioned 
by what Shultz calls a ‘leader-driven atmosphere’. In such circumstances, 
results are brought about by political interactions at the highest level, 
dynamics that cannot be captured at the structural level. Such critical 
junctures can open up in certain conditions: political choices are buffeted by 
the structural backdrop in the international system – hence Gorbachev’s 
desire to get rid of the arms race: to ease the Soviet economic burden. 
Ultimately, however, choices are defined by leaders’ perceptions, the nature 
of their interactions with their negotiating counterparts, and the way that 
leaders interact with their own staff in approaching such junctures. Frank 
Carlucci, who took over as Secretary of Defense after Weinberger’s 
resignation in 1987, remarks, “Well, Reagan came round about 180 degrees, 
from being a Cold Warrior, to being very intrigued with Gorbachev. […] I can 
remember saying to him at one point: ‘Mr President, you’ve got to recognise 
that Gorbachev is not trying to eliminate Communism – he’s trying to fix it.’ 
But he would stick by his positions […] he was always in favour of 
negotiating; he liked dealing with Gorbachev.”903 As a result of Shultz’s 
actions, Les Denend maintains, “the ‘correlation of forces,’ to borrow a term 
that Brezhnev coined, was shifting inside the Reagan Administration.”904 But 
while Shultz helped bring this shift about, its direction was determined by 
Reagan. Matlock feels Reagan was particularly suited to being an effective 
negotiator: “When it comes to negotiations and dealing with other leaders, 
the fact that [Reagan] had been a professional actor was actually pretty 																																																								
902  Larson, 220 
903 Carlucci interview  
904 Denend interview  
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important.” After all, “an actor’s training is to put yourself into somebody 
else’s shoes. […] It is an empathy – not sympathy necessarily, but empathy.” 
According to Matlock,  
 
“Reagan didn’t have a masterplan. He wanted to be strong enough, 
he wanted to negotiate. […] He had a single-mindedness that was very 
general, and without a concrete plan.  The single-mindedness being, 
he wanted to develop enough strength to negotiate and reduce the 
nuclear threat. And, if possible, encourage the Soviet Union to begin 
to open up, and join the rest of the world.”905 
 
Reagan and Gorbachev were central to the development of US-Soviet 
relations. Their temperaments and dispositions as leaders are key to 
understanding the end of the Cold War.  
 
 
Leadership interactions were crucial in moving the US-Soviet relationship 
from animosity to intensive co-operation 
I have tried to demonstrate in this chapter that Reagan and Gorbachev 
materially influenced the outcome of the end of the Cold War by setting in 
place a dynamic, interactive relationship that directly influenced the evolution 
of US-Soviet relations. Replacing either of the two leaders with a substitute 
would have altered the course and content of these negotiations. In the case 
of the US, it is hard to think of leader other than Ronald Reagan who had 
both the political vision and the personal perseverance to effectively throw 
caution into the wind and engage in a systematic effort to wind down the 
nuclear stand-off that had defined international affairs for almost five 
decades.  
The opposition Reagan faced on the home turf to this move was 
formidable, especially among politicians whose intellectual views precluded 
any notion that a reformist leader could come to power in the USSR. A more 
cautionary leader would have struggled to go as far, as fast as Reagan did. 
As Robert Gates remarks, “I have always believed that Reagan was the only 
member in his whole Administration, including most conservatives, who 
actually believed that the Soviet Union could be brought down on his 																																																								
905 Matlock interview 
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watch.”906 If leaders’ independent, genuinely held beliefs can influence the 
evolution of the international system, much more attention in IR needs to be 
paid to leadership interactions. Soviet retrenchment was not a fait accompli 
but brought about by leadership interactions in a context that was opening 
and, therefore, susceptible to being shaped by these interactions. Budding 
trust in Gorbachev and an increasing desire to redefine the US-Soviet 
relationship was, certainly in Reagan’s case, prompted by a sense of 
conviction in the authenticity of Gorbachev’s motives, as well as the 
President’s fervent opposition to nuclear weapons. In the final analysis, it was 
the victory of the idea of sustained negotiations in the Reagan 
Administration, coupled with the President’s idiosyncratic approach to 
negotiations, that prepared the ground for a peace-minded Soviet leader to 
sit down with Reagan and attempt to tackle the differences that separated 
the two superpowers. Reflecting on this point, Shultz notes:  
 
“One powerful but too often overlooked idea is that strength and 
diplomacy go together. They are not alternatives, as is often implied. 
Rather, when done right, they are complementary. President Reagan 
believed in the importance of being strong, not only in military terms 
but also in our economy and self-confidence. He nourished strength 
but he never forgot about diplomacy. He loved negotiations, and he 
and I would exchange stories drawn from our common experiences in 
the arena of labor relations.” 907 
 
The combination of strength with diplomacy was crucial, because the two 
strategies enhanced each other:  
 
“Many of President Reagan’s supporters were all for strength but they 
distrusted any effort to negotiate with leaders of the Soviet Union. By 
contrast, I found that Ronald Reagan was self-confident and ready to 
negotiate whenever appropriate.”908 
 
Reagan in turn could not have accomplished his pivot to diplomacy had it not 
been for George Shultz. Greenstein summarises this well:  																																																								
906  Gates interview  
907  Shultz (2007), xx 
908  Ibid 
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“Shultz provided two ingredients that were otherwise lacking: a 
persistent and practical drive toward improved relations through the 
accomplishment of tangible objectives […] and organisational skills to 
mobilize at least parts of the fractious US government to interact on a 
systematic basis with the Soviet government.”909 
 
International affairs are not just subject to structural pressures brought 
about by an anarchic international system and the balance of power. People 
matter, and ideas matter. A powerful example of how ideas have influence is 
Reagan’s persistent pursuit of SDI, which ended up shaping the course of US-
Soviet negotiations in important ways.910 People matter domestically, insofar 
as they populate the institutions of government: they exert influence through 
their ideas, interpersonal relationships, and their interactions with decision-
makers in crafting policy. And people matter internationally through their 
approach to diplomatic encounters with other governmental representatives. 
After Reykjavik, Shultz’s executive assistant Charles Hill felt that “suddenly 
the Soviets were human beings.” 911  Years later, the same Charles Hill 
explained why he felt that social science has lost its way: 
 
“Herodotus [showed] in Book Two of his History that the inexplicable 
absence of a predetermined nature was why human beings have to 
hold political meetings, as crocodiles do not. In the early years of this 
new century, however, consciousness has atrophied at an accelerating 
pace. Social science is the new scholasticism, an intellectual paradigm 
in which participants are published, prized, tenured and made 
prominent for their contribution to one great required idea: to prove 
‘scientifically’ that human beings have nothing resembling what 
formerly was called ‘free will.’”912 
 
The story of Reagan and Gorbachev’s transformation of the 
international system is not one of free will alone: economic and military 																																																								
909  Greenstein (1996), 217 
910  After Reagan left office, SDI research continued in modified form; ballistic missile defense 
still forms an important part of US defensive strategies.  
911  Cited in Wilson, 114  
912  Hill (2013) 
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pressures mattered a great deal. But the way that these pressures were 
handled was ultimately a function of how these two men in charge chose to 
respond. This is true whenever political leaders face decisions that are 
brought about by bigger, structural developments: their temperament and 
the people whom they surround themselves with influences what they end up 
choosing. In terms of complexity theory in IR, when we think about actors 
and structures, “their interaction is a dynamic process, leading to the 
constant evolution of both actors and structures.” 913  This highlights an 
important mechanism of change in the international system. Decision-makers 
have opinions on the consequences of various courses of action they 
confront, and these estimations influence their choices. Theories that strip 
away agency fail to realise that the behaviour of key actors in the 
international system is partly responsible for the atmosphere of their 
relations. This atmosphere, in turn, influences actors’ behaviour. 914  Such 
feedback loops permeate international affairs. Reagan and Gorbachev, after 
beginning an intense phase of interaction in 1985, continuously made more 
and more positive updates of their estimations of the consequences of a 
course of engagement, which strengthened their collaboration as time went 
on, in a virtuous cooperative cycle. This produced a new pattern of 
interaction among US-Soviet politics that ended up rewriting the nature of 
that relationship.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
EMERGENCE, INTERACTION, NON-LINEARITY: THE COLD WAR’S 
ENDGAME 
 
 
 
 
The greatest enigma associated with the end of the Cold War is its peaceful 
conclusion. 
Richard Ned Lebow 
 
 
Of such fine nuance is diplomacy made. 
James A. Baker III 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter examines how the Cold War’s endgame started after 
Mikhail Gorbachev unleashed a complex causal storm with his reforms: a 
sequence of swift, transformative changes that cascaded in a non-linear 
manner through the international system from 1985 onwards. The workings 
of the international system were re-defined by the combined interactions 
between Gorbachev and the Soviet state, between Gorbachev, Reagan and 
Bush as leaders of their respective nations, and between Reagan/Bush and 
their Administrations. A period of intense, complex interaction began with 
Gorbachev’s appointment in 1985 (though Reagan’s interactions with 
Gorbachev are best understood through the President’s political evolution in 
the years prior, as described in the preceding chapter). The key arena of 
change was what Rosenau terms the ‘intermestic’ dimension of politics: the 
international-domestic nexus as a dynamically intertwined entity.915  The three 
concepts of complexity theory this thesis highlights loom large in 																																																								
915  Rosenau (1996); see also Craig and Logevall, 10 
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understanding the endgame of the Cold War, and will be discussed in the 
following order: contingent emergence (the capricious derivation of new 
structures and properties inside a complex system), interaction effects 
between leaders, their key aides, and their respective states, and non-
linearity (the evolution of systems in sudden leaps and bounds).  
“Many policy prescriptions are flawed by the nonsystemic assumption 
that the new course of action will leave untouched the environment with 
which it interacts,” Jervis notes.916 This is a key insight of complexity theory as 
applied to International Relations: the constant, many-layered interactions 
and feedback processes between the international system and its units 
generate certain (though not all) causal effects. These cannot be fully made 
sense of by a linear, uni-directional correlation of cause and effect, which 
separates the units under analysis into static independent and dependent 
variables.917 Consider Giddens’ famous point about the ‘double hermeneutic’ 
between behaviour and observation: “The concepts of the social sciences are 
not produced about an independently constituted subject-matter, which 
continues regardless of what these concepts are. The ‘findings’ of the social 
sciences very often enter constitutively into the world they describe.”918 
Giddens spoke of the two-way relationship between the workings of society 
(the object of social science’s studies) on the one hand, and the outputs of 
social science on the other: the former (i.e., society) informs the latter (social 
science); as society changes on the basis of social scientific findings, this ends 
up creating new findings in social science. Research into particular social 
phenomena that reveal new facts can be and often are absorbed by society 
at large (say, findings in economics regarding market collusion produced 
anti-trust laws). Society, after all, is made up of sentient human beings that 
have the capacity to learn. Applying an analogous argument to International 
Relations suggests that when leaders with new ideas interact with the 
international system, they can not only change outcomes in the system but 
will also adapt their own behaviour in the process as well as that of others, 
creating multiple sources of interactive unit-system feedback. Understanding 
the elements in a complex system in isolation is not enough: the interaction 
between the elements and the system as a whole needs to be studied.  
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917  Jervis (1993), pp. 26; 41 
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Constructivists recognise that static analyses of cause and effect in 
international relations are incomplete, and postulate that co-constitution 
between system and unit defines the nature of international relations. This 
insight was inspired in part by the discipline’s failure to anticipate or credibly 
explain the sudden collapse of bipolarity in 1990. Suspicions that the shift in 
the balance of power was accompanied, if not preceded, by an equally 
foundational shift in the balance of ideas – such as the ‘New Thinking’ 
introduced by Mikhail Gorbachev, or the notion of full nuclear disarmament  
Reagan suggested at Reykjavik – constructivists launched efforts to 
understand the influence of ideational drivers on the end of the Cold War.  
Complexity theory looks at questions of causal co-constitution from a 
different angle. In complex systems,  
 
“inputs and outputs are not proportional; the whole is not 
quantitatively equal to its parts, or even qualitatively recognizable in 
its constituent components; and cause and effect are not evident. It is 
an environment where phenomena are unpredictable, but within 
bounds, self-organizing; where unpredictability frustrates conventional 
planning.”919  
 
Complexity theory applied as an ontological whole to the analysis of a social 
system goes “beyond holism and reductionism through its inclusion of all 
basic connections that can make up a theory.” The goal is to understand “a 
system in terms of a comprehensive set of functional relationships.”920 This is 
an enormous undertaking. In order to live up to complexity theory’s 
methodological ambition it is necessary to understand the entirety of the 
system – which, after all, is larger than the parts that make it up – as an entity 
itself. Such a ‘complex adaptive system’ “receives a stream of data about 
itself and its surroundings” and evolves in a never-ending process of 
endogenously generated adaptive steps.921  This type of analysis almost 
inevitably relies on advanced computer modelling in order to show, for 
instance, how even the smallest changes in the initial conditions of a complex 
system can result in world-changing deviations of the system’s evolution, 
																																																								
919  Alberts & Czerwinski, iii  
920  James (2014; 2002) 
921  Gell-Mann, 4 
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compared to its path in the absence of the change.922 Such work raises 
awareness of the root indeterminacy that prevails in nonlinear systems.  
 A more modest, though still insightful exercise in complexity analysis 
consists of highlighting the interconnections that abound in international 
politics and shape the trajectory of international affairs. As a methodological 
tool, counterfactuals can make us more sensitive to how alternative histories 
are interlinked in a huge branching tree of possibilities, where the actual 
progress of history relies on an interplay of fundamental physical laws, 
accidents/contingent events (going as far back as the initial conditions of the 
universe at the beginning of its expansion), and, potentially – depending on 
one’s view concerning whether our lives are determined by fundamental laws 
or not – the behaviour of individuals. The central point of complexity theory 
is that looking separately at the constituent parts of a system’s 
interconnections enables us neither to predict nor to understand the output 
of the interaction. As put by Jervis, “actions change the environment in which 
they operate,” and “interactions can be so intense and transformative that 
we can no longer fruitfully distinguish between actors and their 
environments, let alone say much about any element in isolation.”923  
 Whereas the analysis of systems has hitherto focused on macro-level 
events alone, a more fine-tuned focus on the interactions between actors – 
seen as inputs of the international system to be studied in conjunction, not in 
isolation – and systems creates novel understandings of how change in 
international politics comes about through indeterminate, counter-intuitive 
ways: top-down and leader-engineered, as well as bottom-up through vast 
social forces; by design through specific choices and policies, as well as 
arbitrarily through contingent effects and unintended consequences. Non-
linearity lies at the heart of complexity: the notion that certain factors and 
developments have little impact on their own, but when they reach a tipping 
point or operate in confluence with other drivers can exercise a gravitational-
like pull in a complex system. Feedback processes between action and 
reaction compose the channel through which complex systemic change is 
filtered. When complex factors interact in a non-linear manner, change need 
not be gradual, so that systems are characterised not by smooth progress 
through additive causal steps, but instead lurch ahead in leaps and bounds. 
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There may be no apparent deterioration of a system’s seeming stability for a 
long period before rapid transformative shifts upset it or even induce 
collapse, said shifts having been brought about by the build-up of interactive 
effects among the system’s units.924  
 
 
Emergence: the rolling, self-propelling origins of New Thinking  
When Gorbachev assumed power in March 1985, the Soviet Union 
was in the midst of a period of relative economic stagnation that took hold of 
the country in the mid-1970s. The GDP of the USSR was growing much more 
slowly than that of the US:  
 
Fig. 2: GDP growth, US vs. USSR, 1973-1989925 
 
 
A few months before he became General Secretary, Gorbachev gave a 
speech in Moscow at a conference on ideology. It revealed the then-Second 
Secretary’s instinctive sense that the Soviet system had to change: 
“Gorbachev spoke at length about the need for democratisation, glasnost, 
equality of all before the law, more self-government at different levels of the 
Soviet political system, and the necessity for more space to be opened up for 
the initiative of individual people and for ‘healthy interests’, work collectives 																																																								
924  Jervis (1997a), 35  
925  Data from Bolt and van Zanden (2014) 
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and local political organs.” 926  It was the first time Gorbachev publicly 
discussed the ideas that were to shape the first years of his rule: perestroika 
(restructuring), uskorenie (acceleration) and the ‘human factor.’ That said, his 
statements were phrased carefully, did not come paired with any kind of 
commitments or specific policy proposals, and were seen as conservative 
calls for marginal change, veiled in the wider vernacular of Soviet 
propaganda. There was general agreement among the Soviet leadership that 
the country’s worsening position warranted some kind of change in policy, 
but Zubok makes the important point that this did not equate to a consensus 
on what kind of policy shift was required: “no reality, however harsh, dictates 
one set of perceptions.”927   
Three basic strategic responses to the Soviet predicament existed.928 
The first, broadly pursued by Andropov and Chernenko, leaned on the 
country’s last major crisis experience during the Second World War. 
Following in the footsteps of Stalin, this entailed emergency measures in an 
effort to mobilise society and state for the task of maintaining strategic parity 
with the United States: Alexander Konovalov, who worked at the USSR’s 
Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies in the 1980s, recounts, “there was 
one famous slogan from the time of Andropov and Ustinov: ‘We shall not 
skimp on defense. We can tighten our belt in any area but defense.’”929 This 
explains Andropov’s and Chernenko’s rejection of Reagan’s early efforts at 
outreach: a hard-line approach of shoring up the domestic base and 
activating crisis mode required rallying around the country’s common 
enemies abroad.930 The second path open to Soviet leaders in the 1980s was 
‘détente redux’, that is, reaching some kind of amicable settlement with the 
US involving mutual arms reductions and withdrawal from conflicts in the 
Third World, all in an effort to move towards peaceful coexistence and in the 
process uphold strategic equivalence with the West. The third approach 
entailed unilateral, targeted reductions in military outlays in order to 
generate breathing room for the Soviet Union, during which gradual reform 
could be put in place while overall social control was maintained.  
																																																								
926  Brown (1996), 79 
927  Zubok (2002), 63 
928  Outlined in Zubok (2002) 
929  Ellman & Kontorovich, 66 
930  See Fischer, A Cold War Conundrum (1997) 
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Key to understanding events from 1985 onwards is that Gorbachev 
never pursued any of those three strategies in a consistent, systematic 
manner, other than being guided overall by a relatively nebulous 
commitment to reform.931 Instead, he zigzagged between these strategies, 
buffeted by the effects that his various transformative policy decisions 
prompted inside the Soviet behemoth. At the time Gorbachev assumed 
power the Soviet Union was not crisis-ridden. As Brown explains, “it would 
be fanciful in the extreme to see the changes which took place between 1985 
and 1988 as a result of massive pressure from below.“ 932 The system was 
struggling in important ways, but had not reached disaster mode. 
Deterioration in economic performance did not amount to collapse, and 
there were ways in which the system could have been kept going. Georgy 
Shakhnazarov, one of Gorbachev’s advisors, believes that there was nothing 
inevitable about the Soviet Union undertaking fundamental reform in the 
mid-80s; moreover a ‘Chinese path’ combining economic reform with 
authoritarianism could have preserved the Soviet Union in the immediate 
future.933 The crisis of survival that the country faced came about by 1990 as a 
delayed consequence of two of Gorbachev’s decisions: first, attempting 
economic reform; second, when early reform efforts stalled, doubling down 
through an attempt at root-and-branch systemic transformation. The former 
decision was born of an instinct of statesmanship, the latter was the product 
of emergence. Gorbachev observed how his policies impacted the Soviet 
and international system, and continually adapted his policies in an effort to 
shape the emergent system changes, thereby further creating further 
systemic ripples in the process.  
Gorbachev’s first policy initiatives of April 1985 were of a command 
nature and aimed at systemic preservation. According to Matlock, it is more 
accurate to refer to the ‘April plenum’ of 1985 as the ‘Andropov platform’, 
since it essentially built on ideas worked out at the behest of Brezhnev’s 
successor.934 Gorbachev continued Andropov’s programme of uskorenyie 
(acceleration), which focused on strengthening labour discipline, reducing 
corruption, and tightening management practices. Gorbachev’s first 
signature reform policy was an aggressive attempt to limit the production 																																																								
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and sale of alcohol in the Soviet Union, going much further than the half-
hearted anti-alcohol propaganda efforts of the past.935 The biggest effect of 
this was to deprive the Soviet government of some $30 billion in tax revenue 
from alcohol each year from 1985 to 1988 (when the campaign was quietly 
ended). At the same time, sugar consumption in the USSR increased by 14% 
as people started brewing moonshine, prompting a rise in organised 
crime.936 Unintended consequences blighted Gorbachev’s reforms from the 
get-go. 
Gorbachev’s more far-reaching ideas concerning perestroika 
(economic restructuring) and glasnost (political opening) emerged after initial 
reform efforts came to nothing. This prompted a conceptual shift among 
Gorbachev and his main allies, who began to introduce more sweeping 
changes to the Soviet Union’s political and economic make-up. Given the 
mammoth scale of the task of reforming the USSR’s socio-economic 
structures, the shift from corrective to transformative reform prompted the 
phenomenon of complex emergence to take hold: economic and political 
reform policies took on a life of their own as they moved through the system, 
meeting resistance from vested interests, which in turn prompted even more 
concerted efforts by Gorbachev to overturn entrenched patterns in the 
USSR’s modus operandi. Thus, while Gorbachev spearheaded the reform 
process, its direction was wayward, emerging out of a series of contingent 
policy choices and turning points: the new structures and properties that took 
hold in Soviet society – i.e. the ‘policy output’ – were not directly brought 
about by the ‘policy input’.  
Brown notes, “conceptual change is an important species of political 
innovation in any society and immeasurably more important in a system such 
as the Soviet one, in which all political actions were required to adhere to an 
officially sanctified ideology.”937 Gorbachev and the ideological brethren that 
he promoted to positions of power, such as Foreign Minister Eduard 
Shevardnadze, political advisor Anatoly Chernyaev, and Politburo member 
Alexander Yakovlev, introduced ideas into the political discourse of the USSR 
that ended up undercutting what Brown calls the ‘ideological and 
institutional pillars’ of the Soviet system. After new political concepts were 
presented and approved by official voices, they developed in unpredictable 																																																								
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ways. This was especially noticeable in the later stages of reform, once 
glasnost’s institutional reforms and ideological shifts had curtailed the 
authorities’ means of controlling public discourse.  
From the beginning of his tenure, Gorbachev’s plans came up against 
“the complexity of the institutional networks and the strength of the 
bureaucratic agencies whose support was necessary for the implementation 
of policy”, which was essentially a systemic layer through which these policy 
shifts passed and morphed. 938  Water that seeps through rocks passes 
through porous stone more readily than, say, granite. Similarly, Gorbachev’s 
path of reform encountered varying types of resistance, which conditioned 
the pace and scope of his proposals: opposition was weakest in foreign 
policy, followed by political reform – both areas where Gorbachev possessed 
significant institutional authority as General Secretary – and strongest in the 
area of economic reform, where the clash with vested interests was most 
direct.  
Changes to Soviet foreign policy were easiest to effect. Shevardnadze 
was a stalwart ally who shared the Gorbachev’s worldview and policy 
priorities. The General Secretary possessed wide constitutional latitude in 
setting the course of the USSR’s diplomatic strategy. Thus Gorbachev was 
free to pursue an intensive, activist foreign policy: during his six years in 
power he held a total of nine summit meetings with Presidents Reagan and 
Bush – amounting to almost half of all the twenty US-Soviet summits held 
during the entire Cold War. From early on in his tenure Gorbachev looked to 
the international arena as a potential lever to reduce the stress the Soviet 
system was subjected to through the arms race. This was also where he 
began to encounter the first signs of (in this case ineffectual) resistance on his 
own side to changing the status quo, when Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev, 
Commander of the General Staff, questioned Gorbachev’s plans in 1985 for a 
unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests and his pursuit of the Geneva summit 
with Reagan.939 Akhromeyev later opposed the INF Treaty and eventually 
resigned over reductions in conventional forces announced  by Gorbachev in 
December 1988. Others in the Defence Ministry reluctantly backed 
Gorbachev’s moves to shrink the size of the military, in the expectation that 
they were largely designed for propaganda rather than actual policy.940 																																																								
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Odom characterises these officials as trying to wait “out the reformers while 
pretending to be reformers. […] Wrongly, they believed that time was on 
their side.”941 In the area of political reform, too, Gorbachev was able to 
implement transformational change. Bureaucratic resistance to his initial 
proposals provided a feedback loop that influenced the scope and direction 
of political change: institutional inertia spurred Gorbachev toward more 
radical solutions, culminating in the policy of glasnost in 1988 that introduced 
free speech and eventually contested elections. These drastic steps were 
designed to overcome resistance from apparatchiks who had shown 
stubborn reluctance to sacrificing their authority and privileges at the altar of 
political change.942  
In the domain of economic reform Gorbachev encountered the most 
entrenched obstacles to his plans: “the ability of the ministries to control the 
reform process, even when directed by energetic and serious reformers like 
Gorbachev […] severely constrained the politicians.”943 Ministries and the 
Communist Party apparat were in charge of implementing the economic 
policy process and were not responsive to demands for change. In the 
absence of a market system, regional party leaders acted as core decision-
making nodes in the Soviet economic system. Economic decision-making was 
thus a major source of power for local party operatives, who resisted the idea 
of handing over this authority to market processes. As a result, “glasnost and 
democratisation, while regarded as desirable political goals in themselves by 
Gorbachev (whose understanding of what was meant by those notions 
broadened over time) were seen by him as a necessary means of putting 
pressure on the institutions opposed to essential economic change.”944 
Politburo transcripts show that until 1987, Gorbachev thought market 
elements played a secondary role in what was to remain a planned economy. 
The ‘Basic Positions’ adopted by the party leadership early in 1987, for 
instance, retained a centrally planned economy but tried to shift micro-
economic management from the hands of local party officials. Price reform – 
the move from fixed, centrally allocated prices to more market-based cost 
stimuli, which was to become a key sticking point in perestroika in 1987 – 
remained limited to encouraging enterprises to negotiate and contract prices 																																																								
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for certain raw materials.945 More aggressive steps such as the introduction of 
market structures, private property ownership and moves to end central 
planning were not significant parts of Gorbachev’s economic policy until the 
second half 1987.946  
In the next two years, Gorbachev’s thinking on economic reform 
shifted rapidly. By May of 1990, at the First Congress of People’s Deputies, 
Gorbachev maintained that no better or democratic alternative to the market 
had been found and that a socialist economy could not function without it.947 
This Congress was the first-ever political institution in Soviet Russia whose 
deputies were voted in through a nationwide election: it came about after 
Gorbachev realised that political form was indispensable if the Communist 
party nomenklatura’s resistance to economic reform was to be overcome.948 It 
was one of Gorbachev’s major accomplishments in political reform, designed 
to facilitate his overhaul of the country’s economy. In a 1993 interview, 
Gorbachev commented, “the party bureaucracy, the ministries and all the 
feudal lords were resisting [economic reform]. Even the industrial bosses and 
the managers were afraid of losing their power.’949 Such emergent feedback 
loops, rather than a clear-cut, pre-existing vision, informed the direction of 
Gorbachev’s policies. As English notes, “Gorbachev’s intellectual search of 
1985–86, in tandem with his search for political allies, increasingly led him to 
those who were not only the boldest domestic reformers, but the boldest 
foreign-policy reformers as well.” 950  To break out of the old guard’s 
stranglehold, Gorbachev deepened his ideological interactions with the 
domestic liberal intelligentsia.  
The shift toward deepening reform was strengthened by an entirely 
contingent event that left a lasting impression on the Soviet Union’s political 
establishment: the Chernobyl disaster of April 1986. Chernyaev described it 
as “a tremendous shock […] that raised our view of security to an entirely 
new plane of understanding,” pushing Gorbachev to take “a great, 
instinctive leap to break the old cycle” and spurring him to agree to on-site 
verifications in subsequent arms control agreements.951 The fallout from the 																																																								
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accident was a visceral reminder of the dangers posed by nuclear weapons. 
Even Marshal Akhromeyev agreed the accident touched “minds and souls 
[…] the nuclear danger was no longer abstract, but something palpable and 
concrete.” 952  Soviet Defence Minister Sokholov later remarked, “until 
Chernobyl I was convinced we could fight a nuclear war and prevail.”953 
Chernobyl galvanised top Soviet reformers and strengthened Gorbachev’s 
hand, pushing some of the still sceptical military leaders toward embracing 
greater arms control.954 Initial attempts by the bureaucracy to cover up the 
extent of the disaster incensed Gorbachev and Shevardnadze, impressing 
upon them the urgency of introducing greater transparency and 
accountability in the Soviet system: “the Chernobyl catastrophe apparently 
had great impact not only because the damage was a vivid reminder of what 
a nuclear war would do, but also because it proved extremely difficult for the 
Soviet leaders to learn what had happened from their own bureaucracies: the 
West often provided faster and better information.”955 In a crass illustration of 
this point, Shevardnadze’s aide Tarasenko describes listening to the BBC 
news service every morning after arriving in his office.956 Chernobyl drove 
home the lessons of openness that Gorbachev had preached and made 
restructuring an easier task.957 
The sudden acceleration of policy processes through ‘black swan’ 
events like the Chernobyl catastrophe are a feature of complexity.958 Deputy 
CIA head Robert Gates recalls how Gorbachev responded to Chernobyl: 
“After behaving in the traditional secretive Soviet manner following the 
Chernobyl disaster, Gorbachev responded in a way that would become 
typical – he became bolder and upped the ante, especially by expanding 
glasnost. […] Exposing problems in the system, whether corruption or 
incompetence or simply backwardness, offered the opportunity to build 
support for his reform efforts. [Emphasis added]”959 In this manner, some of 																																																								
952  Cited in English (2003), 261 
953  Busch (2001), 186  
954  See Wohlforth (1996), 33-37 
955  Jervis (1996), 238 
956  Wohlforth, (1996), 60 
957  Lebow and Stein (2004), 202 
958  There is a good argument to be made that a nuclear accident of sorts was waiting to 
happen in the Soviet Union, given the state of disrepair and insufficient security 
safeguards prevalent in many facilities. Chernobyl was more of a grey than a black swan. 
See Omoto, 131; 159-160 
959  Gates (2007 [1996]), 383 
 243 
Gorbachev’s policy goals were not fixed, but the product of his evolving 
opinions and political behaviour, an evolution that was buffeted by events. A 
month after the disaster, for instance, Gorbachev addressed the Foreign 
Ministry, bemoaning the sluggish pace of change in Soviet foreign policy, 
emphasising “the lack of progress on a withdrawal from Afghanistan as well 
as ideological opposition to the settlement of other Third World conflicts, 
‘panicked’ reporting on the progress of SDI and other threat inflation that 
supported unnecessary military expenditures, and a paternal attitude toward 
Eastern Europe as if the USSR were ‘running a kindergarten for little 
children.”960 Chernobyl injected Gorbachev’s ‘new thinking’ with a palpable 
sense of intensity and provided an acute backdrop to on-going preparations 
for the Reykjavik summit. When challenged by the Politburo on his planned 
negotiating position at the summit – that of pushing for a complete 
elimination of nuclear weapons – Chernyaev reports that Gorbachev fended 
off arguments against the proposal with a rhetorical question: “What are you 
doing, still preparing to fight a nuclear war? Well I’m not, and this is what 
determines everything else. If we’re still trying to conquer the entire world, 
then let’s discuss how to defeat the Americans in the arms race. But then we 
can forget all we’ve said about our new policies.” 961  Chernobyl – an 
unpredictable contingency that arose spontaneously –gave a boost to 
Gorbachev’s reform dynamic in 1986.  
After Reykjavik, Gorbachev, much like Reagan, faced opposition from 
hardliners to his arms control agenda, which the Soviet leader fended off, 
doubling down instead on his own course. 962  The Reagan-Gorbachev 
interaction at Reykjavik, despite seemingly yielding no results, strengthened 
their determination to pursue arms control. In a speech a month after 
Reykjavik Gorbachev shifted the ideological basis of Soviet foreign policy, 
stating, “universal human values take precedence over the interests of any 
particular class.” Against scepticism in the Politburo he decided to 
rehabilitate dissident scientist Andrei Sakharov in December 1986. Sakharov 
proceeded to argue publicly in favour of human rights and arms control. 
Early in 1987 Shevardnadze informed Shultz that the Soviet would withdraw 
from Afghanistan with or without US assistance in achieving a political 
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settlement there.963 Reykjavik had produced spill-over effects: Soviet foreign 
policy was on the move. Shevardnadze told foreign ministry officials, “the 
goal of diplomacy is to create a favorable environment for domestic 
development.”964  
Around the same time Gorbachev grew increasingly aware of the 
difficulties his proposed reforms encountered inside the Soviet system. In 
January 1987 he confided in his closest advisors, “We didn’t think it would be 
so hard. It’s turned out to be so terribly difficult in the economy, in the social 
sphere, in the Party itself. Especially among the higher echelons. And what 
we have now isn’t nearly as bad as what it’ll be later. […] We are plagued by 
conservatism, complacency, inertia, an unwillingness to live in new ways. We 
got down to dealing with society, but we have not stirred it up yet.”965 In 
October 1987, Gorbachev complained to the Politburo, “our ideas, even 
some of our guidelines, run into a wall of resistance that blocks their 
implementation,” and a month later he described how “perestroika is going 
slowly. […] It’s this way because some members see perestroika as an effort 
to dismantle the old order, the methods to which they’ve long grown 
accustomed.”966 Gorbachev’s economic aide, Gennady Zoteyev provides a 
good example of inertia; he describes a 1988 meting with Nikolai Baibakov, 
the director of the USSR’s central planning agency Gosplan, one of the key 
institutional pillars of the Soviet command economy:  
 
“Baibakov invited me for a discussion. For almost two hours, I tried to 
explain to Baibakov the past, the present, and the future of the Soviet 
economy. He listened rather lethargically, probably because he simply 
failed to comprehend many of the things I was saying. At the end of 
the conversation he snapped out of his slumber and asked a rhetorical 
question: ‘How can all this be happening? We worked so hard and 
accomplished so much. We have such a powerful industry, the energy 
sector, and here you are coming up with such gloomy assessment [sic] 
and forecasts.’”967  
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In order to overcome such inertia, Gorbachev “intended to subordinate 
foreign policy to the imperatives of correcting the domestic economy to a far 
greater degree than his predecessors.”968 
Gorbachev realised that his approach to economic reform was fruitless 
in the face of a lacklustre Soviet establishment. This prompted him to switch 
gears as time went on. The Twelfth Five Year Plan of 1986 trod cautiously in 
the area of industrial economics, emphasising cost cutting and quality 
improvements, and shied away from raising prices. This was partly because 
Gorbachev did not have a well-thought out alternative model in mind, nor 
specific ideas for moving towards an alternative. Hence he spoke largely in 
generalities and his reform suggestions remained within the existing 
system.969 When this approach failed to produce results, Gorbachev moved 
from a path of nudging the reform process along towards changing the 
system where he could, and letting the results unfold on their own terms – an 
embrace of emergence. This is what Robert Gates means when he asserts, 
“as people write their memoirs and we reflect on the latter half of the 1980s 
there is a tendency to run those years together and to suppose that where 
Gorbachev ended up in 1988-1989 was where he intended to go in 1986. In 
fact, he was making up strategy as he went along – as he put it, ‘on the 
march.’”970 At one point, Chernyaev wrote in his diary, “Inside me depression 
and alarm are growing, the sense of crisis of the Gorbachevian idea. He is 
prepared to go far. But what does it mean? His favourite catchword is 
‘unpredictability.’ But most likely we will come to a collapse of the state and 
something like chaos.”971 The scope of the changes Gorbachev wished to 
undertake was immense and growing as time went on. In a complex system, 
maintaining control over the direction of such processes is more challenging. 
With the passage of time, Gorbachev grew to realise this; but far from shying 
away from the task, he embraced the unpredictability of the process. 
Chernyaev describes two of Gorbachev’s favoured phrases: ‘let processes 
develop’ and ‘processes are in motion’ (protsessi poshli). Ligachev notes in 
his memoirs how Gorbachev often temporised before taking a position on 
important questions. 972  In Lévesque’s words, “Gorbachev allowed the 																																																								
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reformist current to develop on its own and then adopted compromise 
measures which did not always go in the same direction.”973  
Gorbachev encouraged discussions and conversations concerning the 
ideas and propositions he was making, but these debates invariably drew to 
a close once they reached the stage of practical administrative steps that 
needed to be undertaken. Chernyaev sums the approach up as “best to just 
wait and watch while ‘processes’ ran their course.”974 This approach was also 
increasingly evident in foreign policy: as early as 1987, at a meeting between 
Gorbachev and FRG President Richard Weizsäcker, there is evidence of the 
Soviet leader’s preference for letting unfolding realities on the ground 
influence the trajectory of history. Gorbachev informed Weizsäcker, “the 
Soviet Union respects postwar realities and the German people of both the 
FRG and GDR. We are planning our future relations based on these realities. 
History will show who is right.”975 Furman believes that this method was 
inherent to the project Gorbachev was undertaking: “the work that 
Gorbachev did could only have been done without accurately perceiving all 
its complexity and danger. If he had started to compute everything, to think 
through various alternatives in his head, he simply could never have 
undertaken it.”976 This idea of runaway reform, of a policy project assuming 
proportions that went beyond the control of the individuals who unleashed 
the process, was later described evocatively by Chernyaev: Soviet society in 
1985 was as a “totalitarian boulder, a lumpenised population with a give-me 
psychology.” When Gorbachev “yanked this boulder of its moorings and 
gave it a push”, it proceeded to gain momentum to the point where brakes 
could no longer be applied, and the social processes unleashed by 
Gorbachev’s reforms ended up crushing the very system he was seeking to 
heal.977   
Gates describes this phenomenon of complexity thus: 
 
“Through economic reform, Gorbachev began to undermine the 
central administrative structure that met at least the most minimal 
basic material needs, without putting an alternative structure in place. 																																																								
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Through democratization, he revealed the inner workings of the party 
and over the months proved – including to himself – that the party 
could not help solve the USSR’s problems.” 
 
Gorbachev started a process that he hoped would save the Soviet Union, 
when in fact it achieved the inverse: 
 
“Mikhail Gorbachev in 1986-87 started a number of political, 
economic, social and ethnic fires that he believed would liberate the 
USSR from its past and freshen the ground for new growth. What was 
not apparent to him or nearly anyone else back then was that the fires 
would spread beyond his control, creating ultimately a conflagration 
that would consume him and the system he tried to save.”978 
 
This is a vivid description of the concept of escalating emergent trends in a 
complex system. 
Gorbachev was relaxed about the idea of letting processes run their 
course, since he retained faith in the underlying motivations behind the 
reforms he took. He was not necessarily naïve in this regard, since it can be 
fruitful to open up channels of political communication in a society that faces 
structural challenges: discourse, “as both a set of ideas about the soundness 
and appropriateness of policy programmes and the interactive process of 
policy formulation and communication, […] can create an interactive 
consensus for change [which] can exert a causal influence on policy change, 
serving to overcome entrenched interests and institutional obstacles by 
altering perceptions of interest.”979 In the Soviet Union’s case, unfortunately 
for Gorbachev, apathy by the citizenry towards what was viewed as a flawed, 
corrupt but ultimately unchangeable political system gave way to a culture of 
opposition, first at the highest level of leadership, later, with the spread of 
glasnost and the opening of the media landscape, across society as a whole. 
Instead of forging a new political consensus through a healthy process of 
political discourse, the formerly dictatorial society started to fracture. Vladimir 
Mozhin of the Central Committee’s economic department reports that 
“Gorbachev’s appeal for use of political rather than coercive methods [in 
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economics] fell on deaf ears.”980 The Byzantine apparatus of the Communist 
Party could not and did not want to change and instead became a cauldron 
brewing opposition to economic reform. By the time of the 28th Party 
Congress in July 1990, Gorbachev was openly accused of deviating from the 
Marxist-Leninist line, though his opponents were unable to vote down 
Gorbachev’s proposals to ‘heal socialism by capitalism’.  
Gorbachev’s increasing emphasis on political openness over time, as a 
means to prompt the Soviet leviathan to change, did not have its desired 
effect. Liberalisation reduced the possibilities of relying on methods of social 
control, instead beginning to free the Soviet population from fear. Once 
command-style economics lost its political backing labour discipline began to 
slide, worsening the economic situation.981 Gorbachev’s attempts at gradually 
replacing top-down control of the economy with market impulses simply 
prompted the bureaucracy to turn against him. A September 1988 Politburo 
resolution reorganised the party apparatus and ended the principle of 
sectoral control of the economy by the Communist Party, instead charging 
the Central Committee with overall ‘political supervision’ of the Soviet 
economy. Individual Politburo members opposed this reform, but were 
unable to mount effective organised resistance – a flaw of the collective 
leadership process that enabled Gorbachev to plough ahead with his agenda 
and continue his efforts to divorce the Communist party from the 
economy. 982  In effect, Gorbachev was battling the structural legacy of 
Brezhnev’s policy of ‘trust in cadres’, through which Soviet officials who had 
demonstrated fealty to the system were in many cases allowed, quite literally, 
to die in office.983  Brown speaks of a ‘gang’ that Brezhnev surrounded 
himself, Politburo appointees of the 1973 vintage including his eventual 
successor Andropov, and Brezhnev’s Defence Minister, Dmitry Ustinov.984 The 
in-built tendency toward conservatism by this system of patronage slowed 
down Gorbachev’s reform plans. As late as March 1989 the Politburo 
outmanoeuvred him on the issue of agriculture by formally confirming that 
collective farms remained the cornerstone of Soviet agriculture. This put an 
end to a two-year long effort by Gorbachev to move to a lease-holding 																																																								
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system of farming, which that had enabled Chinese peasant income to 
double between 1978 and 1982.985  
Efforts at economic reform were thus erratic and failed to follow any 
kind of grand plan. A comparison to the economic reforms in China illustrates 
how complicated Gorbachev’s task was. China’s laundry list of reform was of 
a considerably lower order of complexity, owing to the country’s lesser state 
of economic development in the 1970s: China’s economy was 80% 
agricultural and 20% industrial in 1979; the picture in the USSR was the 
inverse.986 Because prices were fixed and the state monopoly on production 
was maintained, Gorbachev’s endeavour to improve industrial efficiency and 
productivity resulted in Soviet factories switching their output away from low-
margin everyday consumer items like soap, washing powder, matches, and 
sugar, which eventually produced shortages that damaged Gorbachev’s 
perestroika in the eyes of citizens. 987 In 1987 attempts were made to imitate 
the Chinese model of reform. Broadly speaking this meant the creation of a 
two-sector economy with a ‘free’ sector of cooperatives, leased enterprises 
and joint ventures, which was to co-exist with a state sector characterised by 
mandatory orders, fixed prices and the centralised allocation of inputs. 
According to Evgeniy Yasin, an economist who worked on reform projects for 
the Soviet Council of Ministers at the time, this was the last chance to nudge 
the Soviet Union toward a path of sustainable growth. It floundered because 
this “gradual transition to a market economy” required, as in China, the 
“secret police and censorship to perpetuate an old ideological cocoon within 
which a new economy system could develop like a butterfly.” 988  An 
opportunity seemed to exist for gradualist economic reforms whilst 
maintaining political control; after the latter was relaxed, the former stopped 
being a realistic goal.989 Once Gorbachev decided in 1989 to break the 
Communist Party’s monopoly on political power, Yasin describes how the 
nature of economic developments shifted to a state of emergence: 
“Afterwards, events unfolded spontaneously, no longer under the control of 
the government or the Party.”990  
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This was to become a theme of the Gorbachev era: his ‘wait and see’ 
approach to unfolding complexity meant that crisis situations were not seized 
proactively. The consequence for policymaking in such scenarios is that as 
time passes, the range of choice available to decision-makers narrows, and 
certain paths are effectively foreclosed.991 Emergence in complex systems 
can deprive leaders of room for manoeuvre, and end up creating new 
political realities that run against the intentions or wishes of policymakers.992 
The domestic choices made by Gorbachev between 1985 and 86 
deepened the economic and financial turmoil faced by the Soviet state. 
Gorbachev responded to the deteriorating situation by weakening the power 
of the nomenklatura and the central party, hoping that dismantling existing 
sources of authority in the USSR’s politico-economic system would speed up 
the success of his economic reforms. Similarly, he used the hierarchical nature 
of the Soviet political system to circumscribe the influence of the military on 
foreign policy.993 By 1988, Gorbachev decided to launch truly radical reforms 
in both foreign and domestic policy, which unleashed centrifugal forces that 
caused the Soviet system to start spinning out of control. The increasing 
turbulences the country faced diminished its negotiation position vis-à-vis the 
US and trapped Gorbachev in his reform efforts: looking for vindication 
abroad, he encouraged Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe to follow in his 
steps, which brought about a sweeping revolutionary transition from 
autocracy to democracy in the Warsaw Pact states. At that stage, the best 
chance to prevent the Soviet Union’s downward spiral was through a decisive 
reversion to the old model of complete control over society. Gorbachev’s 
half-hearted efforts to that end late in 1990 alienated key allies and 
undermined his authority, hastening the breakdown of the Communist Party’s 
authority, which was sealed during the failed anti-Gorbachev coup in June of 
1991. 
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  The emergent effects of his collision with the deep-rooted Stalinist 
bureaucracy pushed Gorbachev to the fateful conclusion in late 1987 that 
economic reform would not be successful in the absence of wholesale 
political reform.994 Uskorenie (acceleration) had not produced results in 1985 
and 1986, and Gorbachev believed structural reform à la perestroika would 
flounder without democratisation as a means to break down intra-systemic 
obstacles to change. Says Kramer, “by mid-88 Gorbachev came to believe 
that economic revitalisation for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe was 
impossible without thoroughgoing political reform.”995 At this stage, the 
trajectory of domestic reform was fundamentally re-shaped by the first major 
success of Gorbachev’s tenure: the INF Treaty, whose genesis was discussed 
in the preceding chapter. With it, Gorbachev achieved what Snyder calls a 
‘watershed for Soviet security’, departing radically from numerous decades-
old arms control shibboleths in a number of ways: the treaty eliminated an 
entire class of missiles, breached the principle of ‘parity’ 996  in missile 
reductions that had been key to all preceding arms control treaties, violated 
the principle of ‘equal security’ (since French and British nuclear missiles were 
excluded from the reductions), and, crucially, was based on the Zero Option 
first outlined by Reagan in 1981 and resolutely opposed by all Soviet leaders 
since then.997 
The INF Treaty, as with all binding, formal diplomatic arrangements, 
was the product of intense, prolonged negotiations, spear-headed by the 
foreign policy vision of the leaders in charge rather than by some kind of 
structural lodestar alone (such as a country’s security position in the 
international system). The interactions that go into crafting international 
treaties can change the perception of the actors involved: through his 
repeated and ever-improving relatiions with Reagan, Gorbachev grew more 
comfortable scaling back the country’s burdensome military expenses. By 
1989, Gorbachev believed the “improved international climate allowed him 
to focus on constructive endeavours at home, obtain Western technologies, 
and that NATO would not undercut Soviet Union.”998 Gorbachev didn’t sue 
for peace: he pursued it with Reagan after an inter-personal dynamic 																																																								
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developed that made peace feasible. This shift in perception paved the way 
for the restructuring of Soviet policy towards Eastern Europe. How interaction 
effects between Gorbachev and the Reagan and Bush Administrations 
guided this process will be looked at next. 
 
 
Interaction effects: the adaptive to-and-fro of leader relations 
After coming to power Gorbachev initially remained beholden to 
Andropov’s view that compromise could not be reached with the Reagan 
Administration.999 The Twelfth Five Year Plan of 1986 called for an increase in 
military spending.1000 Gorbachev publicly reaffirmed the Brezhnev Doctrine’s 
core mantra that ‘socialist gains are irreversible’, warning that external forces 
wishing to move a country out of the socialist orbit would endanger 
European order and peace.1001 This early approach mellowed as Gorbachev 
realised through his burgeoning relationship with Reagan that the President 
was interested in improving the climate of superpower relations. Zubok 
describes Soviet foreign policy in 1985-86 as the ‘search for détente for the 
sake of perestroika’, Gorbachev’s principal focus being the prevention of a 
new round of the arms race.1002  
As noted, it was in the domain of foreign policy that Gorbachev 
sensed the greatest latitude for change, even if little by way of substance 
came about immediately in terms of an improved US-Soviet relationship. His 
experiences with Reagan in Geneva and Reykjavik suggested to Gorbachev 
that the potential for a new dynamic in East-West relations was real and 
could potentially liberate the Soviet Union from the burden of never-ending 
military competition. At the same time, he was aware of the growing 
opposition to disarmament proposals among his own generals, who were 
‘hissing among themselves,’ as he told a Politburo meeting in December 
1986, after Reykjavik.1003 General Makhmut Gareyev, Akhromeyev’s deputy, 
later reported his view that “if the arms race had been conducted in a more 
sensible manner, we could have sustained it and still maintained strategic 
parity, we could have matched the Western powers and ensured global 																																																								
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stability. We also had every opportunity to preserve the Soviet Union.”1004 By 
contrast, Gorbachev became increasingly convinced that ending the arms 
race was central to his efforts of reforming the Soviet system.  
Person-to-person interactions in the sphere of foreign policy were 
crucial in shaping the positions of key US leaders toward Gorbachev. The 
CIA, in its assessments of Gorbachev’s reforms, was sceptical of his desire to 
achieve systemic change and instead assumed he was pursuing conciliatory 
policies in the hope of generating breathing space so that the Soviet system 
could be revitalised rather than fundamentally changed. In a letter to Shultz 
early in 1986, Gates explained he was aware of the Secretary’s misgivings 
that “we at CIA are too rigidly fixed on the notion of no change in the Soviet 
approach to the US or their domestic problems and, therefore, that we are 
missing the importance of current developments and also misreading the 
shape of things to come in the Soviet Union,” but went on to state his belief 
that Gorbachev “is trying to re-create the détente atmosphere of the early 
1970s on the same premises […] so far he has been very orthodox on the 
basics at home and abroad.”1005 As the preceding chapter showed, however, 
the interactions between Reagan, Shultz and Gorbachev strengthened 
Reagan’s view that the Soviet leader was earnest in his attempts to move 
their relationship from confrontation to co-operation.  
The shifting web of influence in the Reagan Administration contributed 
to this perception taking hold in US foreign policy. Caspar Weinberger, for 
instance, was reluctant to pursue Eduard Shevardnadze’s suggestion of 
setting up a meeting between the two countries’ Defence Ministers. 
Weinberger resigned in 1987 the wake of the Iran-Contra scandal and was 
replaced by Frank Carlucci, who describes his predecessor as “intuitively a 
harder liner than me; I was more pragmatic.”1006 Carlucci travelled to Moscow 
in 1988 to meet directly with Soviet Defence Minister Dimitri Yazov in the first 
encounter of its kind under the Reagan presidency. Carlucci deferred all arms 
control discussions to George Shultz and instead focused on military doctrine 
and military-to-military contacts. He gave a speech to senior military officials 
at the Voroshilov Military Academy, was allowed to observe Soviet military 
exercises, and even inspected a cutting-edge Blackjack bomber, a key pillar 
in the USSR’s forward-based strategic bombing systems and thus its nuclear 																																																								
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1005 Gates (2007 [1996]), 374 
1006 Carlucci interview, 
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force doctrine. The Carlucci-Yazov meeting prompted the following report by 
Gorbachev to the Politburo: “It was a very substantive and candid discussion, 
sometimes even surprisingly candid. This is the sign of the times. There are 
human beings, not beasts. The human factor is at play here; as well as in the 
relations between the Presidents.” Carlucci agrees that his trip and 
subsequent visits by Yazov cemented the budding trust between the two 
countries’ leaders. 1007  
 As the dynamic of reform unfolded in the USSR, the interactions 
between Gorbachev and his Western counterparts were crucial in shaping 
the direction that the Cold War now took. At the 27th Party Congress in 1986, 
Gorbachev did not yet set out a coherent new foreign policy, but made clear 
that “so far as relations with the United States were concerned, the only 
security worthy of the name is mutual security.”1008 George Shultz and Jack 
Matlock were among the few top Reagan officials to take Gorbachev’s word 
that his attempts at reform went beyond cosmetic changes and endeavoured 
to change the Soviet Union on a more fundamental level. As Robert Gates 
readily agrees, it was Shultz who “discerned in Gorbachev’s rhetoric and 
proposals much more potential for a fundamental change in Soviet direction 
than [CIA] did.”1009 He further recalls, “Secretary Shultz, more than anyone 
else in the administration, felt that Gorbachev meant what he said […] while 
[Shultz] always supported keeping the military pressure on, he also used 
diplomacy to help the Soviets find the exits he believed they had to go 
through.”1010 Matlock reports that Reagan was impressed by Gorbachev’s 
evident willingness to eliminate intermediate nuclear forces and took note of 
the liberalising steps that were taken in the USSR, such as efforts to open up 
the Soviet media.1011  
In May 1988, Gorbachev announced to the Central Committee that he 
intended to hold the 19th CPSU conference later that summer. Furthermore, 
Gorbachev planned to hold contested elections in 1989 for a new Congress 
of People’s Deputies. Matlock briefed Reagan on what he described as a 
‘game-changing’ development. A few days later, on his first visit to the Soviet 
Union, Reagan revoked his infamous depiction of the USSR as an evil empire 																																																								
1007 Carlucci interview; see also Blanton and Savranskaya (2008), NSA Electronic Briefing 
Book 251, Doc. 5 
1008 Brown (1997), 221  
1009 Gates (2007 [1996]), 378 
1010 Gates (2007 [1996]), 387 
1011 Matlock, (2010) 
 255 
with the words, ‘that was another time, another era.’ Reagan went on to 
credit Gorbachev for the changes that had taken place in the Soviet Union. 
Gorbachev felt justifiable vindication for his foreign policy strategy, reporting 
to the Politburo afterwards, “The President, despite all his prejudices, was 
capable of looking at things realistically and corrected his former odious 
views […] Thus, the human factor that we hold in such great esteem in our 
foreign policy played its indispensable role.’”1012 Within the space of a few 
years, Reagan had moved from a position of treating the Soviet Union as an 
intractable adversary to fully embracing its leader. Material changes alone 
could not prompt such a turnaround in relations: the interpersonal dimension 
was key in eliciting a response to Gorbachev’s reforms. 
Interactions with foreign leaders were taken seriously by Gorbachev, 
who listened to points made by his interlocutors, and tried to adjust Soviet 
policy to accommodate Western concerns when he felt that legitimate points 
of view were being advanced rather than the adversarial zero-sum stances of 
the past. A debate with Margaret Thatcher after Reykjavik was summarised 
by Gorbachev for the Politburo as follows:  
 
“She focused on trust. She said, ‘The USSR has squandered the West’s 
faith and we don’t trust you. You take grave actions lightly: Hungary, 
Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan. We couldn’t imagine that you’d invade 
Czechoslovakia, but you did. The same with Afghanistan. We’re afraid 
of you. If you remove your INF, and the Americans do too, then we’ll 
be completely defenseless before [your huge armies].’ That’s how she 
sees it. She thinks we haven’t rejected the ‘Brezhnev doctrine.’ 
Comrades, we have to think this over. We can’t ignore these 
arguments.”1013 
 
Chernyaev credits this exchange as the reason for Gorbachev’s 1987 pivot in 
Soviet foreign policy towards paying greater attention to relations with 
Europe. In February 1987 Shevardnadze first tabled the then radical idea of 
German unification: after a visit to Berlin, he reported to Gorbachev, “The 
idea of a united German nation exists in the minds of the communists there. 
They seek contact with West Germany and they don’t criticise West 
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Germany. We must seriously and academically examine the idea of a unified 
Germany.”1014 After the INF Treaty was signed, foreign affairs began to take 
on an outsized role in driving the Soviet reform process, spurring Gorbachev 
to greater activism: to secure the INF Treaty he had faced down vehement 
opposition by the military establishment and in the process secured a 
landmark agreement with the US. As a consequence, Gorbachev, 
Shevardnadze, Yakovlev and a narrow circle of their advisors increasingly 
directed foreign policy after 1987, rather than the Politburo as in the past. On 
the crucial issue of Germany, Gorbachev and Shevardnadze handled almost 
all of the negotiations.1015  
This mutually supporting interactivity in arms control went beyond the 
senior leadership level alone. In 1988, Shevardnadze informed Gorbachev 
how talks at the working level (rather than ministerial) proceeded: “[Ass. 
Secretary of State] Ridgway and [Dep. Foreign Minister] Bessmertnykh are 
sitting together, conducting official talks. But they connect at the intuitive 
level – this should be so, we can do this, we won’t worry about that yet, we’ll 
come back to this later, etc.”1016 Gorbachev reflected on this: “The two teams 
passed the test of their ability to work together. When will this happen again? 
As I watched them listening to me, I had the impression that they forgot 
they’re on Reagan’s staff. Just normal people who know their 
responsibilities.”1017 Foreign policy was the area where Gorbachev possessed 
great leeway and could chart a relatively idiosyncratic course, and he 
succeeded in bringing Reagan into a mutually supportive virtuous cycle of 
improving relations. This was, to say the least, an unexpected development: 
“Paradoxical as it may seem, efforts toward disarmament and new relations 
with the West – originally meant to ‘create favourable external conditions for 
perestroika’ – in fact became its locomotive.”1018 These are the causal paths 
of system change that can influence international relations.  
 Decisions and disputes in Soviet foreign policy were seen in the US as 
a canary in the coalmine of Soviet reform. Jack Matlock, in his capacity as 
Ambassador to the Soviet Union, closely monitored a Politburo debate in 
1988 concerning the basis of Soviet foreign policy. After Yegor Ligachev 																																																								
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wrote an article in Pravda arguing that the international class struggle 
remained the basis of Soviet foreign policy – “We proceed from the class 
nature of international relations,” he asserted, talk of any other approach 
“only confuses the Soviet people and our friends abroad” – Alexander 
Yakovlev, a reformer and key Gorbachev ally, gave a public speech 
contradicting Ligachev’s position.1019 Shevardnadze subsequently informed 
Matlock in private that ‘the common interests of mankind’ had replaced the 
old Leninist foreign policy line. This was followed by Gorbachev’s speech to 
the UN General Assembly in December of 1988, in which he announced a 
unilateral Soviet troop reduction in Eastern Europe amounting to some 
500,000 personnel, proclaiming that there can be ‘no limits of a nation’s 
freedom of choice’ in what amounted to a public dismissal of the Brezhnev 
Doctrine.  
Matlock reports, “By the end of 1988 senior American and Soviet 
officials had developed a degree of personal trust that contrasted sharply 
with typical Cold War suspicions. Conversations became more and more 
candid as the political leaders agreed on common goals.” 1020  On 
Shevardnadze’s last visit to Washington during the Reagan Administration, 
Shultz arranged a private dinner for him and a handful of other guests. 
Matlock remembers Shevardnadze speculating on the future of the USSR, 
anticipating that the country would somehow muddle through its economic 
difficulties but would eventually have to deal with the ‘nationalities question,’ 
with the Soviet foreign minister explicitly raising the possibility that ‘the 
Soviet Union will not survive as a unitary state.’ 1021  The nature of this 
conversation and the fact that Shevardnadze’s explosive remarks were not 
subsequently leaked is a rather remarkable indicator of the degree of trust 
and convergence of interests that had taken hold among top US and Soviet 
leaders within the span of a few years of the Reagan-Gorbachev relationship, 
brought about largely by the positive atmosphere that the key protagonists 
on both sides had managed to generate. The consequences of these 
interpersonal links had been profound in terms of producing the steps 
necessary to overhaul the adversarial US-Soviet relationship.  
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The Reagan-Bush transition 
As 1988 drew to a close the curtains were drawn on the Reagan 
Administration. In Reagan and Shultz, Gorbachev lost a pair of trusted 
partners. By this point, the two US statesmen bought almost wholesale into 
the notion that the Soviet leader was genuinely trying to bring the Cold War 
to and end and move the former foes toward a new era. Reagan later 
recalled:  
 
“It’s clear that there was a chemistry between Gorbachev and me that 
produced something very close to a friendship. He was a tough, hard 
bargainer. He was a Russian patriot who loved his country. We could – 
and did – debate from opposite sides of the ideological spectrum. But 
there was a chemistry that kept our conversations on a man-to-man 
basis, without hate or hostility.”  
 
Reagan felt Gorbachev was different from his predecessors, because he was 
“the first not to push Soviet expansionism, the first to agree to destroy 
nuclear weapons, the first to suggest a free market and to support open 
elections and freedom of expression.”1022 After his trip to Moscow in 1988, 
Reagan called Gorbachev “a serious man seeking serious reform […] quite 
possibly, we’re beginning to take down the barriers of the postwar era; quite 
possibly we are entering a new era in history, a time of lasting change in the 
Soviet Union.”1023 The dense personal interactions at the highest levels of the 
two superpowers’ leadership between 1985 and 1988 produced an 
important legacy in the form of disarmament treaties, policy shifts, and 
change on the ground. The depth of domestic opposition that Reagan and 
Gorbachev had to overcome to sign the INF Treaty, not to mention the 
hurdles posed by the negotiations, demonstrate that personal commitment 
to diplomacy can be integral to effecting change in international relations.  
In 1989, US-Soviet leadership interactions changed in nature as a new 
team arrived at the White House. George H. W. Bush was determined to 
imprint the Presidency with both his own personnel and policies. The inter-
personal dynamics within a presidential administration are an emergent 
property of the micro-system of US foreign policy-making: the decisions 
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made by an Administration are in part driven by the dense web interactions 
spun by the various principals involved in policy formation. This means that 
to fully understand how foreign policies differ between Presidencies, 
attention must be paid to the personalities of policymakers in an 
Administration, not only individually, but also in relation to the each other. 
Brent Scowcroft, National Security Advisor to President Bush, puts the point 
as follows:  
 
“Personality is extremely important. […] Rarely does a President know, 
when he’s selecting the people around him, how they’re going to 
interact with each other. Most of the time he usually knows all of the 
people, but he’s not intimate with them, and certainly they’ve never 
worked together before. So our system has a built in risk factor as to 
how well people are going to work together.”1024 
 
In the Reagan Administration, fractious and disruptive relations 
between the various foreign policy decision-makers paralysed US policy 
towards the Soviet Union for most of Reagan’s first term. George Shultz 
eventually broke through the gridlock, positioning himself as the President’s 
chosen lieutenant in Soviet affairs by crafting a policy designed to echo 
Reagan’s diplomatic intuitions about the merits of outreach. Shultz 
steadfastly defended this crucial policy position against hardline anti-Soviet 
cabinet officials who tried to sabotage him at every step. His prowess in 
navigating the densely fought-over terrain of Reagan’s Soviet policy paved 
the way for a presidentially led initiative to improve relations with the Soviet 
Union, expressed through path-breaking summit meetings and landmark 
arms reduction treaties.  
President Bush, mindful of the political paralysis that policy bickering 
in an Administration can produce, had a different approach to selecting his 
cabinet. His presidency was characterised by productive foreign policy 
debates that facilitated the bold diplomatic strokes necessary for German 
reunification to not only emerge as a realistic policy goal but to become 
reality within an astonishingly brief timeframe. Philip Zelikow, a key Soviet 
advisor on Bush’s NSC, explains: “Bush doesn’t pick a team that’s going to 
be creative on German unification per se. He picks Baker as it’s Baker, he 																																																								
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picks Scowcroft as it’s Scowcroft. For reasons that antedate all of that: Bush 
knows who these people are.“ An intra-Administration argument concerning 
reunification emerges “during the spring and summer [of 1989], and actually 
there is a difference of view between Scowcroft [and Baker].” 1025  This 
crystallization of two competing opinions on Reunification did not create an 
intra-Administration policy logjam, but instead led Bush to go with his instinct 
that Germany was ready for reunification, without antagonising half the 
Cabinet in the process. Later, the harmonious atmosphere in foreign 
policymaking in the Bush White House contributed to creative diplomatic 
proposals that pushed the Reunification process forward.  
Central to the web of interaction in an Administration is the President, 
around whom all policy debates ultimately revolve, and with whom final 
policy choices rest. Any presidential transition involves breaks in personalities 
and policy, and the interaction between these two factors is worth 
investigating. The Reagan-to-Bush transition in 1989 was abrupt: the NSC 
and State Departments were pruned and an entirely new team came in, 
“representing foreign policy approaches fundamentally at odds with those of 
the Reagan Administration. […] These changes were soon reflected in major 
shifts in policy.”1026 The incoming Bush Administration was reluctant to pick 
things up where Reagan and Shultz left them off. In particular, Bush hesitated 
to endorse Gorbachev publicly. Shultz remembers, 
 
“Scowcroft and, I think, Gates had persuaded [Bush] that Reagan and I 
had been going too fast and too far, and they did have a ‘pause’ in 
relations. […] There was a constant fight in the American 
establishment between the point of view that things were changing in 
the Soviet Union and Gorbachev was an agent of change – that was 
my view and that was Reagan’s view – and others who thought that 
the Soviet Union would not and could not change, and Gorbachev was 
just an aberration, don’t pay any attention. So there was a real 
difference of opinion.”1027 
 
Hutchings, who joined the NSC in 1989, recalls that the Bush administration’s 
policies “departed sharply from the Reagan administration, particularly in 																																																								
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rebuilding support for nuclear deterrence and radically revising Soviet policy 
away from a narrow focus on arms control, toward a much more ambitious 
political agenda.”1028 
There were a number of major unresolved issues that confronted the 
Bush Administration in January 1989. Europe remained divided into 
opposing military blocs, further arms control agreements to reduce strategic 
nuclear weapons and conventional military forces were still under 
negotiation, and proxy wars in Africa and Central America continued. One 
basic conceptual divide within the Bush Administration was whether it was in 
the US’ national interest to support perestroika. Matlock, by this point 
Ambassador to the USSR, strongly argued in the affirmative; sceptics like the 
new National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft and his deputy Robert Gates 
took a more cautious line. Scowcroft is explicit about his views at the time:  
 
“I had some very fixed views in mind coming in [to the White House] 
that differed with the Reagan Administration. […] Gorbachev came in 
with the notion not of ending the Cold War but of reinvigorating the 
Soviet Union.”  
 
Scowcroft did not buy into the outgoing Administration’s claim that Cold War 
tensions were over:  
 
”When the Reagan Administration started saying the Cold War has 
ended, I didn’t buy any of it. […] I thought that what Reagan was 
doing was in part being seduced by Gorbachev, and in part simply not 
understanding what was going on. And I remember telling President 
Bush that I thought the whole Gorbachev approach was not designed 
to end the Cold War. It was designed to make the Soviet Union more 
effective and efficient in prosecuting it, and that the fundamental 
things that made up the Cold War, if you will, were all still in place. 
And that the main element of made the Cold War the Cold War was 
the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe.”1029 
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The new Secretary of State, James Baker, disagreed with Scowcroft: 
“There were some in the Administration, some of the more Cold Warriors like 
Brent [Scowcroft] and [Robert] Gates […] who felt that perhaps the Reagan 
people had been too quick to embrace [Gorbachev], too quick to talk. I 
never believed that. Honest, I didn’t believe it.”1030 Baker wanted to work 
with Gorbachev and help his reforms succeed, and ensured that his turf as 
the US’ senior foreign policy leader was not trodden on. He prevented 
Robert Gates from giving a public speech early in 1989 which forecast that 
Gorbachev was not going to succeed in his reform efforts.1031 In February 
1989 Richard Cheney, the new Secretary of Defence, gave a television 
interview predicting that Gorbachev, if he was serious about his efforts to 
change the Soviet Union, was bound to fail. Baker’s response was immediate: 
“I picked up the phone and called the President, and I said, ‘You can’t have 
your Secretary of Defence out here telling the press that the guy you want to 
work with as a reformer is going to fail. That’s not our policy.’ And the 
President agreed with me, and they walked away from Cheney’s remarks at 
the White House press briefing.”1032 Cheney has also described his thinking 
at the time: “A major concern for me through this whole period is that I don’t 
know what the hell is going on in the Soviet Union. […] Gorbachev clearly is 
an improvement over his predecessors. Gorbachev appears to be committed 
to glasnost and perestroika. But I was then very sceptical about whether or 
not he would succeed, whether or not he would be able to deliver, and 
exactly where the Soviets were going with the whole thing.” 1033  These 
divergent views did not paralyse the Administration, since they were 
processed by an efficient national security-making system defined by the 
harmonious handling of differences between principals.  
Policy divisions in the Bush cabinet were substantial, but the new 
Administration didn’t degenerate into the same internecine fighting that 
marred the first Reagan term. This highlights an overlooked aspect of how 
the complex balance of interrelationships inside a team of political leaders 
influences the outcomes of the policymaking process. The stark difference of 
views concerning the sincerity of Gorbachev’s reform efforts were handled in 
a professional manner that prevented egos from clashing and tempers from 																																																								
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flaring. Bush, who as Vice-President witnessed how interpersonal clashes can 
harm an Administration’s policy effectiveness, made it clear that “he didn’t 
want any [discord] in his administration and all of us knew it, and knew that 
probably the surest way to get into trouble with the President was to be seen 
as creating a problem in these working relationships.”1034 In addition, the 
President assembled a team that managed to operate effectively, not least 
because they were all familiar with each other: “It was […] very important that 
almost everybody in the inner circle in the administration had known each 
other for a long time.” 1035 During the Ford Administration, Richard Cheney 
was White House Chief of Staff, George Bush headed the CIA, Brent 
Scowcroft was National Security Advisor and James Baker was 
Undersecretary of Commerce. “We all had these relationships. […] This was a 
very experienced group of people. Everybody had a great sense of humor. 
Humor played a huge role in the Bush administration and both at the 
principals’ level and the deputies’ level in making things work smoothly.” 1036 
Colin Powell, Bush’s Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, concurs: “We were 
all old friends. We had all worked with each other in different capacities, so 
we knew each other. […]  We knew what each one of us thought, we knew 
our strengths and weaknesses, and Bush would let us argue in front of 
him.”1037 Similar testimony has also been provided by Richard Haass, then 
Special Assistant to President Bush on the NSC: “I’ve worked for four 
Presidents and I would say, by order of magnitude, this was the least-divided 
administration of the four. Compared to Carter, Reagan, and Bush, the 
current President Bush.” 
Robert Gates is particularly adamant about the significance of the 
nature of interpersonal interactions in an Administration: 
 
“You can have all the structure in the world, but at the end of the day, 
policy is made by human beings and governments are effective or not 
effective in substantial measure because of the quality of the 
individuals in it and their ability to work with one another.” 
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The relationships in an administration can be built on mutual trust or on 
bureaucratic warfare, and this has real policy effects: “It really does matter 
when the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense aren’t speaking to 
one another, or hate each other’s guts, as I have seen, or when nobody trusts 
the National Security Advisor.” He is clear that “these things matter, and if 
everybody does trust each other and works productively together, then that 
has beneficial results.”1038 
Gates describes an interactive element of complexity in policymaking: 
namely, the atmospheric conditions within which policies are formulated and 
decisions are made, brought about by the co-ordination and co-operative 
practices that take hold among decision-makers. Team dynamics feature 
prominently in the design of policy. By May 1989, the incoming Bush 
Administration was under pressure since US-Soviet relations had stalled as a 
result of a strategic ‘pause’ it had put in place during which foreign policy 
was to be re-evaluated. The upcoming NATO summit was important because 
of two unresolved issues. An acceptable formula for conventional force 
reductions had to be found in response to Warsaw Pact proposals for force 
reductions, and a rift between Margaret Thatcher and Helmut Kohl 
concerning short-range nuclear missiles needed to be healed. Where 
Thatcher felt that failure to upgrade the ageing Lance missiles would 
undermine deterrence and weaken European security, Kohl believed that 
stationing new missiles on German soil would continue to make his country a 
target of nuclear strikes and undermine to the emerging new European 
security architecture.1039  
Bush ended up presenting a far-reaching, accelerated timetable of 
conventional force reductions which placed equal limits on US and Soviet 
forces. This was met with equal support from fellow NATO members and 
from Gorbachev. The short range nuclear missile question was resolved only 
after intense diplomatic negotiations at the foreign minister level, through 
which an acceptable compromise was found, based on adding the qualifier 
‘partial’ before the phrase ‘reductions in short term nuclear missiles’ to the 
final communiqué. As Baker later commented, “Of such fine or boring 
nuances are diplomatic negotiations concluded.”1040 All in all, the summit 																																																								
1038 Gates Miller Center interview (2000) 
1039 As James Baker explains, “The Germans would say, ‘The shorter the missile, the deader 
the German.’” Personal interview (2014). 
1040 Personal interview  
 265 
ended up solving both of the major NATO irritants, leaving the Bush team 
elated: “The NATO summit was a resounding success. An almost euphoric 
atmosphere surrounded the press conference. The press had to admit that 
we had turned the entire situation around. While we subsequently had a 
great many difficulties with reporters on specific issues, they never returned 
to their theme of the spring – that we had no vision, and no strategy but 
drift.”1041 The work that went into the US proposals helped buoy the new 
Administration. Zelikow recounts the collaborative experience of how the 
conventional force reductions were co-authored by Baker, Scowcroft, Cheney 
and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who all had contrasting stances 
on the scope and timing of the force reductions:  
 
“Bush was empowering them to think big and creatively, a little bit 
insecure about whether or not he was going to be a successful foreign 
policy President who could keep up with Gorbachev. And then these 
men and their respective staffs kind of – ‘Oh, well look, if you move 
here, that could…’ – and they saw how it came together, knitted it into 
a package that no one of them could have produced on their own, but 
that together was really a package that then swept the whole Alliance 
with them, solved all these problems that had been vexing the 
Alliance in one package, and gave them an incredibly dynamic 
position that actually set things up for a lot of what happened in the 
summer.”1042  
 
With the above, Zelikow provides a practical description of emergence in the 
complex system of US policymaking: the sum of foreign policy output is 
bigger than its parts. The collective contributions of and interactions among 
the various key Administration members helped bring about an innovative 
policy outcome that boosted Bush’s attempts at leading the Western Alliance 
at a crucial time when profound change was taking place in the international 
system. This helped the Bush Administration find its footing and avoid the 
dysfunctional foreign policy that characterised the Reagan Administration 
until 1983: foreign policy gridlock, ongoing, unsolved NATO disputes, and 
the inability to strike up a working relationship with the Soviet Union.  
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Zelikow argues that the virtuous cycle surrounding the NATO Summit 
helped Bush’s foreign policy team develop a cohesive approach, 
subsequently allowing it to smoothly handle the delicate task of supporting 
the aspirations of Soviet client states and republics that were seeking 
independence, without appearing to encourage or contribute to the break-
up of the USSR.  
 
“Teams gain a sense of how to succeed after they’ve had their first 
success. […] You do things, they work, you see how they work, you 
begin to believe in each other, you can get in a virtuous cycle. […] So 
a lot of what become the striking features of this team […] on this and 
other issues later really gelled during this period in the beginning or in 
late March/early April of 1989. [The Administration] began going into 
habits of ways of doing things which weren’t always perfect, but were 
by and large highly functional.”1043 
 
Outcomes in foreign policy are at least in part driven by the interactive group 
dynamic of the individuals responsible for formulating policy ideas on behalf 
of key decision-makers. These internal interactions were to prove particularly 
important in helping the Administration deal effectively with the fast-
changing German situation. Zelikow constructs a ‘Third Reagan Term’ 
counterfactual to make the point, again premised on the importance of 
looking at teams rather than individuals when analysing US foreign policy-
making: “Both in the Reagan case and the Bush case it’s much more useful 
and insightful to think of teams. The Presidents have a big effect on the 
colouration and make-up of their teams.”1044 George Shultz believed that the 
Cold War was ‘all over but the shouting’ in 1989 and worried that the Bush 
Administration “did not understand or accept that the Cold War was 
over.”1045 This put him on the side of Cold Warriors like Margaret Thatcher, 
who believed that the division of Europe was an integral part of the 
continent’s security architecture.1046 As such it was no surprise that Rozanne 
Ridgway, who spent six years in the State Department as Shultz’s chief aide 
and temporarily stayed on in the Bush Administration, argued against a US 																																																								
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1044 Ibid 
1045 Shultz (1993), 1138 
1046 Oberdorfer (1988) 
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push for reunification. Ridgway chaired the Bush Administration’s first policy 
review on Western Europe in March 1989 and concluded the following 
regarding reunification: “There is no more inflammatory and divisive issue, 
and it serves no US interest for us to take the initiative to raise it.”1047 The 
prevailing web of influence in the Reagan Administration, which was also 
more deferential to the Thatcher government than the Bush Administration, 
would likely have veered toward the view that a divided Germany was the 
key to the stability of Europe, and that the German question should not be 
re-opened1048. 
 The team around Secretary Baker, headed by Robert Zoellick and 
Dennis Ross, was more gung-ho about the potential for foreign policy 
innovation in Europe in 1989. Already by March, Zoellick advised Baker to 
“get ahead of the curve on the issue of German Reunification.”1049 Baker was 
drawn to a paper written by Ross and Francis Fukuyama from the State 
Department’s Policy Planning Staff, which recommended that Reunification 
proceed solely on the basis of German membership in both the EU and 
NATO – terms least likely to be palatable to the USSR.1050 These kinds of 
ambitious and creative negotiation ideas are, according to Zelikow’s mind, 
the product of the ‘distinctive blend’ that accompanies different 
policymaking teams.  
 Ridgway was right in pointing out that the issue of reunification was 
not salient for West Germany at the time: “The Germans were resigned to 
the fact unification was impossible.” 1051  It is true that as late as 1989, 
Wolfgang Schäuble – who headed Kohl’s Chancellery – argued that “old 
hopes that the unity of Germany could be achieved through the reunification 
of both German states in the not-too-distant future” were ‘illusory’ and 
accepted that after the construction of the Berlin Wall, there was “no way to 
overcome the German division.”1052 Horst Teltschik, foreign policy advisor to 
Kohl, stated that government policy until the end of 1989 leaned toward 
encouraging economic reform and a move toward democracy in the GDR, 
rather than a territorial merger.1053 It is debatable whether Kohl would have 																																																								
1047 Cited in Zelikow and Rice, 26 
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felt comfortable enough to make the rapid and audacious moves towards 
reunification in autumn of 1989 under a hypothetical ‘Third Reagan Term’ 
with a far stronger White House preference for European stability and 
continuity. The Reagan team’s greater faith that the Soviet Union under 
Gorbachev had fundamentally changed would suggest that, far from there 
being a rationale for a reunified Germany to join NATO, this outcome would 
actively destabilise the continental security environment by creating a new 
German behemoth, since the USSR no longer posed a threat.  
Thus the interactivity of the policy generation process produces 
different preferences in different Administrations. Under Bush, it was Brent 
Scowcroft who was sceptical of rushing to endorse reunification. He 
convinced James Baker to replace ‘reunification’ with ‘reconciliation’ in an 
October 1989 speech.1054 Later that month, however, George Bush told a 
New York Times reporter, “I don’t share the concern that some European 
countries have about a reunified Germany.”1055 The disagreement between 
Baker and Scowcroft played out behind the scenes, allowing Bush to observe 
the key arguments at stake and make an informed choice that reunification 
was desirable. Says Zelikow, “I actually think this may have been where he 
was leaning anyway. But he’s not trying to consciously butt conventional 
wisdom. In a way because of our disagreement, we’re telling him, ‘Both of 
these positions are respectable.’ Had we been united in opposing 
[reunification], I don’t think he would have defied us.”1056 Bush’s relative ease 
at giving his explicit support to what amounted to a major transformation of 
the European order is somewhat surprising in view of his reputation for 
practising a prudent approach to diplomacy. Bush told Zelikow he regarded 
himself as “less of a Europeanist, not dominated by history.”1057 It appears 
that Bush’s personal relations with Kohl supported his inclination to trust 
West Germany to shoulder the burden of reunification responsibly: “There is 
the story that Bush actually told me himself, how impressed he’d become 
with the Bonn Republic, and the trust that he had begun to feel, and actually 
a personal connection with Kohl, going back to the Euromissile arguments 
[the controversial NATO missile deployment of 1983], when Bush had been 
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Vice President.”1058 To paraphrase James Baker, of such fine nuances of 
interpersonal and intellectual relationships can policies be forged.  
Once support for reunification began to emanate from the White 
House, Kohl started to move much more boldly into that direction. He also 
proved adept at seizing a window of opportunity that opened after the Berlin 
Wall came down on 9 November 1989.1059 A few weeks after the ‘fall of the 
Wall’, Kohl presented a ten-point plan for reunification to the Bundestag, 
though the end-goal was still phrased cautiously in a roundabout way. 
Zelikow links Kohl’s move to the tacit assent signalled by Bush in September, 
suggesting that it kick-started an emergent sub-process in the wider turmoil 
of 1989 that first unfolded within the parameters of German domestic 
politics, with Kohl stirring up public expectations of what was possible, in the 
hope of shifting creating a public consensus that endorsed reunification.1060  
 The first summit meeting between Gorbachev and Bush was held in 
Malta in December 1989. By this point, President Bush had come firmly down 
on the side of the Soviet leader. Over the summer, Bush dismissed 
intelligence reports that suggested Gorbachev was losing control over reform 
in the USSR with the frustrated rejoinder, “Look, this guy is perestroika.”1061 
On a visit to Poland and Hungary, Bush took care to publicly support reform 
Communists rather than nationalist politicians. At Malta, Bush and Gorbachev 
established their working relationship. 1989 was drawing to a close, a year in 
which the balance of power in Europe had shifted markedly against the 
Soviet Union. The lack of major agreements at the summit has led to it being 
labelled a ‘missed opportunity’ and evidence of Bush’s lack of vision in 
dealing with Gorbachev.1062 In fact, however, the summit did have major 
consequences in terms of the interactions between Bush and Gorbachev. 
Bush describes the “friendly openness between [Gorbachev and I] and 
genuine willingness to listen to each other’s proposals” at Malta, through 
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which two leaders appeared to have developed a measure of mutual respect 
and confidence in each other.1063  
More important was their incipient discussion concerning the future of 
Germany. While Gorbachev made clear his irritation over Kohl’s ten-point 
plan and expressed a preference for the continuation of the territorial status 
quo, he once again reverted to his relatively passive endorsement of 
emergence as a means of dealing with the unfolding transformation of 
Europe:  
 
“There are two German states; this is the way history happened. Let 
history decide how the process will develop and what it will lead to in 
the context of a new Europe and a new world. [Emphasis added]”  
 
To which Bush responded,  
 
“I agree. We will not take any rash steps; will not try to accelerate the 
outcome of the debate on reunification. […] On this issue you are in 
the same boat with our NATO allies. Most of the conservative ones 
among them welcome your approach. […] I hope that you understand 
that you cannot expect us not to approve of German reunification.  At 
the same time, we realize the extent to which this is a delicate, 
sensitive issue.  We are trying to act with a certain reserve.”  
 
Commenting on the speed and scale of the political changes that had taken 
place in Europe that year – and truthfully asserting that the US, far from trying 
to actively influence the outcome of these revolutions, stood on the sidelines 
– Bush told Gorbachev, “we were shocked by the swiftness of the changes 
that unfolded” and complimented Gorbachev on the USSR’s response:  
 
“We regard highly your personal reaction and the reaction of the 
Soviet Union as a whole to these dynamic, and at the same time 
fundamental, changes.”  
 
Gorbachev and Bush interacted in a mature, sober-minded and transparent 
manner. At the same time, this may involuntarily have signalled to the Bush 																																																								
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Administration that Gorbachev would not draw a red line at German 
reunification within NATO. Zelikow and Rice – the latter an eyewitness to the 
proceedings in Malta – report:  
 
“Gorbachev‘s relaxed demeanor convinced the Americans that the 
Soviet leader was malleable on the German question. As the meetings 
wrapped up in Malta, Baker and Scowcroft’s advisers talked about 
avoiding any situation in which the Soviet Union might be forced to 
say no to some concrete proposal on Germany. They reasoned that 
the Soviet government did not seem to know where it was going, so 
the West should not try to force Gorbachev to declare a bottom line.” 
  
Akhromeyev, another eyewitness (by that point a military advisor to 
Gorbachev), later ruminated that Gorbachev made a crucial error: “Bush 
realised that had a position [on reunification] been formed, it would have 
been expressed by M. Gorbachev in Malta.”1064 It seems that the interplay 
between these two unique leaders at least partly contributed to rapid 
German reunification on Western terms. Chernyaev describes Gorbachev’s 
“renowned tendency to seek compromise, his predilection for bringing about 
peace everywhere, and hence his calculated readiness to accept what he 
does not really approve of. […] This makes Gorbachev as a person and 
politician at once strong and weak.”1065 Scowcroft, when asked about how 
the President would have responded had Gorbachev phrased an explicit red 
line concerning a reunified Germany’s NATO membership, responded:  
 
“We talked about this a lot. And we never came down with what I’d 
call a ‘policy’ toward it. But my sense is that we would not have 
pushed it on the Soviet Union that we wanted this [reunification within 
NATO] to happen. The President especially was attuned to 
Gorbachev. He didn’t want to make trouble for Gorbachev, he really 
didn’t.”1066 
 
This confluence of characters, then, may explain the by now infamous 
moment in May of 1990 when Gorbachev unexpectedly gave his assent to 																																																								
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German reunification within NATO at the Washington Summit, prompting 
outrage among his entourage. President Bush had asked, innocuously 
enough, whether Gorbachev could accede to the Helsinki principle that 
sovereign states were free to choose their alliances, to which the Soviet 
leader responded in the affirmative. When challenged whether this applied 
also in the case of Germany and NATO, Gorbachev reiterated his stance. 
Condoleezza Rice confirms that Bush’s handling of this most delicate of Cold 
War endgame situations was based on the absence of a Soviet red line and 
an appreciation of Gorbachev’s negotiating characteristics:  
 
“We weren’t so certain that there was a red line in the sand about 
NATO. And with Gorbachev, who had a tendency to keep saying ‘Yes’ 
if you didn’t make him say ‘No,’ the view was ‘Don’t force that answer 
too soon.’”1067 
 
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, Scowcroft warned Bush, “there are no 
guarantees that the Soviet Union will go quietly into the night.” He feared a 
military move born of desperation, not calculation, if the Soviet Union 
interpreted the situation as one “in which vital interests were on the line and 
not acting was believed in Moscow to be more dangerous than acting.”1068 
That said, by February 1990 Condoleezza Rice informed Scowcroft that the 
USSR “is probably unable to re-extend its tentacles” into Eastern Europe.1069 
The US team tailored its approach to the topic based on Gorbachev’s 
predilections:  
 
“Gorbachev didn't seem to want to put stakes in the ground. It wasn't 
like that. It was almost as if he was looking for a way for this to all turn 
out OK. And so we tried to give him as much cover as possible on the 
things that mattered to them, without compromising the one that 
mattered to us, which was Germany within NATO.”1070  
 
This is how interactions on a personal level between leaders of states, and 
between leaders and their own teams, form one layer of complex causality in 																																																								
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international affairs. Policy positions are not derived entirely from abstract 
material facts. Negotiations are not conducted by automatons that passively 
interpret information. The human element plays an important role in 
determining which ideas take hold over decision-makers, and in their 
interpretation of each other’s moves and preferences. The nature of the 
working relationships among decision-making teams contributes to the 
efficacy of policymaking. Zelikow, commenting on the Bush administration’s 
foreign policy accomplishments, remarks: “You can’t really ascribe to any one 
of them the secret. That’s why I emphasise this point about the team. […] [As 
with] chemical compounds, I can’t just pull out Calcium atoms and Sulphur 
atoms, and say ‘It produces the same effects.’”1071 The web of relationships 
that is spun inside different Presidential administrations cannot be 
understood by looking at various individuals separately, but instead by 
studying how they harmonise as a group. Personality conditions choices and 
preferences: the interaction of personalities, too, gives rise to choices and 
priorities in international affairs. This is a secondary interaction effect in 
policymaking, on top of the primary interactions between high-level leaders, 
where the heavy lifting occurs: Reagan and Gorbachev gradually broke down 
the perception of zero-sum US-Soviet rivalry in the international system 
through the dogged pursuit of arms control; Bush and Gorbachev’s 
interactions paved the way for the unexpectedly quick and smooth 
reunification of Germany in 1990.  
 
 
Nonlinearity: systemic leaps and root unpredictability 
Just as Dobzhansky notes that ‘nothing in biology makes sense except 
in the light of evolution,’1072 in complexity theory, nothing makes sense 
except in the light of nonlinearity. The end of the Cold War unfolded through 
a complex confluence of choices, contingent events and timing. The 
progression of events under Gorbachev was neither orderly nor smooth. This 
points to the role played by non-linearity in international relations, a system 
characterised not by stability but by discontinuities, not by predictability but 
by uncertainty. That explains why Gorbachev never achieved what he set out 
to do – to save socialism and preserve the Soviet Union – and instead 
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brought about the inverse. The evolution of Gorbachev’s reform path was 
non-linear: it did not follow a step-by-step additive process where one reform 
incrementally brought about the next. Instead, the key systemic reforms of 
perestroika and glasnost unfurled in a jumbled manner, the overall direction 
of which Gorbachev neither planned nor foresaw, and the ultimate outcome 
of which he did not desire. Systemic change took place within the parameters 
of complexity. It was launched through interactive dynamics between the 
principal political actors in the system and steered by bottom-up 
developments that were unleashed by these leaders. Politicians did not lose 
complete control, rather, they set the benchmarks within which non-linear 
change unfolded – primarily Gorbachev, by consistently refusing a violent 
response to the regime change in the Eastern bloc. This policy red line 
precluded the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact from 
spilling over into open conflict. 
After Gorbachev came into office, his stated priority was “to protect 
and strengthen as much as possible the fraternal friendship with our closest 
comrades-in-arms and allies, the countries of the great socialist 
commonwealth.” His first meetings with Eastern European leaders were full 
of exhortations for them to “do everything possible to undermine the 
aggressive attempts [...] made by class enemies [who] are nowadays seeking 
to achieve the ideological dissolution of socialism from within.” At the end of 
April 1985, Eastern bloc leaders met in Moscow and extended the Warsaw 
Pact for another 30 years. Gorbachev did not mince his words, telling his 
colleagues, “military-strategic parity is a vital prerequisite for the security of 
the socialist states. Understandably, safeguarding the military balance has 
required – and, if the situation does not improve, will continue to require – a 
great deal of resources and effort. But without this it will be impossible to 
defend socialist gains.”1073 It was Gorbachev who prevented any changes to 
the basic treaty text and pushed for a 30-year renewal of the alliance as 
opposed to a shorter period.1074 Since the above statements were made 
behind closed doors rather than for public consumption, it can be assumed 
that they were not propaganda but, in the words of Kramer, “underscored 
[Gorbachev’s] desire to push for greater cohesion and integration between 																																																								
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the Soviet Union and its East European allies.”1075 Yet within the space of just 
four years, the entirety of what Gorbachev had hoped and aimed for in terms 
of his Eastern Europe policy had been turned in its head. The steps and 
developments that led to this outcome followed a pattern of non-linear 
change: there was no straightforward line from 1985 to 1989, rather, 
Gorbachev’s positions evolved through a series of feedback loops, 
contingencies and disparate events. 
Brown’s account of the six stages of reform describes this complex 
evolution.1076 In 1985 and 1986, Gorbachev began to prepare the ground for 
reform, focusing on improving economic performance through remedial 
policies and trying to enlist the top Soviet leadership to inject new political 
vigour into the USSR. He encouraged the political accountability of the 
political class, for instance through anti-corruption campaigns. As Zubok 
shows, Gorbachev departed from this initial path once he realised the old 
elite could not be co-opted, instead deciding to encourage new political 
forces, chiefly liberals and the nationalist intelligentsia, and thereby setting in 
motion a political process that would end up turning vehemently against the 
system.1077 The failure of Gorbacgev’s initial incrementalist restructuring led 
to a second phase that Brown calls ‘radical political reform’, lasting from 1987 
to 1988. It brought about a third phase of ground-breaking political 
transformations in 1989 in the ‘near abroad’, which yielded a politically 
destabilising blowback at home in 1990, with rivals such as Boris Yeltsin 
taking advantage of new-found political liberties introduced as part of 
glasnost, and increasingly attracting the support of disillusioned new thinkers 
who felt he was the new face of reform.1078 This brought about a fourth 
phase, during which Gorbachev attempted to apply the brakes on the forces 
of reform he had unleashed: this was the so-called ‘turn to the right’, which 
so unnerved Gorbachev’s key ally Shevardnadze that it prompted him to 
resign in December 1990, warning that ‘dark forces of nationalism’ and 
dictatorship were on the offensive. The fifth phase of reform took place in the 
first half of 1991, when Gorbachev attempted to negotiate a voluntary new 
agreement between the USSR’s constituent republics so as to revitalise the 
weakening Soviet Union. The sixth and terminal phase of reform began with 																																																								
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the failed anti-Gorbachev coup of June 1991, whose principal outcome was 
to terminally weaken the authority of the Communist Party, shifting power to 
the first elected President of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, who used it to dislodge 
Gorbachev and then negotiated an orderly break-up of the Soviet Union.   
This trajectory of political change was not designed to follow an 
overarching, consistent policy course. Rather, Gorbachev set the initial course 
toward gradualist reform, encountered systemic resistance primarily in the 
area of economic change, began to emphasise political reform as a means to 
transform the set ways of the Soviet system, before belatedly slowing down 
the pace of the process he had put in motion. All along, Gorbachev used the 
domain of foreign policy to proceed with a growingly radical re-alignment of 
the Soviet Union’s international priorities, relying on relations with his 
increasingly trusting Western interlocutors to try and speed up change at 
home. Gorbachev’s early instinct to change the Soviet system was thus 
buffeted by domestic resistance from vested interests, progressively 
improved interactions with international partners, worsening economic 
performance, and eventually the forces of politically liberated peoples at 
home and abroad, who began to exert bottom-up pressure to do away with 
the autocratic means of control and ideological superstructure that provided 
the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies with the authority and legitimacy 
to govern.  
Nonlinearity does not amount to unrestrained chaos and total loss of 
control. English makes the point that the crucial revolutionary year of 1989 
was marked by contingency and a fluidity of events that bordered on the 
chaotic – but the events themselves followed from the ‘New Thinking’ that 
Gorbachev had put in place since 1985.1079 Chief among the constraints on 
the system’s convulsions was the removal of violent means of repression from 
the policy toolbox available to Soviet leaders. The course of the policies 
Gorbachev charted towards Eastern Europe was fundamentally enmeshed 
with his near-pacifist refusal to countenance the use of force in order to 
maintain Soviet power: an attribute not merely unusual for a political leader 
but with a direct, essential material impact on the end of the Cold War.1080 
Chernyaev noted that as long as Gorbachev chaired Politburo meetings, it 
was “simply impossible even to suggest” any sort of intervention to halt the 																																																								
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events in Eastern Europe.1081 This was in marked contrast to the debates in 
the Politburo in 1980 and 1981 on whether to use force to prevent Solidarity 
from toppling the Communist government. Although Moscow ultimately 
decided against intervention, plans to invade were called off only after the 
Jaruzelski government to impose order through martial law. Decision-making 
was influenced by the fall-out of the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979; 
Andropov predicted that another Soviet military operation “would make 
things very difficult”, citing “a variety of economic and political sanctions” 
already in place.1082 By contrast, Gorbachev’s aversion to the use of force was 
not driven by consequentialist thinking, but stemmed from his deep-rooted 
opposition to physical force as a means of politics. This was Gorbachev’s 
signature idiosyncratic trait that he threw into the mix of the end of the Cold 
War, akin to Reagan’s anti-nuclear commitment. Andrei Grachev, one of his 
advisors, remarks, “for Gorbachev, an unwillingness to shed blood was not 
only a criterion but the condition of his involvement in politics.” According to 
Alexander Yakovlev, who was appointed to the Politburo in 1987, “avoidance 
of bloodshed was a constant concern for Gorbachev.”1083 Another aide, 
Vladimir Yegorov, wrote of his boss, “by character he was a man incapable of 
using dictatorial methods.” 1084  The periodic episodes of violence that 
occurred during the decline and fall of the Soviet Union never took place 
with official sanctioning and were always met with the same response by 
Gorbachev, who declared violence a taboo: after a massacre of 
demonstrators in the Georgian capital of Tbilisi in April 1989, Gorbachev told 
the Politburo, “We have accepted that even in foreign policy force is to no 
avail. So, especially internally, we cannot resort and will not resort to 
force.” 1085  Kramer confirms that at Gorbachev’s request, the Politburo 
decided to refrain from military action in Eastern Europe regardless of how 
events in 1989 would turn out (though this decision was not publicly 
disclosed so as not to demoralise Warsaw Pact governments).1086 
In the maelstrom of a complex, multi-layered political evolution, the 
personality of the key players involved matters: this affects how decision-																																																								
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makers in charge interpret events, perceive developments; it influences what 
signals leaders wish to send to competitors and allies at home and abroad, 
conditioning policy choices and responses to events. Gorbachev’s key 
character traits were optimism, openness toward the West, and a deep-held 
antipathy toward force.1087 Gorbachev treated other statesmen with respect 
and formed lasting friendships, many with Western politicians, had a 
tendency toward ‘best case’ thinking (hence his embrace of unpredictability 
and emergence once perestroika and glasnost started to shake things up – as 
per his favoured phrase, ‘processes are in motion’), and undertook his 
diplomatic dealings on an assumption of good faith, integrity and the utility 
of international agreements.1088  Most importantly, Gorbachev was the source 
of the changes in the Soviet Union which eventually culminated in its 
retrenchment (though he was also partly responsible for its implosion, after 
the changes he unleashed veered out of control).  
The specific reforms Gorbachev undertook were only partly a response 
to material conditions. The more his policies proceeded to uproot long-
entrenched habits in the USSR, the more Gorbachev began to prompt 
opposition to his path. The dismissal of Boris Yeltsin, one of Gorbachev’s 
Politburo appointees, early in 1988 was due to Yeltsin’s public impatience 
with the pace of reform, which he felt was too slow. Matlock recounts the 
details of Yeltsin’s downfall, engineered by Gorbachev, and in the process 
unwittingly shut a window of opportunity that could have saved the Soviet 
Union. In September 1987, Yeltsin wrote Gorbachev a letter in which he 
attacked Yegor Ligachev, the conservative Politburo member, and “referred 
to the opposition of other, unnamed Politburo members opposed to real 
change,” predicting that this would lead back “to a condition very much like 
the Brezhnevian stagnation they had tried to cure.”1089 Yeltsin requested to 
resign. Gorbachev ignored this prophetic letter until Yeltsin took the matter 
into his own hands and broached the subject at a Central Committee 
meeting in October. Matlock reports the response: “Gorbachev reacted with 
extreme hostility to this intervention, summarized Yeltsin’s criticism in 
distorted form, accused him of unbridled ambition, and called for a 
discussion.”1090 All but one of the twenty-seven delegates rose to denounce 																																																								
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Yeltsin, whose resignation was accepted. He was excoriated in Pravda and 
removed as head of the Moscow Party Committee. By that point, Yeltsin had 
made a name for himself as an energetic and enthusiastic reformer who had 
won the backing of a large number of Muscovites with his successful anti-
corruption and efficiency drives. Instead of harnessing his energy, Gorbachev 
viewed him with suspicion.  
Quite likely it was Gorbachev’s own ambition that prevented him from 
seeing Yeltsin not as a rival but a potentially influential ally. Matlock reports 
that US officials repeatedly advised Gorbachev to bring Yeltsin into the fold, 
but the General Secretary was a poor team player who was unable to see 
merit in working with Yeltsin.1091  Gates feels Gorbachev tried to act as 
‘captain, quarterback and coach’ of the reform process. Gorbachev and 
Yeltsin disliked each other, and “had it not been for that animosity we might 
still be dealing with a much more federal Soviet Union.”1092 In what Gates 
calls “one of the most amazing episodes in history,” Yeltsin ended up 
destroying the Soviet Union “because it’s the only way he can put Gorbachev 
out of a job.” From within the storm of complex change Gorbachev 
unleashed, he had the temporary chance to safeguard the existence of the 
Soviet Union by allying himself and sharing power with Yeltsin, who instead 
became his chief rival and ended up becoming the first President of Russia 
before dissolving the Soviet Union. Yeltsin eviscerated the power structures 
of the USSR in order to supplant Gorbachev as leader. Late in 1987, when 
Gorbachev fired Yeltsin, Matlock believes he missed the opportunity to 
instead bring him into the fold: “He would have continued to be a problem, 
but a manageable one, and Yeltsin’s energy could have provided a useful 
counterpoint to the laggard conservatives.”1093 But as the intensity and scale 
of change began to grow in the Soviet Union, Gorbachev responded 
aggressively to someone he perceived as encroaching on his power. In a 
valuable lesson on how complexity can foil even a political giant like 
Gorbachev, the short-term destruction of a potential rival produced a self-
destructive unintended consequence in the form of an enemy who set about 
to successfully tap alternative sources of power and ended up dislodging his 
erstwhile nemesis. 
 In 1987, Gorbachev was also assailed from another front. Politburo 																																																								
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member Yegor Ligachev – the very man Yeltsin accused in his September 
letter to Gorbachev – orchestrated a conservative critique of the reforms, 
sponsoring a letter in Pravda which called for a return to Stalinist principles of 
rule, and giving a speech in which he attacked the departure of Soviet 
foreign policy from its Leninist roots. Chernyaev wrote afterwards, “Ligachev 
began opposing Gorbachev more and more, convinced that his own neo-
Stalinist idea of perestroika was the only correct one.”1094 Disputes in the 
Politburo and the press surrounding the course of New Thinking, in English’s 
mind, “reflected less a dispute over policy than a struggle for power. The 
leaders of new thinking had already crossed their Rubicon by late 1986, and 
there was little chance of turning back so long as Gorbachev remained at the 
helm.”1095 The increasing rambunctiousness of Soviet policymaking was a 
consequence of the openness that was introduced into the political system 
through glasnost, and in the process forced Gorbachev to clamp down on 
dissent from his colleagues. 
The revolutions of 1989 were catalysts for abrupt systemic change; a 
critical juncture that opened up quickly and without forewarning after a 
critical mass of change had accumulated in the Eastern bloc. 1989 marked an 
irreversible turning point in the trajectory of the Cold War’s end. The events 
that year occurred due to the sweeping changes to Soviet policy under 
Gorbachev, courageous action by dissidents and citizens, and amidst a 
collective breakdown of confidence and will among the hardline rulers of 
Eastern Europe’s captive nations, which was prompted by Gorbachev’s 
repeated insistence that they had to handle the challenge to single-party rule 
peacefully, and on their own.1096  The backdrop to all this was the fast 
improving state of East-West relations, which gave Shevardnadze and 
Gorbachev the reassurance they needed that the West was not about to 
exploit the turmoil or even fuel anti-Soviet sentiment. At the 19th Party 
Conference in June 1988 the Brezhnev doctrine was repudiated. Gorbachev 
told the assembled delegates, “the external imposition of a social system, of 
a way of life, or of policies by any means, let alone military, is a dangerous 
trapping of the past.”1097 The rapid improvement of US-Soviet relations gave 																																																								
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Gorbachev confidence that Washington would not undermine Moscow’s vital 
political-military interests in Eastern Europe. As a result, Gorbachev decided 
to embark on an enormous drawdown of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe, 
“to show that our political thinking is more than just words.”1098 
By 1988 Gorbachev fully embraced the notion that perestroika was an 
open-ended process, one that changed the rules of engagement in the 
USSR, but left outcomes open, subject to how the impact this generated in 
Soviet society. In 1988, whilst on holiday in Crimea, Gorbachev went on a 
walkabout in Sevastopol and was soon surrounded by a throng of citizens 
who harangued their leader – in the new spirit of glasnost – about the 
problems they were encountering in everyday life: food supply issues, 
housing, pensions. At some point, Gorbachev exclaimed:  
 
“What do you think I am, a tsar? Or Stalin? Do you expect me to travel 
everywhere doling things out? An apartment to you, a pension to him, 
a fair salary to her, establishing order in the factory for them. […] Elect 
those who deserve it, get rid of those who are worthless. And organize 
your lives as you see fit. This is the essence of perestroika. If you 
expect me to solve everything, and if you keep looking to Moscow for 
approval and help, then you’ve missed the point completely.”1099  
 
Gorbachev analysed the root of the problem later that year in a speech to 
the Politburo:  
 
“We have a tradition, a bad one spawned by the command-
administrative system, of the Party doing everyone’s work for them. I 
mean the great number of specific resolutions adopted by the 
Politburo. People have grown so accustomed to it that they think that 
unless there’s a Central Committee resolution, nothing can be done. 
There must be a resolution for every step, we determine and regulate 
everything at the highest Party level. We’ll have to put an end to 
this.”1100 
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The route of Gorbachev’s path – characterised by emergent, reform-
induced phenomena such as the apparat’s paralysis when it came to 
overhauling the command economy – brought him to a point where he 
deliberately wished to dismantle the central mechanisms of control that the 
Communist party had relied upon to rule the Soviet Union. That sparked 
internal resistance, which Gorbachev responded to with more wide-ranging 
political reforms, by introducing openness into Soviet politics. Ellman and 
Kontorovich report, “until the system started to fray in 1989, there was no 
trace of civil society or organised citizen politics.”1101 Once the goal of 
perestroika became self-rule and glasnost removed the lid of repression on 
the USSR, non-linearity began to dominate the process of change in the 
Soviet system. Policy inputs and policy outputs diverged as Gorbachev’s 
decisions successively abandoned the state’s instruments of political control. 
The Soviet leader still tried to respond to events, but was often held hostage 
by them, as 1989 was to demonstrate powerfully. 
 This was the year that the political changes in the Soviet Union 
generated a spill-over effect into other Warsaw Pact countries, where they 
were magnified and more transformative than at home. Efforts in Poland to 
set up roundtable negotiations for power sharing between the ruling 
Communists and the Solidarnosc trade union began in 1988. These talks 
were sanctioned by Soviet reformers, who viewed Solidarity as a constructive 
opposition party.1102 In the spring of 1989 the roundtable discussions led 
Poland to transition towards institutional pluralism and democratisation. 
Gorbachev viewed this as the exemplary model of change for Eastern 
Europe: Jaruzelski later reported, “Gorbachev saw the Polish experience as a 
laboratory and a useful example, not only for East Europe but also for the 
USSR itself.”1103 In June, against advice from the Politburo, Gorbachev gave a 
speech to the Council of Europe in Strasbourg in which he publicly rejected 
the Brezhnev Doctrine: “The political and social order in one country or 
another has changed in the past and can also change in the future. Still, it is 
exclusively up to the people themselves. It is their choice. All interference, 
whatever its nature, in the internal affairs of a state to limit its sovereignty of a 
state, even from a friend or ally, is inadmissible.”1104  																																																								
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1103 Ibid, 116 
1104 Ibid, 118  
 283 
Since this was the era of glasnost, Gorbachev’s remarks were 
published at home in Pravda. The Polish people took him at his word: the 
ruling Communists were routed in Poland’s first free elections. Gorbachev 
tolerated this outcome. In Hungary, the leader of the Communist party Karoly 
Grosz initially stalled reforms by warning of a negative reaction from Moscow, 
but when it failed to materialise, gave in to public pressure and passed 
legislation that created a new multi-party constitutional democracy. Grosz, 
when later asked why he did not resort to force to maintain the party’s 
monopoly, cited the fear of Western sanctions and the ‘head-on collision’ this 
would have produced with the ‘whole thrust of Soviet foreign policy.’1105 Imre 
Nagy, leader of the failed 1956 anti-Soviet uprising, was reburied in June, 
with 200,000 Hungarians paying tribute to him in a public ceremony. And 
over the summer, Hungary began to open its borders to Austria: the first 
crack in the Iron Curtain appeared.1106 This prompted protests from East 
Germany’s unreconstructed Communist government – to no avail. Events in 
Eastern Europe were now infecting all of the Warsaw Pact countries. In East 
Germany hundreds of thousands took to the streets from September to 
protest the regime. Gorbachev failed to back his East German counterpart 
Erich Honecker during a visit to celebrate the country’s 40th anniversary in 
October; a few weeks later, the Berlin Wall came down. 
The fall of the Berlin Wall proved the most potent symbol of 1989 and 
the collapse of the Iron Curtain. It signified a tectonic shift in the fate of the 
Soviet empire in Eastern Europe. This seismic event took place in a bottom-
up manner, unplanned and without direction from above – i.e. in a 
contingent, nonlinear fashion.1107 As Lévesque stresses, “the East German 
leadership never made a decision, as such, to open the Wall.”1108 An errant 
Politburo member misspoke at a press conference, implying that a recent 
resolution to permit trips abroad on request was to come into effect 
immediately. When huge crowds began to amass at checkpoints in East 
Berlin in anticipation of crossing over, military personnel on the ground 
opened the borders. Within days, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria experienced 
popular revolutions and peaceful power transitions. In Prague, hundreds of 
thousands of peaceful demonstrators filled Prague’s Wenceslas Square 																																																								
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during the revolution. In Romania, Ceausescu’s downfall occurred during a 
speech he gave from the balcony of the gargantuan People’s Palace the 
dictator had built: masses of listeners turned disorderly when he failed to 
announce reforms, prompting Ceausescu to flee by helicopter from the roof 
of the Palace. He and his wife were soon captured by Romanian troops, 
court-martialled, summarily sentenced to death and executed by an 
improvised firing squad. The wave of democratisation that swept across 
Eastern Europe was the end-process of a nonlinear political transformation: 
changes at the top of the Soviet Union since 1985 eventually made possible 
change from below in Eastern Europe1109. This phenomenon accelerated as 
Eastern Europe’s Communist elites collapsed upon realising the Soviets 
would not intervene in the process.  
Two characteristics of 1989 are remarkable: the pace of change – 
Vaclav Havel, elected President of Czechoslovakia in December 1989, was in 
jail as a dissident as late as January 1989 – and the impotence with which the 
leaders of the two superpowers observed events that swept across Eastern 
Europe. Shevardnadze, visiting Budapest in July 1989, asked Hungarian 
leaders to formally commit themselves not to leave the Warsaw Pact and join 
Western ‘integrative institutions’ without agreement from the USSR.1110 While 
Moscow accepted that the leading role of the Communist party in Eastern 
Europe was abandoned in 1989, Gorbachev did not mean for this to spell the 
end of the Warsaw Pact. But he was powerless to prevent this outcome. 
Once the Soviet Union began to show signs of impending collapse in the 
spring of 1991, the military alliance that held the Eastern bloc together for 
almost forty years was ignominiously dissolved by mutual agreement. 
Wohlforth and Davis correctly argue that “no old thinker advocated the use 
of force in 1989.”1111  But this does not, as they assert, undermine the 
counterfactual that German reunification would not have happened without 
Gorbachev: it was Gorbachev who took the option of repression off the 
table. Scowcroft, in a memo for Bush, made clear that German reunification 
could not go ahead if the Soviets opposed the process.1112 Moreover, it was 
Gorbachev who had succeeded in altering the political context to the point 
that the Soviet leadership would not consider military intervention. 																																																								
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Gorbachev’s policy path made the crucial difference to preventing a violent 
escalation and gave rise to the possibility of German reunification.  
Nonlinear change can be locally predictable, that is, certain 
consequences can be foreseen as likely to follow from certain decisions. In 
1988, some members of the Politburo warned Gorbachev that withdrawal 
from Eastern Europe would signify that the Soviet Union would no longer 
provide “fraternal assistance”, risking “undesirable consequences for the 
entire socialist commonwealth.”1113 Gorbachev chose to accept this risk. This 
prompted Marshal Akhromeyev to resign as Chairman of the General Staff. 
Viktor Kulikov, Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact since 1977 and 
Anatolii Gribkov, Akhromeyev’s deputy, publicly opposed the unilateral cuts 
of December 1988 and were promptly fired.  
 In 1990, Ligachev wrote Gorbachev a letter, warning that “the 
socialist community is falling apart and NATO is growing stronger” and 
predicting the “possible breakup of our federation.”1114 But in order to take 
military action to prevent the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe, 
Gorbachev had to be removed from office. A coup against him was only 
launched in August 1991 (eight months, incidentally, after Shevardnadze 
warned during his public resignation speech that ‘dark forces of 
totalitarianism’ were on the march in the Soviet Union). The plotters were 
disorganised and lacked both the competence and the support to see their 
initially successful deposition of Gorbachev through. Gorbachev had 
thoroughly purged the Soviet military in 1987: the Soviet leader seized the 
unexpected opportunity provided by German civilian pilot Mathias Rust’s 
landing on the Red Square, firing the largest number of Soviet military 
personnel at officer and general rank since the time of Stalin.1115 Gorbachev 
had used this entirely contingent incident to his advantage. According to 
Matlock, “he was looking for a way to do it [i.e. purge the military], and this 
gave him the excuse. […] I remember I was briefing our press, and people 
asked, ‘Does this show their air defences are weak?’ and I said ‘I don’t think 
so! Neither their nor our air defences are set up to shoot down Cessnas.’ I 
mean, come on, how can you consider that a military threat!”1116 The result of 
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this pruning of anti-Gorbachev opposition in the armed forces was to make 
the Soviet military compliant almost until the collapse of the USSR.1117   
Emergence shapes nonlinear transformations and creates openings for 
leaders to mould new structures. The unpredictability of complex change 
means that over time, policies that leaders consider part of their options are 
taken off the table by events on the ground. Dobrynin believes that as time 
went on, Gorbachev had to compensate for the declining prospects of 
success on the domestic reform front with breakthroughs in foreign policy: in 
effect, he was in a hurry to end the Cold War, with the consequence that 
“Gorbachev’s diplomacy often failed to win a better deal with the United 
States and its allies.’1118 The effects of timing on moving an emergent process 
into a particular direction can be observed by outsiders. Condoleezza Rice 
remembers that as the Bush Administration was discussing strategies to 
achieve German Reunification, a consensus existed that there was little need 
for proactive moves on the US part: “Things were going our way. East 
Germany was dissolving.”1119 On November 8, 1989 – the day before the fall 
of the Berlin Wall – George Bush recorded in his diary: 
 
“I keep hearing the critics saying we’re not doing enough on Eastern 
Europe; here the changes are dramatically coming our way, and if any 
one event – Poland, Hungary, or East Germany – had taken place, 
people would say, this is great. But it’s all moving fast – moving our 
way – and you’ve got a bunch of critics jumping around saying we 
ought to be doing more. […] And if we mishandle it, and get way out 
looking like [promoting dissent is] an American project, you would 
invite crackdown, and […] that could result in bloodshed.”1120 
 
In Bush’s case, a reactive approach was warranted: systemic trends 
seemed to point in the direction of his nation’s goals. The President 
benefited from the luck of timing, as his widely derided ‘pause’ in US-Soviet 
relations from January to April 1989 took place just as the collapse of Eastern 
Europe began.1121 The pause, however, was started out of political calculus, 																																																								
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not strategic acumen. Secretary Baker makes this plain: “It was extraordinarily 
important as a political matter that George Bush’s imprimatur be put upon 
the nation’s foreign policy. […] the reason we did the Pause was to make sure 
that Bush’s imprimatur was upon the nation’s foreign policy.”1122 Nothing 
concrete came of this strategic review of US foreign policy other than intra-
Administration frustrations, and the pause was quietly abandoned in the 
spring without any results. Bush, as Greene recounts, noted in a 1996 
interview, “We should have hit the ground running.” But according to 
Greene, “it is clear that the pauza [the Soviet term for ‘pause’] had reaped 
terrific benefits.” This was despite the fact that “many observers, then and 
now, saw [Bush’s] actions from 1989 to 1991 as non-actions; for their part, the 
conservative right was furious at what they perceived as Bush’s abandonment 
of the republics.” What Bush managed to do was manipulate the situation so 
that he could negotiate with Gorbachev from strength, “and in doing so he 
had won major concessions from the Soviets. Moreover, he had done so 
without compromising a good relationship with Gorbachev.”1123 Jervis agrees 
that Bush pursued a “policy of friendly gestures, little concrete assistance, 
and waiting to pick up the pieces of the crumbling Soviet empire.”1124 Bush 
helped bring about Gorbachev’s consent to German reunification using what 
Greene describes as “the full force of his personal diplomacy.”1125 The results 
of this were vividly on display in Washington, DC in May of 1990 when 
Gorbachev suddenly and to the surprise of all attendees of the summit 
meeting concurred with Bush’s tentative suggestion that all nations, including 
reunified Germany, ought to be free to choose which military alliances they 
wish to join. Bush based this diplomatic logic on the Helsinki Accords signed 
by Brezhnev and Ford, and managed to reach Gorbachev. Robert Gates, who 
witnessed the moment, believes that Gorbachev went beyond his brief in 
giving this response. He remembers the moment in detail: 
 
“Bush is laying out his belief that people ought to be able to choose 
the alliance that they belong to. And he sort of poses that to 
Gorbachev, as I recall it, as a question. And Gorbachev, there’s a logic 
to it, if you’re willing to pretend that you’re a democrat with a small 																																																								
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‘d’, and he says, ‘Yes.’ Which he did. I thought Akhromeyev was going 
to have an aneurysm. I mean, he was pale, he couldn’t believe what 
he’d just heard. […] Bush poses the question to him again, and he 
affirms it again. And the Soviet side was just in complete disarray.”1126 
 
This was the diplomatic breakthrough the Bush Administration had 
been hoping and waiting for.1127 It took place three years after Gorbachev 
told German Foreign Minister Richard Weizsäcker that unification might 
perhaps come in a century. 1128  In the intervening period, Gorbachev’s 
bargaining position, weakened in the face of the multiple complex 
conflagrations that emerged: the Baltic republics were threatening to break 
away from the Soviet Union, the economic picture was deteriorating, and the 
Communist party’s monopoly on power was slipping.1129 By contrast to the 
American side’s subtle and reactive response to nonlinear developments that 
were heading their way, Gorbachev had to be proactive to prevent the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. A change of course in 1989, once signs of a 
crisis in the Eastern bloc were imminent, was the last opportunity to stave off 
the loss of Eastern Europe. Gorbachev’s temporising mantra of ‘let processes 
unfold’ ended up paralysing the Soviet Union as it lost power.  
When nonlinear developments occur, “we have only limited ability to 
anticipate what will happen. Multiple policies must then be applied 
sequentially, and actors must be ready to alter their behavior to cope with 
unintended consequences and the novel strategies that others employ. 
Flexibility and resilience are necessary for effective action.”1130 By 1991, 
Gorbachev had effectively lost control over events. After the coup attempt in 
June 1991, the Ukrainian parliament set a date of December 1 for an 
independence referendum. Boris Yeltsin, taking advantage of weakening 
Soviet power by seeking and gaining more authority as President of Russia at 
Gorbachev’s expense, accepted the referendum, against the latter’s wishes. 																																																								
1126 Gates interview 
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When Yeltsin left for his summer holiday in August, Gorbachev failed in an 
attempt at a political comeback.1131 Gorbachev also proved unable to realise 
his goal of maintain the Soviet Union on a voluntary basis through a treaty 
agreement. Again, Bush’s strategic response was cautious, aware of where 
the wind was headed. The President refused Secretary of Defence Richard 
Cheney’s suggestion of recognising Ukraine before the referendum. Bush did 
not want to be seen encouraging the breakup of the USSR and contributing 
to potential bloodshed.1132 
By autumn, Gorbachev made the last major concessions of Soviet 
policy, out of necessity more than anything else, announcing a troop pullout 
from Cuba and ending aid to the Communist regime in Afghanistan. In 
return, he hoped for some kind of Marshall Plan-like support from the United 
States, to the tune of tens of billions of dollars. But the chaos had spread too 
far by then: it was not even clear whether such aid should flow to Gorbachev 
or Yeltsin (since the coup attempt, Bush felt obliged to telephone both of 
them regularly).1133 After Ukraine voted for independence on 1 December 
1991, Bush announced the US’ recognition of Ukraine, and Gorbachev’s goal 
to preserve the union was dealt a death blow. Only four weeks later, the 
Soviet Union was formally dissolved.  
 In this sudden yet unspectacular fashion, so characteristic of nonlinear 
change, the Cold War came to an end. Of course, nonlinear change can just 
as well be sudden and spectacular, as was the case on September 11. In both 
cases, abrupt shifts in the international system occurred as a consequence of 
multiple interaction chains of causation that could not be anticipated. 1134 As 
described by Gates, “Converging trends from above, below and outside 
produced an outcome Gorbachev neither desired nor anticipated and in the 
process transformed Europe.” 1135  The bipolar nuclear standoff that had 
defined the international system for almost fifty years ended without a shot 
when one of the parties imploded. This marked the Cold War’s complex end. 
The seeds of change had been planted by Gorbachev, wittingly and 
unwittingly, since 1985; emergence and his interactions at home and abroad 
shaped their growth, and once critical mass had been reached in 1989, 																																																								
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nonlinear change occurred rapidly. In the end, through a process conditioned 
by high-level leadership interactions (beginning but not ending with Reagan), 
Gorbachev’s policy choices, and fast-crumbling power structures in the Soviet 
bloc, the West finally succeeded in rolling back Communism, pushing the 
borders of Europe eastward by almost 1000 miles and liberating tens of 
millions of people. By the beginning of 1992, the Cold War had ended. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
No question has caused more disputes among both ancient and modern 
philosophers than the relations of cause and effect. 
David Hume 
 
 
Don’t let us forget that the causes of human actions are usually immeasurably 
more complex and varied than our subsequent explanations of them.  
Fyodor Dostoyevsky 
 
 
History is a novel whose author is the people. 
Alfred de Vigny 
 
 
 
 
 
How and why the Cold War ended 
 The end of the Cold War was driven by four key leaders: Ronald 
Reagan, George Shultz, Mikhail Gorbachev and George H. W. Bush. 
Together they steered US-Soviet relations into new territory, through an 
unscripted, iterative set of dynamic choices. Reagan came into office as a 
potential peacemaker, but it took the appointment of George Shultz for 
these instincts to take concrete shape. Prompted by Shultz, Reagan chose to 
transition his Soviet strategy from one of relentless confrontation to one that 
sought dialogue with the Kremlin. After Gorbachev became General 
Secretary in 1985, he decided to embark on a series of increasingly radical 
reforms of the Soviet system, both at home and abroad. In Reagan he found 
a willing partner to proceed with one leg of his plan: defusing Cold War 
tensions by pursuing radical nuclear arms reductions. The two leaders 
engaged in an interactive set of negotiations, channelled by their 
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idiosyncratic commitment to better relations, and shaped by their relative 
bargaining positions on issues such as SDI. Gorbachev had to make a 
number of biting concessions, indicative of both a compromising mind-set 
and the country’s worsening economic position. The Soviet leader conjoined 
his international efforts with domestic reform, seeking to harness 
accomplishments in foreign relations as a cudgel to drive the Soviet system 
toward deeper reform. But rather than recreating his foreign policy 
achievements at home, Gorbachev was met with entrenched resistance from 
Soviet elites and functionaries who benefited from the status quo. In 
response, Gorbachev opted to follow a path of ever more radical reform.  
When Reagan was replaced by Bush, the latter moved carefully so as 
not to signal to Gorbachev that the US sought to take advantage, if not 
foment, the USSR’s mounting problems. This helped reassure Gorbachev 
that, while economic reform had achieved little, and political reform made 
the Communist Party accountable to a dissatisfied Soviet citizenry, the US 
was not about to exploit this situation. The Soviet sphere of influence in 
Eastern Europe slipped away in 1989 after Gorbachev allowed the Warsaw 
Pact publics to depose Communist governments at the ballot box. This 
occurred in a rapid, non-linear succession of revolutions, underpinned and 
indeed encouraged by Gorbachev’s public disavowal of force as a means to 
keep the Eastern bloc intact. Bush’s cautious diplomacy throughout this time, 
and Gorbachev’s vision for a post-Cold War Europe, paved the way for the 
peaceful reunification of Germany in the Western camp. This brought the 
East-West standoff to an end.  
 
 
Idiosyncrasy looms large in IR, but only when the structural context permits it 
The end of the Cold War is best understood as the conclusion of a 
complex path of de-escalation that began with Reagan’s emergent desire to 
sit down and deal with a Soviet leader, combined with the appearance of 
Gorbachev on the scene. The trust generated by these two leaders through 
their interactions made unprecedented arms control successes possible. 
Looking from the post-Cold War era, Deudney and Ikenberry write, both 
Reagan and Gorbachev turned out to be anomalies.1136 They are a potent 
example of how interactive, will-powered foreign policy leadership can bring 																																																								
1136 Deudney and Ikenberry, 2011 
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about transformative international outcomes. In Reagan and Shultz’s case, 
they followed the path of diplomatic outreach resolutely in the face of 
substantial opposition from within their own government. Rozanne Ridgway 
recalls:  
  
“The internal burdens on the conduct of a nearly four-year dialogue by 
President Reagan and Secretary Shultz with the Soviet Union were 
enormous. There was a persistent and often debilitating effort to 
prevent contact, to remove substance from dialogue, to march in 
place or to block movement, to label those working on behalf of the 
president as everything from ‘wimps’ to ‘symps,’ to misrepresent 
intentions, to defeat presidential decisions.1137 
 
As for Gorbachev, it was his independent pursuit of far-reaching liberal-
minded reform that conditioned the path the Soviet Union took from 1985 
onwards. A feasible alternative, which did not correspond with Gorbachev’s 
temperament and sentiments, was a gradual shift into a post-Communist 
authoritarian system that maintained political control while moving towards a 
market-based economic system.  
 The external context mattered a great deal in setting the stage for the 
Reagan-Gorbachev interactions. Both Reagan and Gorbachev were able to 
infuse the international system with their idiosyncrasies because the 
weakening of one of the pillars of bipolarity provided an opening for leader-
driven change. Gorbachev pursued reform in response to an internal crisis of 
stagnation the Soviet Union had been experiencing since the 1970s. The 
fundamental forces that produced the situation in which Soviet hegemony 
was under threat are reasonably well-understood from the point of view of 
parsimonious, structural theories of state behaviour in IR. No analysis can 
foresee the outcomes that structural pressures produce. The Soviet Union 
was stable in 1985 and rivalled the United States in its global reach. At the 
very least, it was a military superpower, albeit one with worsening prospects. 
What structural theories assume is that an underlying cause like stagnation 
produces an outcome such as retrenchment in the international system 
(though they did not predict this when it came to the Soviet Union). But the 
catalysts that move events from underlying cause to outcome are manifold, 																																																								
1137 Ridgway, 124 
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and conditional. They include the leaders of the day and their policy 
preferences, the teams they surround themselves with, and bottom-up 
pressures exerted by complex modern societies. In the 1980s, all these 
factors interacted with each other in contingent ways, and their combination 
generated the actual outcome of peaceful retrenchment. Other outcomes 
were perfectly possible. 
 The ultimate aim of this study is to provide what Chernoff calls ‘better 
explanations’ of IR: an enhanced ability to understand how causal factors 
connect with each other to produce effects.1138 Complexity theory helps us 
make better sense of interactive causation. I argue that it provides a clearer, 
sharper base from which to study IR than theories relying on linear, additive 
causation, where outcomes are direct derivatives of inputs. Complex 
outcomes are formed through interactive patterns of causality, something 
that counterfactual analysis can bring to fore. Emergence, interaction and 
nonlinearity are key descriptors of the international system, providing insights 
into how world politics unfolds. The downside of the complexity paradigm I 
rely on is that its examination of continuous interaction effects between the 
various elements under study – leaders, structures, contingencies – produces 
a correspondingly dense analysis; it does not lead to neat and simple 
research results. Complexity theory comes with its own pitfalls, and is thus 
best seen as a complementary approach to IR. 
 
 
Concluding reflections: the role of leadership in IR 
In January 1989, Erich Honecker declared that the Berlin Wall might 
survive for a hundred years if the grounds for its existence were not 
removed. 1139  Similarly, neorealist models of IR treated the international 
system as stable, and saw bipolarity as an almost fixed feature of world 
politics. The influence of leaders such as Gorbachev and Reagan brought 
about a ‘fat tail’ event in the form of far-reaching, peaceful systemic change. 
As part of this, Gorbachev took arguably ‘irrational’ decisions that ended up 
destroying the Soviet Union. This was not a case of a leader acting suicidally, 
but of a leader being overwhelmed by the unintended consequences of his 
actions. Reagan, too, took decisions in the field of nuclear arms reduction 
																																																								
1138 Chernoff (2014) 
1139 Garton Ash (1993), 365 
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that, in strict neorealist terms, made the US more vulnerable; in his case the 
effects of his decisions were the ones he hoped for.  
The interactive links between leadership and other causal dynamics in 
IR are not well-understood. However, leaders in IR should not be studied 
isolation, and this thesis’ focus on leadership is not to be taken as an 
argument that agency is its own determinant. Looking separately at the 
constituent parts of a system’s interconnections does not enable us 
understand the output of the interaction. Moreover, leadership is not a clear-
cut ‘variable’ in IR: the link between intent and result in international 
relations, for instance, is extremely tenuous, as the case of Gorbachev shows. 
The riddle of agency in IR has to do with the activity of leading, balanced 
against the structural position of the leaders in question.  
Nonetheless, leadership is a promising avenue of inquiry for IR. 
Because the international system is complex, it exhibits self-defining 
qualities, and leaders are in a privileged position to contribute to these. The 
end of the Cold War is fundamentally a story of diplomacy as a means of 
generating trust to overcome entrenched animosity. But agents’ causal force 
is far from limitless. More research needs to be done on the importance vs. 
the impotence of leadership in IR. And more research needs to be done to 
understand how leaders position their preferences in a complex international 
arena. Why did Richard Cheney strongly reject the goal of regime change 
during the Gulf War in 1991, only to endorse a diametrically opposite 
position in 2003? Was it the changed structural context, or did idiosyncratic 
factors drive his new policy preference? How did his views interact with those 
of other policymakers around him, and international events? Such questions 
are ripe for analysis using the framework of complexity theory in IR.  
The end of the Cold War is a powerful illustration of how dynamic, 
open-ended processes of complex change can remake the international 
system. The collapse of the Soviet Union was a ground-breaking event. As 
Zelikow points out, “throughout human history changes of this scale have 
happened only as the corollary of bloodily catastrophic war.”1140 But care 
needs to be taken always when studying such episodes: the most 
consequential and dramatic events in social science are the most complex 
and thus the hardest to extract lessons from.1141 Still, certain theoretical 
																																																								
1140 Zelikow (2014), viii   
1141 Schweller and Wohlforth (2000), 63 
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conclusions can be reached from such investigations. Brooks and Wohlforth 
assert that their basic finding is “decline, the perception of decline, new 
ideas and new politics were closely related” in the 1980s.1142 What this thesis 
has tried to show is that it was the contingent, non-linear interrelationship of 
these developments that defined the end of the Cold War. The study of such 
complex inter-linkages, aided by counterfactual thinking, will hopefully 
provide the basis for many more causal investigations in IR.  
																																																								
1142 Brooks and Wohlforth (2000), 51 
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